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Introduction
Núria Almiron and Jordi Xifra
Climate change is thought to be the greatest environmental threat humanity 
has ever faced. Whether this is true or not, all signs indicate that it poses a major 
challenge to human-centered ideology and lifestyle. Despite the fact that the 
planet’s climate has changed constantly since the dawn of time, climate scien-
tists overwhelmingly agree that the current period of warming is more rapid, 
is human-induced, and has serious implications for the stability of the planet’s 
climate. Nevertheless, after almost forty years of discussion, the main political 
outcome has been inaction – i.e. the absence of effective reaction by humans 
to mitigate or stop contributing to global warming. Even without evidence 
for climate change, the mass pollution produced by humans on Earth – and 
its noticeable effects on nature, other animals, and humans – should be reason 
enough to trigger a radical shift in our habits and activities. However, this is 
hardly the term that can be used to describe actions that have been taken to 
address global warming, and environmental pollution in general. In fact, the 
only real radical shift has been at the level of rhetoric.
It is well known that the main barrier to action on environmental issues is a 
combination of vested (political and economic) interests and human reluctance 
to change habits. Obstacles to addressing human pollution of the Earth have 
actually been so successful that a rhetoric of adaptation has emerged in place 
of mitigation. While mitigation addresses the root causes of climate change and 
focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and stopping the destruction 
of carbon storages (like rainforests), adaptation merely seeks to lower the risks 
posed by the consequences of climatic changes, without addressing the causes 
of the problem. Overall, the failure of mitigation rhetoric and the rise in the 
adaptive form represent a major success not in the realms of science, politics, or 
economics, but rather in that of communication. In this respect, climate inac-
tion cannot be properly understood without examining the role that public 
relations, and more specifically strategic communication by interest groups, has 
had in promoting the ideology of denial.
The role played by interest groups in creating a climate change denial rheto-
ric has been widely examined in the United States, revealing a so-called denial 
machine organized by the U.S. right-wing countermovement and made up of 
big corporations, conservative think tanks, contrarian scientists, and Republi-
can politicians (e.g. Boykoff, 2016; Brulle, 2014; Dunlap & McCright, 2015; 
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Jacques, 2006; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; McCrigth, 2016; McCrigth & 
Dunlap, 2010). This research has defined the worldview behind the denial 
countermovement as a mixture of Enlightenment-liberal and conservative-core 
values, including a commitment to limited government, devotion to private 
property rights, an emphasis on individualism, support for the status quo, faith 
in science and technology, support for economic growth, and faith in future 
abundance. Largely, this exploration has shown that climate change denial, and 
climate inaction as its main consequence, is also a political issue.
The aforementioned research has not only been very relevant from a political 
sciences perspective but also raised questions that may be deemed essential to a 
better understanding of the phenomenon of climate change denial and climate 
inaction. Prominent among these are questions related to the role of commu-
nication. Climate Change Denial and Public Relations: Strategic Communication and 
Interest Groups in Climate Inaction aims to specifically address those questions. 
That is, it examines the strategic communication adopted by the main actors 
involved in the public relations effort behind climate change denial. Thus, the 
main goal of this book is twofold. First, to provide an in-depth analysis of how 
strategic communication by interest groups (mostly corporate lobbies, advo-
cacy groups, and think tanks) is contributing to climate inaction. And second, 
to do this from a multidisciplinary perspective that expands the usual approach 
of climate change denialism and also introduces a critical reflection on the 
roots of the problem, including the ethics of the denialist ideology and also the 
rhetoric and role of climate change advocacy.
The anthropogenic causes of climate change are explained not only by 
particular human activities driven by politics and economics but also by the 
human-centric ideology we adopt when interacting with the planet, which 
of course shapes politics and economics but is also promoted culturally and 
socially, and thus communicatively. If we are to increase our understanding of 
climate inaction, then it is crucial to adopt a critical perspective to discuss this 
set of ideas, in combination with the role of public relations and, more specifi-
cally, the strategic communication of interest groups. This book attempts to 
achieve this by taking as a starting point the fact that climate inaction is not 
only a political problem but fundamentally an ethical and communicative issue.
Approaches to climate change denial have usually been restricted to the 
general causes and consequences of anthropogenic global warming; that is, 
to analyses mainly focused on the denial of climate change, the denial of its 
anthropogenic causes, and/or the denial of its seriousness as a problem. Only 
rarely has specific attention been paid to the ideological roots of denial. However, 
as IPCC reports repeatedly stress, our capacity to mitigate climate change is 
strongly influenced by the livelihoods, lifestyles, behavior, and culture that lie 
behind individual consumption patterns and corporate decisions. For this rea-
son, a critical reflection on the anthropocentric ideology behind climate change 
denial is a compulsory task when addressing its communication. Although 
researchers have already connected the prevailing political ideology and climate 
change denial, a focus on the anthropocentric roots of ideology has not been 
explored in any depth in relation to public relations and climate change denial.
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To this end, a multidisciplinary group of experts have contributed to this 
book, including researchers from the fields of public affairs, public relations, 
and media and communication studies, but also ethics, philosophy, sociology, 
technology, and political sciences, as well as advocacy and lobby practitioners.1 
Their work is presented in four separate parts.
Part I constitutes an ethical and historical reflection on the ideology behind 
the anthropogenic causes of climate change, denialism, and public relations. 
The main ideas presented in this first part provide the theoretical background 
of the volume. The first chapter, by Núria Almiron, discusses the concept of 
ideological denial – this author’s views on the speciesist anthropocentric ideol-
ogy spread by the strategic communication of both the top pollution lobbies 
and the climate advocates. Jordi Xifra addresses the anthropocentric roots of 
public relations with a historical and ontological reflection that draws a parallel 
between the creation of the Anthropocene and the anthropocentric roots of 
public relations-like activities in Prehistory. Lisa Kemmerer provides an over-
view of ecofeminist theories and how they contribute to critically deconstruct 
the ideology behind environmental destruction and climate inaction, and to 
understand the discourse and narratives involved in climate advocacy. Catia 
Faria and Eze Paez argue that the damage caused by climate change and the 
strength of our reasons to oppose it can only be assessed considering the inter-
ests of both humans and nonhumans – whereas lobbies and climate advocates 
mostly prioritize human interests. Finally, Karin Kuhlemann addresses the 
human population issue behind climate change, tracing the origins of this taboo 
to the most often cited arguments for nonengagement with population growth 
by interest groups.
Part II scrutinizes how the narrative of climate change denial is constructed, 
theorizing on the particular creation of narratives by knowledge-interest net-
works influencing media, the public opinion, and the political sphere. Miquel 
Rodrigo-Alsina starts this part by analyzing the general power of narratives 
in constructing interpretative frameworks that legitimize the stories about cli-
mate change spread by interest groups and strongly influence media and public 
opinion. Maxwell Boykoff and Justin Farrell focus on analyses of contrar-
ian voices to unveil the political economy of contrarian messages and connect 
these considerations with social networks of climate contrarianism and climate 
countermovement activities. Dieter Plehwe delves further into the study of 
the knowledge-interest nexus by providing an analysis of the expertise-interest 
nexus and the expertise-lobbying behind climate change denial.
Part III addresses particular examples of lobbying for denial in climate 
change issues, including the associated meat taboo and nuclear denial. The 
selected examples correlate with the theoretical approach provided in the first 
part and therefore go far beyond the strict definition of climate change denial 
to encompass the taboos and myths embedded in the wider concept of ideologi-
cal denial. Lucy Michaels and Katharine Ainger offer an overview of the 
public relations companies working with climate change deniers and their lob-
bying strategies, referred to by the authors as “the climate smokescreen”. Their 
chapter draws on research conducted by the Corporate Europe Observatory 
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in 2015. Vasile Stanescu discusses the meat industry’s role in global warm-
ing and argues that there is a meat taboo, called here meat-eating denial, which 
is supported by economic interests and their lobbies and fuels climate inac-
tion. Núria Almiron, Natalia Khozyainova, and Lluís Freixes argue for 
the existence of a technological myth in the climate change denial discourse 
related to the nuclear renaissance; that is, the public relations campaign promoting 
nuclear energy as a solution to global warming.
Finally, Part IV includes two chapters on advocacy against climate change 
denial, including their online strategies, as well as a critical analysis of advo-
cacy against climate change denial using the complex systems approach. While 
Part III connects theory to practice in the main field of lobbying for denial, 
this part offers a practical approach to climate change advocacy to fight against 
climate inaction. First, Luis E. Hestres chronicles Internet-mediated efforts 
by U.S. climate and environmental advocates to take on denialist campaigns 
that seek to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change. Then, Ana 
Fernández-Aballí reviews the theory, ethical underpinnings, and methodo-
logical configuration of currents of thought, fields, and movements, developed 
both in the Global South and in the Global North, to understand their influ-
ence and potentiality in climate change advocacy.
To conclude, the overall aim of this book is to provide tools to help fight the 
climate change denial machine in Western democracies, which has been reinvig-
orated with the rise of neoliberal populism across the world mostly inspired by 
Trumpism (the policies advocated by Donald Trump in the U.S.). In respect 
of this, the book attempts to (i) raise awareness regarding obstacles preventing 
democracies from reacting to environmental issues, (ii) expand our understand-
ing of interest groups in general, and (iii) provide an ethical reflection on the 
ideological roots and role of strategic communication regarding climate change 
in current capitalism. In this way, Climate Change Denial and Public Relations: 
Strategic Communication and Interest Groups in Climate Inaction is a contribution 
to critical public relations that blends an expanded view of climate change 
denial with interest group theory and practice. It is the editors’ hope that it is of 
interest to a wide range of readers, including the following: critical media and 
communication scholars in general and critical public relations and strategic 
communication scholars in particular; multidisciplinary scholars interested in 
the critique of anthropocentrism (environmental ethics, environmental phi-
losophy, animal ethics, ecofeminism, non-speciesist ethics, etc.); climate politics 
and political ecology scholars; environmental scholars, including environmen-
tal communication researchers; undergraduate and graduate students of public 
relations, strategic communication, public affairs, advocacy, media, communica-
tion, and environmental studies; policy makers, lobbyists, and journalists; and 
climate change advocates.
The editors would like to thank all of the authors for their seminal con-
tributions and Routledge’s Taylor & Francis group for allowing the updated 
publication of a paper previously published in one of its journals. We also wish 
to thank the editor of this series, Kevin Moloney, and our editor at Routledge, 
Jacqueline Curthoys, for all their support and help.
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Note
 1 A number of the chapters in this volume (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 13) reflect the questions 
addressed in the project THINKClima (climate change, denialism, and advocacy commu-
nication; discourse and strategies of think tanks in Europe), discussed within two panels 
organized by this project: “Lobbying for Inaction: Climate Change, Denial and Interest 
Groups”, held on July 3, 2017, within the Barcelona International Critical PR Confer-
ence #7, and “Climate Change Denial and Think Tanks: EU vs U.S.”, held on March 7, 
2018, in the Faculty of Communication of Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. The 
THINKClima project is funded by the Spanish State Research Agency (Agencia Estatal 
de Investigación, AEI) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under 
grant CSO2016–78421-R.
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climate change denial  
and public relations

1  Rethinking the ethical challenge 
in climate change lobbying
A discussion of ideological denial1
Núria Almiron
A battle of ideas
Climate change denial can be roughly defined as the stance that advocates 
against the evidence posited for human-induced global warming. This stance 
has become such a powerful and organized force in the United States that 
it has been labeled a denial machine – a public relations engine made up of a 
“loose coalition of industrial (especially fossil fuels) interests and conservative 
foundations and think tanks that utilize a range of front groups and Astroturf 
operations, often assisted by a small number of ‘contrarian scientists’ ”, who are 
“greatly aided by conservative media and politicians . . . and more recently by a 
bevy of skeptical bloggers” (Dunlap, 2013, p. 692).
The climate change denial machine has been accurately compared with the 
denial campaign launched by the tobacco industry in the mid-20th century 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2011). However, the outcome and impact of the climate 
change denial effort are bigger and go beyond the United States. This is so 
because of the higher degree of globalization of capitalist interests in place since 
the late 20th century, when the climate change denial machine was created, 
making it easier for transnational interests to interact and cooperate with each 
other and even build international coalitions of interest groups. In the EU, for 
instance, where denial forces are relevant but do not reach the magnitude of a 
denial machine, policies for climate mitigation recurrently encounter obstacles 
posed by industries that, either aligned or in competition with their U.S. coun-
terparts, share with the U.S. industrial sectors the same reluctance towards and 
fear of change (mainly when change is not driven for profit). In this regard, the 
success of the billionaire public relations effort launched by what in the United 
States has also been called the denial countermovement (Dunlap & McCright, 
2015) has not escaped anyone’s attention, particularly with Donald Trump’s 
arrival in the U.S. presidency, which meant the virtual incorporation of the 
denial machine into the very heart of the U.S. administration (Sidahmed, 2016).
Both the political economy and narrative of climate change denial have been 
uncovered in recent decades thanks to the work of a number of scholars, experts, 
and journalists. Despite their work being solely U.S.-focused, this literature is 
very useful for understanding not only the U.S. denial countermovement but 
climate change denial as a global trend. Overall, there is a large consensus among 
critical investigators and scholars that this is mostly an ideological battle, i.e. that 
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climate change skepticism and inaction are not about science but political ideas, 
and specifically the ideas that conform our worldview. The Weltanschauung 
behind the denial countermovement is a mixture of Enlightenment-liberal and 
conservative-core values that has become a very convenient dominant social 
paradigm for the elites – including commitment to limited government, devo-
tion to private property rights, emphasis on individualism, support for the status 
quo, faith in science and technology (when it is convenient to short-term capi-
talistic interests), support for economic growth, and faith in future abundance 
( Jacques, 2006, 2012). Thus, among critical thinkers it is widely acknowledged 
that the denial machine was constructed first and foremost to protect “busi-
ness as usual” in the industrial and financial capitalist system; or in other words, 
to protect capitalistic profit (Farrell, 2015; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; 
Layzer, 2007; McCright, Marquart-Pyatt, Shwom, Brechin, & Allen, 2016).
At the same time, looking at the core ideology of the denial machine as it is 
deployed in the U.S., but with followers elsewhere, including the EU,2 is useful 
for understanding not only denial but also the inaction and/or ineffectiveness 
of defenders of anthropogenic climate change. This is so because of what an 
expanded discussion of the ideas promoting climate change denial reveals. This 
chapter attempts to introduce such a discussion.
To this end, in this chapter I will first look at what climate change denial is 
by examining the different conceptual approaches used to scrutinize this mas-
sive public relations campaign. Following this, I will summarize alternatives 
for addressing the issue advocated by defenders of the anthropogenic-roots of 
climate change; that is, the main solutions lobbied by climate advocates. My aim 
here is to point out that, in spite of the opposing stances adopted by climate 
change advocates and denialists, they all share what I call a major ideological 
denial, the refusal to accept that some ideas are systematically kept out of the 
discussion. Finally, I will introduce these underdiscussed ideas, which are not 
new but reflect a sort of historical taboo and are directly related to the human-
supremacist lens that permeates the arguments of both climate change denialists 
and advocates. However, the ultimate goal of this chapter is not to equate cli-
mate change denial with climate change advocacy in any way, but to encourage 
a more honest and effective discussion regarding our values and worldviews.
Climate change denial: main approaches
There is a debate over which term is most appropriate for labeling the oppo-
sition to acknowledging the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic global 
warming (AGW). North American scholars have mostly led the debate, because 
the United States has larger and more powerful organizations lobbying against 
restrictions on carbon emissions. Some have suggested that the different terms 
should be viewed on a continuum representing different degrees of rejection, 
some individuals and organizations only holding a skeptical view on some 
aspects of climate change and others “in complete denial mode” (Dunlap, 2013).
This debate is particularly obscured by the fact that there are three different 
sources and fields of usage for the terms: The public opinion field, the scholarly 
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or academic level, and the advocacy arena. In public debate (media, everyday 
conversation, etc.), climate change skepticism, climate change denialism, and climate 
change contrarianism are often used with the same meaning. They are all applied 
to denial of, dismissal of, or unwarranted doubt regarding the scientific consen-
sus on the rate and extent of global warming and its link to human behavior. 
However, scholars have tried to differentiate these concepts to better under-
stand the phenomenon. At the same time, what advocates call themselves has 
also influenced the public and scholarly spheres, and not usually for the sake of 
clarity. The entanglement of these three sources and usages is beyond the scope 
of this conceptual clarification. Here I will only try to clarify the main current 
understandings of each term regardless of their historical background.
Thus, semantically the concepts of skepticism and denialism reflect a different 
degree of rejection, yet definitions provided for them do not always help to 
comprehend the differences. Similarly, both terms have weak points that allow 
for criticism when they are used. For these reasons, other words have also been 
used in the search for a better way of understanding opposition to scientific 
consensus on the anthropogenic causes of global warming. The most relevant 
terms in this respect have been contrarians and climatic countermovement.
Skepticism
Skepticism is probably the most controversial term. While those actively involved 
in challenging climate science commonly prefer to describe themselves as skep-
tics, for some authors this is “allowing denials to cloak themselves in the mantle 
of science even as they deny critical parts of climate science” (Powell, 2011). 
Skepticism has played an important role in science, and these climate skeptics 
clearly do not comply with common standards of scientific skepticism, since 
they persistently deny evidence.
For Peter J. Jacques, the term skepticism is also inappropriate because the 
“skepticism in environmental skepticism is asymmetrical” since while “skeptics 
cast doubt on ecological science, they have an abiding faith in industrial science 
and technology, free enterprise, and those great institutions of Western Enlight-
enment” ( Jacques, 2012, p. 9).
Critical authors have used this term abundantly, however. The literature 
identifies four key dimensions of climate change skepticism (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2000; Rahmstorf, 2004; McCrigth, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013): Trend skep-
ticism (believing that the Earth is not warming, and climate change is not hap-
pening); attribution skepticism (believing that human activities are not causing 
climate change); impact skepticism (believing that climate change will not have 
significant negative impacts); and consensus skepticism (believing that there is no 
strong scientific agreement on the reality and human cause of climate change).
Jacques et al. (2008) stated that the term skeptic is most commonly invoked 
to describe someone who (a) denies the seriousness of an environmental prob-
lem, (b) dismisses scientific evidence showing the problem, (c) questions the 
importance and wisdom of regulatory policies to address them, and (d) consid-
ers environmental protection and progress to be competing goals (p. 354). Yet 
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this could perfectly fit with a description of denialism like the one produced by 
Norgaard (2006, following Cohen), which includes three dimensions as they 
relate to environmental issues: Literal (sheer refusal to accept evidence), interpre-
tative (denial based on interpretation of evidence), and implicatory (denial based 
on the change/response that acceptance would necessitate).
Capstick and Pidgeon (2014) attempted to clarify the term in relation to 
how members of the public use it. They argued that a distinction should be 
made between two main types of skepticism among the general public: Epistemic 
skepticism, relating to doubts about the status of climate change as a scientific 
and physical phenomenon; and response skepticism, relating to doubts about the 
efficacy of action taken to address climate change. The latter, according to these 
authors, is more strongly associated with a lack of concern about climate change.
Denialism
Denialism is the term preferred by the strongest critics of the phenomenon, 
such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and critical scholars, to refer 
to those organizations that have attempted to undermine and obstruct the sci-
entific consensus around climate change or policy solutions to climate change, 
against the recommendations of the scientific community that countries must 
act urgently to reduce carbon pollution (e.g. Greenpeace, 2013). As mentioned 
in the introduction, Dunlap (2013) has described the “denial machine” as a coa-
lition of interests made up of conservative think tanks, front groups established 
by the fossil fuels industry, contrarian scientists, conservative politicians, and 
conservative media ( joined by bloggers since the mid-2000s).
Denialism as a term has been criticized for several reasons. First, because the 
use of denialism alone erases the important differences that someone with doubts 
may hold compared to someone in complete denial mode. Yet the concept of 
denialism can also reflect these nuances. For instance, French analyst Stéphane 
Foucard (2010) divided denialists into the following different progressive kinds 
(which closely resemble the dimensions of skepticism mentioned earlier):
1 Someone who denies the existence of climate change as a whole
2 Someone who denies the anthropogenic causes of climate change (but 
does accept that climate change is real)
3 Someone who denies that climate change is a serious problem (but does 
accept that climate change is real and has anthropogenic causes)
4 Someone who denies climate change is a challenge (but does accept that 
climate change is real, as well as its anthropogenic causes and its seriousness, 
believing that technology will fix it)
Foucard’s classification is actually similar to the anatomy of denial described 
by Powell (2011), although the latter closes the circle. Powell’s anatomy tracks 
how global warming deniers have thrown up a succession of claims falling back 
from one line of defense to the next as scientists refute each one in turn. In 
The Inquisition of Climate Science, Powell ascribed the following phrases to these 
successive claims (2011, p. 172):
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The earth is not warming.
All right, it is warming but the Sun is the cause.
Well then, humans are the cause, but it doesn’t matter, because warming 
will do no harm. More carbon dioxide will actually be beneficial.  
More crops will grow.
Admittedly, global warming could turn out to be harmful, but we can do 
nothing about it.
Sure, we could do something about global warming, but the cost would 
be too great. We have more pressing problems here and now, like 
AIDS and poverty.
We might be able to afford to do something to address global warming 
someday, but we need to wait for sound science, new technologies,  
and geoengineering.
The earth is not warming. Global warming ended in 1998; it was never  
a crisis.
The term denial has also been criticized by some due to its inclusion of an 
unnecessary and inappropriate implicit link to other denial movements. In this 
respect, Jacques elaborated on the appropriateness of the denial label by review-
ing its major use, Holocaust denial. According to said author, it follows from 
this analysis that climate change denial is a label consistent with Lang’s “General 
Theory of Historical Denial” (Lang, 2010). Although the term denial may sug-
gest that we are comparing climate change rejection with a human holocaust, 
which might be deemed insensitive and inappropriate, the Holocaust theory 
reveals that denial does not point just to this comparison but to a whole genre, 
a common historiographic category that fully applies to climate change denial: 
“Climate change and the Holocaust are not equivalent, but that does not mean 
there is no climate [change] denial” ( Jacques, 2012, p. 10). In the same text, 
however, Jacques also notes that the term denial promotes the oversimplification 
of far more complex issues by suggesting a false binary position of acknowledg-
ment versus denial.
Contrarianism
Contrarianism is another term used to refer to those who oppose fighting against 
anthropogenic global warming. This term is not new at all. The first scholar to 
use it was probably Myanna Lahsen in 1999, when referring to the most out-
spoken leaders of climate rejection. Later, McCright (2007) defined contrar-
ians as those who “proclaim their strong and vocal dissent from this growing 
consensus by criticizing mainstream climate science in general and pre-eminent 
climate scientists more specifically, often with considerable financial support 
from fossil fuels industry organizations and conservative think tanks” (p. 201).
O’Neill and Boykoff (2010) and Boykoff (2013) have further developed the 
definition of climate contrarianism by disaggregating claims-making to include 
motives behind critiques of climate science and exclude individuals who are 
thus far unconvinced by the science or individuals who are unconvinced by 
proposed solutions.
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For Jacques, however, the word contrarian also has problems because, first, 
scientists rejecting climate change science hold a more populist position than 
the word contrarians may suggest, and, second, the word contrarian has a “flavor of 
heroic daring, a David versus Goliath connotation for debunking myths from a 
repressive mainstream through courage and intelligence”, which in no way fits 
with the reality of those rejecting climate change science ( Jacques, 2012, p. 10).
Climate countermovement organizations
The latest label used by some scholars to group climate skeptic, denialist, 
and contrarian organizations is climate countermovement organizations – Jacques 
reminds us that the proper name should be “right-wing counter-movement” 
( Jacques, 2012, p. 9). Under this term, Boykoff and Olson (2013) include those 
organizations that advocate against government policies to take substantive 
action to mitigate climate change. According to these authors, this movement 
particularly opposes mandatory restrictions on GHG emissions, through either 
regulation or a carbon fee.
Brulle (2014) included a number of conservative think tanks, trade asso-
ciations, and advocacy organizations under the countermovement umbrella 
that have not only played a major role in confounding public understand-
ing of climate science, but also successfully delayed meaningful government 
policy actions to address the issue. Said author explains that this is an efficacious 
approach to defining this movement because it forces us to view it as a cul-
tural contestation between a social movement advocating restriction on carbon 
emissions and a countermovement opposed to such action. Quoting Meyer 
and Staggenbord (1996), Brulle recalls that countermovements have histori-
cally been those organizations opposed to the objectives of social movements. 
Countermovements are networks of individuals and organizations that share 
many of the same objects of concern with the social movements they oppose. 
They make competing claims on matters of policy and vie for attention from 
the mass media and the broader public. As noted by Gale (1986), countermove-
ments typically represent economic interests directly challenged by the emer-
gent social movement.
In his computerized discourse analysis of the U.S. climate change coun-
termovement, Farrell (2015, 2016) includes under this concept organizations 
overtly (i) spreading uncertainty about climate change arguments, (ii) opposing 
mitigation of carbon emissions, and (iii) disseminating information contrary to 
scientific consensus on the climate change issue.
A summary
The aforementioned approaches have very successfully contributed to unveil-
ing the organized rejection of climate change science – mostly in the United 
States but also its impact and intertwinement with other international actors. In 
his analysis of the anti-reflexivity theory in the U.S. general public, McCright 
(2016) combined their use in a way that shows how they complement one 
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another. This author summarized these different approaches by suggesting that 
climate change denial countermovement refers to the collective force defending the 
industrial capitalist system; climate change denial refers to the individuals and 
organizations in the organized countermovement challenging the reality and 
seriousness of anthropogenic climate change; climate change skepticism refers to 
the members of the general public who do not believe scientific claims about 
climate change but who otherwise are not likely to be actively involved in the 
climate change denial countermovement; and skepticism in general refers to 
“rejecting the science”, “denial”, “skepticism”, “contrarianism”, or “naysaying” 
(p. 78). In his paper, McCright acknowledged that employing skepticism in this 
way is inconsistent with how philosophers and sociologists of science have his-
torically used the term. However, as social scientists who study climate change 
lack a more accurate term somewhere between skepticism and denial, this author 
uses the former for the general public who simply report views opposed to the 
scientific community and reserves the latter for those individuals and organi-
zations who actively challenge the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic 
climate change in an organized way.
Of course, it would be too simplistic to consider the U.S. denial campaigners 
as solely to blame for our global incapacity to mitigate climate change – even 
if the U.S. public relations effort can largely explain why it is one of the two 
major contributors to global warming on the planet (the other being China, 
which is not a democracy). In this respect, the literature has produced different 
explanations as to why climate change denial and inaction happen at the socio-
logical and psychological level. Norgaard (2011), for instance, summarized the 
most important answers into three types: Information deficit theory (a lack of 
access to information, a lack of understanding and manipulation of information 
by the elites); psychological inconsistency theory (cognitive dissonance, efficacy, 
and helping behavior, that is, knowing but not wanting to know or acting in 
opposition to what we know we should do); and rebuttal of the theory of post-
materialism (insofar as the results challenge the idea that modernization and 
wealth promote greater environmental concern among citizens).
However, it is worth remembering that the main concepts we use to refer 
to the phenomenon clearly show the success of the elites’ attempts to manipu-
late public perceptions regarding climate change. The key terms used to refer 
to the current climate situation are by no means accidental. The most widely 
used concept currently, namely climate change, was actually chosen to promote 
inaction. It is well known today that the concept of climate change was cre-
ated in 2003 by an advisor to the Bush administration, Frank Luntz, who 
suggested using the expression to replace global warming since climate change 
was “less frightening” – climate has nicer connotations and change, as Lakoff 
recalls, “[leaves] out any human cause of the change” (2010, p. 71). Later, under 
the Trump administration in 2017, it was revealed that the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) was told to avoid using the term climate change in 
its work, officials being instructed to reference “weather extremes” alongside 
other new expressions again aimed at leaving out the human-driven cause 
(Milman, 2017).
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Overall, an overview of climate change denial reveals how rejection of the 
anthropogenic causes of climate change and its seriousness is led by a coalition 
of interest groups, mostly think tanks, on behalf of capitalistic interests. More 
specifically, research shows that while climate change denial has become a par-
ticularly institutionalized countermovement in the U.S., where environmental 
advocates and climate scientists have been most aggressively contested (Brulle, 
2014; Dunlap & McCright, 2015; Jacques et al., 2008), inaction has been the 
common trait of all industrialized Western economies in what Norgaard has 
called the “social organization of denial”, a “collective distancing from disturb-
ing information” (2011, p. 374).
Climate change advocacy: what are the solutions?
On the climate advocacy flank, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate change 
(IPCC) is the most internationally accepted authority on climate change sci-
ence. This panel, created under the auspices of the United Nations, does not 
directly carry out any original research but rather bases its assessment on the 
abundant and very diverse published literature on the topic. On the basis of 
this, the IPCC produces reports that compile the most important evidence in 
line with that agreed by leading climate scientists and with the consensus of 
participating governments. For this very reason, the IPCC’s recommendations 
are at the core of most political action and climate change advocacy, as the 
panel has become both an impressive scientific platform and a powerful lobby 
in itself. Examining the IPCC’s proposals therefore provides a useful shortcut 
to obtaining an overview of the main actions promoted by governmental and 
nongovernmental climate advocates. Nevertheless, this simple exercise reveals 
important contradictions.
On the one hand, if we look at the specific data provided by IPCC reports, 
the sources of problems are clearly identified. On the other hand, however, the 
IPCC systematically fails to recommend solutions that fully match the core 
problems the panel itself has highlighted in its reports since 1990. This incon-
sistency is persistently reproduced in media and climate policy and revolves 
around four main topics: Economic growth, human overpopulation, human 
diet, and human technology.
First, the IPCC reports routinely highlight economic and population growth as 
continuing to be the most important drivers of increases in CO
2
 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion. In the Synthesis of the 5th Assessment report or 
AR5 (IPCC, 2014), population and economic growth alone are mentioned up 
to seven times as the main drivers of AGW and are highlighted many other 
times together with other significant variables (lifestyle, energy use, land use 
patterns, technology, and climate policy). Population growth, along with the 
larger urbanization resulting from it, is also considered a constraining factor 
with potential implications for adaptation and mitigation scenarios. Specifically, 
AR5 mentions that population growth increases human exposure to climate 
variability and change as well as demands for, and pressures on, natural resources 
and ecosystem services. It also drives economic growth, energy demand, and 
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energy consumption, resulting in increases in greenhouse gas emissions. In spite 
of these acknowledgments, neither the stagnation nor reduction of human pop-
ulation or economic growth is suggested as a solution. Contrarily, the IPCC 
assumes population and economic growth to be inescapable natural factors and 
recommends adaptation responses to them (in the case of population growth, 
for instance, it suggests compacting development of urban spaces, intelligent 
densification, building resilient infrastructure systems, etc.).
Second, the IPCC reports also highlight that lifestyle choices are the main 
explanation for humans’ historical increase of carbon emissions. The IPCC 
reports have actually been very specific since the 2007 edition, pointing out the 
main sources of greenhouse gas emissions by sectors. Prominent among these is 
agriculture. Agriculture (alongside related activities, such as forestry and other 
land use) accounted for 24 per cent of all direct greenhouse gas emissions in 
2010 ( just behind the electricity and heat sector, with 25 per cent of all emis-
sions). To this we must add the indirect weight of agriculture in the emissions 
of other sectors (mainly transport and industry). When the full cycle of our 
food production is incorporated, the agriculture and food sectors account for 
the majority of direct greenhouse gas emissions, as several governmental and 
other independent reports have already estimated (for governmental reports 
see: FAO, 2006; Leip et al., 2010; UNEP, 2010, 2012; Gerber et al., 2013).3 The 
agriculture sector is an important contributor to CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion and is the main contributor to non-CO
2
 climate forcing agents, 
including methane (mostly from livestock management), nitrous oxide (mostly 
from fertilizer use), and the loss of natural carbon pools (because of defor-
estation and forest degradation, mostly due to cattle grazing and crop cultiva-
tion for animal feed). All of these agriculture emissions are directly related to 
the mainstream Western human diet, which is spreading across the world and 
includes high amounts of animal protein. Accordingly, the AR5 makes up to six 
mentions of the need for changes to the human diet (including changes in con-
sumption patterns and reduction of loss and waste of food). Although the AR5 
provides no estimations for the impact of dietary changes, it points out that this 
has “significant” potential to reduce GHG emissions from food production. In 
contrast, however, the solutions suggested by the IPCC report do not include 
the shift to a plant-based diet.
Finally, in spite of the strong role the IPCC reports assign to human popula-
tion, behavior, choices, and culture, all scenarios for climate change adaptation 
and mitigation rely heavily on technology. Technology is one of the most recur-
rent words in the synthesis reports, and technological solutions are the ones 
the largest amount of space is devoted to in the last AR5. Although renewable 
energies (wind, solar bioenergy,4 geothermal, hydro, etc.) are included in the 
pool of measures for mitigation, a strong emphasis is placed on technological 
solutions, which, unlike renewable ones, involve a high number of adverse side 
effects and uncertainties. The most commonly mentioned technologies are car-
bon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear power.
CCS is a process by means of which carbon dioxide (CO
2
) from industrial 
and energy-related sources is separated (captured), conditioned, compressed, 
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and transported to a storage location for long-term isolation from the atmos-
phere. AR5 acknowledges the high risks of CCS (for instance, through leak-
ages) for human health and ecosystems, yet it is included as an unavoidable 
measure in the IPCC’s solutions. CCS has massive backing from industry and 
policy makers as it allows them to carry on doing business as usual (and actually 
create a new business through CCS operations) (Global CCS Institute, 2016).
Nuclear power is also considered a mature low-GHG emission source of 
baseload power and included in all scenarios for mitigation, in spite of all the 
risks and adverse effects also acknowledged by the IPCC reports (legacy/
cost of waste and abandoned reactors, nuclear accidents, waste treatment, ura-
nium mining and milling, safety and waste concerns, proliferation risk). As the 
nuclear industry well knows, when all the energy-intensive stages of the nuclear 
fuel chain are considered, from uranium mining to nuclear decommissioning, 
nuclear power is neither a low-carbon nor an economical electricity source 
(MIT, 2003; Caldicott, 2006; Coderch & Almiron, 2008; Maryland PIRG 
Foundation, 2009), which is why nuclear plants actually need to be publicly 
subsidized everywhere.
In addition to CCS and nuclear power, other potential technological solu-
tions are also considered. The one that receives most attention in AR5 is geo-
engineering. Geo-engineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies 
operating on a large scale that aim to deliberately alter the climate system with 
the pretext of alleviating the impacts of climate change. Most methods seek to 
either reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy in the climate system (Solar 
Radiation Management, SRM) or alter the climate by increasing the removal 
of carbon dioxide (CO
2
) from the atmosphere using carbon sinks (Carbon 
Dioxide Removal, CDR). CDR methods involve the ocean, land, and technical 
systems, including such methods as iron fertilization, large-scale afforestation,5 
and direct capture of CO
2
 from the atmosphere. Although the IPCC reports 
acknowledge the uncertainty, challenges, and risks of geo-engineering, these 
technologies are considered as potential options for mitigation. Again, the pros-
pects of new business opportunities created by all these new technologies are 
very welcomed by policy makers and industry.
To summarize, the IPCC reports repeatedly stress that our capacity to miti-
gate climate change is strongly influenced by variables that lie behind indi-
vidual consumption patterns and corporate decisions, like livelihoods, lifestyles, 
behavior, and culture. More specifically, reports routinely highlight three main 
drivers of increases in global warming emissions: Economic growth, human 
population growth, and lifestyle choices (notably diet choices). However, when 
it comes to solutions, the IPCC reports do not recommend either mitigating 
human population and economic growth or the shift to a plant-based diet. 
Rather, all scenarios for climate change adaptation and mitigation rely heavily 
on technology – with a strong emphasis on technological solutions involving a 
large number of adverse side effects and uncertainties – and on cultural patterns 
that despite their importance have a lesser impact on the environment than 
population, economy, and diet.
As stated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), 
total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions continued to increase from 1970 
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to 2010, with larger absolute increases between 2000 and 2010, despite a grow-
ing number of climate change mitigation policies following IPCC recommen-
dations. It seems obvious that we are not taking the appropriate path. However, 
research and policies continue to point to the same decisions and policies in a 
perpetual denial of this failure.
Discussing ideological denial
From the previous analysis it follows that, in spite of the opposite poles cli-
mate change denial and climate change advocacy represent, both sides share 
key ideological taboos.
In the first place, organized climate change denial rejects not only the anthro-
pogenic causes of climate change or its seriousness, but rather the idea that 
capitalism, at least in its current form, is unsustainable. According to authors like 
Jacques (2012), climate change science severely challenges Western modernity 
and the ideals of Western progress, attacking the base of industrial power and 
modern society. This author actually states that the psychological barrier erected 
by climate change denialism is fed by the fact that “climate science offers an 
imminent critique of the industrial base of Western modernity, it tempts us to 
think of authentic changes to the world’s political economic structure because 
it is so irreparably unsustainable” ( Jacques, 2012, p. 15). Kari Nogaard has also 
highlighted that climate change challenges the ontological security of people 
(2006, 2011). Therefore, denialists are not just refuting science but the idea of 
any need for structural change. Underneath this rebuttal is the approval of cur-
rent capitalistic values, including the right to exploit the planet as a commodity 
(involving human and nonhuman life), the rejection of any deceleration of 
economic and population growth, and any change in consumption patterns, 
including current lifestyle choices like diet. Denialists actually lobby for more 
of all this, which is actually the source of the problem for the IPCC.
On the other hand, climate advocates seem to be much more aware of the 
system’s failures, yet they neglect to address the core issues challenged by the 
IPCC’s diagnosis (which are also ignored in the IPCC’s recommendations, as 
we have seen). This disregard is not uniformly adopted by all climate advo-
cates, however. The reluctance to address the infeasibility of permanent eco-
nomic growth is a common trait of mainstream climate policies, but it is not 
equally shared by green nongovernmental organizations, which may, to varying 
degrees, contest permanent economic growth to the extent of considering it a 
myth. The same is true of faith in technology, with governments and climate 
policies sharing with climate change denialists the tendency to overestimate the 
capacity of human technology and underestimate its risks, while green NGOs 
are traditionally, again to a varying degree, much more suspicious of technol-
ogy’s capacity to fix our problems. Nevertheless, it is true that green NGOs 
have typically aligned with governments and climate policies in their reluctance 
to address the issues of human overpopulation and human lifestyle, prominently 
human diet.
It follows then that both denialists and advocates, the latter to varying degrees, 
reject the acknowledgment that how we position ourselves on the planet is at 
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the root of climate change denial and, more importantly, at the root of what 
prevents humanity from efficiently reacting to environmental issues even when 
acknowledging anthropogenic global warming. As this worldview is mostly 
grounded in giving unjustified preference to the interests of the human species 
over the rest of the planet – promoting the increase of human and resource use, 
insisting on a diet that is not only very polluting but based on the exploita-
tion of other sentient beings, and expecting human technology to fix related 
problems – this ideological denial is actually a denial of our speciesist stance. 
That is, it is a refusal to acknowledge that moral anthropocentrism6 – usually 
connected to the socially constructed belief that human species interests are the 
only relevant feature that matters morally – is the problem.
Of course, the anthropocentric bias of our treatment of nature has largely 
been addressed by environmentalists. Aligned with ecologist views, some cli-
mate change social scientists have also highlighted the moral anthropocentric 
bias in the environmental crisis. For example, Jacques (2006) defined the eth-
ics of the denial countermovement as “deep anthropocentrism” and presented 
the eco-centric view of environmentalists as the solution. However, although 
eco-centrism acknowledges moral consideration of the biosphere, it fails to 
address the major drivers of global warming (human overpopulation, economic 
growth, and an animal-based diet). This failure is consistent with the core values 
of environmental ethics (Leopold, 1949), which are devoted to preserving the 
“integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community” (Callicott, 2014, p. 66) 
at any cost, including by culling individuals of certain species to preserve an 
alleged balance in ecosystems. Since the human being is the type of individual 
that produces a greater imbalance in the ecosystems, this biotic precept, to be 
consistently applied, should request for the culling of the over populous Homo 
sapiens for the greater biotic good. This, I believe, would be immoral. If so, it 
would be inconsistent – and likely a result of a speciesist bias – not to believe 
that the similar culling of nonhuman animals is also immoral. This logic reveals 
that environmentalism is flawed in its twofold attempt to both be acceptable 
as an ethical view and avoid being human-centered and is why animal eth-
ics, ecofeminism, and non-speciesist ethics have extensively discussed moral 
anthropocentrism and speciesism beyond the limitations of eco-centric views 
(e.g. Faria & Paze, 2014; Gaard & Gruen, 1993; Horta, 2010; Regan, 1983; 
Singer, 1975/1990; Sustein & Nussbaum, 2004).
Thus, a mere eco-centric approach is not a solution but actually very prob-
lematic when addressing the taboos of climate change denialists and advocates. 
These taboos are based on a strong belief of our superior capacity as a species, 
which is a result of our anthropocentric stance. Overpopulation, dietary style, 
endless economic growth, and our technological skills have traditionally been 
considered indicators of the human species’ success on Earth. We like to think 
that no other species have expanded so far, so sophisticatedly, and with so much 
power. In children’s schoolbooks and history books the explosive growth of 
human beings is associated with our being the most successful species on Earth. 
Likewise, the increasing amounts of the Earth’s biological and environmental 
resources that are being appropriated to sustain this expansive human species are 
justified by our superior intrinsic value or moral considerability. That is, simply 
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put, because humans allegedly matter more than nonhumans from a moral point 
of view. Therefore, a greater number of human beings on the planet and greater 
resource consumption, in spite of all the problems brought by human overpopu-
lation, are welcomed as indicators of the species’ success (Harari, 2014).
The view that humans are more important than individuals from other spe-
cies also influences ethical judgements about interactions with other organisms. 
These ethical views are often used to legitimize treating other species in ways 
that would be considered morally unacceptable if humans were treated simi-
larly. We do not need animal protein to survive or to maintain good health (in 
fact, the opposite is often true: Animal-based diets are strongly related to a long 
list of diseases of affluence, Deckers, 2016, pp. 167–190), yet we confine and 
cruelly exploit billions of animals to produce unethical food we do not need, 
and this contributes hugely to global warming.
To fix the problems caused to the environment by this human-centered 
approach to life we turn to technology. Technology is very useful of course, but 
its role in providing a climate solution is persistently overestimated. We prefer 
to assume the adverse side effects of many climate technological solutions with 
total uncertainty of any positive outcome (and in some cases with total aware-
ness of the severe limitations of any) rather than radically change our behavior, 
values, and ideas. The fact that lifestyle has been associated with success, where 
technology plays a mythological role (Harari, 2017), is no coincidence. We 
include our technological skills among the attributes that make our species spe-
cial and different. Such technology has made intense exploitation and manage-
ment of the environment possible, and this in turn has been considered a huge 
success since it has increased human numbers and given us the impression of 
being in control of nature. Indeed, it has typically been deemed an evolution-
ary success and a proof of our superiority, to the extent that it can be found 
in the core ideas of two stances that are seemingly poles apart: Denialism and 
advocacy of climate change.
Short coda
As sociologists have shown, the human-supremacist views underlying both cli-
mate change denial and advocacy are not a mere prejudice in the minds of 
humans, but rather a set of shared beliefs built to legitimate the social order 
(e.g. Nibert, 2002, 2013, 2017a, 2017b). Speciesism or moral anthropocentrism 
is thus not only a bias but an ideology; it is not the cause of our behavior but 
rather an instrument created by humans to justify our practices. Consequently, 
refusing to discuss the human self-centered approach to climate change has 
been defined here as a type of ideological denial. As stressed, what we are deny-
ing is not that we view the world from a human perspective, but that we award 
ourselves privilege in this way – to such an extent that we do it even at the cost 
of extreme inefficacy.
Privileging ourselves is, of course, nothing new; moral anthropocentrism has 
constituted the moral status quo for five thousand years. It has been consoli-
dated by institutionalized religions (the planet and all nonhuman animals would 
be placed at the service of the human being by a creative God), amplified by 
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the humanism born of the Enlightenment (which defines human being, and 
human reason, as the only source of knowledge and value), and supported by 
all economic activities linked to the exploitation of natural resources and other 
animals since the domestication of plants and animals (to justify practices that 
usually involve destruction and suffering of other animals and the Earth).
Therefore, it follows that what prevents society from discussing the issues that 
might help mitigate global warming (and resituate humans on the planet with 
a more ethical and sustainable stance) are not just interest groups lobbying for 
capitalistic profits, but also the many behaviors and attitudes promoted in sup-
port of moral anthropocentrism. This may provide an explanation of why both 
lobbying forces, for and against anthropogenic climate change, experience the 
same ideological denial to varying degrees.
Notes
 1 The author expresses her profound gratitude to colleagues who have provided comments 
on and insights into different versions of this text, or into some core ideas of it, while 
preparing the working papers for the THINKClima project; they include Miquel Rod-
rigo, Marta Tafalla, Catia Faria, Lisa Kemmerer, Maxwell Boykoff, Riley Dunlap, Dieter 
Plehwe, and Eze Paez.
 2 The list of think tanks publicly challenging climate science in Europe includes, for 
instance, the Europäisches Institut für Klima und Energie (Germany), the Liberal Institute 
(Switzerland), the Austrian Economics Center (Austria), the Centre for Policy Studies 
(United Kingdom), the Institute of Economic Affairs (United Kingdom), the Hayek Insti-
tut (Austria), and the Instituto Juan de Mariana (Spain), among others.
 3 Animal agriculture contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Agri-
cultural soil and livestock directly emit large amounts of potent greenhouse gases. Agri-
culture’s indirect emissions include fossil fuel use in farm operations, the production of 
agrochemicals, and the conversion of land to agriculture (Greenpeace, 2008). According 
to Gil, Smith, and Wilkinson (2010), if all parts of the livestock production life cycle are 
included, we should consider the following:
• Fossil fuels used to produce mineral fertilizers used in feed production
• N
2
O emissions from fertilizer use
• Methane release from the breakdown of fertilizers and from animal manure
• Land-use changes for feed production and for grazing
• Land degradation
• Fossil fuel use during feed and animal production
• Fossil fuel use in production and transport of processed and refrigerated animal product
  Overall, the livestock industry is estimated to account for 18–51 per cent of global 
anthropogenic emissions.
 4 Bioenergy refers to the use of natural resources – trees, logging slash, agricultural crops, 
grasses, peat, algae, etc., otherwise known as biomass – as alternative sources for the gen-
eration of heat and electricity, as well as feedstock for the production of biofuels. Yet 
burning biomass also produces carbon emissions, and biomass is not infinitely available. 
This is why bioenergy is a very controversial solution and needs much more scrutiny 
before proving to be a renewable green alternative to fossil fuels.
 5 The planting of new forests on lands that have not historically contained forests.
 6 Not to be confused with epistemic anthropocentrism, the cognitive condition that “human 
beings are such that the limits and form of their knowledge necessarily takes a human 
reference” (Faria & Paez, 2014, p. 100). As Faria and Paez show, epistemic and moral 
anthropocentrism are not the same, and the former does not mean the latter is inevitable.
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The Anthropocene is a proposed epoch dating from the commencement of 
significant human impact on the Earth’s geology and ecosystems. However, it is 
not always an easy concept to establish and gives rise to many metaphors, such 
as the fact that it is “the sign of our power and our impotence. . . . It is a warmer 
world with more risks and catastrophes” (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016, p. 11). 
Whatever it is, we are not talking about an environmental crisis, but a natural 
revolution originated by humans, and this opens the door to a social science 
approach, as the one covered by this chapter.
The idea of human impact and the ecosystem is a common one in the 
body of public relations knowledge. It defines public relations as a communica-
tion process to build and preserve mutual and beneficial relations between an 
organization and its publics. Therefore, the principle here is the construction 
and maintenance of beneficial relationships with the organizational ecosystem 
through an influence process led by people that form part of the dominant 
coalitions of organizations. This ontological standpoint offers the opportunity 
to approach public relations as an Anthropocene practice in the climate of trust 
between organizations and their publics. Nonetheless, this perspective may be 
considered as purely metaphorical. This chapter therefore aims to go further 
and analyze how the origins of today’s public relations can be approached from 
this point of view. To this end, our starting point is the fact that the Anthro-
pocene has no agreed start date. Indeed, one proposal, based on atmospheric 
evidence, is to establish the start with the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th 
century (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; Zalasiewicz et al., 2008). According to its 
official historiography, this start date coincides with the birth of public relations. 
However, this coincidence only supports the anthropocentric-ontological per-
spective of public relations, not the historiographical one. Another group of 
scholars (e.g. Pimm et al., 2014) links the Anthropocene to earlier events, such 
as the rise of agriculture and the Neolithic (around 12,000 BCE). The impact 
of humankind on the Earth’s ecosystem had reputation management strate-
gies as its main cause. Thus, this new approach has important effects on the 
ontology and historiography of public relations. Indeed, in Prehistory public 
relations-like activities started to resolve issues of prestige in complex early 
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social structures, in which power relations were partly established and managed 
through a direct impact on the ecosystem.
My analysis of the anthropocentric roots of public relations will follow a 
prehistoric linear evolution through two of the great ages, the Neolithic Revo-
lution and the Urban Revolution. Despite having previously argued that the 
history of public relations requires a nonlinear approach to free it from the ties of 
professional history that dominate its historiography (McKie & Xifra, 2014), the 
linear perspective that I adopt here also has the underlying idea of showing how 
human concern for reputation and its management is as old as humanity itself.
The Neolithic Revolution as an effect  
of concern for reputation
The Neolithic Revolution was the wide-scale transition of many human cul-
tures from a lifestyle of hunting and gathering to one of agriculture and settle-
ment, making the continuous increase of the population possible (Bocquet-Appel, 
2011). Research on this historical phenomenon is undergoing, or becoming 
the object of, a certain scientific revolution or change of paradigm (Kuhn, 
1962), as is also taking place in other disciplines. On the basis of this, the aim 
of this section is to present the key aspects that must be taken into account in 
order to answer the question of why agriculture and a sedentary way of life 
were adopted. To do this, we must articulate the answer in accordance with the 
social, economic, and territorial consequences of the decision contained in the 
question, which will allow me to suggest the notable influence of reputation 
and leadership in these consequences. And all this falls under the horizon of 
constant evolution in the theories that seek to explain the consequences of the 
Neolithic Revolution (Hernando, 1994).
There are several competing (but not mutually exclusive) theories related to 
the factors that drove populations to take up agriculture. The most prominent 
of these are: The Oasis Theory, originally proposed by Raphael Pumpelly 
in 1908 (cited by Arya, Arya, Arya, & Kumar, 2015), suggests that as the cli-
mate got drier due to the Atlantic depressions shifting northward, communi-
ties contracted to oases, where they were forced into close association with 
animals. These animals were then domesticated alongside the planting of seeds. 
However, this theory has little support among archaeologists today because 
subsequent climate data suggest that the region was becoming wetter rather 
than drier.
The Hilly Flanks hypothesis, proposed by Robert Braidwood (1948), sug-
gests that agriculture began in the hilly flanks of the Taurus and Zagros moun-
tains, where the climate was not drier as Childe had believed, and fertile land 
supported a variety of plants and animals amenable to domestication.
The Demographic theories proposed by Carl Sauer (cited by Arya et al., 
2015) and adapted by Binford and Bindford (1968) and Flannery (1968) posit 
that an increasingly sedentary population outgrew the resources in the local 
environment and required more food than could be gathered. Various social 
and economic factors helped drive the need for food.
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The evolutionary/intentionality theory, developed by David Rindos (1984), 
views agriculture as an evolutionary adaptation of plants and humans. Starting 
with domestication through the protection of wild plants, it led to specialized 
location and then fully fledged domestication.
All in all, an approach to this crucial historical phenomenon from the per-
spective of public relations should prioritize above other theories the Brian 
Hayden feasting model, which suggests that agriculture was driven by osten-
tatious displays of power, such as holding feasts to exert dominance (Hayden, 
1990, 1996, 2001). This system required assembling large quantities of food, 
which drove agricultural technology. Hayden, together with Michael Dietler, 
has developed some of the most useful interpretative proposals for using the 
archeology of the feast to trace all the processes of change and transformation 
experienced by the communities of the past and that explain the development 
of social complexity.
Hayden (1990, 1996, 2001) has focused on the implications of the feast for 
the evolution of the last hunter-gatherer societies of the Fertile Crescent and 
their transformation into the first food-producing communities – the Epipale-
olithic Natufian culture (around 12,500 to 9,500 BCE) and the Pre-Pottery 
Neolithic (around 8,500 to 5,500 BCE). In fact, Hayden interprets the origins 
of agriculture and the Neolithic Revolution in this area as a result of the need 
and will to concentrate and accumulate large quantities of surplus (especially 
cereals and legumes and their derivatives, such as the first fermented alcoholic 
beverages: Beer made from barley and oats), which were manifested by certain 
families and people initiating new competitive ways of accessing social leader-
ship. Thus, the origins of agriculture and the definitive domestication of cereals 
such as wheat and barley would be largely related to the need to dispose of and 
accumulate large quantities of beer in order to hold regular large-scale commu-
nity feasts that articulated the social functioning (and its incipient complexity) 
of these first Neolithic communities.
Under this theory, these new forms of leadership would be characteristic of 
a new type of social organization, what Hayden (2011) defined as transegalitar-
ian societies: A type of society based on redistribution and the periodical holding 
of grand community acts of consumption (large collective feasts), which would 
be understood as acts of empowerment and social self-promotion in order for 
the hosts to present themselves to the community as efficient leaders and gener-
ous redistributors or givers, with the aim of attracting a network of customers 
or followers. It would, then, be similar in form to current impression manage-
ment and reputation management.
In some ways, Hayden’s proposal and the very concept of transegalitar-
ian societies is a revised, renewed, and nuanced version of what in the 1960s 
and 1970s anthropologists such as Sahlins (1963), Godelier (1996) or Harris 
(1993) defined as Big Man systems – from which they highlighted the public 
ceremonies and the economy of prestigious goods ( Johnson & Earle, 1987) – 
which would come to represent an intermediate or prior appearance of the first 
knights and the first states. In other words, the idea of transegalitarian societies 
would also serve to define those situations immediately prior to the appearance 
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of the first social structures with a fully consolidated or institutionalized politi-
cal power.
As an example or a paradigmatic case that largely confirms or validates 
Hayden’s theory, it is worth referring to one of the oldest contexts document-
ing evidence related to the production and consumption of beer, which is the 
spectacular site of Göbleki Tepe (located in present-day Turkish Kurdistan), 
considered the oldest constructed shrine in the world. Göbekli Tepe is located 
within the area of the Fertile Crescent, the area of the planet where agriculture 
and livestock practices are first thought to have been adopted, and therefore 
the beginning of the Neolithic, on an older chronological horizon. It is a cer-
emonial celebration space constructed around 9,000 BCE, where several com-
munities from the area would gather on certain special days or at certain times 
of the year, and where some large mortars and crafted stone receptacles have 
been found, which would have been used to ferment and preserve beers made 
from wheat and barley.
In order to be able to better understand what Hayden’s theory represents for 
the conceptualization of an anthropocentric historiography of public relations, 
we must analyze what is meant by feasts and rituals of consumption.
Feasts, semiotics, and prestige foods
As Dietler (2001) pointed out, feast “is an analytical rubric used to describe 
forms of ritual activity that involve the communal consumption of food and 
drink” (p. 65). All meals or consumption practices outside the common or 
ordinary, and which however stand out precisely because of their occasional 
nature, constitute a feast, since they are held at exceptional, commemorative, 
or festive times. In fact, the communal consumption of food is a human activ-
ity that even today expresses the culminating moment of many of our most 
important social acts. In this sense, it has been pointed out that the practice 
of the feast represents the setting par excellence for staging and naturalizing 
social relations.
Celebrations and social events where feasts are held can have various pur-
poses or objectives: They may be family celebrations (marriages, funerals, and 
rituals of initiation) or religious celebrations – many of which are traditionally 
related to seasonal changes, such as the main religious festivals in our Western 
calendar, which has fossilized a ceremonial cycle typical of the ancient Medi-
terranean and clearly related to lunar cycles: Solstices and equinoxes, or openly 
political/identity-related (national day, country day, the day of independence). 
Whichever it may be, what we are interested in here is that many of these cel-
ebrations and festivities in one way or another include a culminating social act: 
The holding of the feast.
The study of feasts brings together two concepts or factors: Consumption 
and ritual, which always involve many different ideological, social, cultural, and 
identity-related connotations, and even religious connotations (think here of 
consumption habits in the Islamic world, the Jewish world, etc., and their strict 
codes and norms).
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Eating and drinking, beyond their fundamental biological functions, are also 
social practices or activities through which human communities express and 
communicate multiple meanings and messages. And this is done both to high-
light messages within the community itself, to the group people belong to 
(marking out categories, social roles, etc.), and in relation to differences and/
or connections with other neighboring groups or communities (in this case 
defining boundaries and borders with regard to identity or culture). In soci-
ology we talk about the semiotics of food (Appadurai, 1981; Goody, 1982; Van 
der Veen, 2003), which is nothing more than understanding eating habits as a 
true language through which multiple meanings and sociocultural messages are 
communicated.
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that in all societies it is possible 
to distinguish between those foods that are basic necessities (that is, for habitual 
and common consumption), and those that are consumed exceptionally or in 
a prestigious context (prestige foods). The latter are always very sought-after 
products, because they are of limited or restricted availability, which makes 
them acquire social distinction (Hayden, 2001). Prestige foods are commonly 
exotic products; that is, unusual products with limited circulation. Among these, 
throughout history, those that have particularly stood out are those products that 
have certain stimulating or intoxicating properties (coffee, tea, beer, wine, etc.).
The hermeneutic turn in feasting research
Until around twenty years ago, research on feasting in prehistoric and protohis-
toric societies was related to a hedonistic type practice. In general, perception 
of it was based directly on Homeric passages, where feasting is described as an 
elitist practice engaged in only by socially important and prominent groups and 
figures (Perlès, 1999), figures who when practicing feasting somehow saw them-
selves reflected in the mythical gods and heroes of the ancient Mediterranean.
The feast factor was only valued in some very distinguished, very special 
contexts, with very spectacular elements, as is found in the case of various 
sumptuous tombs that contained numerous funerary objects. In these cases, the 
practice of feasting was simply interpreted as a show of social ostentation and 
conceived exclusively as an act of elitist consumption in which only members 
of the elite took part in order to honor the deceased. That is, the study of feast-
ing was conceived solely as an aristocratic or high class practice (Dietler, 1996).
In the mid-1990s, however, there was an important interpretative change of 
direction in the field of archaeological research into feasting. From that time on, 
a series of highly influential renovation works were published, which, based on 
comparative research between archeology and other disciplines such as anthro-
pology, sociology, and ethnography, began to view feasting from new interpre-
tative perspectives.
In this interpretative twist, it is possible to highlight the emergence of two 
renovating lines or currents, which are not exclusive, and are often presented 
together in works by several authors: One line links rituals of consumption 
with identity constructions, and the other links them with the emergence of 
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social complexity. Evidently, both lines are of the highest interest to our analysis, 
as they incorporate key concepts in the critical theory of public relations.
The first analytical perspective, led by archaeologists such as Hamilakis (2002) 
and Twiss (2012), links rituals of consumption and identitary constructions. It 
is based on the conception of food as a field in which many social and cultural 
factors come together and contribute in a particularly relevant way to the pro-
cesses of creating, negotiating, and reformulating the identitary constructions 
of various groups and social agents. In fact, a whole series of essays essentially 
from the field of sociology (Appadurai, 1981; Goody, 1982; Bourdieu, 1984; 
Douglas, 1984; Mennell, 1996) place emphasis on the idea that consumer hab-
its and practices are one of the social scenarios where groups and individuals 
participate more actively in establishing limits and criteria that define many 
of the strategies of social distinction and cultural differentiation, both through 
everyday dietary routines and through exceptional feasts or meals. That is, dif-
ferences in relation to food and culinary habits among various human groups 
are not simply a consequence of economic or ecological conditions, but there 
are always social representation criteria. In relation to these issues, we should 
above all note the influence of contributions by the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu, who showed that food consumption reflects and recreates the social 
and symbolic codes of a society. In fact, in his study on distinction (1984), 
Bourdieu stated that the taste for certain aesthetics, manners, and substances 
(which include food and consumption habits) does not respond to objective 
criteria, but rather deals with authentic social constructions through which 
social boundaries are created and differences are naturalized.
The second perspective links rituals of consumption and the development 
of social complexity. In this second novel current, led by Hayden (2001) and 
Dietler (1990, 1996), feasting is now conceived as a practice that is presented 
in a transcultural way (that is, at all times and in all cultures), becoming a very 
important activity when it comes to linking social organization and the ideo-
logical strategies of a human community. The idea that feasting would be a 
particularly important factor in the functioning of traditional pre-industrial 
societies (as is the case of protohistoric communities) is stressed and empha-
sized, because in this type of society feasting usually acted as a setting or stage 
for political action, it being a key element in articulating a wide range of social 
processes, among which, aside from commercial and economic processes, the 
acquisition of political power stands out.
In fact, nowadays, as mentioned earlier, feasting plays a key role in explain-
ing the phenomena of change and social transformation that take place within 
the framework of processes that lead to development of complexity; that is, of 
processes that lead to the emergence of the first fully hierarchical and politically 
organized societies (first forming of states).
The role of feasting in earliest hierarchical societies
In the first hierarchical societies, feasting always involved a connection between 
two fundamental factors: The shared consumption of food and drink (usually 
32 Jordi Xifra
special foods, which differed in quantity and quality from the products con-
sumed in everyday consumption practices) and the social component of 
expressing solidarity, success, social status, or power (Dietler & Hayden, 2001).
Hayden (2001) has pointed out that, from an ecological point of view, feast-
ing is an extremely widespread or universal practice, since it can probably be 
traced back to at least the Upper Paleolithic (40,000 to 10,000 BCE). In fact, as 
we have indicated here, this author has suggested that the origins of agriculture 
could be linked to the demand arising from certain regular community acts of 
consumption. However, we have little data regarding the possible practice of 
feasting among hunter-gatherer communities.
That said, there are some indications that on certain occasions large hunts 
were accompanied by ritual meetings, which would include festive acts of com-
munity consumption. During the Upper Paleolithic, which is the period during 
which we see the expansion of man’s presence on the planet, large specialized 
hunts were widespread, a practice that involved very different social and techni-
cal organization from occasional hunting (Zelder, 2008). This type of hunting 
demanded the collaboration of many individuals, and only the coming together 
of several families or groups of families would allow the necessary individuals 
to mobilize larger human contingents than the domestic group. In fact, these 
periodic meetings involved the implementation of extensive mechanisms for 
information exchange and social integration. As Perlès (1999) has noted, it is in 
the regions that this type of hunting started where we find the first appearance 
of shrines, furniture art, and personal ornaments, that is, of all those elements 
that played an active role in collective rituals that favored group integration and 
collaboration.
If we go back to a more remote era (around 500,000 years ago), when the 
use of fire became widespread, some authors have noted that the preparation 
and cooking of food on a collective fire would have favored the practice of 
communal consumption, promoting the social function of eating and coexist-
ence (Perlès, 1999). However, although we may believe that the practice of 
feasting for alliance and solidarity was widespread among groups of hunters-
gatherers, we can be sure that the social significance of these practices would 
have differed significantly from the feasting characteristic of more complex 
societies (Hayden, 2001).
Since the third millennium BCE we have known of Sumerian references 
written in cuneiform texts and engraved representations that inform us of the 
holding of feasts and can be linked to the redistribution practices that took 
place in this region (Schmandt-Besserat, 2001). In fact, in Mesopotamia, the 
mythological-religious literature and figurative representations that appear 
on some tablets and cylindrical seals provide accurate information regarding 
royal feasts and the temple ( Joannès, 1999). On the other hand, the significant 
increase in the consumption of alcoholic beverages (beers and wines) in the 
Middle East during the fourth and third millennium BCE has been interpreted 
as an essential factor for understanding the development of an economic policy 
closely related to the competitive holding of the feast in processes that led to 
the consolidation of the first states ( Joffe, 1998).
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Be that as it may, the effectiveness of consumption strategies can be traced 
to prior to the appearance of these complex political constructions, the social 
importance of feasting being essential to understanding the functioning of 
small-scale societies. However, there can be no doubt that the most important 
changes that can be observed in consumption practices took place in the tran-
sition stages from egalitarian societies to the emergence of more complex and 
stratified social formations (Hayden, 2001). This is why for many archaeologists 
feasting has come to be understood as an indispensable factor in understanding 
the development of social complexity and inequalities (Potter, 2000). As Rap-
paport (1968) pointed out, feasting could act as an important mechanism for 
redistributing food among members of a community and therefore served as a 
good instrument for promoting social and economic interdependence within 
the group.
At the same time, feasting could serve as an ideal context for forging social 
hierarchy relationships, because offering feasts could be a particularly effective 
resource to demonstrate economic strength and political skills when it came to 
gaining prestige and earning support from followers. In other words, the hold-
ing of feasts could become a means to measure the host’s skills, whom the guest 
then saw as a qualified, efficient, and generous leader (Potter, 2000).
From the aforementioned we can deduce that to manage the feast was also 
to manage social capital; in other words, it was a form of reputation manage-
ment. The organization of large and sophisticated feasts indicated that there 
was a host who had control over the work of others and that he or she was 
an efficient mobilizer of cooperative effort (Hayden, 1996; Johnson & Earle, 
1987). Indeed, tribal leaders might use feasts to compete and demonstrate their 
ability to gather together large amounts of food (Demarrais, Castillo, & Earle, 
1996). In this sense, it is necessary to bear in mind that the organization and 
financing of feasts often included the cooperation of multiple individuals car-
rying out collective tasks such as communal hunting and the large-scale slaugh-
ter of domestic animals. In short, by means of feasts the host could regularly 
coordinate participation, cooperation, and inter-community loyalty, it being 
a resource that was especially effective on occasions that required the group’s 
allegiance: Weddings, exchange relations pacts, situations of conflict, etc. ( John-
son & Earle, 1987).
On the other hand, the resources presented and consumed at a feast usu-
ally included exceptional products of high value and also exotic goods, which 
brought the host success not only based on their ability to supply a remarkable 
number of resources, but above all based on the fact of having privileged con-
trol to access certain prized products, usually associated with the possession of 
sacred knowledge (Potter, 2000). In fact, it is with regard to this point that the 
regular holding of feasts can be more clearly related to the ceremonial exchang-
ing of gifts and, definitively, with the social mechanism that characterizes the 
functioning of those communities that practiced an economy of prestigious 
goods.
Thus, communal practices of ritual consumption could act in many cases 
as an appropriate context for agreeing exchanges and compensation, as well 
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as for exhibiting and enabling the circulation of prestigious goods, especially 
when it came to exotic products or foodstuffs. Of particular interest in the 
case in question were the social use of certain exotic dishes and especially the 
restricted consumption of new products such as wine. From this perspective, it 
has been pointed out that feasts were the ideal context for the consumption of 
prestige foods, since they are basically events used to create, improve, or estab-
lish social relationships (Van der See, 2003). In fact, communal hospitality can 
be understood as a specific way of exchanging goods because it establishes the 
same reciprocal relationships between host and guest as between the two par-
ties involved in any exchange relationship. The main difference is that food is 
amortized in the actual act of consumption; that is, unlike durable goods that 
can circulate in successive exchange operations, food must be produced again 
in order to meet reciprocal obligations. Therefore, apart from its potential for 
the manipulation of political symbolism, feasts fulfilled important functions in 
the broadest sense of the regional political economy, as they often acted as the 
instrument that articulated the exchange systems in a regional context (Dietler, 
1999). In this function, the potential of hospitality was manipulated as a useful 
instrument for defining social relationships. Of all forms of gift presentation, 
dining hospitality was probably one of the most effective and subtle. This leads 
to feasts often being seen as a mechanism for social solidarity that serves to 
establish a sense of community, and, in fact, hospitality is often used as a meta-
phor for generosity (Zelder, 2008).
At the same time, however, feasting was a fundamental instrument for pro-
moting social comparison and obtaining political support through the creation 
of obligations and debts in return for the unequal transfer of gifts and food. In 
fact, creation of the obligation of debt is in the eyes of many anthropologists 
the most fundamental aspect for understanding the political potential of feasts 
(Potter, 2000). The host obtained benefits through the establishment of a broad 
network of contractual debt relationships that motivated people to produce and 
deliver surplus. Thus, the host could exercise more direct control over man-
power and see his wealth grow thanks to the material gains he obtained from 
others donating communal surpluses (Hayden, 1996). However, indebtedness 
can only be an effective policy when there are social or technological mecha-
nisms that allow the monopolization of the resources necessary to finance a 
feast, so a host must be really capable of uniting a certain set of followers and 
deal with the expenses involved in financing the feast. Consequently, the prac-
tice of feasting can only be used effectively to extend and maintain social differ-
ences in the long term, when these conditions are met. Otherwise, problems in 
dealing with the financing of the feast can place hosts in a considerable situation 
of debt with respect to their guests, which may end up affecting their status as 
a recognized and independent leader.
Managing symbolic capital in early hierarchical societies seems to have 
been one of the main causes of the Neolithic Revolution, which marked the 
beginning of man’s struggle for reputation as a natural characteristic of human 
existence, so correctly analyzed by Hobbes centuries later (Xifra, 2017). Thus, 
as radical as Diamond’s (1987) claim would seem, that one of the effects of 
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agriculture was more hunger, war, and tyranny, given that it affected power 
structures and strategies, it does seem to be quite consistent with the reputa-
tional origins of the invention of agriculture.
The Urban Revolution
As is the case with the Neolithic Revolution, the Urban Revolution has also 
been the subject of multiple approaches, although most have been directly or 
indirectly influenced by the founding work of Vere Gordon Childe (1950) 
on the origins of urbanism. Despite the undeniable contribution of the domi-
nant paradigm posited by Childe always being highlighted (Marcus & Sabloff, 
2008), it has not escaped criticism, which derives from new archaeological find-
ings, among other factors. Childe (1950) presented a ten-point model for the 
changes characterizing the Urban Revolution:
 1 In relation to size, the first cities must have been more spread out and 
densely populated than any previous settlements.
 2 In terms of composition and function, the urban population already dif-
fered from that of any village, with full-time specialist craftspeople, trans-
port workers, merchants, officials, and priests.
 3 Each primary producer paid over the tiny surplus he could wring from the 
soil with his or her still very limited technical equipment as tithe or tax to 
an imaginary deity or a divine king who thus concentrated the surplus.
 4 Truly monumental public buildings not only distinguished each known 
city from any village but also symbolized the concentration of the social 
surplus.
 5 Priests, civil, and military leaders and officials naturally absorbed a major 
share of the concentrated surplus and thus formed a “ruling class”.
 6 Writing.
 7 The elaboration of exact and predictive sciences – arithmetic, geometry, 
and astronomy.
 8 Conceptualized and sophisticated styles.
 9 Regular “foreign” trade over quite long distances.
10 A state organization based now on residence rather than kinship.
Although sometimes interpreted as a model of the origins of cities and urban-
ism, Childe’s concept in fact describes the transition from agricultural villages 
to state-level, urban societies. This change, which occurred independently in 
several parts of the world, is recognized as one of the most significant changes 
in human sociocultural evolution. And despite contemporary models for the 
origins of complex urban societies having progressed beyond Childe’s original 
formulation, there is general agreement that he correctly identified one of the 
most far-reaching social transformations prior to the Industrial Revolution, as 
well as the major processes involved in the change.
Thus, the Australian archaeologist’s contribution is substantial in its struc-
ture, but not in its functionality. That is to say, the criteria posited by Childe, 
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without being all-embracing, can serve as a guide to direct us through the heart 
of an issue full of varied and rich perspectives. However, more than verifying 
the certainty of these ten criteria, what I believe to be of interest is to analyze 
whether these criteria have served and can serve as elements to determine types 
of city. In my opinion, and following Cowgill (2004), we can talk about differ-
ent cities, so Childe’s contribution is not univocal and his criteria correspond to 
independent variables that, if fulfilled or complemented, will give rise to some 
of the different forms of what we know today as a city – the consequence of a 
process that began some 12,000 years ago in the Fertile Crescent region.
Three main critical approaches have employed the dominant paradigm of 
the Urban Revolution: That defended by Cowgill (2004), the study by Algaze 
(2001, 2004), and the theories that Marcus and Sabloff (2008) refer to as “post-
modern” (p. 24). To analyze this, we must focus on the emergence of the 
first city in Mesopotamia and Algaze’s (2004) application of the notion of a 
world-system coined by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). According to Algaze, 
the emergence of primitive Mesopotamian civilization is directly linked to the 
city and the state being consolidated as preeminent forms of political and spa-
tial organization. Consequently, the survival of those forms of organizations in 
Lower Mesopotamia depended on the existence of a system of economic and 
political relations that had areas with complementary or essential resources and 
societies that harbored different levels of social integration. In Mesopotamia, 
this manifested itself in recurrent cycles of centralization, expansion, and even-
tual collapse. The prevailing need to maintain control over trade routes and 
access to the required resources and raw materials led to a series of different 
types of expansion enhanced or limited by the variability of conditions in the 
center or on the peripheries of the city.
Algaze’s approach does not contradict the proposal posited by Cowgill 
(2004) when it links the creation of the city territory to the economic exploi-
tation of resources in the physical environment, giving rise to the key factor 
of sociopolitical complexity in the first states. This is because the main conse-
quence of the emergence of the city and its territory in Mesopotamia was the 
appearance of the primitive form of what we know today as the state, that is, the 
city-state, which is a difficult and complex concept, as previous authors have 
stated (Algaze, 2004; Cowgill, 2004). Among the different elements involved 
in the emergence of city-states in Mesopotamia, we must highlight the first 
emergence of forms of government, which led to the city becoming a form 
of power legitimation where reputation and management were a fundamental 
issue in perpetuating that legitimation.
As Algaze (2001) pointed out, environmental variables should be viewed 
as remote causes of the aforementioned complexity, while political variables, 
such as leaders or their followers (collective action), and even decision- making 
mechanisms, should be viewed as proximate causes of political complexity. 
We should therefore perhaps draw on other sources that have dealt with the 
Neolithic Revolution through novel methodologies in order to better under-
stand the complexity of societies that emerged from the Urban Revolution. 
Thus, without looking any further afield, Winterhalder and Kenneth’s (2006) 
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approach based on the ecology of human behavior presents itself. This method-
ology incorporates analytical elements from microeconomics or risk manage-
ment that work when applied to the Neolithic and could easily be extrapolated 
to the field of emerging forms of government, since some of these same micro-
economic theories have been applied to the field of public and political man-
agement in the search to find parallels between private and public management 
processes. In other words, an approach to the government of the first city-states 
based on risk management would allow us to observe original forms of risk 
communication that were established as reputation management mechanisms.
Another element inherent in the previous one is that of the city as a way 
of legitimizing power. From this perspective, the theory of the city as a crea-
tion is very relevant (Cowgill, 2004). Drawing on different contributions, that 
of anthropologist Adam T. Smith (2003) stands out. According to this author, 
the elements that make up a political landscape are spatial experience, spatial 
perception, and imagined space. Experience here refers to sensitive and emo-
tional experience – that is, how reality affects a particular individual within a 
 society – created via the structuring of a certain social space between leaders 
and ordinary people. Perception, on the other hand, refers to the social interac-
tion between social agents and a defined space; that is, the constructions of obe-
dience, respect, and legitimation established among the inhabitants of a given 
social space based on the interaction between citizens and power structures. 
And finally, imagination encompasses the ideological mechanisms that make up 
political landscapes – divine legitimation of the power that falls on rulers, for 
example (Castillo, 2005).
That is, the creation of city-states was certainly strategic for the purposes of 
legitimizing power. From this point of view, Cowgill’s (2004) introduction of 
the concept of public amenity would seem extremely important – for example, 
hydraulic supply systems (fountains, reservoirs, and aqueducts); waste disposal 
systems (drains and sewers); street paving; places of worship; markets; public toi-
lets; theaters and other leisure facilities; places of public assembly; fortifications 
and places of refuge; and institutions for maintaining public order and distribut-
ing food to some sectors of the population, among others. This phenomenon 
can be considered to be the clearest antecedent of euergetism – the practice, 
in ancient Greece and Rome, of high-status and wealthy individuals in society 
distributing part of their wealth to the community (Veyne, 1992) – in which 
governors and public figures based their reputation management strategy on 
charitable acts dedicated to the construction of these public facilities. As Cow-
gill (2004) pointed out, these acts were tools used to garner reputation and 
power, since power required (and requires) high doses of prestige and reputa-
tion to legitimize it.
Thus, in ancient Mesopotamia, reputation was another element in the emer-
gence of city-states, and the most important from the viewpoint of an anthro-
pocentric approach to public relations and its history. From this perspective, 
when addressing order, legitimacy, and wealth in ancient Mesopotamia, Baines 
and Yoffee (1998) reject the idea that the term propaganda is relevant to the 
ancient Middle East, since the people had restricted access to the sources of 
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ideology, which they call “high culture” (p. 235); that is, the production and 
consumption of aesthetic elements under the control and for the benefit of a 
civilization’s internal elite, including the monarch and the gods. High culture 
is a communicative construct, since through it, meanings and experiences are 
created and transmitted. High culture incorporates systems of writing and artis-
tic production. This perspective distinguishes between writing as a specialized 
means of expression and as a broad instrument of social control. The spiritual, 
moral, and intellectual content communicated through high culture can be 
materialized in visual art and architecture, in which case it can be largely inde-
pendent from the verbal form. In ancient civilizations, the elites controlled the 
symbolic resources, making them only significant when they were the ones 
exploiting them (Baines & Yoffee, 1998). Therefore, what we see here are 
controlled forms of legitimizing prestige and power as a consequence of the 
emergence of city-states. As I have stated elsewhere (Xifra & Heath, 2015), 
what these authors are referring to is the existence of cultural hegemony – in 
the terms considered by Antonio Gramsc – in ancient Mesopotamia, which 
is consonant with (or, alternatively, forms part of ) the social hegemony that 
Algaze (2004) detected in Mesopotamian cities.
In effect, those responsible for managing impressions, reputation, and 
legitimacy were the temple officials, private landowners, community elders, 
and wealthy merchants, as well as senior administrative and military officials 
(Baines & Yoffee, 1998). This is, then, the same cultural (and therefore politi-
cal) hegemony that, from another angle, the Greek and Roman patrons also 
sought, just as sports sponsors and cultural philanthropists do today. Thus, cul-
tural hegemony arises out of and is a consequence of the creation of cities, 
while it is also a good example of how these cities were the seeds of the current 
state, hosting a network of complex relationships of the most diverse natures, 
but mostly, power relations that sought to maintain, if not increase, hegemony.
This idea is also connected to the point of view posited by Smith (2003), 
who believes that, also in Mesopotamia, the mechanism of imagination can be 
used to analyze some reliefs and stelae where monarchs and rulers are shown 
to be linked directly to the gods, reinforcing the theory of the domination and 
maintenance of hierarchies and social classes. Other stelae show the preponder-
ance and coherence of cities, since the reliefs of some palaces represent rulers 
and dependent cities. All of the aforementioned reflects sociopolitical relation-
ships in ideological terms, since Mesopotamian iconography and texts gener-
ated the urban landscape of the region, justifying the coherence, politics, and 
hierarchy of the cities in question (Castillo, 2005). Power was physically and 
visually defined through high culture, as well as architecture.
In sum, we cannot approach the study of the Urban Revolution without 
bearing in mind the historical continuum that shows this revolution to precede 
the Agrarian or Neolithic. Although we are talking about two delimitable peri-
ods in time here, historical structures typical of the longue durée run through 
both: power, its management, and the elements that surround it, especially 
reputation and legitimacy. These structures and elements were consolidated in 
geographical and social terms with the appearance of complex societies that 
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gave way to city-states, which in turn served to highlight the hierarchy of that 
power through buildings and monuments. It is, therefore, an anthropocentric 
phenomenon – the Urban Revolution, like the Neolithic, was the fruit of 
man’s intervention on nature. And in this intervention elements derived from 
new networks of relationships, and the consequent social complexity played a 
fundamental role, with power, legitimacy, and reputation standing out above all 
else. In fact, since the appearance of city-states, power has included symbolic 
elements, resulting in what Bourdieu (1977, 1990) would centuries later call 
symbolic capital emerging within the framework of these revolutions.
Anthropocentric implications for public relations
Humans have created a striking new pattern on Earth that has triggered a new 
geological age: The Anthropocene era. From this standpoint, this chapter draws 
a parallel between the creation of the Anthropocene and the anthropocentric 
roots of public relations-like activities. Indeed, as we have pointed out pre-
viously (Xifra, 2012), one of the most prominent public relations schools of 
thought, the European School of Public Relations, considered public relations 
an anthropological discipline because it is based on humans. For members of the 
European School of Public Relations, this anthropological foundation implied 
that public relations was a form of communication that human beings used to 
contact one another and create a climate of trust under which social relations 
could develop (Matrat, 1971). This climate of trust was the goal of any public 
relations campaign, meaning the function of public relations was to intervene 
in that metaphorical climate through the intervention of man. From this point 
of view, public relations can be considered to be ontologically anthropocentric, 
its anthropocentrism being post-capitalist and mainly in the corporate sphere.
Having made the preceding reflection, the contents of this chapter have 
implications for the history and historiography of public relations. Modern 
public relations is mainly related to reputation management (e.g. Hutton, 
Goodman, Alexander, & Genest, 2001), and reputation is a phenomenon that 
has concerned humanity since its identification as a symbolic asset and, there-
fore, a resource of power.
This situation could only arise in the midst of social complexity, the first 
manifestations of which emerged, as we have seen, shortly prior to the Neo-
lithic Revolution and the adoption of agricultural practices. These two anthro-
pocentric phenomena have one of their causes in the fact of being able to 
guarantee material resources (food), which in turn stimulated the symbolic 
resources of power, such as prestige. Behind the emergence of agriculture was 
the need for human beings to generate a reputation that allowed them to main-
tain their hegemony within social complexity. To do this, taking into account 
that the feast was the means of communication – surely the first means of 
communication in history, after sound and painting – the emerging social elites 
could not take the (reputational) risk of not having the food resources derived 
from harvesting and hunting, meaning an agricultural and livestock system was 
necessary. And this, as I have already pointed out previously (Xifra & Heath, 
40 Jordi Xifra
2015), remains the prime manifestation of the current practice of public rela-
tions. Hence, the historiography of public relations should extend its narrative 
to Prehistory and realize that the phenomenon of public relations is noth-
ing more than actors (today’s corporations) who emerged from the Industrial 
Revolution adapting to a problem as old as humanity itself.
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3  An ecofeminist analysis  
of worldviews and  
climate change denial
Lisa Kemmerer
Introduction: can we see the air that we breathe?
We don’t often think about breathing – even less about the air that we breathe – 
yet the atmosphere that provides us with oxygen surrounds all things, sustain-
ing plants and animals alike. Cultures are like the air that we breathe. They 
surround us and are essential to how we live and what we think. They shape 
human beings long before humans are aware of their influences, long before 
we are able to decide whether or not we wish to adopt the outlooks and ways 
of the community we are born into. Cultures teach us such simple things as 
how to greet others, and such complicated things as what is sacred. Cultures 
dictate what foods are eatable, how to eat those foods, and what sorts of food 
formalities are required at the communal table. The culture we grow up in also 
shapes our worldview – how we envision the world around us, and how we 
understand our place in the world.
Only with the interconnected world slowly pieced together by explorers, 
then by cars, boats, and aircrafts, and now by the Internet, have people become 
somewhat more aware of the influence of culture. We can now see that what 
we take for granted is not a given. We can see that we do not necessarily eat 
what others eat, that we do not eat how others eat, and that food formalities 
differ across cultures. We can also see that our worldview – how we understand 
ourselves in relation to the larger world, including birds and trees, rivers and 
stones – varies across cultures.
How we understand ourselves in relation to the larger world affects the envi-
ronment. For example, climate change as we know it has stemmed from the 
activities of humans who hold a particular worldview, yet it affects all humans – 
all living beings. Climate change has disrupted seasonal rainfalls for millions 
of crop dependent people, has lifted temperatures enough to drive species to 
extinction, and is in the process of raising sea-levels to threaten billions of peo-
ple in communities along the ocean. “While many of us have the resources to 
move if necessary, the world’s least advantaged human populations are unable to 
escape the impacts of climate change” (Roberts, 2017, p. 1). For many who are 
disempowered, climate change threatens their very existence. The indigenous 
Alaskan community of Shishmaref recently voted to relocate their entire village 
because their homes were falling into the ocean, because the ground is eroding 
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under the force of rising seas (Groc, 2017, p. 12). When humans suffer, wildlife 
suffers: “The biggest climate-driven threats are likely to come from human 
communities affected by changes in weather and climate”, who encroach on the 
habitat of other vulnerable species (Can We Help Wildlife Adapt by Crowd-
sourcing Human Responses to Climate Change? p. 5). There can be no doubt 
that not only humanity suffers from the ravages of climate change. Though 
humans have caused this rapid change in climate, many  species – billions of 
living beings and almost every ecosystem – is at risk because of climate change.
Despite the dire effects of climate change, those who are empowered – those 
who have caused the problem and those who are able to respond in some 
meaningful way – are slow to respond, and their response is completely out of 
proportion with the threat posed by climate change. Many empowered peo-
ple deny climate change –with regard not just to the changes that climate 
change will bring (and is bringing), but also to the very existence of this well- 
documented, global phenomenon. In fact, those in power have generally cho-
sen to go right on feeding climate change, though this monster-of-our-making 
will ultimately threaten not only indigenous peoples and other species, but 
their way of life, and the very lives of their offspring.
Because factory farming is the number one cause of greenhouse gas emis-
sions (GHGE) (Kemmerer, 2014, pp. 5–17), as well as industrialization and 
lifestyle more generally in “developed” nations, peoples of more industrialized 
nations have disproportionally contributed to climate change. These nations – 
Greco-diaspora1 cultures, especially the United States2 – are largely to blame for 
climate change, and so these nations are responsible for making the sacrifices 
to slow and eventually reverse climate change. Citizens in the United States, in 
particular, tend in the reverse direction, not only refusing to make changes, but 
conveniently denying that there is any need for such changes. (I suppose there 
is no greater evidence of U.S. guilt and complicity than the denial machine 
organized by the U.S. corporate lobbies despite rapidly accumulating global 
evidence indicating a hastening progression into the claws of climate change; 
Dunlap & McCright, 2015.)
Those of us who are responsible for this problem (in large part) must be will-
ing to recognize, acknowledge, and address the problem if we are to slow the 
process, and perhaps prevent some of the most devastating likely outcomes of 
our current trajectory. Given that culture surreptitiously shapes our worldview, 
which shapes our relationship with the larger world around us, it makes sense to 
examine the Greco-diaspora worldview behind climate inaction to see if there 
is anything likely to fuel indifference to the natural world, or even malevolence 
towards nature.
Climate change is rather a new experience, yet the deadly changes that come 
with climate change are upon us and continue to move forward with momen-
tum that cannot be easily reversed. Now is the time to consider how the Greco-
diaspora worldview might be implicated, and how rethinking our worldview 
might help alleviate some of the forces that undergird our tendency to plow 
mindlessly forward into the fires of climate change – especially the massive 
corporate interests that have fostered U.S. corporate and political climate 
An ecofeminist analysis 45
change denial. What is nature? What is our outlook towards nature? How do 
we envision our relationship with nature? How does this guide human-nature 
interactions? Exploring the answers to these questions in the Greco-diaspora 
worldview might help us to understand how lobbyists, public relations, and pol-
icy makers living in Greco-diaspora nations feed the flames of climate change, 
and how we might consciously intercede to shift the deadly trajectory from the 
deadly path we currently travel.
Cultures foster worldviews that maintain “recalcitrant truths” that appear as 
“permanent and fixed” even though they do not exist outside of the culture 
where these views are held (Medina, 2011, p. 25). Worldviews “hide ossified 
valuations and rigidified beliefs”, and if we are to be proactive in shaping our 
future, this “body of truths always has to be critically revisited in the light of 
new experiences” (Medina, 2011, p. 25). Human caused climate change is a 
new experience for those of us who currently populate the planet. This chap-
ter demonstrates how ecofeminist theory can help us to critically examine, 
deconstruct, and rebuild the Greco-diaspora ideology that feeds climate change 
and that fosters the indifference and lethargy of our response to this critical 
environmental threat.
Ecofeminism: dualism, hierarchy, and oppression
In 1974 Françoise d’Eaubonne coined the term ecofeminism, calling women to 
unite in an ecological revolution that would dismantle patriarchy. Most funda-
mentally, she connected the exploitation and degradation of the natural world 
with the exploitation and degradation of women. Her interest was not solely 
sexism, or the empowerment of women. d’Eaubonne sought the “destruction 
of male power to make way, not for female power or matriarchy, but for new 
egalitarian gender relations between women and men and between humans 
and nature” (Howell, 1997, p. 232). She recognized that the damaging imbal-
ance of power between men and women was part of the damaging imbalance 
of power between humanity and the natural world.
Fundamentally, ecofeminists agree that the domination/oppression of 
women and the domination/oppression of nature “are intimately connected 
and mutually reinforcing” (Gaard, 1993, p. 1; King, 2003, p. 458) via systems of 
oppression: Oppression is “legitimized and perpetuated by various institutions 
such as the state, the military, religion, the patriarchal family, and industrial 
capitalism” (Heller, 1995, p. 351). Given that oppressions are interconnected, the 
ecofeminist quest for solutions draws freely from the fundamental tenants of a 
number of social justice movements, including “peace movements, labor move-
ments, women’s health care, and the anti-nuclear, environmental, and animal 
liberation movements” (Gaard, 1993).
In their search for forces undergirding sexism and environmental degrada-
tion, ecofeminists have implicated patriarchal religions, animal agriculture, and/
or a fundamental worldview rooted in dualism and hierarchy (Fisher, 1979, 
p. 381). Because dualism and hierarchy are central to the Greco-diaspora world-
view, the third option seems to undergird the other two. This diaspora has 
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a tendency to view the world dualistically and hierarchically, positing a host 
of things/beings as ideal prototypes (Prototype category), with other things/
beings viewed as their opposites and as lesser (Not Prototype) (Adams, 1995, 
pp. 39–59).
In Table 3.1, Prototype contains the preferred (valued) model – the  prototype – 
while Not Prototype holds those beings and things denigrated in relation to the 
Prototype category: Man over woman, human over chicken, white over Latinx, 
and hetero over queer and trans. This supports the ecofeminist understand-
ing that both women and nature are denigrated (Not Prototype) in relation 
to men and culture/civilization (Prototype), and that the two oppressions are 
interconnected.
This dualistic vision must be recognized as false value dualisms because the 
dualistic categorizes presented are neither opposites nor mutually exclusive. 
For example, humans carry a variety of karyotypes, including 45 X, 47 XXX, 
48 XXXX, 49 XXXXX, 47 XYY, 47 XXY, 48 XXXY, 49 XXXXY, and 49 
XXXYY (Callahan, 2009, p. 62). Another example stems from the dualistic 
vision of black and white – and of white versus people of color more broadly. 
Anthropologists have discovered that the oldest skeletal remains for any human 
being are found in Africa, and it therefore seems likely that all humans trace 
their ancestry to Africa – especially given that there were no geographical 
barriers preventing human movement between Africa, Europe, and Asia (Mac-
Eachern, 2012, pp. 41–42). We might ask ourselves “how many ‘whites’ and 
‘blacks’ actually have skin that is white or black?” (MacEachern, 2012, p. 36). 
Just because Greco-diaspora peoples conceptually divide humans into races 
“does not imply that those races are real biological units, any more than the 
fact that people tell ghost stories implies that ghosts really exist” (MacEachern, 
2012, p. 36). A final example is provided by humans in relation to animals. 
Humans are primates, mammals – animals – and therefore cannot be opposite 
what they are. Moreover, all that lives is part of nature, and nothing living can 
be opposite that which it is.
False value dualisms undergird and enforce denigration, othering, and 
oppression. In order to maintain this power structure – and gain the advantages 
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of exploitation – those in power strive to “maintain a strong distinction and 
maximize distance” between dominant and subordinate individuals, between 
Prototype and Not Prototype (Plumwood, 1991, p. 23). This Greco-diaspora 
worldview not only erroneously polarizes pretty much everything that exists 
theoretically, but then proceeds to devalue one side of the equation. Not only 
females but anyone found unfit for the Prototype category falls into the sub-
ordinate Not Prototype category: “Unmanly” men, “uncivilized” humans, 
humans who are not recognized as productive, abled, and/or who are not 
heterosexual. These devalued “Not Prototype” individuals are then viewed as 
lesser, and wherever possible, as means to the ends of the dominant group. False 
value dualism creates a hierarchy in which all that is on the Prototype side is 
favored over all that is on the Not Prototype side. Men, whites, culture, human 
beings, minds, civilization – and many more, such as production, youth, thin-
ness, Christianity, and capitalism (Adams, 2003, p. 50; Lorde, 2000, p. 527; Fisher, 
1979, p. 381). A worldview rooted in hierarchy stems from false value dualisms, 
and all things on the Not Prototype side are devalued together in relation to all 
things on the Prototype side.
They are devalued together in that any entity in the Not Prototype category 
is understood to be closer to other entities in the Not Prototype category than 
they are to any entity in the Prototype category. In a “dualistic worldview, men 
and women, civilization and nature, are not simply defined as polarities, but all 
that is associated with women is devalued and subordinated” in relation to all 
that is associated with men and maleness (Kheel, 2008, p. 38). Those in the Not 
Prototype category are viewed not just as interrelated, but as interrelational – as 
part of a large “family” of Not Prototype. For example, women and anymals3 
tend to be viewed as closer to nature than men – but of course this is impos-
sible, since humans are animals, and animals are all part of nature. Similarly, 
women and people of color tend to be viewed as less civilized and less rational 
than those on the Prototype side, while those who are differently abled or non-
heterosexual tend to be viewed as nonproductive. Because Not Prototype indi-
viduals are viewed as Not Prototype in more than one dimension, they are also 
viewed as yet more denigrated and more exploitable. For example, a woman 
of color (both not man and not white) is likely to be viewed as yet lower on 
the hierarchy of beings than a man of color (who is at least male, even if not 
white – though he may have one Black parent and one white parent, being 
equal parts Black and white). A lesbian is likely to be denigrated as not man 
and not heterosexual and not productive and closer to nature and anymals. False 
value dualisms and ensuing hierarchy are foundational to the Greco-diaspora 
worldview, undergirding such pervasive problems as sexism and male privilege, 
homophobia, and a disregard for those who are differently abled and/or aged – 
especially older women, who fall into the emotive/non-reasoning category, and 
are also considered no longer productive, since unable to use their wombs to 
produce sons.
All that lies on the Not Prototype side is viewed not only as lesser, but also 
as requiring male protection/management and thereby exploitable. For exam-
ple, women and farmed anymals are often viewed as helpless and dependent 
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(De Welde, 2003, p. 86), requiring both male protection and the expertise and 
skills of men. Women and anymals are viewed as requiring men to take care 
of them, and in exchange, available to serve the needs of men, satisfying their 
appetites for flesh, for example, and their desire for offspring and property. This 
is evidenced by social expectations and laws that accept, expect, and permit the 
exploitation of women and anymals, and have long held anymals and women 
as property. Some of these property laws have been changed in Greco-diaspora 
communities with regard to women – but certainly not with regard to anymals. 
In the 1970s, for example, laws began to emerge in the United States allowing 
legal recourse for wives raped by their husbands. But only in 1993 did spousal 
rape become a crime in all fifty states (hHogan, 2012). Within my lifetime it 
was legal for married men in any U.S. state to force themselves on a partner – 
the idea being that a man was entitled to use his wife for sex. Anymals and 
women, down through time, have been expected to service men in power in 
exchange for upkeep. Anymals and women who did not fulfill the expectation 
of production and reproduction were often dismissed/dispatched.
The necessity that men protect women is most strongly reinforced through 
sexual violence, especially rape.4 In the United States, “violence is seen as sexy 
and sexuality as violent” (Buchwald, Fletcher, & Roth, 1995, p. ii). Even though 
sexual assault crimes are known to be underreported, U.S. reports indicate that 
roughly every 2.5 minutes someone “is sexually assaulted”, while one in six 
women have been raped or have experienced an attempted rape (Valenti, 2007, 
p. 64). The United States fosters a rape culture that encourages “male sexual 
aggression” and supports “violence against women”, condoning “physical and 
emotional terrorism against women as the norm” (Buchwald et al., 1995, p. ii, 
italics in original). “Violence against women is at epidemic levels in the United 
States. Sexual assault, intimate partner violence, harassment, and stalking are part 
of many women’s daily lives” (Valenti, 2007, p. 61). Men in rape cultures such 
as that of the United States tend to “see the female as existing for male use and 
male gratification” (Fisher, 1979, p. 36). Meanwhile, women in rape cultures tend 
to be perpetually concerned about the possibility of sexual assault, especially 
rape – they are “used to feeling unsafe”, and habitually “do things throughout 
the day to protect themselves” (Valenti, 2007, p. 63). In rape cultures, fear of rape 
often determines where and when women travel, what they carry with them, 
and what they are thinking about as they move through public (male) spaces, 
which they know to be potentially unsafe – for females because of males.
Women are exploitable. Anymals are exploitable. All that is on the Not Pro-
totype side is viewed as available for all those on the Prototype side. Ecofemi-
nists point to the interconnected nature of oppression, to dualism and hierarchy 
as undergirding oppressions – “Racism, the belief in the inherent superiority of 
one race over all others and thereby the right to dominance. Sexism, the belief 
in the inherent superiority of one sex over the other and thereby the right 
to dominance. Ageism. Heterosexism. Elitism. Classism” (Lorde, 2000, p. 527). 
Ageism, ableism, and speciesism are also on the list of prominent Greco-diaspora 
oppressions. Because they recognize that oppressions are rooted in a world-
view of dualism and hierarchy that fosters systems of oppression, ecofeminists 
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recognize that the “struggle for women’s liberation is inextricably linked to 
abolition of all oppression” (Gruen, 1993, p. 82).
Dualism, hierarchy, oppression, and animal agriculture
A cow exploited for dairy in the United States suffers from at least three forms 
of discrimination: She is not male and not human, and is therefore assumed to 
be not rational. A cow exploited for dairy is a farmer’s property, and has no legal 
right to liberty, bodily integrity, or even life. Labeled “animal”5 and irrational, 
she is viewed as having no innate value as an individual, and is legally manipu-
lated and exploited from birth to death by those in the Prototype category.
In the dualistic worldview, most cows are viewed as having one thing going 
for them – are seen as productive – at least for a few years. Viewed as a pro-
ductive female, a cow’s suffering is both physically and psychologically unique 
because the exploitation she experiences is rooted in her female biology. Before 
being exploited as flesh for eating (along with much younger male bovines), 
she is exploited for about five years for her reproductive biology, for nursing 
milk. Naturally, like humans, a cow only lactates if she is pregnant and gives 
birth. Ironically, the milk she produces for her young becomes the focus of the 
farmer’s economic interest, while her calf – precious to her as to any mother – 
is viewed by the farmer as nothing more than a byproduct of the dairy industry, 
even if a byproduct that can be sold for profit.
Ranchers exploit male bovines differently because steers have no capacity to 
be impregnated, give birth, or lactate, and so they are exploited solely for their 
flesh. Except for a very tiny percentage of bulls who are exploited for sperm, 
steers are slaughtered at about 9 months.
Cows are not unique in the world of farmed anymals – all factory farmed 
females suffer in particularly painful ways because of their reproductive biology, and 
they suffer for a longer period of time than their male counterparts. When work-
ing for legal changes on behalf of farmed anymals, anymal activists naturally 
target what is deemed to be the worst practices. For at least a decade, activists 
have focused on the extreme confinement of veal crates for calves, farrowing 
and gestation crates for sows, and battery cages for hens. The common denomi-
nator for each of these extreme mechanisms of confinement is the exploitation 
of female reproductive capacities. Millions of calves, snatched from the loving 
care of their desperate mothers shortly after birth, are stuffed into tiny veal 
crates so that we can consume their mother’s milk. “Veal production in the U.S. 
remains closely tied to the dairy industry”, and “the U.S. produces more than 
150 million pounds of veal annually” (Veal, 2017). The mothers of these calves 
also suffer greatly. They suffer from repeated, forcible impregnation, repeated 
childbirth and kidnapping, and what must seem to them an endless cycle of 
milk production in which they are milked for ten out of twelve months of 
every year. Cows exploited for dairy are repeatedly put through this painful 
cycle until they are no longer considered productive – though only about a 
quarter of the way through their natural lifespan – at which time they are sent 
to slaughter (Kemmerer, 2011, pp. 6–9).
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Sows and hens are also exploited for their reproductive capacity, and in the 
process, as with cows, they suffer both psychologically and physically in ways 
that other farmed anymals do not suffer. Like cows, sows are repeatedly, forci-
bly impregnated. They suffer extreme confinement in gestation and farrowing 
pens, when they are pregnant and when they are nursing, respectively. In the 
process, as with cows, they are repeatedly forcibly impregnated. Whereas piglets 
would normally nurse for nearly four months, they are taken away after just two 
or three weeks with their mother. Some 100 million sows and their offspring 
are slaughtered annually (Kemmerer, 2011, pp. 9–10). After they are 18 weeks 
old, 300 million “laying” hens are housed in extreme confinement for the rest 
of their very short lives. They are kept in these tiny battery cages because we 
exploit them for their reproductive eggs. Though their wild counterparts, jun-
glefowl of India, produce only about twenty eggs per year, factory farmed hens 
are manipulated so that they produce upwards of 250 eggs annually. Yet they 
never hear the peep of a chick, or see their offspring flap their little wings as 
they learn to fly (Kemmerer, 2011, pp. 10–13).
Not only cows, sows, and hens suffer in particularly excruciating ways – 
 psychologically (from never actually being allowed to reproduce and raise 
young, and from the loss of their young). Hens and sows exploited for eggs and 
offspring also suffer from extreme confinement. Cows, sows, and hens also suffer 
in particularly painful ways physically – from forced impregnation and excessive 
production. They also suffer much longer than their male counterparts because 
they are exploited for their reproductive capacities. Factory farmed cows suffer 
seven times as long as their male counterparts; factory farmed sows and hens 
suffer twelve times as long as males of the same species (Table 3.2).
Cows, sows, and hens suffer because they are females – because they are 
exploited for their reproductive powers. Cows, sows, and hens suffer repeated, 
forcible impregnation, extreme confinement, and maternal deprivation. Like 
Sojourner Truth, wouldn’t these suffering, cruelly exploited individuals cry 
out – “Ain’t I a female, too?” (Kemmerer, 2011, p. 23).
Female farmed anymals fall into the false dichotomy of not male, not human, 
not rational, and not civilized. In the Greco-diaspora worldview, all they have 
going for them is their productive capacity, and so they are exploited for their 
reproductive capacities . . . and then slaughtered. The value of their lives is 
measured only through what those on the Prototype side can glean from the 
Table 3.2  Comparison of farmed anymal suffering based on sex.
Months/weeks 
for males
Years for females Lifetime production Well-known sufferings of 
females in industries
Cows 9 months 6 years (7 × as long) 150 tons of milk Downed cows, rape racks
Sows 6 months 6 years (12 × as long) 120 piglets Gestation/farrowing pens
Hens 6 weeks 1.5 years (12 × as long) 350 eggs Battery cages
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exploitation of their reproductive capacities – their young, their nursing milk, 
their reproductive eggs, and then, finally, their flesh.
An ecofeminist analysis of animal agriculture  
and climate change
In the Greco-diaspora worldview, anymals, women, and the natural environ-
ment are pushed onto the Not Prototype side – and they are viewed as more 
closely connected to one another than to those on the Prototype side. Anymals, 
women, and the natural environment are all denigrated in relation to those 
on the Prototype side. They are all assumed to require the management and 
protection of those on the Prototype side, and subsequently as available for 
exploitation by those on the Prototype side. How does this ecofeminist analysis 
help us to better understand climate change?
Anymal exploitation is the number one cause of GHGE. Consuming ani-
mal products creates ten times more fossil fuel emissions per calorie than does 
consuming plant foods directly (Oppenlander, 2011, p. 18). Anymal agriculture 
creates GHGE via:
• Producing grains to feed farmed anymals (70 per cent of grains in the U.S. 
and 60 per cent of grains in the EU are grown to feed farmed anymals 
(Kemmerer, 2014, p. 8), which means that the machinery manufactured 
and run with fossil fuels to plow the land, transport seeds, store seeds, plant 
crops, weed crops, store and transport chemical fertilizers and herbicides, 
spread chemical fertilizers and herbicides, harvest, transport produce, store 
produce, and so on are all on behalf of anymal agriculture).
• Tending (throughout their shortened lifespans) and transport of farmed 
anymals and their nursing milk and reproductive eggs.
• Slaughter, transport, and storage of anymal products (body parts, nursing 
milk, and reproductive eggs).
• Farmed anymal respiration (carbon dioxide), cud chewing (potent meth-
ane), and other gases released by billions of farmed anymals – all of which 
are accentuated in grass-fed production.
• Manure decomposition (which create the most potent greenhouse gas, 
nitrous oxide).
• Deforestation to plant crops to feed farmed anymals, and so to graze farmed 
anymals.
(Kemmerer, 2014, pp. 5–17)
The Greco-diaspora worldview denigrates farmed anymals (as Not Prototype 
in almost every way) to the point where they are treated as objects for exploi-
tation, rather than as individuals with personalities, with lives to be respected. 
Because of the Greco-diaspora worldview, they are cruelly exploited en masse 
for flesh, dairy, and eggs. Because the Greco-diaspora worldview affords no 
respect to farmed anymals, animal agriculture despoils the Earth. Yet, like the 
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air that we breathe, we do not see our worldview, let alone the suffering and 
devastation that follows from this worldview. Most of us living in the Greco-
diaspora don’t even know that all of our most pressing environmental problems 
stem from anymal agriculture (Kemmerer, 2014):
• The production of feed crops for farmed anymals, and grazing, are the pri-
mary causes of deforestation.
• Manure in water systems is the primary cause of water pollution and dead 
zones.
• Watering crops (again, 70 per cent of grains in the U.S. and 60 per cent of 
EU grains are fed to farmed anymals) is the number one cause of freshwa-
ter reduction.
• Overgrazing (and deforestation for grazing and feed crops) is the primary 
cause of desertification.
• Anymal agriculture is the number one anthropogenic cause of GHGE.
(Kemmerer, 2014)
Ecofeminists note that denigration and exploitation of all that is on the Not 
Prototype side, viewed as dependent and exploitable, are inherent in the Greco-
diaspora worldview. Moreover, this denigration causes tremendous environ-
mental damage. And where the exploitation of female and anymal intersects, 
this results in the greatest suffering and the greatest environmental damage. 
Lactating cows consume about 20 gallons of water and 56 pounds of grain per 
day, depleting freshwater reserves and requiring an army of gas-guzzling trucks 
to do all that is necessary to produce large quantities of grain (Kemmerer, 2014, 
pp. 11–12). Of course, what goes in must come out, and just one lactating cow 
produces about 150 pounds of waste every day (Kemmerer, 2014, p. 18). As cud-
chewers, kept alive much longer than their flesh-producing counterparts, cows 
exploited for dairy also produce GHGE in the form of methane, and again, 
they produce more than any other exploited bovines – particularly if they are 
grass fed (Kemmerer, 2014, p. 15). Consequently, if one cares about the planet, 
“it is much better to be quarter-vegan than 100 percent vegetarian” (Halley, 
2015, p. 159). As ecofeminism indicates, the denigration and exploitation of 
anymals and females are linked with environmental devastation – including 
climate change.
What we consume is of critical importance with regard to climate change, 
but how much we consume is also vital. Again, ecofeminist analysis of the Greco-
diaspora worldview, of dualism, hierarchy, and environmental degradation, offers 
insights into the problems of overconsumption.
At least in part, consumption stems from the number of humans consuming, 
and in turn, this is affected by birth rates, which are dependent on the sta-
tus of women in a particular community. Birth rates drop naturally, alleviating 
environmental degradation, when women are empowered – when women feel 
they have opportunities and options in life (Kemmerer, Kirjner, Gross, & Bail-
let, 2015, pp. 263–264). Empowered women also tend to wait longer to have 
children, often skipping a generation (Kemmerer et al., 2015, pp. 263–264). 
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Having fewer children and skipping a generation are critical for slowing human 
population growth.
Lowering birth rates is particularly vital in Greco-diaspora communities, where 
the value placed on production and reproduction has spawned and fosters capi-
talism, which has fostered extremely high consumption patterns. For those born 
into Greco-diaspora communities, every birth comes packaged with compara-
tively high levels of consumption (Kemmerer et al., 2015, pp. 261). For  example – 
and most importantly – Greco-diaspora peoples tend to consume more anymal 
products, which makes their environmental footprint astronomically larger than 
that of other peoples. Greco-diaspora nations also tend to use carbon-crunching 
cars and take hot showers on a daily basis, and use air conditioning in the sum-
mer and heaters in the winter (Kemmerer et al., 2015, pp. 259–261). All of this 
is harmful to the environment – much more harmful than living without these 
unnecessary luxuries. The Greco-diaspora worldview not only disempowers 
women, leading to higher birth rates than would otherwise be the case, while 
simultaneously celebrating production and reproduction, but also denigrates the 
environment so that the damaging effects of human population and our exploita-
tion of the natural world (in the form of consumption) scarcely register.
Helping one denigrated, oppressed category (women and/or anymals) helps 
other denigrated, oppressed categories (the environment). As ecofeminists note, 
oppressions are interconnected so that respecting females and anymals will 
reduce environmental degradation, including greenhouse gas emissions that 
foster climate change.
Philosophies of interconnection
As noted, concepts and entities viewed as polar opposites in the false value 
dualisms of Greco-diaspora cultures are easily understood to be connected and 
interrelated. To offer yet more examples, heterosexuality and homosexuality 
exist on a sliding scale, and are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, no one is fully 
abled or fully disabled when we consider such things as memory, genetic pro-
pensities, condition of teeth, vision, social skills, a slightly shorter leg, and so on. 
While such differences may be prohibitive in some ways (someone with a short 
leg is not apt to be a gymnast, and someone with weaker vision is not likely 
to become a pilot) all living beings have a variety of such differing conditions 
and abilities. Like sexuality, disability exists on a sliding scale. Finally, mind/
reason/spirit and body/emotion are connected via a physical brain, from which 
thoughts, reason, and emotion stem.
Moreover, dualistic opposites do not exist in nature. Dualistic opposites 
support extant power structures – they support and defend the privilege and 
power of those who are white, male, able-bodied human beings. This method 
of categorization, like all cultural worldviews, only exists within the mindsets of 
Greco-diaspora people. But it does not exist in all mindsets of Greco-diaspora 
people. Needless to say, some (if not many) of those on the Not Prototype side 
are likely aware that they are not lesser than those on the Prototype side, that 
they are not inherently exploitable for the purposes of those who imagine that 
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they are more important. Still others (frogs, grasses, small children, river ecosys-
tems, and people who live in relative cultural isolation) are not even aware of 
the nonsense of false value dualisms of Greco-diaspora communities. Outside 
the worldview/mindsets of many in Greco-diaspora communities, there is no 
reason to hold men over women, whites over Blacks, humans over chickens, or 
mountains over mole-hills and pebbles. This is only a Greco-diaspora world-
view of where individuals stand in relation to one another and in relation to the 
world. Nonetheless, those firmly within this cultural tradition are likely to find 
it almost impossible to imagine any human who does not believe that humans 
are above chickens – in fact, most Greco-diaspora individuals are likely to find 
it extremely difficult to imagine a world without a hierarchy of being. Similarly, 
people living in other cultures likely find it difficult to believe that any human 
could envision themselves as separate from, let alone above, a chicken (or any 
other living being). For example, in the Sioux worldview, which “deeply val-
ues nature and wildlife”, it is understood that “all animals – two-legged, four-
legged, everything – are equal” (Lee, 2017, p. 8).
When faced with pressing problems like climate change, it behooves us to 
“uncover how truths have been made” and seek out “competing and alterna-
tive truths” (Medina, 2011, p. 26) – not only the Sioux worldview, but many 
indigenous worldviews, and worldviews from Asia, as well as insights provided 
by science. Indigenous cultures (such as Sioux culture), though all unique, tend 
to more readily recognize humans as animals – and anymals as people. Indige-
nous worldviews are more likely to recognize humans as one community among 
many communities of being, each marvelous and each marvelously interdepend-
ent (Kemmerer, 2012, pp. 23, 38–39). Ayllu is an Andean, Quechua word that 
refers to one’s extended family, their larger community. For the Quechua, “it is 
not only that everything is alive, but that everything is a person with whom one 
converses and shares, equally” (Valladolid, 2001, p. 655). Ayllu “refers to the family 
that extends beyond just the human relatives. The rocks, the rivers, the sun, the 
moon, the plants, the animals are all members of the ayllu. All those that are found 
in the territory where they live in community are their ayllu” (Valladolid, 2001, 
p. 656). Indigenous peoples tend to “recognize their own villages as part of a 
larger community that includes all of the natural world” (Kemmerer, 2012, p. 23).
Philosophies and religions of India offer a vision of oneness in which all 
living beings, all of history, the present, and the future, are inextricably inter-
connected. In the Hindu spiritual understanding, through eons of karma and 
reincarnation, all beings will have been and therefore are in some measure male 
and female, cow and frog, Latinx and Native American. Hindus “see themselves 
in every living being, and . . . every living being in Self ” (Kemmerer, 2012, 
p. 63). As all rivers join to one sea, which rises again into the atmosphere 
to become individual drops, so all living beings – whatever form they might 
take – are united and interconnected (Müller, 1962, p. 102). The ground of each 
individual’s being “is identical with the ground of the universe”, whether that 
individual is mollusk or bird (Embree, 1972, p. 59).
Buddhism emerged in India and accepted core philosophical visions of the 
Hindu tradition, including reincarnation, karma, and a vision of oneness and 
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interconnection from the larger Indian philosophical tradition. It is therefore 
not surprising that, over time, Buddhism developed “a vision of radical oneness, 
of interidentification, where all entities are identified with all other entities” 
(Kemmerer, 2012, p. 103). Radical oneness teaches that “I am one with the 
wonderful pattern of life which radiates out in all directions. . . . I am the frog 
swimming in the pond and I am also the snake who needs the body of the 
frog to nourish [his or her] own body” (Allendorf, 1998, pp. 43–44). Buddhist 
oneness suggests not only that we are all “in this together”, but that we are this, 
“rising and falling as one living body” (Cook, 1977, p. 229). How, then, can a 
chicken be of lesser value than a human being?
Finally, consider the Greco-diaspora vision of hierarchy in light of biology, 
which teaches us that humans (like all animals) are ultimately and fundamentally 
dependent on plants for their existence. Vegans (deer, rabbits, and so on), omni-
vores (including bears and coyotes), and carnivores (largely felines and raptors) 
require greens, for none could live without grasses and shrubbery that sustain 
the atmosphere and feed the vegans and omnivores, as well as carnivores (who 
eat vegans and omnivores). Given the fundamental importance of greens, the 
dependence of all flesh on plants, everything green and growing, lies at the 
foundation of existence, and is therefore more important to life than animals – 
particularly humans, who do little to help ecosystems and much that is damaging 
to the natural world. Moreover, if the ability to persist and live compatibly on 
planet Earth is any measure of evolutionary fitness, then humans must be recog-
nized as a very low life form indeed, for we seem incapable of living peacefully 
either with one another or with other living beings and the natural environment.
These two worldviews (indigenous cultures and Indian philosophies and 
religions), and science, allow us to see the Greco-diaspora worldview in a 
fresh light, a light that exposes our worldview as narrow, arrogant, and shal-
low – as failing to reflect the complex, interdependent world in which we find 
ourselves. In this light, the Greco-diaspora, dualistic, hierarchical worldview 
appears groundless and misguided. Indeed, the “truths” of the powerful are 
often clouded by self-interest and ignorance.
Conclusion
The Greco-diaspora worldview presented and critiqued in this chapter under-
girds climate change denial and resultant inaction, all promoted by incredibly 
powerful special interests through their flush public relations campaigns. Human 
understandings of our rightful relations with one another and with the natural 
world are shaped by culture, our community’s worldview. But Homo sapiens are 
often “unable to understand the world that they themselves have created” – to 
recognize their worldview as nothing more than that (Medina, 2011, p. 31). See-
ing our worldview for what it is, especially the damaging Greco-diaspora world-
view, can help us to work against climate change – and climate change denial.
Ecofeminists expose false value dualisms and hierarchy as central to the 
Greco-diaspora worldview – the worldview of those largely responsible for both 
climate change and climate change denial – and as justifying the exploitation 
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of the many, and of the natural environment, by and for the few. Ecofeminists 
reveal how the denigration and exploitation of women are linked to denigra-
tion and exploitation of cows and sows and hens, and how the denigration 
and exploitation of all that is deemed not male and not human lead to the 
denigration, exploitation, and destruction of the environment. They expose 
the Greco-diaspora worldview as false, as harmful to individuals, as ecologically 
destructive, and as fundamentally unjust. Ecofeminists implicate the Greco-
diaspora worldview, as invisible as the air that we breathe, in fostering climate 
change and climate change denial.
Ecofeminism is an integrative, holistic theory rooted in a conception of inter-
connection, and an integrative, holistic practice that “requires activism consist-
ent with analysis” (Howell, 1997, p. 233). As individuals we can work against 
climate change if we examine our part in the problem, if we change our lives 
accordingly. To do this, those of us who come from Greco-diaspora cultures 
must own and let go of any privilege and power granted us by false value dual-
isms. Those of us from the Greco-diaspora must stop othering, denigrating, and 
exploiting farmed anymals, women, lesbians, people of color, “weeds”, soils, and 
so on. When we examine our Greco-diaspora worldview, and see the resultant 
damage – when we see the connections between our largely unnoticed world-
view and the ravages of climate change – we can let go of these misconceptions 
and change how we look at the world and how we live in the world.
Once we have adjusted our personal lives (go vegan, for example), we can 
reach out to others, and we can share what we have learned. We can help 
others to recognize false value dualism and hierarchy, resultant denigration and 
exploitation, and we can show them that it is not difficult to let go of  privilege – 
whether white, human, hetero, or male privilege. As we bring our actions in line 
with our knowledge, we can invite others to walk beside us by lobbying, public 
relations outreach, and from positions of leadership in social justice organizations.
Luckily, the worldview of Greco-diaspora peoples is just one among many 
possible worldviews. Ecofeminism, alongside worldviews from other cultures, 
offers an alternative vision, one of interconnections and respect for life and the 
environment. If we work at it, we can see the air that we breathe, recognize our 
utter dependence not just on the atmosphere but on this planet, and choose to 
change our outlook and our actions.
Notes
 1 Greco-diaspora refers to nations and cultures that look back to their roots in ancient Greece. 
These nations are often termed Western, but I do not use this term because it reveals a 
certain narrowness of vision – west of what?
 2 U.S. culture stems most immediately from England, more distantly from ancient Greece, 
and more broadly from Western Europe. These nations/cultures and any nation/culture 
that stems from any one of these areas are implicated in this chapter. I focus largely on U.S. 
culture for several reasons: To point the finger inward – because this is the culture with 
which I am most familiar – and because the United States seems to be a more-so affect in 
comparison with other Greco-diaspora nations/cultures.
 3 Anymal (a contraction of any and animal, pronounced like “any” and “mal”) refers to all 
individuals who are of a species other than that of the speaker/author. This means that if a 
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human being uses the term, all species except Homo sapiens are indicated. If a chimpanzee 
signs anymal, all species (including human beings) will be included except chimpanzees. 
Using the term anymal avoids the use of:
• Animal as if human beings were not animals
• Dualistic and alienating references such as non and other
• Cumbersome terms such as nonhuman animals and other-than-human animals
  See Kemmerer (2006).
 4 Rape is generally defined as “forced intercourse”, whether oral, anal, or vaginal, whether 
the force is physical or psychological (Valenti, 2007, p. 65). Sexual assault is “unwanted 
sexual contact”, including touching, kissing, standing so as to rub up against someone, 
attempted rape, and rape (Valenti, 2007, p. 65; Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 2015, pp. 620–621).
 5 “Animal” is in quotes to remind that humans are also animals, and so this term is misused 
when used as a way to “other” animals that are not also human beings.
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Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change is considered to be an existential challenge for 
human societies and thus one of the most pressing ethical issues in the global 
political agenda. A changing climate will increase floods, storms, and droughts, 
thereby threatening the health and livelihood of many human beings. Though 
most of these humans are yet unborn, it is nevertheless true that our present 
decisions shall have a large impact on their future well-being. It is commonly 
assumed that values such as human life, the environment, and biodiversity are 
those most potentially negatively affected by climate change. Nevertheless, as 
we shall argue, this neglects to take into account the interests of the majority of 
present and, probably, future sentient organisms – nonhuman animals. If climate 
change is to be prevented or mitigated, it must be because it is bad for all individ-
uals affected by it, irrespective of species membership or other irrelevant criteria.
Regardless of the magnitude and complexity of the problems surrounding 
the ethics of climate change, there are many who deny its importance, includ-
ing the extent to which it is caused by humans, as well as its impact on the 
environment or on human societies. In this chapter we start by introducing 
two requirements to assess an ethics of climate change. Any sound such eth-
ics should be able to both accommodate the scientific consensus on the topic 
and correctly pinpoint the moral reasons we may have to prevent or mitigate 
its consequences. We then proceed by examining different versions of denial-
ism and by assessing the extent to which they comply with, or fail to meet, 
such requirements (first section). Denialism in its different varieties is usually 
thought to be best confronted from an environmentalist perspective. Never-
theless, we argue that environmentalism cannot provide us with good enough 
reasons on which to ground an ethics of climate change (second section). Con-
trariwise, we defend that the badness of climate change and the strength of 
our reasons to oppose it can only be properly assessed considering the interests 
of both humans and nonhuman animals. Thus, an alternative (antispeciesist) 
approach to the ethics of climate change is necessary (third section). Once we 
adopt this perspective, it can be argued that a disvaluable probable outcome of 
climate change is that it reduces the opportunities for humans to help animals 
that live in the wild. This entails that our reasons to mitigate climate change 
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may be even stronger than ordinarily supposed (fourth section). Finally, we will 
state the conclusions of our argument and suggest a few questions for further 
research (fifth section).
The ethics of climate change and two varieties  
of denialism
Any plausible ethics of climate change must meet an:
Epistemic Requirement: That is, it must defer to the facts about climate 
change and their impact on individual well-being and the environment, as 
identified by the scientific consensus;
and a
Moral Requirement: That is, it must include an acceptable theory assessing 
the net expectable value (either positive or negative) of climate change 
and specifying the reasons we may have to mitigate it or prevent it from 
happening.
The term climate change denialism is ambiguous, since it may express at least 
two different and incompatible views. These may be distinguished according 
to whether they refer to the Epistemic or Moral Requirements previously 
described. Thus:
Epistemic Denialism: Either anthropogenic climate change does not exist or 
the individuals affected by it will not be severely harmed.
This is perhaps the most visible kind of denialism.1 Consider first the claim 
that there is no such thing as anthropogenic climate change. Epistemic Denial-
ists need not refuse to believe that the climate is changing. They may simply 
claim that human activity is an inconsequential or minimally relevant contrib-
uting factor to that change. The main contributors to climate change would 
be the natural processes that have caused similar climactic fluctuations in the 
Earth’s past. Because climate change would not be the consequence of human 
activity, there would be no reason to modify the patterns of production and 
consumption that, on this view, are mistakenly believed to cause it. In addition, 
because any naturally occurring change in the climate would be gradual and 
stretch over a long period of time, it would be very unlikely to have severe, 
irremediable consequences for human well-being.
This version of Epistemic Denialism is, however, incompatible with the sci-
entific consensus on the issue (Allison et al., 2009; IPCC, 2014). There seem to 
be compelling reasons to reject this position and to accept, on the contrary, that 
human activity is the main contributor to climate change.
On another version of this view, anthropogenic climate change exists, but it 
is denied that the individuals affected by it will be severely harmed. This kind of 
Epistemic Denialism does not seem to be acceptable either. As before, the sci-
entific consensus suggests that, on the worst-case scenario, climate change will 
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be very harmful to, at least, hundreds of millions of human beings. Even if the 
risk of this scenario is low, because the harm inflicted would be so serious, the 
expectable consequences of climate change for millions of individuals would 
still be severe (IPCC, 2014, pp. 13–14).
Suppose, then, that we reject Epistemic Denialism. We accept that anthropo-
genic climate change exists, and that many individuals will be severely harmed 
by it. That suffices to meet the Epistemic Requirement mentioned earlier. 
Nevertheless we may endorse some form of:
Moral Denialism: The overall negative importance of climate change is 
unduly magnified. This is because:
 (i) The well-being of some individuals who will be severely harmed by 
climate change must be discounted to some degree, or it does not 
matter at all.
or because:
(ii) The severe harms suffered by some individuals will be, at least, com-
pensated by the benefits others will receive.
Let us consider first (i). Here the Moral Denialist admits that climate change 
will cause severe harms to many individuals. Yet it contends that these con-
sequences do not seriously matter from a moral point of view, since we may 
permissibly discount the harms suffered by the victims, or even refuse to take 
them into account altogether.
This seems to be the position implicit in the attitudes of some people in 
enriched countries. They are insufficiently motivated by the plight of inhabit-
ants of impoverished nations, who are both the ones most likely to suffer the 
severest consequences of climate change and the least equipped to cope with 
them. Such an example of Moral Denialism is not acceptable. On any plau-
sible ethical position, the interests of all humans matter. Even according to 
those views that allow for some degree of partiality, it seems wrong to refuse 
to impose some cost to the well-being of our fellow citizens if that is neces-
sary to avoid a moral catastrophe for hundreds of millions. Indeed, on some 
views, because those who would be harmed the most are already worse off, our 
reasons to mitigate or prevent the consequences of climate change would be 
especially strong (Singer, 2002; Gardiner, 2004).
This criticism can be extended to any version of Moral Denialism (i). It 
necessarily entails some form of unjustified discrimination, since it consists in 
disconsidering, totally or in part, on irrelevant grounds the interests of some of 
the individuals harmed by climate change.2 Thus, this kind of Moral Denialism 
cannot meet the Moral Requirement specified earlier and cannot therefore be 
part of a plausible ethics of climate change.
Now, regarding (ii), this would be the view that anthropogenic climate change 
has some beneficial effects and that these are, at least, sufficient to compensate 
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for the harms it causes. On the strongest version of this view, it may be claimed 
that the positive effects of climate change are more important than the negative 
ones. If that were the case, climate change would have expectably net positive 
consequences, so that we would have no reasons to mitigate it or prevent it 
from happening.
By way of illustration consider the following hypothetical scenario. Similarly 
to the actual world, the majority of human beings are comparatively very badly 
off. Contrary to the actual world, however, in this imagined situation the worse 
off would be the ones who would benefit the most from climate change. On 
this other Earth, the negative effects of climate change would be concentrated 
in the most affluent countries, whereas the most impoverished ones would 
see a reduction in the risks of natural catastrophes, such as famines, floods, and 
epidemics.
If, as we should, we reject all kinds of unjustified discrimination, many 
important ethical positions would imply that in this scenario we all have reasons 
to endorse Moral Denialism (ii). Though anthropogenic climate change would 
be real, its overall effects would make it desirable, considering the interests of all 
those affected.3 Thus, though Moral Denialism (i) is always unjustified, Moral 
Denialism (ii) may be acceptable under some circumstances on a variety of 
ethical perspectives. Therefore, it may be a part of a plausible ethics of climate 
change.
It is usually believed that environmentalism provides one of the most robust 
theoretical frameworks for grounding an ethics of climate change. On the one 
hand, it is compatible with accepting the scientific consensus about its exist-
ence and effects, thereby meeting the Epistemic Requirement. On the other, it 
allegedly assesses the seriousness of its consequences in the proper way by tak-
ing into account its negative impact on the well-being of all humans, without 
discrimination, as well as on ecosystems, species, and biodiversity. Thus, it would 
also meet the Moral Requirement.
In the next section, however, we will argue that the latter is not the case. 
This is because, as it will be explained, environmentalist positions unjustifiably 
disregard the interests of free-living animals. That leads them either to incur an 
unjustifiable Moral Denialism (i) or to be unable to endorse Moral Denialism 
(ii) in those scenarios in which it would be justified.
The environmentalist approach to climate change ethics
It does no longer seem to be a matter of contention whether anthropogenic 
climate change is real. As we have claimed before, any ethics of climate change 
that does not meet the Epistemic Requirement should be rejected on scien-
tific grounds. The question that should concern us is, thus, to what extent the 
overall consequences of climate change are desirable or not, as well as what we 
should do about it.
Probably the most widespread ethical approach to climate change is some 
version of environmentalism. According to environmentalism, an important 
reason why climate change should be prevented or mitigated is because it will 
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amount to a serious loss of valuable natural entities. Depending on the theory, 
what these entities are and how they are valued may vary. Consider first:
Anthropocentric Environmentalism: Natural entities and processes are valu-
able only insofar as their preservation is necessary to guarantee present and 
future human well-being.
According to this view, natural entities and processes are not valuable in 
themselves. They merely have the kind of value usually called instrumental. That 
is, they are valuable as a means to obtain something else, which is whatever is 
considered to have final, or telic, value. Furthermore, this version of environ-
mentalism is anthropocentric because it assumes that only human well-being 
can be considered valuable in this ultimate way.
Now, if individual well-being is morally relevant, then it must be relevant 
regardless whose well-being it is. Humans though, are not the only ones capable 
of having a well-being of their own. Every sentient individual does. The term 
sentience refers to the capacity to experience the world in negative and positive 
ways—that is, to experience suffering and pleasure. Since most nonhuman ani-
mals are sentient, they also have a well-being of their own.
A sentient individual is harmed by a certain event just in case she is made 
worse off than she would have been if that event had not occurred. Maybe that 
event introduces something bad in her life, or maybe it prevents something 
good from happening. To the extent that an event harms an individual, that 
individual has an interest in that event not taking place. Thus we also have 
reasons to prevent or mitigate the harms that may befall upon nonhuman indi-
viduals because of climate change.
Some might be tempted to say that nonhuman well-being should not be 
an object of moral concern because nonhuman animals do not belong to the 
human species. However, species membership is, in itself, completely irrelevant 
for determining whether someone’s well-being should be considered, since 
it does not affect whether or how an individual can be harmed or benefited. 
Neither should it affect the weight we assign to someone’s interest not to be 
harmed.
The same happens with other criteria that have been appealed to in order to 
establish a moral divide between human and nonhuman individuals, such as the 
higher cognitive capacities of adult human beings (Singer, 1975; Pluhar, 1995; 
Dombrowski, 1997; Tanner, 2011; Horta, 2014). Of course, cognitive complex-
ity is gradual and not species-specific. That is, not all human beings have the 
same levels of cognitive capacities, and many nonhumans have equal or higher 
cognitive complexity than certain human beings. If we want to ground an eth-
ics of climate change on such a criterion of moral considerability, we will nec-
essarily be led to defend that the weight of interests of individuals varies with 
the complexity of their cognitive capacities. The implication is that the interests 
of human beings with lower cognitive capacities would thus matter less than 
the interests of the best cognitively equipped individuals (or not at all). How-
ever, there seems to be something morally disturbing about such a scenario. 
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We usually think that independently of their level of cognitive capacities, the 
well-being of the least endowed humans matters (at least) as much as the well-
being of the best endowed. And that seems correct. Higher cognitive capacities 
do not correlate with higher capacity for suffering. Thus, equal interests not 
to suffer should be equally considered, irrespective of species membership and 
other morally irrelevant criteria.
What follows from this is that when assessing the badness of climate change, 
Anthropocentric Environmentalism fails consider all individuals affected by it. 
By neglecting to take into account the well-being of nonhuman animals, sim-
ply because of their species, Anthropocentric Environmentalism incurs in an 
kind of unjustified discrimination, usually called speciesism (e.g. Singer, 1975; 
Pluhar, 1995; Horta, 2010a). This is a particularly important oversight, as we 
will now see, regarding animals living in the wild.
Anthropocentric Environmentalism assumes that the natural environment is 
instrumentally valuable for human well-being. Even if that may be true when 
considering well-being exclusively, it is far from being the case once we include 
nonhuman well-being into the moral calculus. This is so because due to the 
higher exposure to the environment of nonhuman animals and their low ability 
to cope with it, natural processes as they presently exist are overall harmful for 
free-living sentient individuals. The widespread belief that the lives of animals 
in nature is idyllic, that is, that they tend to have positive levels of well-being, 
is probably false. The majority of free-living animals follow a wasteful repro-
ductive strategy that increases fitness by maximizing the number of offspring. 
On average, only one individual per parent survives. The rest, often thousands 
or millions, die shortly after hatching. Given that most animals that live in 
the wild follow this strategy, data suggest that suffering and early death likely 
predominate in the wild (e.g. Ng, 1995; Tomasik, 2009/2015; Horta, 2010b). 
In addition, animals that do survive to adulthood endure a variety of natural 
harms. Starvation, parasitism, disease, aggressions by conspecifics or predators, 
and extreme weather conditions are the norm in nature (e.g. Faria & Paez, 
2015; Faria, 2016).
It has been suggested that animals living in the wild exceed in many orders 
of magnitude the present number of human beings and nonhuman animals 
under exploitation (Tomasik, 2009).4 Thus, by disregarding the interests of free-
living animals, Anthropocentric Environmentalism incurs an unjustifiable form 
of Moral Denialism (i), according to which the interests of the majority of 
individuals affected by climate change do not matter at all. As we have seen, 
there is no plausible defense of such a view. A sound nondiscriminatory ethics 
of climate change must factor the well-being of all sentient animals (including 
those living in the wild) when calculating the moral importance of the expect-
able harms and benefits of climate change. We must assess the ways in which a 
changing climate may aggravate their situation or, contrarily, alleviate it.
Now some proponents of environmental ethics oppose Anthropocentric 
Environmentalism. They claim that, important though harms and benefits to 
human and nonhumans may be, we should not be primarily concerned about 
the impact of climate change on individual well-being. Rather, we should 
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counteract the consequences of climate change mainly because it jeopardizes 
other values Consider:
Telic Environmentalism:
 (i) Natural entities and processes are valuable in themselves, even if 
individual well-being also has ultimate value.
(ii) Whenever the aim of promoting the well-being of individuals and 
that of preserving natural entities and processes are incompatible, the 
latter has priority.
Different views will have different accounts of what natural entities are val-
uable in this final, or telic, way. They may include living organisms, species, 
biocenoses, and ecosystems or other ecological wholes. For instance, on Aldo 
Leopold’s seminal view an action is wrong when it goes against the integrity 
and stability of the so-called “biotic community” (Leopold, 1949/1989). Other 
such holistic views have been defended (e.g. Callicott, 2009), while there are 
those who claim that the value of ecological wholes is entirely reducible to that 
of its individual members (e.g. Taylor, 1986; Attfield, 1987).
Whatever the account of what entities have ultimate value, it is important to 
stress that, for Telic Environmentalism, the badness of anthropogenic climate 
change cannot be reduced to its potential negative impact on individual well-
being. Indeed, our most important reasons to counteract climate change are not 
given by its negative impact on individual lives. Rather, a state of affairs with 
less ecological integrity and stability and higher levels of individual well-being 
would be worse than a scenario with more ecological integrity and stability 
but lower levels of individual well-being. Given that conservationist aims have 
priority over the promotion of well-being, we should always prefer the latter 
scenario over the former.
In the case of anthropogenic climate change, on Telic Environmentalism, 
our main reasons to mitigate or prevent its effects are not provided by a concern 
for the well-being of sentient individuals. After all, this same negative impact on 
their well-being would take place if the climate was similarly changing due to 
entirely natural causes. We have reasons to try to stop or revert the process of 
climate change because it has been caused by human activity. It is its anthropo-
genic origin that makes it so especially disvaluable. According to this view, any 
human interference in natural processes entails a loss of value, and anthropo-
genic climate change amounts to an interference on a gargantuan scale. Moreo-
ver, on Telic Environmentalism as defined earlier, it would be justified to harm 
individual animals, human or not, in order to pursue these environmentalist 
aims. On this view, what matters most is the preservation of natural entities and 
processes free from human interference.
Now, it seems hardly acceptable that an ethical position should entail that, 
even in some cases, conservationist aims justify harming human beings when 
that benefits no other sentient individual. Imagine that a certain anthropogenic 
climatic variation will expectedly bring about the extinction of a certain species 
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of (non-sentient) parasites. As a result 400,000 human lives will be spared by 
not being infected with a certain vector-borne disease, without threatening 
anything of similar or greater importance for any other sentient being. If Telic 
Environmentalism is to be consistent we should prevent such climatic fluc-
tuation from happening, even if it would result in important benefits in terms 
of human well-being. Similarly, we should aim at counterbalancing ecological 
fluctuations generated by anthropogenic climate change even in those cases 
in which doing so would significantly diminish human well-being. Certainly, 
most people would find this unacceptable.
Some might then try to qualify Telic Environmentalism in a way that is 
compatible with the full consideration of human well-being, as follows:
Telic Environmentalism*:
 (i) Natural entities and processes are valuable in themselves, even if 
individual well-being also has ultimate value.
(ii) The aim of promoting human well-being has priority over the aim 
of preserving natural entities and processes, which in turn has prior-
ity over the aim of promoting nonhuman well-being.
This seems to be a very widespread view among both environmentalist scholars 
and the general public. However, as we have seen before, there is no principled 
difference between human and nonhuman well-being. As sentient individuals, 
both human and nonhuman animals can be negatively and positively affected 
by what happens to them, thereby being potentially harmed or benefited by 
the effects of climate change. If that is the case, then any attempt to ground 
human exceptionalism in an ethics of climate change will qualify as an instance 
of speciesism. Thus, it would incur in Moral Denialism (i), making ti an unac-
ceptable moral theory. Telic Environmentalism* is, then, confronted with a 
dilemma: Either it chooses to have unacceptable consequences for the human 
case or it endorses speciesism. In any case, this suffices to render it inadequate 
for grounding a plausible ethics of climate change.
Moreover, by refusing to take into account the well-being of nonhuman 
animals, or by considering it less important than human well-being, Telic 
Environmentalism would fail to meet the Moral Requirement in another way. 
Ignoring nonhuman well-being in the assessment of the expected value of 
climate change amounts to excluding from our ethical reflection the majority 
of those individuals who will be affected by it – free-living animals. Most of 
these animals presently have net negative lives, containing more suffering than 
positive well-being. A sound ethical position should be sensitive to the possi-
bility that, given their very low levels of well-being and their huge numbers, a 
changing climate might be overall positive for them. If that were the case, Moral 
Denialism (ii) would turn out to be the most justified ethical position. Yet, by 
disregarding the well-being of free-living animals, Telic Environmentalism is 
not equipped to support this view.
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Antispeciesism and climate change
Neither Anthropocentric nor Telic Environmentalism, then, is adequate to ground 
an ethics of climate change. There is, however, a sounder alternative, consisting in 
an antispeciesist approach to climate change ethics. In this section, we will describe 
that position in some detail. We will also show how, unlike environmentalism, it is 
an acceptable theory capable of meeting the Moral Requirement, irrespective of 
whether the consequences of climate change are good or bad overall.
The antispeciesist approach to climate change
Consider:
Antispeciesist Climate Change Ethics:
 (i) What matters most in assessing the net expectable value (either pos-
itive or negative) of climate change is its impact on the interests of 
sentient individuals.
(ii) The interests of some individuals do not matter less, or at all, simply 
because of their species.
This view tells us, first, that the most important consideration, from a moral 
point of view, when assessing the impact of climate change – and determining 
what we have most reasons to do about it – is its effects on the interests of the 
sentient individuals who will be affected by it. Unlike environmentalist views, 
therefore, it denies that there may be non-sentient entities (such as ecosystems, 
species, or biodiversity) whose preservation, for their own sake, may be more 
important than how the lives of sentient individuals fare.
This is, of course, perfectly compatible with assigning instrumental value to 
these natural entities and processes. Insofar as sentient individuals require an 
environment in which to exist, we have reasons to ensure that it fulfills those 
conditions that allow individuals to have the best possible lives. Ensuring that 
the result of anthropogenic climate change is not an environment more hostile 
to the interests of sentient individuals is, thus, one of the main aims that an 
Antispeciesist Climate Change Ethics assigns to moral agents.
Moreover, climate change may affect different individuals in different ways. 
Some may suffer comparatively minor harms due to it, while the well-being 
of others may be seriously affected. It is even possible, in principle, that climate 
change benefits some individuals. In assessing these different harms and ben-
efits it would be unjustified to discriminate against some human beings simply 
because of their gender, skin color, origin, or affluence.
Yet, in addition, according to this view, it would be unjustified to similarly 
disconsider in any way the harms or benefits some individuals may receive on 
the grounds that they are not human beings. As explained in the previous sec-
tion, this stands in sharp contrast with those environmentalist views that claim 
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that it would be justified to harm – or refuse to benefit – free-living animals, 
but not human beings, in pursuit of conservationist aims.
Antispeciesism and free-living animals: the Pessimistic Scenario
As we said before, animals living in nature constitute the overwhelming major-
ity of all sentient individuals. Nevertheless, the impact of climate change in 
their lives is seldom considered seriously. Certainly, warnings have been raised 
about the possible loss of biodiversity caused by human activity. Yet this typical 
environmentalist consideration must be distinguished from genuine concern 
for the well-being of individual animals. First, biodiversity loss may affect spe-
cies whose members are not sentient (such as plant, fungi, or bacteria). Second, 
both in practice and in principle a loss in biodiversity – i.e. a reduction in the 
number of existing species – is compatible with an increase in the quantity and 
quality of individual nonhuman lives. Third, over long stretches of time natural 
processes may make up for any present reduction in the number of species. 
Nevertheless, harm that may accrue to animals due to anthropogenic climate 
change will not be compensated by the mere passage of time.
As we did when discussing environmentalist views, we may wonder whether 
the effects of climate change on the well-being of free-living animals will 
be overall good or bad. This is important. Since these animals constitute the 
majority of sentient beings, it is impossible to provide an answer to the question 
whether climate change is net positive or, alternatively, net negative, all things 
considered, without taking them into account. We may also wonder whether, 
in any of those scenarios, an Antispeciesist Climate Change Ethics would incur 
some form of unjustified Moral Denialism, just as the environmentalist views 
that were surveyed do.
Let us consider first the following possibility:
Pessimistic Scenario: Because of climate change, the overall well-being of 
free-living animals will be lower.
Assuming an idyllic view of nature, it may seem reasonable to consider this 
the most likely outcome of climate change. On this view, if this hypothetical 
scenario was the case, then an inconceivable number of nonhuman individuals 
would also have worse lives because of it. In addition, we already have compel-
ling reasons to believe that hundreds of millions of human beings will have 
worse lives due to its effect. The implication of the Pessimistic Scenario is that 
even if we thought that climate change was bad because it was bad for human 
beings, we would have been wrong in our assessments. Given its impact on non-
human animals, it would actually be far worse. Therefore, our reasons to mitigate 
it or altogether prevent it would be much stronger than we previously thought.
We defined Moral Denialism in the following way:
The overall negative consequences of climate change have been unduly 
magnified. This is because:
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 (i) The well-being of some individuals who will be severely harmed by 
climate change must be discounted to some degree or it does not 
matter at all.
or because:
(ii) The severe harms suffered by some individuals will be, at least, com-
pensated by the benefits others will receive.
We also claimed that Moral Denialism (i) is always rejectable, since it implies 
some form or other of unjustified discrimination. Speciesism is one of those 
forms of discrimination. If the Pessimistic Scenario is true, whenever we dis-
regard the impact of climate change on free-living animals we are all being, in 
a way, Moral Denialists of this sort. Because an Antispeciesist Climate Change 
Ethics avoids any form of discrimination, including speciesism, it fails to be 
objectionable in this way.
On the other hand, if we reject all forms of discrimination, on the Pessimis-
tic Scenario, Moral Denialism (ii) could not be considered a justified position. 
That is, indeed, what would follow from an Antispeciesist Climate Change 
Ethics. The overwhelming majority of sentient beings would be harmed by 
climate change. That would not be compensated even if some human animals 
were to benefit from it. Thus, the expectable value of this scenario would still 
be net negative.
Antispeciesism and free-living animals: the Optimistic Scenario
Consider now:
Optimistic Scenario: Because of climate change, the overall well-being of 
free-living animals will be greater.
This scenario is not altogether implausible once we reject the idyllic view 
of nature. The effect of climate change in certain ecosystems may lead to a 
reduction in the quantity of free-living animals that they are able to support. As 
explained, we have compelling reasons to believe that the life of most of these 
animals is net negative, containing more suffering than positive experiences. If 
climate change causes a number of animals not to exist who would have other-
wise been born, that reduces the amount of suffering in the wild. If this was the 
main effect of climate change in ecosystems, the overall result would be a net 
reduction in animal suffering. In terms of their own well-being, then, climate 
change would be good for free-living animals.
Let us set aside the question of which situation, the Pessimistic or Optimistic 
Scenario, is the one we have most reason to believe, which will be discussed 
in the following section. Let us ask now whether an antispeciesist approach 
can provide acceptable grounds for an ethics of climate change even if we are 
optimistic about its effects. Moral Denialism (i) is, as argued, always rejectable, 
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as well as incompatible with an Antispeciesist Climate Change Ethics. We said, 
however, that Moral Denialism (ii) may be acceptable under some circum-
stances from a variety of ethical perspectives.
The Optimistic Scenario appears to be one of those circumstances. If we 
reject speciesism, it is hard to escape the conclusion that this situation would 
be morally preferable to mitigating or preventing the effects of climate change. 
Whether we endorse some consequentialist or deontological moral theory,5 the 
reduction in suffering that would thereby occur would provide us with com-
pelling moral reasons not to alleviate or nullify its effects.6 An acceptable ethics 
of climate change would claim that, therefore, Moral Denialism (ii) is justified. 
The antispeciesist approach is compatible with that claim.
The Moral Requirement, as defined earlier (first section), implies that any 
plausible climate change ethics must include an acceptable theory about how 
to assess its consequences on individuals and the reasons we thereby have to 
interfere with them. We also argued that any such theory must be able to reject 
any form of unjustified discrimination, thereby avoiding Moral Denialism (i). In 
addition, it must be able to reject Moral Denialism (ii) in those cases where, all 
things considered, the overall consequences of climate change are net negative. 
Conversely, it must entail this form of denialism in those cases in which there are 
compelling reasons to endorse it. As we explained, Moral Denialism (ii) would 
be a justified position provided that climate change is, overall, net positive.
Environmentalism fails to meet the Moral Requirement – it is no adequate 
grounds for an ethics of climate change (second section). Yet an antispeciesist 
approach is. On the one hand, it rejects speciesism and other forms of discrimi-
nation, along with Moral Denialism (i). On the other, it rejects Moral Denial-
ism (ii) in the Pessimistic Scenario, when there are compelling reasons to do 
so, while endorsing it in the Optimistic Scenario, when it is a justified position.
In the following section we will argue that the Pessimistic Scenario is the 
most plausible of the two hypothetical futures, even if for reasons that are not 
readily apparent. The implication is that, when we take into account the inter-
ests of free-living animals, our reasons to mitigate or prevent climate change 
reveal themselves to be much stronger than it is ordinarily acknowledged.
Further reasons to mitigate climate change:  
helping free-living animals
Let us set aside, for a moment, the impact of climate change on human well-
being. Suppose we focused exclusively on the question of how climate change 
will affect for good or ill the well-being of animals living in the wild. Very 
little work has been done on this topic, so that as Care Palmer (2011) admits 
we must recognize that we simply do not yet have enough data to settle for the 
Pessimistic or the Optimistic Scenario
Nevertheless, we believe that fortunately it might not be necessary to solve 
this problem in order to determine whether we should be inclined for the 
Pessimistic or the Optimistic Scenario. Once we consider how climate change 
may affect human capacity to alleviate or eliminate the suffering of free-living 
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animals, it seems we have compelling reasons to be pessimistic, given the huge 
number of animals affected and the severity of the harms they endure.
As explained earlier, these animals are exposed to a wide array of severe natu-
ral harms. They are usually starved and dehydrated. They suffer from extreme 
weather conditions. They are severely injured or ill. If we reject speciesism, we 
must acknowledge that we have very strong reasons to intervene in nature in 
order to help these animals, whenever we can. This is so provided, of course, 
that with our intervention we will not cause more harm than the one we 
intended to prevent or alleviate.
This situation of free-living animals, however, is so severe that it can only be 
addressed through collective human action. Indeed, the most far-reaching inter-
ventions in nature (such as medical care or a possible modification of reproduc-
tive strategies) require knowledge and technology not yet attained. It is likely 
that human beings will be disposed to help nonhuman animals in such costly 
ways only if they do not have to cope with the harms climate change may even-
tually inflict upon human societies. Thus, climate change minimizes the chances 
that animals will be helped. Given that they have very bad lives and they are the 
majority of sentient beings, progressive reductions in said chances amount to a 
corresponding increase in the expectable net negativity of the future.
The implication is thus that we have further reasons to prevent or mitigate 
climate change insofar as it increases the opportunities for human beings to 
help animals that live in the wild. Once this has been acknowledged, it must be 
concluded that our moral obligation to fight against climate change is far more 
serious than originally supposed.
Conclusion
If we are right, the usual way of understanding the ethics of climate change 
and the problem of climate change denialism is misguided. This is because 
Moral Denialism tends to be overlooked in our collective conversation about 
this topic, understandably eclipsed by Epistemic Denialism. In addition, envi-
ronmentalist views are assumed to provide the soundest moral accounts about 
the badness of climate change for human beings, nonhuman animals, and the 
environment, as well as about our obligation to mitigate it or prevent it.
We have argued, however, that this is mistaken. Environmentalism cannot 
ground a plausible climate change ethics. It incurs in unjustified Moral Deni-
alism by disregarding the effects of climate change on the lives of free-living 
animals. Only an antispeciesist approach is equipped to take into account the 
possible negative and positive effects of climate change on all sentient beings, 
thereby correctly assessing its overall value and deriving the reasons we may 
have to interfere with it.
From this antispeciesist perspective, the most serious negative effect of cli-
mate change is how it may make it less likely that human beings are able to help 
free-living animals in any significant way. Ensuring the continued existence of 
human societies with a capacity to assist these animals on a large scale should be, 
at least, one of our most important aims in our efforts against climate change.
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Notes
 1 Epistemic Denialism is present, for instance, in the current (2019) U.S. administration. 
See Lavelle, M., 9 June 2017, 5 Shades of Climate Denial, All on Display in the Trump White 
House. Retrieved from https://insideclimatenews.org/news/09062017/five-shades-
climate-denial-donald-trump-scott-pruitt-rex-tillerson-jobs-uncertainty-white-house; 
Holden, E., 3 July 2018, Climate change skeptics run the Trump administration. Retrieved 
from www.politico.com/story/2018/03/07/trump-climate-change-deniers-443533.
 2 For a robust account of the concept and wrongness of discrimination see Lippert- 
Rasmussen (2014).
 3 This is, of course, a purely hypothetical situation. As stated before, the authors are well 
aware that, according to the scientific consensus, climate change will be severely harm-
ful to millions of the most vulnerable humans, with future generations possibly being 
the ones most affected. It is worth asking, however, whether different circumstances may 
lead to a more positive assessment of climate change, since a sound climate change eth-
ics should be sensitive to such counterfactual considerations. Indeed, as will be seen later 
(third and fourth sections), it is worth asking whether the inclusion of free-living animals 
in our moral calculus may lead to such reevaluation of the impact of climate change.
 4 There are, at least, one quintillion wild animals (Tomasik, 2009). Animals under human 
control amount to, at least, one trillion (FAO, n.d.; Mood & Brooke, 2012). Humans con-
stitute a mere 0.00000076 per cent of all sentient beings.
 5 Consequentialist moral theories claim that we should act so as to bring about the best 
possible outcome. Different consequentialist theories disagree about what may be the best 
possible outcome. For instance, on utilitarianism, only the quantity of well-being matters. 
On egalitarianism or prioritarianism, it also matters how well-being is distributed. Non-
consequentialist theories claim that we are not generally required to bring about the best 
possible outcome. Deontological views are one kind of non-consequentialist theories. 
They claim that there are moral side-constraints that make it sometimes wrong to bring 
about the best possible outcome. For instance, a rights theory claims that it is generally 
wrong to violate individual rights, unless under extraordinary circumstances.
 6 That seems clearly so on utilitarianism. If the expectable results of climate change are net 
positive, taking into account the benefits for both humans and nonhumans, we would be 
required to let it happen without trying to mollify it. For similar reasons, such a require-
ment would also follow from egalitarianism or prioritarianism. See de Lazari-Radek and 
Singer (2014), Persson (1993), and Holtug (2007) for examples of, respectively, utilitarian, 
egalitarian, and prioritarian accounts that consider nonhuman animals. The obligation to 
let climate change happen may also plausibly follow from deontological accounts. Suppose 
it was necessary to violate some moral principle, such as infringing on individual rights, in 
order to do so. Even in that case, the aim of preventing some moral catastrophe may justify it.
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5  The elephant in the room
The role of interest groups in creating  
and sustaining the population taboo
Karin Kuhlemann
Preamble: the population explosion
Starting from the earliest unambiguous Homo sapiens populations roaming 
African savannahs, it took us about 300,000 years to reach a population size 
of one billion. We reached that milestone around 1804, when Jane Austen 
was penning her novels and Thomas Robert Malthus had already published 
a second, more developed version of his famous essay on population. A mere 
five generations later, in 1927, there were two billion of us. We doubled again 
within two generations: four billion by 1974. We are now expected to reach 
eight billion by 2023. If naturalist David Attenborough reaches age 97, he will 
have witnessed three doublings of the global population within his lifetime. Of 
all the human beings ever to have lived, an estimated one in fourteen are alive 
right now (Haub & Kaneda, 2018).
It is certainly true that the rate of population growth has come down signifi-
cantly. But our numbers are still expanding by eighty million to eight-five mil-
lion per year, roughly the same net growth since the 1970s. This works out to an 
extra billion people every twelve to fifteen years. The new billions have come in 
so fast we have lost sense of how gigantic even one billion truly is for a species 
of our size and appetites. If it were possible to line up one billion people into 
a shoulder stand, it would bridge the distance between the Earth and Moon 
four times. A stack of our current 7.7 billion-strong contingent would stretch 
one-fifth of the distance between Earth’s orbit and that of our nearest planetary 
neighbor: the eerily beautiful, barren, airless, toxic, radiation-doused Mars.
It used to be received wisdom that our numbers would peak at nine billion 
around the middle of this century then stabilize.1 Meanwhile we would find 
a way to eradicate food waste, persuade the global public to eat less meat, and 
develop technological solutions to the manifold threats to food security2 and 
livelihoods wrought by natural resource depletion. Then the expected popula-
tion peak moved to ten billion. The discourse among food security experts 
became yet more tentative and caveated; the United Nations started promoting 
insects as the protein source of the future.3
It was only in 2014 that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
started acknowledging that, along with economic growth, population growth 
is a primary driver of potentially catastrophic increases in greenhouse gas 
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emissions (IPCC, 2014). Perhaps because the IPCC wanted to avoid further 
controversy when reporting on climate change, a subject already beset by deni-
alism and policy inertia, little attention was paid to the implications of the 
population-climate change nexus. In essence, efforts to produce more food and 
to expand the economy to cater to the sustenance and livelihood needs of our 
ever-larger numbers are fueling climate change, which in turn makes it harder 
to grow food and threatens livelihoods. We are stuck in a vicious circle.
Standard assurances that we need not worry about population growth have 
become more muted since the publication of the United Nations’ 2015 and 
2017 demographic projections, which show our global numbers reaching 
eleven billion around 2090 and still ballooning well into the 22nd century 
(United Nations, 2015 and 2017). Though surprising to many, these projections 
in fact track long-range population forecasts produced by the United Nations 
and the World Bank over a quarter of a century ago (McNicoll, 1992), then 
quietly shelved as population denial hardened into a taboo.
The population taboo
The taboo was a long time coming. As early as the 1950s public figures were 
already biting their tongues and omitting population growth when discussing 
major threats to humanity, keen not to make serious problems appear even 
more hopeless, and anxious not to offend religious sensitivities.4 In time the 
sensitivities that came to obliterate discussion about overpopulation were not 
religious, but rather incongruously, those of an emerging global social justice 
movement concerned about the lot of the world’s poor, in particular women – 
the people most vulnerable to the impacts of overpopulation. These sensitivities 
came to a head at the United Nations’ International Conference on Population 
and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt, during September 1994.
The ICPD was a population summit at which the international community 
decided that we should stop talking about population. The mood of the time 
was a mix of optimism and frustration. Fertility rates had been falling even 
in high-fertility areas of the world. Many attendees (if few demographers)5 
believed that the demographic transition was unstoppable, bound to unfold on 
its own all over the world and wrap up within a few decades. “Populationist” 
spoilsports raising concerns about the unsustainability of current and future 
population numbers were dismissed as Malthusian holdovers who failed to get 
with the times. Many attending the ICPD shared the exasperation of social 
justice activists about the slow pace of realization of basic rights for women, 
serious injustices in global systems of trade, and grossly unequal patterns of 
consumption between the world’s rich and poor. In addition, there was con-
cern about the design of anti-natalist interventions in India, and general unease 
towards the Chinese one-child policy. Religious conservatives were alarmed 
at the ongoing trend of liberalization of abortion; they might also have been 
anxious at the ways smaller families and greater gender equality seem to lead to 
a decline in religiosity. In addition, many Western representatives were nervous 
about appearing to be anti-immigrant. And then there was the raw power of 
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growthism – politicians, business interests, and economists who believed that 
population growth was a good thing anyway. It was, as Martha Campbell has 
put it (2007), a “perfect storm” of opposition to population concern.
The consensus reached at Cairo in 1994 was that it was wrong to regard 
population growth as anything other than a symptom of poverty, lack of educa-
tion, and social or gender inequality.6 Problematizing population growth was 
to be regarded as suspect at best, and tyrannical at worst, an affront to a sup-
posed human right to procreate that was virtually absolute. But this is incon-
sistent with any realistic view of human rights. All rights require resources to 
give them effect, and often come into conflict with one another, by requiring 
incompatible actions or non-compossible resource allocations. An uncondi-
tional freedom to create new right-holders cannot be justified – at least, not 
without resort to implausible value commitments. It follows that the view of 
the right to procreate agreed at the ICPD represents a self-defeating failure to 
resolve underlying moral conflicts. A realistic human right to procreate must 
be conditional or limited (or both), a moral reality often acknowledged in 
scholarly literature.7 The practical consequences of this, however, are poorly 
understood and generally not discussed.
It made no difference that the position agreed at the ICPD was philosophi-
cally groundless; indeed, few raised this objection.8 The Cairo consensus was 
remarkably effective at shaming experts into silence. In the quarter-century 
since, natural scientists, environmentalists, demographers, journalists, and policy 
makers have studiously avoided problematizing population growth.9 One of 
the consequences of the population taboo was a sharp drop in funding for 
family planning services for many years after the ICPD.10 The situation has 
slowly improved after a series of initiatives aimed at refocusing policy makers’ 
attention; nonetheless, current disbursements still fall far short of the estimated 
funding required to fulfill unmet need for contraception (Grollman et al., 
2018), let alone instigate demand.11 Arguably greater harm has been done to 
humanity’s ability to understand and appropriately respond to climate change 
(Murtaugh & Schlax, 2009; Chamie & Mirkin, 2014; Wynes & Nicholas, 2017) 
and other complex, creeping catastrophes connected to overpopulation (Kuh-
lemann, 2018b).
In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that the contemporary rhetoric 
used to deny overpopulation and delegitimize population concern is a product 
of age-old growthist ideation combined with a revival of late 18th century 
utopian speculation. I start with a broad outline of the longer history of the 
debate, from antiquity to Malthus to the 20th century interest groups involved 
in bringing about the population taboo: growthists, religious conservatives, and 
social justice activists.12 I suggest that the controversy about overpopulation can 
be best understood as a duel between the widely shared belief in a demographic 
invisible hand guiding collective actions towards optimal communal outcomes 
versus the rather more dispiriting, pragmatic realization that collective action 
problems exist, can be extremely serious, and generally cannot be solved with-
out limiting individual freedoms.
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From antiquity to Malthus
Human overpopulation is empirically and normatively complex. Nevertheless, 
the basics of the phenomenon are not particularly complicated. People have 
probably always understood that there can be too many of us, more than our 
local environment can bear. Anxieties about humanity’s propensity to over-
populate are encoded in ancient storytelling, where the gods brought about 
barrenness, stillbirths, natural catastrophes, and war as a way of relieving the 
Earth from the stress of our excessive numbers.13
Plato (428–348 BCE) held that all conflict originates from a failure to temper 
desires through reason. He thought there should be limits on the size both of 
the population and of the territory, in order to ensure self-sufficiency as well as 
unity. Where populations did grow larger than the food supply, a wise lawmaker 
would pre-empt the “plague” of rebellious, hungry people by shipping them 
abroad, “giving the euphemistic title of ‘emigration’ to their evacuation”.14
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) found it strange that anyone proposing regulation 
of property to ensure people had enough for a good life would not also propose 
regulation of births. “For the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is 
bound to lead to poverty among the citizens”, which would lead to civil unrest 
and crime.15 A similar caution is attributed to Confucius (551–478 BCE): 
Excessive population growth would impoverish the masses and engender strife.
Theologian Tertullian (ca. 200 CE) wrote of a long history of increased pros-
perity and civilization, as well as overpopulation cycles relieved by out-migra-
tion and bouts of calamitous mortality. “The ancient records of the human race” 
showed that the human population has gradually increased, leading to the occu-
pation of new lands. One could see that “the world is becoming dailty better 
cultivated and more fully peopled than in olden times”. And yet, Earth “scarcely 
can provide for our needs”, such that “the scourges of pestilence, famine, wars 
and earthquakes have come to be regarded as a blessing to overcrowded nations, 
since they serve to prune away at the luxuriant growth of the human race”.16
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) feared that overpopulation might became 
a global problem. If so, he predicted humanity would be taught a very hard les-
son: “[W]hen every province of the world so teems with inhabitants that they 
can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere”, and when human 
ingenuity and cruelty “have reached their highest pitch”, the planet would 
purge itself via one or another of floods, plagues, and famines, until humanity, 
“becoming few and contrite”, would come to change their ways.17
Though not a global catastrophe, the Medieval Black Death was arguably one 
such purge, and it did lead to changes in Europe. An estimated 30–50 per cent 
of the European population succumbed to the plague between 1347 and 1351 
alone (DeWitte, 2014). There were further major outbreaks until the late 17th 
century, and more localized outbreaks for at least a century after that. Among 
the social changes wrought by the catastrophe was the collapse of the feudal 
system. European peasantry were able to command higher wages and lower 
rents despite desperate efforts by the ruling classes to reign in the bargaining 
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power of laborers rendered scarce by the plague. There was also a surprising, 
though temporary, increase in economic efficiency and living standards, which 
receded as the population began to rise again after 1500 (Clark, 2016).
Malthus’ context: the age of revolution
By the late 18th century, the Industrial Revolution was helping fuel unprec-
edented population growth. Unemployment and destitution were wide-
spread, and the costs of poverty relief were rising rapidly (Langer, 1975). 
Intra- and inter-class relations were fraying, and tempers were flaring. It 
looked as though the French Revolution could be but the first of many 
episodes of bloodshed.
Alongside these fears there was growing optimism about the possibilities 
for greater rationality and social progress hinted at by early modern develop-
ments in the sciences, economics, and philosophy. For many intellectuals, this 
took the form of a renewed interest in older utopian ideas of human and social 
perfectibility.
Growthist ideation, older still, pervaded political discourse at the time, as 
now. Right- and left-wing politics were incipient at best during the age of 
revolution, but proto-conservatives and proto-liberals alike regarded popula-
tion growth as a positive phenomenon and were dismissive of resource limits. It 
was commonly believed that some invisible mechanism (initially at least, divine 
providence) operated to calibrate population, economic activity, and the natu-
ral environment to ensure happiness in the world (Mayhew, 2014, pp. 25–26; 
McCormick, 2016). By and large, radical thinkers shared these growthist 
assumptions, too, though as we shall see, some more than others.
The radicals of the European age of revolution were more alike than differ-
ent. As a rule, they were freethinkers opposed to religious dogma (many were 
outright atheists), and who believed in the power of reason to improve human 
affairs. They promoted democracy, gender equality, social justice, and individual 
freedoms, and advocated for legal and institutional reforms. Most if not all 
espoused some version of utilitarianism. Quite a few were scandal-prone advo-
cates and practitioners of “free love”. Nevertheless, there were areas of strong 
disagreement, principally about human nature. I suggest two distinct view-
points can be identified: on one side, the anti-establishment, anarchic utopians; 
on the other, the more pragmatic, reform-minded disciples of Jeremy Bentham, 
which I shall refer to here, without any claim to precision, as the utilitarians.
Generally speaking, utopians regarded human beings as naturally benevo-
lent and prudent, and infinitely perfectible. We would reveal ourselves to be 
paragons of morality and reason once freed from injustice, oppression, and 
ignorance, artifacts of unjust or irrational social and political institutions. The 
onward march of human progress would render resource scarcity moot; it was 
only a distant threat, anyway, and one humanity could easily overcome by free-
ing individuals to act as they wish. Utopians incorporated a considerably greater 
element of growthist ideation than utilitarians at that time, in particular what 
I describe as cornucopianism later in this chapter.
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Utilitarians, too, believed in a moral imperative against tyranny: Humanity 
would do better under conditions of freedom and justice. But human beings 
were also rather fallible and selfish, and could not be counted on to act in a 
manner that promoted the public good without appropriate incentives and 
disincentives. This was rather different from utopians’ hagiographic view of 
human nature. Utilitarians believed in the power of good government, and had 
much less difficulty accepting the reality of resource constraints, both in terms 
of incomes available for workers and environmental degradation.
The first version of Malthus’ Essay was published anonymously in 1798 as 
a provocative, uncompromising pamphlet explicitly challenging the unbridled 
optimism of two of the most influential utopian works of the time, William 
Godwin’s classic of philosophical anarchism, An Enquiry Concerning Political Jus-
tice (1793), and Nicolas de Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress 
of the Human Spirit (1795). Condorcet was already dead by the time of Malthus’ 
essay, a casualty of the French Revolution’s reign of terror. But Godwin was 
very much alive and at the height of his popularity among the British intel-
ligentsia. Malthus’ own father admired Godwin’s ideas, as did Erasmus Darwin 
and Thomas Wedgwood, grandfather and uncle respectively to Charles Dar-
win, who years later would emphatically take Malthus’ side. Other prominent 
supporters of utopian ideas included members of the Romantic movement 
and several radical journalists, many of whom sprung to Godwin’s defense and 
relentlessly demonized Malthus in the press (Hale, 2014).
It was not particularly controversial, even in Malthus’ time, that human popu-
lations were prone to grow rapidly, though it was popularly believed, somewhat 
fantastically (and quite erroneously), that the population of Europe used to be 
much larger during antiquity (Mayhew, 2014). As noted by William Godwin, 
“other writers. . . . have attributed to the human species a power of rapidly 
multiplying their numbers, have either seen no mischief to arise. . . . or none but 
what was exceedingly remote”.18
Godwin was mistaken about this; Malthus was far from the first to problema-
tize population, even in his own time.19 But this quote neatly summarizes what 
is held to be controversial about the concept of overpopulation: it involves 
the unambiguous problematization of human population growth. What kind of 
problem? Contrary to Malthus as doom-monger of popular imagination, his 
focus was not on some imminent or future apocalyptic collapse. The Essay was 
about poverty.
The radical split over Malthus
Whereas utopians regarded progress as unidirectional and inevitable, Malthus 
saw humanity trapped in cycles of prosperity and misery that limited the scope 
for lasting improvement to the human condition. During times of plenty – 
perhaps due to an advance in technology, the discovery of a new resource, or 
some propitious change in climate – people prospered and had more children. 
Without concerted efforts to limit births (“preventative checks”), population 
would grow until the land available for cultivation or the wages a laborer was 
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able to command were again insufficient, leading to immiseration and suffering. 
Malthus’ principal observation, then, is that rather than using resource boons 
to secure long-lasting improvements to people’s lives, we tend to use them to 
increase the number of lives.
Efforts to expand agricultural productivity to feed ever-larger popula-
tions must sooner or later come against hard limits. Malthus held that at 
this point, “positive” (forceful) checks come into play: The increased mor-
tality and reduced fertility brought on by war, famines, ill-health, despot-
ism, and violence, in particular towards women and children (Charbit, 2009, 
pp. 38–42; O’Flaherty, 2016). Malthus did not regard these as hazards lying 
in some apocalyptic future; instead, he thought that an oscillation between 
preventative and positive checks had been in operation throughout history 
(McCormick, 2016).
It is a standard strategy to hand-wave overpopulation away with reference 
to some supposed (if mysterious) mechanism whereby society-wide procrea-
tive and consumption habits undergo a painless, automatic, and unproblematic 
re-calibration in response to changing environmental, social, and economic 
conditions. This was, and remains, the structure of utopian population denial 
arguments. Malthus had no time for this kind of Deus ex machina explanation. 
Whatever his views on Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” as an optimizer of market 
exchanges, Malthus rejected the idea of a demographic invisible hand:20 human 
societies were inherently prone to overshoot the resources available to them.
Some of Malthus’ criticisms of utopian ideas in the first version of his Essay 
were unfairly dismissive. Later versions moved away from rigid (and dubious) 
mathematical formulas towards a more cautious, reflective empiricism, also 
incorporating certain utopian arguments Malthus had come to endorse. But 
a major disagreement remained firmly in place. Malthus regarded population 
growth as the primary cause of poverty. Utopians thought population growth 
had no causative role at all.
Utopians speculated that the triumph of Enlightenment principles and the 
abolishment of property rights would lead to technological innovation, peace, 
and prosperity for all. They thought overpopulation was not possible. Individu-
als would stop over-reproducing on their own, out of natural prudence and 
benevolence, well before our numbers became a problem. In either case, we 
would surely come up with innovative solutions to overcome any resource scar-
city. Things would sort themselves out all on their own, provided we ensured 
maximum individual freedoms. The real cause of poverty was social injustice 
and contemporary institutions. Not only this, many utopians were indignant at 
the very suggestion that population growth could, or did, cause poverty. Fore-
shadowing the modern shaming discourse that led to the population taboo, 
some utopians claimed that Malthus’ theory amounted to an unacceptable 
“naturalization” of the oppression of the poor, or even worse, that it blamed the 
poor for their own misfortunes.
Malthus argued in response that, though unjust or ill-designed human insti-
tutions are an obvious target of criticism, their contribution to human suffer-
ing was superficial compared to the impact of procreative behavior over time. 
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Without efforts to prevent births, human over-reproduction would sooner or 
later reduce even an idealized society from a situation of perfect equality and 
abundance to one of gross exploitation of labor and human misery. Though the 
vocabulary of collective action problems would not emerge until well over a 
century after his death,21 Malthus realized that this was the shape of the prob-
lem: everyone and no one were to blame.22 The solution was to exercise our 
rational faculties to purposefully counteract our natural tendencies, the only 
way to secure lasting improvements to the human condition.
What utopians found offensive the emerging utilitarian school of thought 
found logical. Along with the Whig establishment, the 19th century disciples 
of Jeremy Bentham23 wholeheartedly embraced Malthus’ ideas. They had no 
trouble accepting that resources were limited and that individuals could act 
against their own and everybody else’s interests.
The philosopher who perhaps made the greatest contribution to utilitarian 
thought, John Stuart Mill, thought that Malthus’ ideas were a clarion call for 
policy interventions to encourage family size limitation to improve the situa-
tion of the working class:
Malthus’ population principle was quite as much a banner, and point of 
union among us, as any opinion specially belonging to Bentham. This great 
doctrine, originally brought forward as an argument against the infinite 
improvability of human affairs, we took up with ardent zeal in the con-
trary sense, as indicating the sole means of realizing that improvability by 
securing full employment at high wages to the whole laboring population 
through a voluntary restriction of the increase of their numbers.24
Mill was the first to propose, in 1848, a different kind of utopia: a steady 
state economy where population size was stable, the population enjoyed high 
standards of living, and the natural environment was preserved.25
Though Malthus is widely regarded as the founder of modern demography, 
he arguably had an even greater impact on economics. John Maynard Keynes 
regarded Malthus as the founding father of the discipline. Like Mill, Keynes’ 
admiration for Malthus’ ideas went hand in hand with vocal advocacy for gen-
der equality and access to contraception.
Malthus also plays a surprising role in the development of modern biology. 
Charles Darwin explicitly acknowledged that Malthus’ observation that plants 
and animals (including humans) tended to over-reproduce sparked his insight 
of a natural selection driver for evolutionary processes. Darwin duly became 
the next lightning rod for moral outrage and criticism, notably from Karl Marx, 
who interpreted Darwin’s theory of evolution as reprehensibly aimed at justify-
ing individualism, capitalism, and free markets. That is, Darwin was criticized 
for “naturalizing” poverty and injustice, much as Malthus had been. As with 
earlier utopians, Marx believed that freeing workers from oppression would 
usher in a time of abundance. This may have been motivated reasoning, spring-
ing from Marx’s view that scarcity made conflicts inevitable. That said, it is 
unclear whether Marx actually disagreed that population growth tended to 
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cheapen labor and cause poverty; his comments on population were inconsist-
ent at best (Linder, 1997).
In the decades to follow, Mill and other “Malthusians” would lead the way 
in campaigning for public access to and information on contraception. In this 
they were departing significantly from one of the weakest aspects of Malthus’ 
practical prescriptions.
Malthus and contraception
It is telling that Victorian birth control advocacy was often synonymized with 
Malthusianism – or more accurately, neo-Malthusianism, for Malthus did not 
endorse contraception. In the second version of his Essay (1803, revised again 
in 1806, 1807, 1817, and 1826), Malthus stressed the importance of preventa-
tive checks, effectively accepting the force of one of Godwin’s key arguments. 
It was within the ken of humanity to exercise procreative self-restraint, which 
Malthus thought could be motivated by a taste for comfort. But he assumed 
births would be avoided through sexual abstinence; he did not countenance 
contraception or abortion, regarding both as forms of “vice”.
Francis Place, the founder of the birth control movement, was a living 
embodiment of the neo-Malthusian position. A self-educated man of humble 
birth, Place overcame considerable economic hardship and disadvantage before 
finding success as a tailor. He duly avoided a life of “vice” by marrying early, 
but ended up with fifteen children, which made life very difficult for the family. 
Place vehemently disagreed with Malthus’ abstinence-based approach to fam-
ily limitation; it was as impracticable and utopian, in its own way, as Godwin’s 
notions of human perfectibility.26
People have sex, whether within or outside of wedlock, even when circum-
stances are dire. But human ingenuity was capable of separating sex from pro-
creation, and some relatively effective contraceptive methods already existed.
The quest to prevent unwanted pregnancies is probably as old as civili-
zation. Efforts at contraception – some plausibly effective, others bizarre or 
 dangerous – are mentioned in ancient records from Egypt, Mesopotamia, and 
China. Successful reliance on coitus interruptus figures in one of the stories in 
the Bible’s Book of Genesis. Greeks and Romans are widely regarded as hav-
ing managed to limit family size somehow during classical antiquity (Caldwell, 
2004). One particular herb, silphium, was so popular as a contraceptive and 
early-stage abortifacient that Pliny the Elder claimed it was worth more than 
its weight in silver. Silphium could not be cultivated, and by late antiquity it had 
been collected to extinction, making it impossible for us to establish its efficacy 
(Riddle, 1997, pp. 44–46). In a context of limited understanding of human biol-
ogy and high fallibility of pre-modern birth control, though, there were always 
more babies than were wanted. Infanticide, whether via smothering, exposure, 
or intentional neglect, has been practiced throughout human history, and across 
virtually all societies (Brewis, 1992).
Many middle- and upper-class people in Europe and North America were 
already practicing some form of birth control during Malthus’ time, principally 
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the sponge, though misinformation remained rife.27 What information existed 
was not reaching working-class people or those living in destitution;28 those 
who were least able to cope with unintended births were kept in the dark about 
what they might do to prevent them.
Many radical thinkers and social reformers were willing to take considerable 
personal risks in their passionate advocacy for public information on and access 
to means of contraception. A teenaged John Stuart Mill was shocked into activ-
ism after finding the tiny corpse of a strangled baby hidden under rags under 
a tree in St. James’ Park. Mill subsequently spent a night in prison on obscen-
ity charges for handing out leaflets offering practical advice on contraception 
to working-class women. The history of family planning advocacy is replete 
with activists who were jailed, slandered, or otherwise persecuted for similar 
“offenses” against morality, notably Annie Besant, Charles Bradlaugh, Henry 
Allbutt, Emma Goldman, Margaret Sanger, and (in the 1970s!) Bill Baird.
Later 19th century to mid-20th century: the progressive  
fight for family planning
As the decades of the 19th century rolled in, much of radical thought was 
not so radical anymore. The political establishments of France, Britain, and the 
United States had accepted, to at least some degree, that individual freedoms 
had moral force (though not much force if the individual was female, or non-
white). Democracy had largely won over tyranny, at least as an uncontroversial 
ideal. European and North American intellectuals joined up in loose networks 
of an emerging progressive movement, of which the more mature Mill and 
neo-Malthusians were part.
Although ideologically diverse, progressives were characteristically focused 
on social, institutional, and cultural reform. They rejected the utopian/anarchist 
notion that abolishing government and freeing individuals from the coercion of 
the law would realize a world of endless abundance and benevolence. Like Mal-
thus and the early utilitarians, progressives regarded government interventions 
and public services as necessary to address many serious social and economic 
ills, and to protect individuals from harm. Progressive causes included universal 
suffrage, gender equality before the law, evidence-based policy making, univer-
sal access to education, and protections for the working class. They were also 
concerned about checking corporate power, preserving natural resources, and 
tackling corruption in government.
The interaction of progressive causes produced a general interest in expand-
ing access to and information about modern family planning methods. This 
was not necessarily out of concern about overpopulation. Progressives readily 
grasped that being able to limit one’s fertility was a practical precondition to 
female autonomy and well-being, and to achieving social justice. We should 
bring fewer people into the world, give them each better nutrition and educa-
tion, and secure for them a better chance in life. This may sound like common 
sense to many, but the ethics of procreative restraint was surprisingly conten-
tious (and remains so today).
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In late 19th century Britain at least, neo-Malthusianism was a threat to 
imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism. There were vocal opponents of birth 
control who claimed that it interfered with natural (and supposedly desirable) 
overpopulation processes that ensured the survival of the fittest and therefore 
human evolutionary progress – an astounding bastardization of Malthus’ and 
Darwin’s ideas. In a related, growthist line of argumentation, conservative ideo-
logues argued that population growth supported wealth creation as well as 
the country’s political and military dominance in the international arena. To 
the extent that population growth did lead to unemployment and poverty, the 
solution was to export surplus people to the colonies, converting the emigrants 
and native peoples alike into England’s “profitable customers” (D’Arcy, 1977).
In the 20th century, opposition to family planning would acquire a distinc-
tively nationalist tone, laced with the growthist version of anti-individualism: 
citizens as economic (and literal) cannon fodder, duty-bound to have large 
families and to submit to lives of struggle, even death on the battlefield, all 
for the good of the nation. Nationalist arguments against contraceptive access 
typically played along explicitly racist and sometimes classist lines, and were 
consistently sexist. It was women, not men, who were called upon to undertake 
reproductive labor, though those from minority ethnic backgrounds, or from 
among the urban poor, were often excused or even discouraged from showing 
their patriotism in this way. It is ironic, then, that the popular tactic of smearing 
population concern as some sordid “eugenics” plot in substance attributes to 
anti-natalist activists the practices and discourse of their adversaries. Pronatalist 
nationalist ideology was common in Europe and the United States in the run-
up to the Second World War, with varying degrees of hostility towards minori-
ties. Though more subdued since the genocidal horrors of Nazi Germany,29 
racist pronatalism has remained a common feature of nationalist discourse and 
policy practice,30 and has notably reappeared of late in the United States.31
Birth control methods remained unreliable, expensive, and difficult to obtain 
all the way to the middle of the 20th century, despite the efforts of prominent 
neo-Malthusian intellectuals such as H. G. Wells, John Maynard Keynes, Ber-
trand Russell, Charles Drysdale, Marie Stopes, and Margaret Sanger to soften 
social opposition to contraception. Modern disposable condoms and the hor-
monal contraceptive pill were first developed in the late 1950s; while condoms 
rapidly became available to the general public, the female-oriented pill was to 
be the subject of drawn-out, moralized battles. Even today access to the pill is 
unaccountably complicated in most of the world, symptomatic of a persistent 
trivialization of the risk and impact of unwanted pregnancies, and of more gen-
eral hostility to women being able to control their own fertility.
Access to contraception and abortion remains a strongly politicized subject 
in most of the world, and to an astounding degree in the United States, the 
country that perhaps best embodies the three ideational groupings that brought 
about population denialism and population taboo: growthism, religious con-
servatism, and social justice activism. I say ideational rather than ideological group-
ings because the relevant normative beliefs and values operate more at the level 
of mental images, implicit assumptions, and “memes”, as opposed to specific 
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philosophical or political doctrines. I will return to this in a moment. First, 
I trace the resurgence of these ideational groupings in the latter half of the 20th 
century, leading up to the Cairo consensus’ population taboo.
Mid-20th century to the present time: the social justice 
movement’s hostility to environmentalism
In the years after the Second World War, growthist ideation became the domi-
nant force in Western economic thought, virtually synonymized with capital-
ism, which was itself positioned as the only realistic approach to structuring the 
individual pursuit of happiness in a free society.
At around the same time, the rapidly developing discipline of demograph-
ics was revealing a picture of unprecedented population growth, faster even 
than during the Industrial Revolution. In the first several years after the Sec-
ond World War, many social scientists, philanthropists, and population concern 
activists sought to bring attention to rampant population growth as an enemy 
of peace. Others were concerned that rapid population growth in the poorest 
nations did not bode well for the emerging ethos of universal human rights. 
India, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Pakistan, South Korea, and Egypt were among 
the first countries to express such concerns (Finkle & McIntosh, 2002).
In collaboration with the International Union for the Scientific Study of 
Population (IUSSP), the United Nations convened its first world population 
conferences in 1954 (Rome) and 1965 (Belgrade), ostensibly apolitical events 
intended to foster the exchange of ideas among experts from around the world 
about general problems relating to population.
By the 1970s, there was no longer any such pretense. Population con-
ferences had become deeply ideological and politicized events at which 
growthist speculation, the pronatalist pieties of religious conservatives, and 
well-meaning social justice challenges would be repeatedly thrust against the 
inconvenient, impious, or unfeeling arguments of demographers, development 
experts, family planning advocates, and the newly emerged environmentalist 
movement, all of whom supported policy efforts to bring about speedy reduc-
tions in fertility rates.
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 is standardly regarded as marking the 
beginning of modern environmentalism, building on earlier, conservation-focused 
initiatives. Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, a best-selling jeremiad published 
in 1968, further energized the movement. Environmentalists and “population-
ists” were largely the same people through most of the 20th century. True to 
their progressive roots, these activists’ interests ranged from concerns about 
anthropogenic impacts on natural ecosystems to improving gender equality to 
worries about human health and international development. These pluripotent 
motivations are well exemplified by William Vogt, an ecologist who penned a 
best-seller about the threat posed by overpopulation (Road to Survival, 1948), 
and would later lead Planned Parenthood. The environment-population linkage 
would be further strengthened by the publication of yet another international 
best-seller, Limits to Growth (1972).
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The first Earth Day was celebrated on April 22, 1970, and accompanied by 
a series of real achievements for the environmental movement in spite of often 
fierce opposition by growthist ideologues. Legislation securing key environ-
mental protections was passed in many countries, such as the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (United States, 1969), the Clean Air Act (United States, 
1970), the first European environmental policy (Paris Declaration, 1972), the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1975), the Inter-
national Whaling Commission’s moratorium on commercial whaling (1982), 
the Endangered Species Act (United States, 1984), and the Montreal Protocol 
outlawing ozone-destroying airborne chemicals (1987).
These early successes were almost immediately resented by a loose assemblage 
of international political movements perhaps best exemplified by the New Left 
in the United States, but also European Green parties (Beck & Kolankiewicz, 
2000). Also included were women’s groups with variable commitment towards 
the perennially feminist cause of access to contraception and abortion. For 
expedience, and again without any claim to precision, I refer to this assemblage 
as the social justice movement.
Social justice activists were generally hostile to concerns about population 
growth and environmental degradation, decried as elitist or even imperialist 
distractions from the “real” problems plaguing women and the world’s poor: 
social and economic injustice. In the lead up to the Cairo consensus, many 
social justice activists held that environmental problems were solely or primar-
ily caused by overconsumption by the rich rather than the vast multiplication 
of our numbers. To suggest otherwise was to blame the victims of oppression, 
or else a matter of thinly disguised racism.32 A fresh, utopian-flavored ideology 
had emerged, complete with an implicit belief in a demographic invisible hand 
and shaming discourse against those who disagreed.
Differential fertility rates, almost certainly the complex product of socially 
constructed preferences and the apathy-induced fatalism identified in demo-
graphic research (among other factors), are instead elevated in social justice 
discourse to something akin to a class-based entitlement. But even this bizarrely 
classist element is not sufficient to explain the movement’s opposition to the 
problematization of population. After all, even if one believes it is oppressive to 
meddle with class-specific family size preferences, one might still realize that 
the lot of the poor is not improved by stretching already insufficient family or 
community resources over a larger number of people.
The explanation, I suggest, lies in the cuckoo-like infiltration of growthist 
ideas into the social justice movement via the utopian worldview it embraced. 
The reality or urgency of resource constraints is doubted, variously as a mirage 
brought about by unequal distribution or as a far-future problem that can be 
easily solved through human ingenuity.33 To the extent that environmental 
problems like climate change are acknowledged, the cause lies somewhere 
else – unjust institutions, say, or selfish Western consumers. Aggregate procrea-
tive behavior is assumed to naturally coalesce at a safe or even beneficial level, 
subject only to individuals enjoying conditions of freedom and justice.
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The growthist memeplex and population denialism
Overpopulation undeniably raises difficult questions about the limits of indi-
vidual liberties, the morality of risk imposition, inter-generational fairness, the 
ethics of procreation and parenthood, our relationship to the natural world, and 
perhaps above all the way our societies and economic systems are structured. The 
mind recoils from the ethical complications, while engagement with the reality 
of population-linked catastrophic risks such as climate change can be paralyzing. 
We instinctively look for excuses not to think or do anything much about it.
Growthists stand ready to supply us with just such excuses. As Tim Hor-
ton (2008) has put it, the mantra goes: “Growth is good. Growth is necessary. 
Growth will come. Growth can be accommodated”. By “growthists” I mean 
political, business, and religious leaders, intellectuals, social influencers, and 
other holders of practical or cultural power whose rhetoric (and presumably 
sincere worldview) reflects a particular set of memes,34 that is, certain culturally 
transmissible ideational units.
A number of authors35 have identified recurrent ideas underscoring attitudes 
to population and economic growth. I suggest these ideas can be organized and 
synthesized as a growthist memeplex of interdependent and mutually supportive 
ideas, containing five memetic clusters:
1 Indefinite economic growth is both possible and desirable, either intrinsi-
cally or instrumentally, to support population growth, social and techno-
logical progress, etc. (Endless economic growth)
2 Population growth promotes economic growth, dynamism, innovation, 
and military might; it is a sign of prosperity and freedom. (Bigger is better)
3 Population ageing and de-growth are calamitous prospects, leading to an 
enfeebling loss of economic, political, and military might, and to vulner-
ability to more youthful, perhaps different-raced competitors. It is up or 
out. (Fear of shrinkage)
4 Our reproductive behavior is not within meaningful agential control any-
way; normal human beings feel an irresistible urge to procreate and to 
center their lives around child-rearing. (Pronatalism)
5 Humans are too rational and inventive to be bound by the physical limits 
of this planet, so we need not worry about resource constraints or environ-
mental degradation. We can and will fix any of these problems, sooner or 
later. (Cornucopianism)
Though I refer to growthists here as an ideological grouping, I do not mean 
to imply that growthists share a coherent or detailed ideology, or even politi-
cal alignment. Growthists might disagree with each other on just about any-
thing, except on the issue of limits to growth. And growthist ideation is not 
the preserve of growthist ideologues such as politicians and economists either. 
The growthist memeplex profoundly colors public attitudes towards worth-
while social goals, empirical evidence, moral conflicts, and thinking about risks 
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and the future. Though these attitudes are more clearly expressed by growthist 
power players and influencers, growthism is internalized to at least some extent 
by virtually every one of us.
The growthist memeplex dominates thinking on how to structure our econ-
omies and run our societies, of which neoliberalism and total utilitarianism 
(in particular in modern futurist thought) are perhaps the clearest examples. It 
underpins population expansionist discourse as well as buttressing opposition 
to family planning and gender equality. Perhaps less obviously, growthism per-
vades historical and contemporary rabble-rousing oratory of primitive anxieties 
about population decline, where individuals are urged to have more children to 
keep ahead of the others – people from different ethnic, religious, or ideological 
backgrounds, with whom we are supposedly locked in a procreative arms race.
Unlike specific doctrines explicitly articulated by this or that school of 
thought, a meme will often go unnoticed and therefore unchallenged. It is 
usually very difficult for anyone to pinpoint the origin of an idea; a successful 
meme will feel like it has always been there, in the way we do or think about 
things. It is endorsed by sheer force of habit. A particularly successful meme 
will weave itself into the subconscious tapestry of our beliefs, value commit-
ments, and attitudinal dispositions, making us feel they are our own. This is not 
a problem most of the time; many memes are benign, and most are harmless 
informational noise. But others are deleterious. Like a gene (or indeed, a virus), 
a meme can persist notwithstanding that it harms the individual or population 
harboring it.
When they occur within a memeplex, memes are extra resilient to detec-
tion, challenge, and extirpation, their plausibility seemingly bolstered by the 
way related memes coalesce within a cluster that supports, and is supported 
by, other clusters. Misogyny and homophobia are perhaps best understood as 
outgrowths of pronatalism, as indeed is hostility to freethinkers and atheists. 
Traditional religious beliefs, after all, are the garb in which pronatalism presents 
itself to the great majority of the world’s people. Pronatalism supports, and is 
supported by, the “bigger is better” embrace of the resulting population growth, 
itself supportive of and supported by the tribalistic fear of population shrinkage 
as well as that most powerful of modern ideas, the pursuit of economic growth 
as an aim in itself. But on their own these four memetic clusters would still be 
vulnerable to critical thought. Among those with a basic grasp of the natural 
sciences, at least, these memes are apt to produce stressful cognitive dissonance. 
Where are the extra resources coming from to support ever larger economies 
and ever larger, or at least never-smaller, populations?
The final memetic cluster comes to the rescue: cornucopianism, the age-old 
belief in human exceptionalism combined with utopian ideas about abundant 
resources and infinite perfectibility of human affairs. There is nothing we can-
not overcome once we put our minds to it. Laws of nature are mere guidelines. The 
techno-optimist element of cornucopianism means a growthist can hold them-
selves out as the greatest believer in the power of science and technology even 
while fundamentally disregarding or dismissing any scientific knowledge that is 
incompatible with the memeplex. The limits of the productive capacity of the 
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natural world, of our planet’s ability to handle our wastes and other environ-
mental insults, need not be rejected out of hand as mistakes by know-nothing 
scientists (though, of course, they often are dismissed in this way). It is usually 
enough to cast doubt on inconvenient truths, for example, by drawing attention 
to real or imagined disagreements among experts, or by characterizing inevita-
bly probabilistic assessments about future scenarios as science being unable to 
provide answers at this time. The jury is still out; we don’t know if this is the real 
problem, or how serious it will be.
Growthists are even more optimistic than the average human being36 while 
remarkably blasé about the consequences of getting things wrong. This may 
be partly due to a generally adventurous outlook. Safety margins are not their 
thing; nothing ventured, nothing gained. But it is even more likely that this 
extreme optimism arises out of a systematic overestimation of the degree of 
control and directionality humanity has over such things as technological dis-
coveries and environmental processes. Sowing doubt lends growthist reckless-
ness a veneer of reasonability. We should not be too hasty; why forego our immediate 
preferences and desires, or views of a brilliant future, to mitigate a threat that may turn out 
to be nothing? We should bide our time, get more information. After all, doing things 
differently can be unsettling and confusing, and no one enjoys limitations on 
their freedoms. Those who do not share growthists’ seemingly endless appetite 
for risk are not cautious or realistic, but instead pessimistic doom-mongers who 
fail to appreciate that virtually any environmental bind can be solved by some 
hypothetical technological solution, the realization of which should be assumed 
to be inevitable, cost-free, and perfectly timed.
The growthist memeplex is atavistic. It was likely selected for in the “empty 
world” phase of our evolutionary history.37 These ideas are maladaptive in our 
full world, groaning under the pressure of the unsustainable demands and aspi-
rations of an enormous global population that has been living off natural capital 
rather than income for quite some time. By fostering denial and tolerance of 
even catastrophic risks, the growthist memeplex poses a formidable obstacle 
to any action on overpopulation or any of its main facets: Climate change, 
topsoil erosion and degradation, freshwater scarcity, defaunation, deforestation, 
overfishing, environmental fouling, creeping un- and under-employment, and 
rising social inequality.
That said, growthists are not alone in population denialism. Indeed, they have 
had the benefit of two influential, if incongruous, allies: religious conservatives 
and the social justice movement.
Though not all religious leaders are religious conservatives, those who are 
largely follow a pronatalist script. Generally speaking, religious conservatives 
hold that contraception and abortion are sins, or at the very least, a symptom 
of a reprehensible lack of support for motherhood. God wants us to go forth and 
multiply; a woman’s natural and divinely ordained role is at home, bearing and raising 
children. If pressed to explain what would happen to all those children, well: one 
might claim that God will provide somehow, or that poverty is just a feature of 
the world, part of some unfathomable divine plan. But these are rather less than 
reassuring or acceptable answers, at least in modern times. Presumably for this 
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reason, religious leaders have increasingly co-opted other elements of the grow-
thist memeplex in their own population denialism, in particular cornucopian-
ism, to which a moralized overlay is added. We have more than enough resources. 
What is lacking is individual hard work, prudence, and compassionate fellow-feeling.
Religious ideation perhaps offers something of a bridge between growthists 
and their most unlikely allies in population denialism: social justice activists, 
modern in outlook, genuinely well-intentioned, and who arguably have had 
the most damning impact in suppressing public dialogue on and awareness of 
overpopulation and its risks.
It is one thing to claim that overpopulation is not occurring, or is not serious; 
this is the realm of denialism. It is quite another to impress upon others that to 
suggest that overpopulation is occurring or is serious is itself morally wrong, an 
unacceptable affront to human rights or to the dignity of the disadvantaged. It 
was the shaming discourse from social justice activists, co-opted (with doubtful 
sincerity) by growthists, that wrought the population taboo.
The invisible hand: utopian ideation,  
and hellish consequences
There is a common thread implicitly running through growthist, religious, 
and social justice rhetoric dismissing overpopulation risks: the idea of an invis-
ible hand, whereby the free and uncoordinated actions of individuals inevita-
bly coalesce in a harmonious manner conducive to the common good and 
the progress of humankind. In its free markets version standardly attributed to 
Adam Smith, the invisible hand was the work of divine providence. A religious 
conservative might still rely on a divine explanation in order to quash critical 
inquiry: Things will work themselves out somehow, by a higher power operat-
ing in mysterious ways, but only if each of us has faith and abides by religious 
tenets.
In its “market-knows-best” guise, the invisible hand arises from the unfet-
tered pursuit of self-interest by individuals and corporations, and supposedly 
provides the optimal way to deliver greater wealth for all. This translates into 
growthist support for economic deregulation, open borders, and free trade, all 
regarded as “natural” and inexorable forces – much as the growthist view of 
procreation.
Market-oriented pronatalism can be understood as the view that “just as an 
invisible hand ensures that the pursuit of individual gain benefits everyone in 
the aggregate, so too does an invisible hand ensure that millions of individual 
childbearing decisions result in a socially optimal population level” (Hoff & 
Robertson, 2016, p. 279). Cornucopian ideologues such as the late Julian Simon 
claim that the market can be trusted to correct for any population problem or 
resource scarcity. The invisible hand idea also goes some way to explain grow-
thists’ cavalier approach to inter-generational risking: overall human activities 
are assumed to produce long-term as well as short-term economic benefits, so 
that the future is always better off overall. A rich future can surely buy its way 
out of any trouble (Gardiner, 2011, pp. 174–175).
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Whatever merits there may be to an invisible hand in optimizing market 
transactions, the idea of a demographic invisible hand is fanciful. There is no 
mechanism by which individual decisions about procreation can be calibrated 
by signals from a market that does not take family size into account, no demo-
graphic marketplace where traders can bargain for the fertility that would trans-
late into the most beneficial population size (Linder, 1997, p. 85).
Adam Smith lived through a time when utopian thought was close to its peak 
in popularity, and also a period during which economic theory and utopian 
ideology became increasingly intertwined (Claeys, 1991). It is in social justice 
ideation, however, that the invisible hand is most utopian. Individuals are seen 
as innately prudent, rational, and benevolent, who would not naturally behave 
in a manner contrary to the public good but are sometimes forced to do so by 
poverty, oppression, or corruption of their good nature by capitalism and con-
sumerism (themselves offshoots of growthist ideation). Once freed from these 
constraints, individual choices would coalesce harmoniously so as to prevent or 
overcome any threats to the common good. With this in mind, social justice 
ideation tends to reject the very possibility of moral conflicts, oppose any talk 
of limits to the justified scope of human rights, and regard any collective action 
problem as a mirage, a product of some external force that is the “real” problem.
This is philosophically and empirically mistaken, but it plays into a broader 
propensity for wishful thinking and intellectual shortcuts found in virtually all 
of us. We want to believe there is nothing to worry about, and no one likes 
to think hard thoughts. It does not help that overpopulation, being a systemic 
problem, rather lends itself to endless reinterpretation as something else. There 
is a “chameleonic insidiousness” to it (Clark, 2016).
The uncomfortable reality is that overpopulation is a matter of neither 
blameless bad luck nor blamable conduct by villainous agents. It is a process of 
aggregate, cumulative harming and risking by regular people going about their 
lives in fairly ordinary ways, having the family sizes they prefer, living with as 
much comfort and enjoyment as they are able to secure for themselves. It is a 
collective action problem: everyone makes only a small contribution that gets 
diluted away among the contributions of many others. Absent coercive con-
straints to ensure a fair and effective collective response, it is wishful thinking 
to believe that a vast majority of people will choose to forego an immediate 
benefit to themselves (having the family size they desire) without any assur-
ance that the public benefit will be secured by a sufficient number of oth-
ers exercising similar restraint. Likewise for other lifestyle adjustments, like the 
dramatic reductions in per capita consumption called for as a (necessarily only 
partial) mitigation of our numbers. There are undoubtedly people of outstand-
ing moral fiber out there, who would choose to (say) forego air travel, eat only 
vegan foods, and refrain from using any of the thousands of products that are 
not realistically recyclable. But only a utopian would think such people make 
up the majority of our 7.7 billion.
Even if this were not the case – even if the world were populated by moral 
angels – the population taboo is still fundamentally incompatible with the 
“invisible hand” worldview implicitly endorsed at Cairo. Let us assume for the 
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sake of argument that it is realistic to expect individuals to judge for themselves 
what is a responsible family size, having regard not only to their own and 
their family’s interests but also to those of their community, including future 
generations. Let us assume also that each individual can easily override their 
personal motivations as well as cultural and social pronatalist messaging and act 
on these complex considerations, resulting in procreative decisions that, col-
lectively, bring about optimal results for all. Even if one thought these are all 
fair and rational assumptions to make (and this author does not think they are), 
it must still be the case that in order to make these complicated assessments, 
individuals must be fully informed of the cumulative impacts and risks posed 
by population growth. With a taboo in place preventing any real discussion 
or awareness-raising on overpopulation, whatever mitigation that could have 
arisen from the aggregate effect of individuals acting on their personal judg-
ment about the right thing to do in face of population risks has been rendered 
all but impossible.
Conclusion: the population taboo as a threat  
to human rights
I have argued in this chapter that, in opposing the problematization of popula-
tion growth, social justice activists revived late 18th century utopian rhetoric 
to which Malthus’ essay was originally intended as a response. We have walked 
this road to hell before. It is paved (mostly) with good intentions.
The cause of advancing and securing human rights has been seriously com-
promised, perhaps fatally, by the silence about and denial of overpopulation 
and its role in fueling catastrophic risks, including but not limited to climate 
change. Rights require resources, even rights that are mere liberties. One’s free-
dom is worth little if they are starving, or if there is no one to protect them 
from and punish those who would disrespect that freedom. It may be argued 
that there is moral value in asserting unfunded freedoms, in that those who 
would oppress another might at least know they are doing something wrong. 
But this is not true, or at least, much less true, of unfunded rights to basic 
provision. Rights to education, medical care, or an adequate standard of living 
mean next to nothing if there are no resources to give them effect. Population 
growth will normally undermine the resourcing of human rights unless it is at 
least matched by a genuine growth in resources, that is, an expansion in avail-
able resources achieved otherwise than through a geographical or temporal 
transfer, or transmutation, of the same needful resources. Economic growth 
today that saps resources needed tomorrow or elsewhere, or which creates dif-
ferent scarcities, is not a genuine growth in resources; it’s the same stuff being 
moved around.
I could not possibly do justice in the confines of this chapter to the complex 
history and not altogether coherent ideological structure of the interest groups 
that wrought the population taboo. I nevertheless hope that I was able to con-
vey the general way in which relentless population denial by powerful grow-
thist interests, combined with the shaming discourse of well-meaning activists, 
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caused the topic of overpopulation to become, in the eyes of many, simply too 
treacherous to broach.
Overpopulation is, nevertheless, too important to ignore. Unsustainable pop-
ulation growth is a threat multiplier to the life chances of billions of people, 
in particular the young and poor. As with climate change, understanding the 
tactics and ideological roots of denialists is key to more effective responses by 
scholars, activists, and policy makers. We need to talk about population.
Notes
 1 See Kuhlemann (2018a) on the problematic logic built into the discourse on population 
stabilization.
 2 See, for example, Godfray et al. (2010) and Foley et al. (2011).
 3 FAO (2013). See also Vidal (2013), Welsh (2013) and BBC News (2013) for a taste of 
how these entomophagic proposals were covered in the press.
 4 See, for example, Snow (1969, pp. 19–20) and Hardin (1971).
 5 See, for example, Potts and Campbell (2005).
 6 See, for example, Abrams (1996) and Mcintosh and Finkle (1995).
 7 Michael Bayles (1976), Onora O’Neill (1979), Dan Brock (2005), David Benatar (2010), 
Christine Overall (2012), Sarah Conly (2016), and Rivka Weinberg (2016), among oth-
ers, have argued that the right to procreate is or may be limited in scope. James Griffin 
offers the right to procreate as an example of the indeterminateness of human rights 
claims (2008, pp. 14, 16–17).
 8 See Wheeler (1999) for a diplomatic articulation of this point in a UN publication.
 9 See, for example, Beck and Kolankiewicz (2000); Campbell (2007); Whitty (2010); 
Coole (2013); Mora (2014); Kopnina and Washington (2016).
 10 See, for example, Cleland et al. (2006), Sinding (2008), and Mazur (2014).
 11 A woman is assumed to have an unmet need for contraception if she is of reproductive 
age, sexually active, does not wish to become pregnant, and is not using contraception. 
But many such women would not use contraception even if it was available (Sedgh, 
Ashford, & Hussain, 2016). Other women do not have a need for contraception because 
they want a large family. See Ryerson (2012) for an accessible explanation of unmet 
demand and unmet need.
 12 See Campbell (1998) for a related discussion. Broadly speaking, Campbell’s “market 
preference” community are growthists. The Vatican and other religious leaders are reli-
gious conservatives. Campbell’s “distribution” and “women’s initiatives” communities 
broadly correspond to what I refer to here as the social justice movement.
 13 Two well-known examples are the early Babylonian epic of Atrahasis (ca. 1700 BCE) 
and the Homeric poem “Cypria” (ca. 650 BCE). See Feen (1996).
 14 Plato’s Laws, 5.736a3.
 15 The Politics, 1265a-1270.
 16 Apologetical Works, ca. 200 AD, Ch 30.
 17 Titus Livius (ca. 1517), Chapter 5.
 18 Godwin (1820) Of Population, An Enquiry concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers of 
Mankind, Being an Answer to Mr Malthus’ Essay on that Subject.
 19 Joseph Townsend published two works in 1786 discussing the relationship of popula-
tion in poverty in much the same way as Malthus (Langer, 1975). Scottish economist Sir 
James Steuart attributed poverty to overpopulation, but found himself unable to come 
up with a socially acceptable response to it (Steuart, 1767, pp. 156). See also Robert Wal-
lace’s suggestion, in Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature and Providence (1761), that any 
society based upon community of goods might well collapse through overpopulation 
(Claeys, 2016).
 20 See, for example, Flew (1957, p. 19) and Linder (1997).
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 21 Shortly before Malthus’ death, W. F. Lloyd articulated what we now describe as the free 
rider problem. Where individual behavior contributes to a future harm to the public, 
their share of the harm, “in the multitude of a large society, becomes evanescent”. The 
result, Lloyd argued, was that even if each person could clearly foresee the harmful 
consequences of their actions, they would still act in the same way. A country being 
overpopulated was not itself evidence that its people were imprudent or otherwise to 
blame; the fault may rest with “the constitution of the society” [(1833) 1980].
 22 As an exception to this, Malthus thought the ruling classes were guiltier than most for 
selfishly encouraging marriage and procreation among the poor they exploited. Malthus 
observes in his Essay that the poor man “has always been told that to raise up subjects for 
his king and country is a very meritorious act. He has done this, and yet is suffering for it; 
and it cannot but strike him as most extremely unjust and cruel in his king and country 
to allow him thus to suffer, in return for giving them what they are continually declaring 
that they particularly want”. Malthus regarded such officially sanctioned pronatalism as 
“absolutely criminal”, akin to forcing people in the water who are unable to swim: “in 
both cases we rashly tempt providence”.
 23 Bentham himself seems to have had no special interest in the topic of overpopulation, or 
at least not until the very last years of his life. See Langer (1975, pp. 670–671).
 24 Mill’s Autobiography (1873), Chapter IV.
 25 Mill’s Principles of Political Economy (1848), Book IV, Chapter VI.
 26 See Norman Himes’ introduction (Himes ed.; Boston, 1930) to Place’s Illustrations and 
Proofs of the Principle of Population (1822).
 27 For example, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft reportedly relied on absten-
tion for three days following menstruation (Toni Bentley, 2005). Unsurprisingly, Mary 
became pregnant within a few months, and died from infection a few days after the long, 
painful delivery of their child, Mary, author of Frankenstein (1818).
 28 The French working classes were apparently better informed than other Europeans, 
which may account for the slower rate of population growth in France relative to other 
European countries during the 19th century. See Livi-Bacci (2012, pp. 68–70).
 29 See Albanese (2004) for a discussion of how nationalist regimes in 20th century Europe 
tended to go hand in hand with pronatalism and a “re-patriarchalization of sorts”.
 30 See, for example, King (1998) and Camiscioli (2001) about French pronatalism, Brown 
and Ferree (2005) on pronatalism in the British media, and Gordon (2002) and Lovett 
(2007) on American pronatalism before the Second World War.
 31 See, for example, Reynolds (2008), Stone (2017), and Kelly (2018).
 32 See, for example, two articles by population denialist, family planning-sceptic Betsy 
Hartmann: “Stop the tired overpopulation hysteria” (2009, Alternet) and “The ‘new’ 
population control craze: retro, racist, wrong way to go” (2009, On the Issues Magazine).
 33 See, for example, Jack Hollander’s argument (2003) that the “real” environmental crisis 
is that the world’s poor do not consume enough. The climate change denialist Bjorn 
Lomborg and the late population denialist Hans Rosling have acquired notoriety on 
the basis of similarly science-skeptical claims. David Foreman, author of Man Swarm 
(2014) and co-founder of Earth First!, describes lefty anti-environmentalists as “progres-
sive cornucopians”.
 34 The concept of a “meme” was introduced by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene 
(1976). See Blackmore (1999) for an interesting discussion.
 35 See, for example, Haque (2013), Higgs (2014, pp. 188–189), Daly (2015a), Lindberg 
(2016), Jackson (2017), and Pilling (2018) on endless economic growth, Hern (1993) 
for an uncompromising critique of the idea that bigger is better, Lovett (2007), Car-
roll (2012), and McKeown (2014) on pronatalism, Kaye (1987) and Coole (2013) 
on what I describe as the fear of shrinkage, and Lawn (2010) and Jonsson (2014) on 
cornucopianism.
 36 For more information on the optimism bias see, for example, Weinstein (1980) and 
Sharot (2011).
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 37 Herman Daly (2015b) conceptualizes the “empty world” as a time during which our 
population and economy were (or were perceived to be) small relative to the containing 
ecosystem, and our technologies of extraction and harvesting were not yet particularly 
powerful.
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Theorizing the story line  
of climate change denial

Introduction
The Palo Alto School is based on the principle that all human reality is a com-
municative reality. It specifies, however, that there are two realities that can 
be distinguished: A first-order reality and a second-order reality (Watzlawick, 
1986, 1989). The first-order reality refers to those aspects of reality that are 
supported by verifiable and repeatable tests and about which there is a large 
consensus. First-order realities are seen as objective realities that exist indepen-
dently of human beings. Therefore, they are considered external to our will. On 
the contrary, the second-order reality is a conception of the first-order reality. 
It is in this second-order reality that the meaning and social value of reality 
are constructed. Watzlawick (1986, p. 149) proposes using gold as a clarifying 
example of this dichotomy. The first-order reality tells us that gold is a min-
eral with perfectly verifiable physical characteristics; however, gold’s value and 
social and cultural significance are a second-order reality constructed by human 
beings.
For climate change, the first-order reality is all the verifiable empirical data 
about its existence. There are many, diverse information sources that provide 
evidence of climate change. International organizations such as the United 
Nations and World Meteorological Organization have created the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2018), which has published numerous 
reports. Even UNICEF (2017) has warned about the risks of climate change. 
Since 2010 government organizations like the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA, 2018) have published climate change indicators in the United 
States. The European Environment Agency (EEA, 2018) also publishes different 
climate change indicators. Thus, there seems to be no doubt that there is a clear 
scientific consensus on the existence of climate change and that human beings 
have an impact on it (McMichael, Powles, Butler, & Uauy, 2007; O’Mara, 2011; 
Vermeulen, Campbell, & Ingram, 2012).
But there is also a second-order reality, which is all the discourses about 
climate change that reinterpret and evaluate these data. As several authors have 
noted (e.g. Boykoff, 2016; Dunlap, 2013; Dunlap & Mcright, 2015), despite 
the huge amount of evidence that humanity is contributing to climate change, 
there are a series of skeptical, oppositional, and denialist discourses about this 
evidence. With second-order realities, we move from the world of science to 
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the world of stories and communication. For most people, who are not envi-
ronmental scientists, this second-order reality is the most important. It is not 
about minimizing the importance of first-order realities, but I want to high-
light that it is precisely in the second-order realities that the first-order realities 
can be reinforced, distorted, masked, or recreated. As Gil Calvo (2003) stated: 
“[W]hile science today produces the consecrated definition of reality, the press 
constructs its profane definition; hence both need each other because they are 
incomplete without the other half. The partial definition of reality ceases to be 
credible” (p. 117).
The media may contain concepts that are not real and that can be shown 
to be false; however, they do not cease to be less real in the public awareness 
because the people take them for true. This is the power of the narratives con-
structed around climate change. In this text I do not reflect on climate change 
itself, but rather on the narratives about climate change. It is obvious that with-
out the existence of climate change these narratives would not exist; however, 
these narratives construct the social and public meaning of climate change. This 
falls within the area of social communication and its means of influence, which 
I will develop in this text. We must not underestimate the narratives that ques-
tion climate change because, as Boykoff (2016, p. 89) points out, we are in one 
of the many disputed spaces on the great battlefield where the world’s political 
decisions on economy and production are made, as well as the public commit-
ment to climate change.
Constructing meaning
In the social sciences there is a well-known debate about the role that sto-
ries play in the conception of reality. Alonso and Fernández Rodríguez (2013) 
remind us that some scholars “end up reducing society to their discourses, 
thus converting reality into a simple effect of simulacra produced by a cultural 
machine that feeds on the substitution of energy for information, production 
for consumption and the real for the virtual as strategic points for constitut-
ing contemporary society” (p 15). The narrative turn in the social and human 
sciences is found both in constructionism (Watzlawick & Kreig, 1994) and in 
semiotic postulates (Baudrillard, 1978a, 1978b). On the other side would be 
those who underestimate stories as pure rhetoric. Thus, they defend that “the 
real, the truth and the positive knowledge exist independently of the observer 
and of the narrative that the observer enunciates about reality” (Alonso & 
Fernández Rodríguez, 2013, p. 15). However, the narrative turn has spread 
extensively in the 21st century. As Salmon (2010, p. 33–34) affirms, the very 
concept of story has gone from one scientific field to another: From psychol-
ogy to education, from the social sciences to political science, from medicine to 
law, and from theology to the cognitive sciences.
In our case, we are in the world of communication and representation. There-
fore, the narrative paradigm acquires remarkable importance. Many years ago, 
Walter R. Fisher (1984, 1985, 1989) proposed elaborating a narrative paradigm, 
which immediately received various criticisms that I will not dwell on here 
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(Rowland, 1987, 1989; Warnick, 1987). Fisher himself (1989) answered some 
of these criticisms and concluded: “[T]he narrative paradigm is a philosophical 
statement that is meant to offer an approach to interpretation and assessment 
of human communication – assuming that all forms of human communication 
can be seen fundamentally as stories, as interpretations of aspects of the world 
occurring in time and shaped by history, culture, and character” (p. 57). I both 
agree and disagree with Fisher (1984), who bases his argument on the following 
general proposals:
(1) Humans are essentially rational beings; (2) the paradigmatic mode of 
human decision-making and communication is argument – clear-cut infer-
ential (implicative) structures; (3) the conduct of argument is ruled by the 
dictates of situations – legal, scientific, legislative, public, and so on; (4) ration-
ality is determined by subject matter knowledge, argumentative ability, and 
skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields; and (5) the world is 
a set of logical puzzles which can be resolved through appropriate analysis 
and application of reason conceived as an argumentative construct.
(p. 4)
In addition, in relation to the narrative paradigm specifically (Fisher, 1984):
The presuppositions that structure the narrative paradigm are: (1) Humans 
are essentially storytellers; (2) the paradigmatic mode of human decision-
making and communication is “good reasons” which vary in form among 
communication situations, genres, and media; (3) the production and prac-
tice of good reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture, and 
character . . .; (4) rationality is determined by the nature of persons as nar-
rative beings – their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what con-
stitutes a coherent story, and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, 
whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know 
to be true in their lives . . .; and (5) the world is a set of stories which must 
be chosen among to live the good life in a process of continual recreation.
(pp. 7–8)
As we can see, the core of Fisher’s narrative paradigm is narrative rationality 
(Warnick, 1987, p. 173), which takes form in narrative probability and narrative 
fidelity (Fisher, 1985):
Narrative probability refers to formal features of a story conceived as a dis-
crete sequence of thought and/or action in life or literature (any recorded 
or written form of discourse); i.e., it concerns the question of whether or 
not a story coheres or “hangs together,” whether or not the story is free of 
contradictions. Narrative fidelity concerns the “truth qualities” of the story, 
the degree to which it accords with the logic of good reasons: the sound-
ness of its reasoning and the value of its values.
(pp. 349–350)
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In terms of narrative probability, the serious texts that deny climate change 
are usually congruent. We would hardly ever find a statement of the type 
“There has never been climate change and, thanks to our environmentalist 
policies, there never will be again”. Coherence implies not falling into con-
tradiction. Coherence is an internal quality characteristic of the text, but it has 
pragmatic repercussions. In the proposed example statement, we do not know 
whether the enunciator says that climate change has occurred or not. The nar-
rative probability depends on the careful construction of the story. Narrative 
fidelity, however, poses more problems because it determines whether the story 
is true or not. If the story matches our experience and knowledge about what 
is being narrated, we will consider it more reliable. However, the evidence of 
climate change is based on scientific studies and not so much on everyday 
experience. It requires people to rely on the environmental sciences, beyond 
their own perceptions. To make a comparison, it would be like trying to estab-
lish that the Earth moves and the sun does not based on our perception of the 
Earth’s movement. The language itself is deceptive. When we say “the sun is 
rising” it is assumed that the sun moves. Although there is easily verifiable proof 
of climate change, like mountain glaciers melting, the fact that narrative fidel-
ity is based on our experience and knowledge means that the interpretation of 
these facts is variable, and therefore can be manipulated. For example, Donald 
J. Trump’s response to global warming is cynical and fallacious. In the official 
trailer of the documentary An Inconvenient Sequel: Truth to Power he appears in 
a meeting saying that we need global warming because “It’s freezing” today 
(Gore, 2017a).
My criticism of Fisher, however, is that he does not include the role played by 
emotions in the construction of narratives. As Ferrés states (2014):
The split between intelligence and emotion goes back almost to the origins 
of Western thought. Already in Greek culture rationality and emotional-
ity were conceived separately, and the privilege granted to the rational 
dimension of the mind was at the expense of emotionality: emotions were 
considered the enemies of reason and truth.
(p. 22)
However, at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the 
cognitive power of emotions was re-evaluated. Even in neurobiology (Dama-
sio, 2001, 2005) the dichotomy between reason and emotion has been broken. 
The communicative value of emotions is no longer questioned. As Salmon 
(2010, p. 154) points out, in the current information society, with a constant 
flow of false news, rumors, and manipulations, the key to power is to dominate 
the story. Nowadays a political vision is not created with rational arguments, 
but rather with stories. You have to achieve emotional adhesion; you have to 
seduce. Ferrés (2014) states:
[W]hen stimuli that have a strong emotional charge coincide with others 
that do not, the former will eclipse the latter, blocking their communicative 
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effectiveness. And when two divergent emotions coincide, the most pow-
erful will prevail. In the first case, emotion wins. And when two opposite 
emotions interact, the strongest one wins.
(p. 102)
Perhaps one of the problems of the stories about climate change is that the 
data have been given more priority than emotions. Climate change as a first-
order reality is important because it affects all of humanity. However, it is also 
very important as a second-order reality because it goes from being a scientific 
reality to a social reality and helps to construct the social discourse of our time.
Societies create social discourses about reality. For Angenot (2010, p. 21) the 
social discourse is everything that is said, written, published, or represented in 
electronic media – in short, everything that is narrated and discussed. But the 
social discourse also establishes what can be narrated and discussed in a his-
torical moment and in a determined culture. Obviously, the concept of social 
discourse is broader than the narratives on climate change. But these narratives 
are part of the social discourse, and therefore the characteristics of the social 
discourse can help us better understand the narratives about climate change. 
For Angenot (2010, pp. 64–73), the social discourse fulfills different functions:
a To represent the world. The social discourse not only represents reality, it 
also contributes to the construction of this reality. In short, it establishes 
what is real, and at the same time it orders it. In this way, it directs the gaze 
towards certain subjects and ignores others. Hence the importance of nar-
ratives about climate change that talk not only about global warming but 
also about the development model and, above all, our relationship with the 
Earth. Lakoff (2010) questions what the actual concept of “environment” 
implies:
The Environment Frame sees the environment as separate from, and 
around us. Yet, we are not separate from Nature. We are an inseparable 
part of Nature. Yet, we separate self from other, and conceptualize Nature 
as other. This separation is so deep in our conceptual system that we can-
not simply wipe it from our brains. It is a terribly false frame that will not 
go away.
(pp. 76–77)
b To establish omissions. Every way of seeing is a way of omitting. All rep-
resentation implies leaving out parts of reality that are not shown. It is not 
easy to obtain a panoptic view. Rather, we have a directed view, which 
implies forgetting. In the social discourse climate change is largely omitted 
from the agenda of the mass media, which we will look at in more detail 
later. As Angenot (2010, p. 47) points out, the social discourse is a device 
to hide and to divert the gaze, since its aim is to legitimize and to create 
consensus.
c To legitimize and control. This is for Angenot (2010, pp. 65–69), with-
out doubt, the most important function of social discourse. The social 
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discourse legitimizes itself and legitimizes the social practices it fosters. As 
this author points out, the legitimizing power of social discourse is also the 
result of an infinity of micropowers, both formal and thematic. Hegemony 
implies censorship and self-censorship: It determines who can speak about 
what and how. Hence the discursive struggle to achieve hegemony in the 
narratives on climate change.
d To suggest and do. The social discourse not only represents reality, it 
legitimizes it and values it; it also suggests and proposes social practices 
(Angenot, 2010, p. 69). The stories about climate change are performative: 
They propose what to do and what not to do. In a reductionist way, we 
could say that the dichotomy is the fight against climate change or doing 
nothing. Of course, there is a whole variety of nuances between these two 
extremes. As we will see later, there are different arguments about climate 
change that involve different attitudes.
e To produce society and its identities. According to Angenot (2010, p. 71), 
the social discourse produces common sense, public opinion, and civic 
spirit. In fact, it establishes our collective and individual identity. For this 
author (p. 72), a paradox occurs in the social discourse: It is presented as 
fragmented and plural, but this is nothing more than an illusion of diver-
sity. Thus, the social discourse produces a monopolistic cohesion in which 
there is both selection and exclusion, beginning with the official language 
of the state. The selection of language is fundamental in the discourse. Fol-
lowing Luntz (2002), Lakoff (2010) points out that it is not the same to 
talk about climate change as it is to talk about global warming: “The idea 
was that ‘climate’ had a nice connotation – more swaying palm trees and 
less flooded out coastal cities. ‘Change’ left out any human cause of change. 
Climate just changed. No one to blame” (p. 72). Implicitly the narratives 
about climate change also tell a lot about our identity as a species: A spe-
cies that is capable of destroying its own habitat. Stephen Hawking (Holley, 
2016) stated that the only way for humanity not to become extinct would 
be to colonize outer space.
f To block the unspeakable. The social discourse not only shows, it also 
hides. For Angenot (2010, p. 73) the hegemony imposes cognitive issues 
and strategies, while rejecting and concealing the emergence of others. As 
we will see later, the frames condition our interpretation of climate change.
For all this, it seems to me of particular relevance to reflect on how climate 
change is talked about. Narratives are important because they can question 
the political, economic, and sociocultural model. As stated by Ferrés (2014): 
“Anthropologists and historians agree that throughout the history of humanity 
there is no known culture or any society that has not reserved a privileged space 
for stories and fiction” (p. 143). Narratives offer different views of the world 
and reality. The elites know the importance of stories, and so they have their 
think tanks (Almiron, 2017) that construct narratives that seek to be hegem-
onic. There is a struggle of opposing stories. However, this discursive war is 
not about big battles, but rather it is a guerrilla war of the alternative narratives 
against the hegemonic narratives.
Talking about climate change 109
Hegemonic narratives, alternative narratives
Salmon (2010, pp. 223–224), in his well-known work Storytelling, states that the 
rise of storytelling produced a new field of democratic struggles, which are no 
longer only the distribution of labor and capital income or worldwide inequali-
ties. This is about the fight for the story. The aim is to influence opinions, and 
transform and instrumentalize emotions. Human beings could be emancipated, 
for Salmon, by the tenacious re-conquest of their means of expression and nar-
ration. According to this author, the fight has already begun; a path is opening 
in the tumult of the Internet and the disorder of stories, widely escaping from 
the gaze of the dominant media. It is the battle for the story.
In the same sense, Angenot (2010, p. 16) starts from the principle that there 
is no “material”, concrete, economic, political, or military story without inex-
tricable ideas put into discourse, which give shape to convictions, decisions, 
practices, and institutions. These discourses, which respond to specific interests, 
give meaning to the actions of the social actors. Therefore, there is a battle to 
obtain the hegemonic narrative. For this author (p. 10) the discursive hegemony 
is fundamental in the social discourse because it establishes the limits of what 
can be said and thought. Although, as he also points out (p. 29–30), discursive 
hegemony is only one element of cultural hegemony, which is much broader 
and encompasses the legitimacy and meaning of the different lifestyles, customs, 
attitudes, and mentalities.
For Angenot (2010, p. 32) the hegemony is the complex set of norms and 
impositions that operate against the random, the centrifugal, and the marginal, 
that indicate the acceptable subjects and, indissociably, the tolerable ways of 
dealing with them, and that institute the hierarchy of legitimacies on a back-
ground of relative homogeneity. According to this author the components of 
hegemony are:
a The legitimate language. The legitimate language is not only the official 
language but also the knowledge of protocol, the idiomatic expressions, 
and the legitimizing tropes. The legitimate language also establishes the 
acceptable enunciator (Angenot, 2010, p. 38). It thus establishes how you 
can talk about climate change, and even who can talk about it. Therefore, 
the alternative discourses on climate change cannot come out of certain 
discursive practices and with legitimized enunciators.
b The topical and gnoseology. According to Angenot (2010, p. 39), the topi-
cal produces the debatable, the plausible, but it is also presupposed in every 
narrative sequence, constituting the order of the consensual verification 
that is the condition of all discursivity. In addition, every discursive act is 
also an act of knowledge; therefore, it is pertinent to raise the gnoseology 
of discourses – that is, the rules that determine the cognitive function of 
discourses (Angenot, 2010, p. 40). As Foucault (1981, p. 143) stated, every 
society has its regime of truth – that is, the types of discourse that are 
received and work as true or false, the way in which they sanction each 
other. One of the discourses, which we will look at later and which claims 
to have the status of true in relation to climate change, is the news.
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c Fetishes and taboos. Social discourses also have their fetishes and taboos. 
Progress and science would be fetishes, while sex and madness would be 
taboos (Angenot, 2010, p. 41). The narratives of climate change also have 
their fetishes and taboos: That which you must talk about, for example, cli-
mate change in relation to science; and that which you cannot talk about, 
for example, overpopulation, the unsustainable development of capitalism, 
or how the Christian cosmogony in Genesis (1:28) proposes the exploita-
tion of the planet when it urges human beings to dominate the Earth.
d Egocentrism/ethnocentrism. The hegemony also establishes a legitimate 
enunciator, which assumes the right to speak about others and which 
discriminates and grants legitimacy and illegitimacy. This enunciator 
judges and classifies. Thus, it deems and rejects certain beings and groups 
as strange, abnormal, or inferior (Angenot, 2010, p. 42). The hegemony 
establishes who can and cannot talk about climate change. In Western 
society, it would be difficult to legitimize a shaman’s discourse about the 
goddess Gaia. The Andean conception of the Earth as Pachamama, the 
Mother Earth, is very different from the Christian conception of the Earth 
as a divine gift to be dominated. Different conceptions imply different 
practices.
e Subjects and worldview. The hegemony also establishes the subjects and 
problems that can be discussed. But these subjects not only form a rep-
ertoire of issues, they organize them into a worldview (Angenot, 2010, 
pp. 43–44). The narratives on climate change not only are a legitimated 
subject of debate, they also give contrasting worldviews, as I mentioned 
earlier. It is not necessary to go too deeply into the implications of climate 
change to understand that it affects the economy, politics, and sociocultural 
conceptions.
f Dominance of Pathos. Angenot (2010, pp. 44–45), in his research into the 
social discourse of the late 19th century, highlights the existence of end-
of-century anxiogenic predictions. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
according to Gil Calvo (2003), “a very acute perception of growing anxi-
ety, widespread suspicion and paranoid social alarm has arisen everywhere” 
(p. 15). Anxiety in particular and emotions in general are also part of the 
narratives about climate change. According to Gil Calvo (2003),
ecologists tend to the worst catastrophist alarmism. But they do so for 
good reason, given the impossibility of predicting the future evolution of 
global ecosystems, they impose a precautionary principle, which requires 
predicting the worst possible scenario, although unlikely, to prevent it from 
happening.
(p. 130)
g Topological system. Finally, Angenot (2010, p. 45) points out that in the 
hegemony there is a system for dividing discursive tasks. That is, there is a set 
of discourses with their genres, subgenres, and styles that through interdis-
cursive devices ensure, on one hand, the cultural harmony of the hegemony 
and, on the other hand, the appropriate adaptations to the different language 
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forms. The narratives on climate change are transdiscursive and transmedia; 
that is, they occur in different types of discourses and in different media 
(from a conference in an auditorium to a documentary on the Internet or 
a story in a newspaper). They are also transgenre; that is, they occur in dif-
ferent discursive genres (from a novel, to a television news item or an aca-
demic article). Each story adapts to the requirements of the place where it is 
published. Although in this reflection I focus on the information, the narra-
tives on climate change are implicit in many discourses, from advertisements 
( Jiménez Gómez & Olcina Alvarado, 2016) to fiction stories (Ballard, 2014).
Gil Calvo (2003, p. 110) points out that with modernity the monopoly over 
defining reality has gone to the press and science. As I have already mentioned, 
the narratives on climate change are transversal; that is, they are in multiple 
discourses. But the media and scientific discourses continue to have a high 
prevalence. However, as Lakoff (2010) notes, the big problem in relation to the 
environment is the lack of ideas, which he calls “hypocognition”:
We are suffering from massive hypocognition in the case of the environ-
ment. It is intimately tied up with other issue areas: economics, energy, 
food, health, trade, and security. In these overlap areas, our citizens as well 
as our leaders, policymakers, and journalists simply lack frames that capture 
the reality of the situation.
(p. 76)
The discourses that defend the existence and consequences of climate change 
must confront not only this hypocognition, but also the conservative ideol-
ogy about the environment. Lakoff (2010) established six points on which the 
conservative moral system against environmentalism is based: (i) The idea that 
there is a moral hierarchy in nature in which man is above everything else and 
can exploit the rest; (ii) the ideology of “let-the-market-decide” in which the 
market is the moral authority; (iii) the fact that phenomena like global warming 
work by systemic causation, not direct causation as conservatives tend to think; 
(iv) the idea that “greed is good”, using market principles as the rule for solv-
ing conflicts between the environment and economics; (v) the idea that profits 
always have to be calculated in relation to development versus conservation; 
and (vi) the fact that the conservative ideology has prejudices against liberalism 
and extends this to the liberal science describing global warming.
As we can see these are beliefs that can greatly condition the interpretations 
of the different narratives on climate change. Any of these beliefs is an ideologi-
cal foundation to question climate change. However, Lakoff (2010) makes an 
interesting reflection: “Many Americans are conservative on some issues and 
progressive on others” (p. 76). That is, we should not think that the influence of 
narratives is always the same and for the whole world. Moreover, among those 
who question climate change there are also different positions.
Boykoff (2016) distinguishes three different positions: The skeptics, the oppo-
nents, and the denialists. The skeptics are those who disqualify the scientific 
112 Miquel Rodrigo-Alsina
evidence of the existence of climate change and that human beings contribute 
to the problem. Opponents directly attack the scientific studies and the scien-
tists who defend the existence of climate change. The denialists are those who 
reject the evidence that reveals climate change, reject the interpretations that are 
made of this evidence, or reject the proposals that are made to reduce climate 
change. In short, skeptics question, opponents attack, and denialists problema-
tize discourses on climate change. Stories are generated that seek to undermine 
the scientific authority of those who defend the climate change phenomenon. 
Thus, different strategies are used to discredit the scientific discourse on climate 
change. For example:
• Climate change is denied: “There is no climate change or at least there is 
no scientific agreement on it”.
• Climate change is not denied, but its effects are denied or minimized: 
“There may be some climate change, but it is not so serious; there is a lot 
of alarmism”.
• Climate change is not denied, but its causes are denied, other causes are 
established, or causes are blurred: “There is climate change, but it is due to 
nature itself; the actions of humanity have nothing to do with it”.
• Climate change is not denied, but it is considered to be inevitable or against 
development: “Nothing can be done about it, and we can’t go against 
humanity’s progress”.
• Climate change is not denied, but it is claimed that science and technol-
ogy will solve it: “Science and technology have always helped humanity to 
solve their problems”.
Arguments of this type, and many others (Skeptical Science, 2018), are intended 
to question the scientific narrative about climate change. As I mentioned ear-
lier, a media story is inevitably linked to a scientific story. Let’s pause a little at 
this point.
One of the great problems of journalistic stories about climate change is 
their degree of newsworthiness. Certain events about climate change are soft 
news. That is, they are news that lack journalistic urgency for publication. As 
much as a scientific report or even an informative work on climate change 
affirms that urgent measures must be taken, the journalistic urgency to publish 
the report is low. This also occurs with documentaries and interviews. It is not 
necessary to publish them immediately; it is possible to wait until the more 
unforeseen events decrease and there is space or time in the media. On the 
other hand, in the urgent news that could be linked to climate change, often 
climate change does not appear as one of the causes of the event. For example, 
in a flood the main news is the flood itself and the damage produced. The news 
item focuses more on the fact and the consequences than on the causes. The 
media do not pay enough attention to climate change (Almiron & Zoppeddu, 
2015; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Greenberg, Robbins, & Theel, 2013; Neff, 
Chan, & Smith, 2008). As information about climate change does not impose 
itself easily, it is necessary to have an editorial policy that favors it.
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Finally, it is important to note that climate change is difficult to interpret and 
evaluate if not from a scientific viewpoint. Many people may have only very 
limited direct and experiential knowledge about climate change. There may be 
concern about climate change, but it is seen as a distant and somewhat diffuse 
problem, not something that is daily and urgent. A good example is given in 
Spain, which does not have a denialist public opinion of climate change. Heras 
Fernández, Meira Cartea, and Justel (2017) state that
the opinion studies carried out in Spain in the last decade indicate that the 
Spanish population is aligned mainly with the consensus opinions of the 
scientific community, considering that climate change is real, attributing 
it to human activity and evaluating it as dangerous and a threat to health. 
However, the challenge remains of making climate change a relevant issue 
in the social agenda.
(p. 46)
You can believe that climate change exists, but live as if it did not exist. That 
is, the acceptance of climate change is more theoretical than practical. This atti-
tude can be explained (Heras & Meira, 2016, pp. 48–49) because the Spanish 
population believes this is an important problem but not an urgent one, because 
it is considered that there are currently other more immediate problems. How-
ever, it is also seen as a problem that is so huge we have little capacity to act on 
it. If we add to this, that the proposals to combat climate change seem costlier 
than the current risk, inaction is an inevitable consequence. In the United 
States, the situation is not very different. Some years ago, Al Gore (2008) stated 
that 69 per cent of North Americans believed that there was global warming, 
but they did not consider it an urgent problem.
One of the problems in getting citizens to feel involved in climate change 
narratives is that climate change forces us to think in the long term, globally 
and with a systemic vision. In relation to global warming, Lakoff (2010) states: 
“Global causes are systemic, not local. Global risk is systemic not local” (p. 77). 
In addition, environmental policies are made by a state, but climate change 
is transnational. You can’t think of a global problem as only a local or state 
problem.
The influence of narratives
What influence do narratives have on climate change discourse? Although 
there are many variables to be considered to determine the effects of stories, 
it seems clear that narratives are not innocuous, but rather influence the way 
people think, feel, and act. What is more difficult is to determine the degree 
of influence of different narratives on different people. However, I can outline 
some influences that seem clear to me. For instance, the agenda-setting theory 
stated, in its first formulation (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), that there is a direct 
and causal relationship between mass media content and the public’s percep-
tion of what is the most important issue of the day. It was said that it is very 
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possible that the mass media do not have the power to transmit to people how 
they should think, but they do manage to impose what the public should think. 
Subsequently, without abandoning part of their initial postulates, McCombs 
and Shaw (1993) stated that the mass media not only set the agenda on what is 
going to be thought, but also establish how something will be thought about. 
That is, the mass media make a proposal of how to interpret the world.
Thus, the media not only determine the subjects the audiences will consider 
relevant, but also influence the attributes with which they narrate the subject; 
that is, the frame with which they interpret the subject. Through the framing, 
narratives impose certain points of view on reality. Narratives help to construct 
the social imaginaries. Alonso and Fernández Rodríguez (2013) define social 
imaginaries as “those dynamic systems of discourses and stories that organize 
the meaning of social action, proposing possible horizons, images of what is 
desirable, legitimate values and realizable futures” (p. 19).
One of the first difficulties we face is getting climate change onto the media 
agenda. Thus, Gore (2008) denounced, in his conference New Thinking on the 
Climate Crisis, the low interest of the main North American media in climate 
change. This implies that climate change does not have a large space in the 
political agenda either, as ecology professor Antonio Gallardo pointed out in 
an interview (Ramajo, 2018). Therefore, it is difficult that it will be part of the 
agenda of the large majority of people.
It should be noted that it is difficult for climate change, from a commu-
nicative point of view, to become news because it does not usually have the 
required characteristics of newsworthiness. As we have seen, many of the news 
items about climate change are soft news. This characteristic means that infor-
mation about climate change can be put off until there is some space in the 
news. This is the great paradox: The lack of communicative urgency of an 
urgent crisis. As Lakoff points out (2010) “the natural word is being destroyed 
and it is a moral imperative to preserve and reconstitute as much of it as possible 
as soon as possible” (p. 80).
It is true that climate change is a crisis and that it is important; however, for 
the mass media it is a crisis that is too long and drawn out to always get into 
the news. To make a comparison, it is like the news about a kidnapping, for 
example, of the girls by Boko Haram in Nigeria. At the time of the kidnapping 
it was news for a few days in a row, but as the days went by and there was no 
new information, the news item gradually disappeared from the media because 
they can only say that the kidnapping continues. When an event continues 
over time, when the exceptional becomes the norm, it ceases to be a novelty. 
This is the case of climate change and Venice sinking, which, as the tendency 
continues, have lost their novelty.
We also saw that there are news items that are associated with climate change 
and that have a great informative impact, such as catastrophes like floods and 
droughts. However, if climate change is mentioned, it is like a background 
soundtrack that is not always perceived. This soundtrack effect means that, 
although climate change is linked to many areas like health, economy, food, 
etc., what is produced is what Lakoff calls “hypocognition”, as we have seen 
before. For example, it is difficult to find news items on food habits that discuss 
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climate change. Al Gore himself (2017b) in an interview presenting the docu-
mentary An Inconvenient Sequel: Truth to Power, when asked about the influence 
of eating habits on climate change, although he admitted that he was a vegan, 
his response was lukewarm. He recognized the influence of livestock on climate 
change, but he pointed out that it is difficult to change eating habits.
Another difficulty is to achieve hegemony in the interpretative frames. Inter-
pretive frames are one of the most important elements of the influence of nar-
ratives because, as Lakoff (2010) reminds, “the facts must make sense in terms of 
their system of frames, or they will be ignored” (p. 73). According to this author, 
“frames include semantic roles, relations between roles, and relations to other 
roles. . . . All of our knowledge makes use of frames, and every word is defined 
through the frames it neutrally activates” (p. 71). However, frames are not eas-
ily activated and deactivated. The problem posed by Lakoff is that “frames can 
become reified – made real – in institutions, industries, and cultural practices. 
Once reified, they don’t disappear until the institutions, industries, and cultural 
practices disappear. That is a very slow process” (p. 77).
Changing frames is difficult, but it is very important because it can imply a 
change in people’s conception of climate change. For this it is necessary to rein-
force and expand the narratives that defend the existence of climate change, so 
that they become hegemonic. However, if there is no change in our awareness, 
it will be difficult for us to come to understand the real climate change crisis. 
As stated by Lakoff (2010):
To understand “the real crises” one needs the right conceptual structures 
in one’s brain circuit. Frames are communicated via language and visual 
imagery. The right language is absolutely necessary for communicating 
“the real crisis”. However, most people do not have the overall background 
system if frames needed to understand “the real crisis”; simply providing a 
few words and slogans can at best help a very little.
(p. 74)
A more progressive awareness is necessary. Facing the narratives against cli-
mate change Lakoff (2010) also recalls the values of progressivism:
[T]he values at the heart of the progressive moral system are empathy, respon-
sibility (personal and social), and the ethic of excellence (make the world 
better, starting with yourself ). Empathy has a physical basis in the mirror 
neuron system . . ., which links us physiologically to other beings (e.g., the 
polar bears) and to things (e.g., redwoods) in the natural world. This leads us 
to see inherent value in the natural world. Personal responsibility means tak-
ing care of yourself (e.g., maintaining one’s health) and taking care of others 
(e.g., protecting their health), and functioning in the outdoors is seen not 
only as way to do those things, but also as way of developing empathy with 
beings and things in the natural world. The ethic of excellence calls on us 
to make the world better (improve the environment) or at least preserve it, 
starting with ourselves (e.g., conserving energy, recycling, etc.).
(p. 76)
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To get these values to spread we need more communication, more stories, 
and more effectiveness. Following Ferrés (2014), the production of media mes-
sages must therefore be a
frontier communication, it must be placed halfway between what the 
interlocutor already knows and what they should know, between what they 
already understand and what they should understand. . . . But, above all, it 
must be halfway between what interests them and what would be good for 
them to be interested in.
(p. 177)
We must tune in with audiences so that the discourse on climate change 
is more effective. However, as Salmon (2010, pp. 152–153) points out, it is no 
longer just about controlling the political agenda, but rather about creating a 
new virtual universe, an enchanted kingdom populated by heroes and anti-
heroes, in which the citizen-actor is invited to participate as a reader captivated 
by a story that follows its legendary course. From now on, it is less about com-
municating than about forging a story and imposing it on the political agenda. 
As we saw before, emotions are very important in stories. In this sense, Lakoff 
(2010) states that “many frame-circuits have direct connections to the emo-
tional regions of the brain. Emotions are an inescapable part of normal thought. 
Indeed, you cannot be rational without emotions” (p. 72).
In order to help the progressives win in the discursive battle, Lakoff (2010, 
pp. 79–80) provides a list of suggestions that includes bettering the communica-
tions system (with spokespeople and bookers), planning the frames (both short 
term and long term), looking for framing gaps (and for how to institutionalize 
them), and remembering the basic hints (framing in terms of moral values pro-
vides a structured understanding of what you are saying, remember that context 
matters, etc.).
Conclusions
“We move more for stories than for statistics when it comes to cementing 
beliefs or making decisions” (Ferrés, 2014, p. 161). A good example of how 
the importance of emotional stories is forgotten is the Al Gore conference 
(2009) on climate change, in which most of the brief talk was about statistics. 
In another conference, Al Gore (2006) began with a funny and ironic story 
about his departure from the White House, to then make fifteen proposals 
of how to fight against climate change. After listening to the talk, it is pos-
sible that the audience did not remember all the proposals that were made, 
but I am sure that they could remember the funny story at the beginning of 
the talk. In this sense, Lakoff (2010) proposes “to talk about values, not just 
facts and figures; to use simple language, not technical terms; and to appeal to 
emotions” (p. 73).
Therefore, I propose that it is necessary to rethink the narratives about cli-
mate change considering the difficulties they may have in the current discursive 
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struggle. As Lakoff (2010) reminds us: “There are limited possibilities for 
changing frames. Introducing new language is not always possible” (p. 72). But 
he also says: “[W]hat needs to be done is to activate the progressive frames on 
the environment (and the other issues) and inhibit the conservative frames. 
This can be done via language (framing the truth effectively) and experience 
(e.g., providing experiences of the natural world)” (p. 76). This battle is funda-
mental for changing people’s awareness.
The documentaries An Inconvenient Truth (2006) and An Inconvenient Sequel: 
Truth to Power (2017) are necessary. However, I agree with Lakoff (2010) that 
this is not enough; the political involvement is missing. But for this the pub-
lic needs to be influenced; we need “to be effective countering the powerful 
conservative forms of resistance” (p. 79). The hegemony of the narratives that 
defend the existence of climate change is fundamental; to achieve this we need 
more than the scientific approach. As for the mass media, they have the imme-
diacy syndrome; i.e. the important thing is what is happening today or what 
will happen tomorrow. It is difficult for the future in the medium or long term 
to draw much attention. The mass media, and much of the public, as we have 
seen, do not see climate change as something urgent.
In the discursive struggle, the narrative that defends climate change is very 
similar to the feminist narrative. Denialism, like sexism, is in many stories. They 
range from the most explicit stories to micro-denialism in texts where climate 
change is hidden. As seen, the skeptics, the contrarians, and the denialists pro-
mote discourses against the existence and urgency of climate change. Their 
arguments need to be criticized and their sources analyzed. Nevertheless, cli-
mate change affects many areas, and it hides in health, food, economics, poli-
tics, demographics, agriculture, international relations, lifestyles, relationships 
with undomesticated animals, the role of domesticated animals on the Earth, 
the conception of nature, etc. It is not only about combating denialism, it is 
about reflecting on how climate change affects multiple realities and increas-
ingly more facets of our daily lives. We should not limit ourselves to scientific 
and journalistic approaches; the media and advocacy groups need to use many 
other approaches to reach the public’s emotions.
The mass media play a crucial role in this discursive struggle. Interest groups 
are very aware of this and try to influence the stories in the media. In many 
cases think tanks become authoritative sources for media outlets or have experts 
who spread the interest groups’ narrative in opinion articles, interviews, talk 
shows, and other media sources. Of course, not all interest groups have com-
mercial links with the industries contributing to global warming, nor are they 
all deniers or skeptics about climate change. In this respect, the mass media 
should, for greater transparency, identify the interests that think tanks have, and 
for greater democratization, give voice to alternative interest groups that are 
truly independent of commercial interests.
At this point the responsibility of the mass media and of the interest groups 
influencing them is inescapable. For the sake of the planet and its inhabitants’ 
well-being, mass media and the public opinion must be freed from the influ-
ence of interest groups and narratives tied to capitalistic benefits alone.
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7  Climate change countermovement 
organizations and media  
attention in the United States
Maxwell Boykoff and Justin Farrell
Introduction
How influential has the right-wing think tank Heartland Institute1 been in 
shaping the United States (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
agenda under the Donald J. Trump administration? That was the main ques-
tion that motivated a March 2018 lawsuit by the Environmental Defense Fund 
and the Southern Environmental Law Center. The legal suit claimed that the 
U.S. EPA failed to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request from six 
months earlier that demanded correspondence between the Heartland Institute 
and the EPA specifically about their red team-blue team proposal for evaluating 
scientific evidence of climate change (Reilly, 2018).
In its first year in power in the United States, the Trump administration 
proposed to form an adversarial red team to debate and debunk the science of 
climate change (seen as a blue team perspective) (Siciliano, 2017). In so doing, 
this approach effectively sought to restructure the peer review process and ele-
vate outlier and contrarian views in the public arena. EPA Administrator Scott 
Pruitt introduced this military-strategy-style approach to evaluating climate 
research for policy applications, by proposing television debates to advance science 
in the public arena (Volcovici, 2017). Through this red team-blue team proposal 
(enlisting the help of the Heartland Institute), Pruitt began to identify potential 
contrarian scientists and economists as participants (Waldman, 2017). While a 
red team-blue team approach may be losing support both inside and outside the 
Trump administration, Pruitt has told the Heritage Foundation that there are 
ongoing plans to constrict climate science under the guise of reform (Wald-
man & Bravender, 2018).
Numerous events in recent years like these have re-calibrated contrarian 
considerations in the public arena. Developments like these have pointed to 
the reality that ideological polarization around climate change issues – par-
ticularly in the United States – has increased in the last thirty years (Dunlap, 
McCright, & Yarosh, 2016) and that media have also played a role in this trend 
(Carmichael, Brulle, & Huxster, 2017). These kinds of actions have also marked 
novel approaches to climate change countermovement or think tank strategies 
to oppose various forms of science and policy engagement from the local to 
national and international scales (Cann & Raymond, 2018).
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This polarization emanating from strategies and tactics from U.S.-based cli-
mate change countermovement organizations or think tanks has led to funda-
mentally different interpretations of scientific evidence, highly varied public 
perceptions of uncertainty, and consequent policy confrontations and stale-
mates. In recent years, more attention has been paid to the structural, political, 
economic, and cultural roots of why, in the face of overwhelming scientific 
consensus, less than half of Americans believe that humans contribute to 21st 
century climate change.
In this chapter, we focus analyses on contrarian voices – often dubbed 
climate skeptics, contrarians, dismissives, doubters, deniers, or denialists – that have 
gained prominence and traction in the U.S. public domain over time through 
a mix of internal workings such as journalistic norms, institutional values and 
practices, and external political, economic, cultural, and social factors. We 
connect these considerations to social networks of climate contrarianism and 
climate countermovement activities. We first outline the contemporary land-
scape of contrarians and contrarian countermovement organizations in the 
United States. Next, we share comprehensive text and network data to show 
how a patterned network of political and financial actors and elite corporate 
benefactors influence polarization effects. Then, we consider how and why 
these actors garner disproportionate visibility in the public sphere via mass 
media, and how media content producers grapple with ways to represent 
claims makers, as well as their claims, so that they clarify rather than confuse 
these critical issues. Last, in the U.S. context we discuss how contrarian actors 
are embedded in countermovement activities through ideological or evidentiary 
disagreement to the orthodox views of science, a drive to fulfill the perceived 
desires of special interests, and exhilaration from self-perceived notoriety. 
Through these dimensions, we explore how contrarians use celebrity as a way 
to exploit networked access to decision-making within the dynamic archi-
tectures of contemporary climate science, politics, and policy in the United 
States. We therefore interrogate the state of play of contrarian social net-
works and their effects – from individual attitudes to larger organizational 
and financial flows – in the U.S. context, commonly referred to as belly of the 
beast in terms of carbon-based industry power and political/societal/cultural 
polarization.
Wither or thrive ye climate contrarian countermovement?
Questions taken up here involve considerations of how various outlier views – 
particularly those associated with movements from the ideological right – have 
influenced public discussions in the United States on climate change. How we 
identify outliers then as contrarians is worth some elaboration. We define climate 
contrarians as those who contest scientific views that the climate is changing 
and that humans contribute. By extension, we then define a climate change 
countermovement (CCM) organization (consistent with Brulle, 2014) as those 
that advocate against policies that seek action to mitigate climate change, espe-
cially mandatory restrictions and penalties on greenhouse gas emissions.2 These 
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movements also advocate against substantive action to adapt to or mitigate cli-
mate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2000).
Over time, many terms have been invoked to describe a heterogeneous group 
of actors and organizations that counter many areas of convergent agreement 
in climate science and policy decision-making. In other words, they take up 
outlier perspectives. These include individuals and CCM organizations charac-
terized as skeptics, contrarians, dismissives, doubters, deniers, and/or denialists. While 
many have pointed out that skepticism forms an integral and necessary element 
of scientific inquiry, its use when describing outlier views on climate change 
has been less positive. The term skeptic has been most commonly invoked to 
describe someone who (1) denies the seriousness of an environmental prob-
lem, (2) dismisses scientific evidence showing the problem, (3) questions the 
importance and wisdom of regulatory policies to address them, and (4) con-
siders environmental protection and progress to be competing goals ( Jacques, 
Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008).3 McCright (2007) defines contrarians as those who 
vocally challenge what they see as a false consensus of mainstream climate sci-
ence through critical attacks on climate science and eminent climate scientists, 
often with substantial financial support from fossil fuels industry organizations 
and conservative think tanks.4 O’Neill and Boykoff (2010) further develop a 
definition of climate contrarianism by disaggregating claims-making to include 
ideological motives behind critiques of climate science, and exclude individuals 
who are thus far unconvinced by the science or individuals who are uncon-
vinced by proposed solutions, as these latter two elements can be more usefully 
captured through different terminology.
It may be tempting to assemble a taxonomy of contrarianism, skepticism, 
or denialism, and by extension trace the amount of media coverage of certain 
claims makers in mass media. However, this approach risks under considering 
context and excessively focusing on individual personalities at the expense of 
political, economic, social, and cultural forces. Further complexity arises when 
drawing conclusions based solely on evident ties between carbon-based indus-
try, contrarian lobbying, and climate policy. The important issue is not neces-
sarily where the funding comes from, but whether these ties influenced the 
content of the claims made by funding recipients (Oreskes, 2004). Moreover, 
this approach cuts both ways, in that it risks dismissing legitimate and poten-
tially useful critiques out of hand by way of dismissing the individual rather 
than the arguments put forward. Treatment of individuals through denigrating 
monikers does little to illuminate the contours of their arguments; it actually 
has the opposite obfuscating effect in the public sphere. In other words, placing 
blanket labels on claims makers overlooks the varied and context-dependent 
arguments they put forward.
In 2018, CCM organizations have enjoyed unparalleled access in the halls of 
U.S. Federal Government. Trump’s nominations for key posts in the adminis-
tration have sparked worry among those who care about climate and environ-
mental protection, justice, and human well-being. These appointments include 
Secretary of State (former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson), EPA Administra-
tor (Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt), Secretary of the Department of 
124 Maxwell Boykoff and Justin Farrell
Interior (Montana Congressman Ryan Zinke), and Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Energy (former Texas Governor Rick Perry), all of whom maintain 
ties to carbon-based industry interests. In the United States, a patterned net-
work of actors – individuals enmeshed in CCM organizations – bolstered by 
élite corporate benefactors has therefore demonstrably muddied the waters of 
discourse and action on climate change. They have also contributed to increas-
ing political and social polarization on climate change.
A climate cabal: patterned networks of political  
actors and corporate benefactors
The explosion of digitized data and archives have made possible a new approach 
to studying climate contrarianism that is much broader in focus, moving beyond 
small-scale studies or the over reliance on survey work. In two studies in 2016, 
Farrell used computational social science methods, including large-scale net-
work science and machine learning (2016a, 2016b). We draw this into this 
article to consider the ways that a patterned network of political actors and 
corporate benefactors has come to exert influence over this issue.
New data, at much larger scales, provides new insight for uncovering the 
complex web of connections between industry, politicians, think tanks, and the 
shifting views of the American public. The data themselves include two inter-
related parts:
• The full institutional and social network structure of climate change 
contrarianism
• A complete collection of written and verbal texts about climate change or 
global warming from 1993–2013 from every contrarian organization5
From these data a comprehensive social network was identified. This is made 
up of 4,556 individuals with ties to 164 organizations involved in promulgating 
contrarian views. The individuals in this bipartite network include interlocking 
board members, as well as many more informal and overlapping social, political, 
economic, and scientific ties.6 This mapping of the structure of organizations, 
companies, and individuals involved in promulgating misinformation and dis-
information about climate change has allowed us to examine the central mes-
sages, and in some cases, the extent to which the success of these messages is 
impacted by sources of funding. For historical reasons, research suggested that 
ExxonMobil and the Koch Family Foundation7 have shown themselves to be 
particularly important backers of CCM groups.8
Figure 7.1 shows how climate countermovement organizations in the United 
States are connected to multiple people, and that not all CCM organizations are 
created equally. What is important about this figure is that there is a noticeable 
core of organizations, clustered together. In line with Farrell (2016a, 2016b), 
this shows that not all organizations are equally connected, but that there is 
a smaller clique of organizations that exert more influence in the CCM, and 
these organizations are the ones that received funding from the Koch Family 
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Foundation and ExxonMobil. Through these analyses we find that funding is 
an important predictor of who is in the core, and thus, who has more connec-
tions with more individuals, enabling them to organize the CCM around uni-
fied messages and strategies for disseminating those messages.
Influential contrarian actors have also moved from these CCM groups into 
posts in the U.S. Trump administration. For example, Myron Ebell has been the 
chair of the Cooler Heads Coalition as well as the Director of Global Warm-
ing and International Environmental Policy at the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute. In 2017 he was selected by U.S. President Donald J. Trump to lead 
the Environmental Protection Agency transition team. Ebell has been quoted 
Figure 7.1  Network mapping of climate countermovement organizations and individu-
als in the United States. The larger black dots represent the 164 organizations 
involved in spreading misinformation and disinformation about climate change. 
The smaller grey dots are individuals connected to each organization. The thin 
grey lines signify each connection an individual has to each organization.
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acknowledging that his advocacy from these positions “does bleed into politi-
cal persuasion and lobbying” for particular policy outcomes but countered that 
these activities are both commonplace and legal (O’Harrow Jr, 2017).
When interrogating how funding from these groups impacts CCM mes-
saging (and by extension the policy decision-makers they seek to influence), 
we find it useful to then trace a spread of misinformation through U.S. media 
to and through the political landscape into the minds of the collective public 
citizenry. It is important to confront the reality that, through this analysis, there 
is indeed a configuration of leading CCM organizations that can accurately be 
described as a climate cabal.
U.S. media amplification of CCM organizations  
and climate contrarian perspectives
In this chapter we trace eleven influential and U.S.-based CCM organizations 
through media attention to their movements and activities over the past thirty 
years in eleven prominent television and newspaper outlets.9 The eleven CCM 
groups are the Cooler Heads Coalition, the Global Climate Coalition, the Sci-
ence and Environmental Policy Project, Americans for Prosperity, the Cato 
Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, the Heartland Institute, the Her-
itage Foundation, Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, the George C. 
Marshall Institute, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute. The eleven U.S. 
outlets are ABC News, CBS News, CNN News, Fox News, MSNBC, NBC 
News, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today, and Los 
Angeles Times.
Figure 7.2 depicts media attention for each of these CCM groups month 
to month over these three decades across U.S. television and U.S. newspapers. 
Figure 7.3 shows data year to year. In these figures we see CCM presence 
increased greatly after 2006. With the exception of a spike in CCM visibility 
in the media around the time of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, coverage was con-
siderably lower in the past. The average year-to-year coverage of these CCM 
organizations from 1997–2006 was about a third (33 per cent) of the aver-
age amount of their visibility in the U.S. media over the subsequent decade 
2007–2016.10 In particular, there was a significant increase in media presence 
of CCM organizations at the end of 2009 and through 2010, following the 
November 2009 so-named email hacking scandal emanating from the Univer-
sity of East Anglia (also known as Climategate). There was also a notable uptick 
in the Heartland Institute’s media presence at the end of 2012, due in part to 
fallout from the release of its May 2012 billboard ad comparing climate believ-
ers with the notorious Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber). In 2014, Americans 
for Prosperity (AFP)11 received a bump in media attention. In 2014, AFP’s 
anti-climate legislation campaigns were given a boost through a tripling of 
funding form the Koch Family Foundation (Mayer, 2016). AFP President 
Tim Phillips, along with others from AFP, then effectively garnered attention 
in media to shape public discourse surrounding the 2014 mid-term elections 
in the United States, particularly stating how AFP was working to aggressively 
Figure 7.3  Media coverage year-to-year 1988–2017 of the Cooler Heads Coalition, the Global 
Climate Coalition, the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Americans for 
Prosperity, the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, the Heartland 
Institute, the Heritage Foundation, Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, the 
George C. Marshall Institute, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
Figure 7.2  Monthly media coverage over thirty years (1988–2017) (ABC News, CBS News, 
CNN News, Fox News, MSNBC, NBC News, Washington Post, Wall Street Jour-
nal, New York Times, USA Today, and Los Angeles Times) of the Cooler Heads 
Coalition, the Global Climate Coalition, the Science and Environmental Policy 
Project, Americans for Prosperity, the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise 
Institute, the Heartland Institute, the Heritage Foundation, Committee for a 
Constructive Tomorrow, the George C. Marshall Institute, and the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute.
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sink the election hopes of any candidate who supported a carbon tax or other 
climate regulations. Furthermore, there has been increased visibility of these 
eleven CCM groups in U.S. media since the election, inauguration, and estab-
lishment of the Trump administration. Total coverage in 2017 (403 stories/
segments) was about double that of the average coverage over the previous 
decade of coverage of these groups (189 stories/year from 2007–2016). Spe-
cifically, the Heritage Foundation, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, and Heartland Institute gained increased visibility in 
2017. U.S. media accounts noted, for example, that the Trump administration 
embraced numerous Heritage Foundation policy recommendations articu-
lated in its Mandate for Leadership series of publications. Among these recom-
mendations was a strong stance on leaving the Paris climate change accord. 
By the Heritage Foundation’s own boastful accounts, 64 per cent of its policy 
prescriptions from that series were then included in Trump budget proposals 
(Bedard, 2018).
Figure 7.4 shows CCM organizations’ media presence in U.S. television 
news segments, while Figure 7.5 shows these CCM groups’ presence in U.S. 
newspaper articles, both from 1988–2017.
Through these analyses of media influence by these CCM organizations in 
these eleven U.S. outlets, we find that influence in public discourse – indicated 
through media coverage – is shaped by founding and funding (e.g. the Global 
Climate Coalition was heavily supported in the 1990s).
Figure 7.4  Media coverage year-to-year 1988–2017 of the eleven CCM organizations on 
ABC News, CBS News, CNN News, Fox News, MSNBC, and NBC News.
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Figure 7.6 shows proportions of coverage from year to year in each outlet 
across these eleven organizations overall. Noting that Fox News and MSNBC 
began coverage in 1996, our research shows that the Washington Post and New 
York Times contribute most significantly to coverage of these prominent CCM 
organizations. In an era of naming and shaming of the Fox News Network by 
many from the left, these findings may run counter to common perceptions 
that attention paid to these CCM groups in U.S. media may be attributed to 
outlets with right-of-center ideologies, stances, and reputations. While Boykoff 
has referred to a “Rupert Murdoch effect” via Fox News (2011) in terms of 
how Fox shapes the content of climate change coverage in the U.S. press, these 
findings do not support the notion that Fox or the Wall Street Journal are pri-
marily responsible for the amplification of these particular outlier perspectives 
in climate change stories.
In fact, in 2017 half of the coverage of these eleven groups was in the Wash-
ington Post, and 26 per cent of coverage appeared in the New York Times. Mean-
while, 7 per cent was in Fox News, and no stories in the Wall Street Journal 
covered these groups along with climate change issues. Expanding out across 
the twenty-two-year period from the founding of Fox News and MSNBC 
(1996–2017), over half the coverage (51 per cent) of these CCM organizations 
was carried through the Washington Post and New York Times. Meanwhile, just 
Figure 7.5  Media coverage year-to-year 1988–2017 of the eleven CCM organizations in the 
Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today, and Los Angeles 
Times.
Figure 7.6  Proportions of media coverage year-to-year 1988–2017 of the eleven CCM 
organizations across ABC News, CBS News, CNN News, Fox News, MSNBC, 
NBC News, the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today, 
and Los Angeles Times.
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15 per cent of the volume of coverage of these CCM organizations appeared 
on Fox News and in the Wall Street Journal, seen typically as bastions of right-
of-center voices on climate change and other issues.12 Over this same time 
period 19 per cent of coverage was on CNN, with 9 per cent on MSNBC, 
5 per cent in the USA Today, and about 1 per cent each on ABC News, CBS 
News, NBC News, and in Los Angeles Times. Therefore, our findings show that 
naming and shaming of right-wing outlets for amplifying the volume of CCM 
organizations and their associated contrarians is misplaced.
Moving from the amount of coverage of CCM groups to the impact of 
this coverage, we can explore considerations regarding how CCM voices work 
through the media to stymy efforts seeking to enlarge rather than constrict the 
spectrum of possibility for mobilizing the public to appropriately address ongo-
ing climate challenges. Twists and turns in the high profile, highly contentious 
science, policy, and politics around climate change in the United States have 
enabled contrarians to gain increased footholds in battles for public understand-
ing and engagement regarding the causes and consequences of climate change. 
The relationship between CCM organizations and climate contrarians has 
been studied extensively in the U.S. context (e.g. Dunlap & McCright, 2011). 
Boykoff and Olson have posited that climate contrarians may effectively act 
as contemporary climate courtesans to CCM organization interests (fueled by 
their corporate backers) (2013). To get at reasons how and why CCM organiza-
tions and climate contrarians influence U.S. climate change discourse through 
media, here we trace their traction utilizing a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches.
Partial explanations to these considerations reside in examinations of insti-
tutional features of media representational practices, particularly in the United 
States. Through computational social science approaches, Farrell has found that 
funding of CCM groups influenced the actual language and thematic content 
of media stories, and the polarization of discourse in particular (2016b). Farrell 
found that well-funded CCM organizations were more likely to have written 
and disseminated contrarian texts through the media. Boykoff has argued that in 
the name of efficiency, reporters increasingly cover a vast range of beats, making 
it ever more difficult to satisfactorily portray the complexities of climate change 
(2011). Meanwhile, media institutions and practices have produced content by 
seeking refuge in journalistic tendencies of personalization and drama, privileg-
ing conflicts and contentions among messengers over treatment of arguments 
and assertions (Weingart, Engels, & Pansesgrau, 2000). Boykoff and Boykoff 
(2007) have outlined and examined the journalistic norms of personalization, 
dramatization, novelty, authority-order bias, and balance, as they shape both 
what become media representations and news.13 Our findings here further sup-
port this previous research where greater funding for the Cato Institute, Heart-
land Institute, and Heritage Foundation over the last decade appears to translate 
to media visibility (see Figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5). These most powerful 
organizations at the center of this cabal have received high levels of funding 
from powerful donors like ExxonMobil and the Koch Family Foundation.
Along with these computational social science approaches, we gain further 
insights through qualitative discourse analysis approaches through a lens of 
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cultural politics. These routes help consider ways that claims and claims makers 
influence media representational practices, and how these portrayals then influ-
ence public discourse. Cultural politics refers to dynamic and contested processes 
behind how meaning is constructed and negotiated, and involves not only the 
portrayals that gain traction in discourses, but also those that are absent from 
them or silenced. Moreover, discourses tether to material realities and social 
practices (Hall, 1997). In these spaces, when media call on CCM organizations 
and climate contrarians for alternative interpretations of climate science and 
policy information, public discussions are altered. Logically, actors (e.g. jour-
nalists and editors) within mass media constantly must make swift decisions 
regarding how to articulate climate concerns by who they select as experts or 
authorized definers to frame the issues (Carvalho, 2007). Media coverage of cli-
mate change shows that the boundaries between who constitute authorized 
speakers (and who do not), and who are legitimate claims makers are consistently 
being interrogated, and challenged (Gieryn, 1999). Essentially, media often con-
nect formal science-policy and informal spaces of the everyday together. Media 
representations then become powerful conduits of climate science and policy 
(mis)information. There are many factors that shape how members of the public 
citizenry consider possible responses to and engagements with climate change. 
Qualitative analyses of media representations then help to see how decisions 
about portrayals (quantity and quality) shape how public citizens consider pos-
sible responses (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012) and how they play into 
climate governance at multiple scales in the United States (Fisher, 2013).
There are many cases where CCM organizations have targeted the power 
of media to amplify certain views, and where media have exposed initiatives to 
manipulate public perception of climate change (Boykoff, 2013). For instance, 
emboldened by the inauguration of U.S. President Trump, the Heartland Insti-
tute held its twelfth nearly annual conference on climate change in Washington, 
DC.14 Attended by prominent political figures such as Congressional Repre-
sentative Lamar Smith (Republican from Texas), the conference was geared to 
amplify these outlier views at the science-policy interface (Mervis, 2017). Yet 
these are by no means recent dynamics. To illustrate by way of another example 
a decade earlier, in 2006 ABC News revealed that the Intermountain Rural 
Electric Association paid $100,000 to climate contrarian Patrick Michaels (a 
frequent representative of the Cato Institute) to reach out to media outlets and 
downplay humans’ role in climate change as well as confuse public understand-
ing of anthropogenic climate change (Sandell & Blakemore, 2006).
Two key challenges continue to persist in mass media that are relevant to 
the ways in which CCM organizations and contrarians have been covered: 
First, media representations have often collapsed messenger viewpoints, inter-
ventions, and perspectives into overly homogenized terms of climate skepticism, 
contrarianism, denialism, and so on; and second, media have often overlooked the 
texture within climate change issues, instead providing broad-brushed treat-
ments of discussions and debates therein.
There are many reasons why media accounts have failed to provide greater 
nuance regarding these heterogeneous CCM groups and associated contrarian 
Climate change countermovement organizations 133
views. Among them, processes behind the challenging of dominant discourses 
take place simultaneously at multiple scales. Large-scale social, political, and 
economic factors influence everyday individual journalistic decisions, such as 
how to focus or contextualize a story with short time to deadline. These issues 
intersect with processes such as journalistic norms and values to further shape 
news content.15 Moreover, media reports have a tendency to conflate the vast 
and varied terrain as unified issues: From climate science to governance and 
from consensus to debate. To the extent that mass media fuse all these issues 
into one, they enhance bewilderment rather than understanding. Media cover-
age of disagreement and dissension – stripped of needed context – significantly 
then (re)shapes understanding for the public citizenry. While there are facets of 
climate science and policy where agreement is strong and convergent agree-
ment dominates, and others where contentious disagreement garners worth-
while debate and discussion in the media, conflation of these distinctions into 
one sweeping issue contributes to confusion and sets up a breeding ground 
for manipulation from outlier viewpoints. CCM organizations and contrar-
ian actors can thrive in these spaces where muddying the waters of productive 
climate change discourse becomes quite easy and feasible through media chan-
nels. Consequently, opportunities to effectively help the public engage in the 
nuance involved in dealing with complex contemporary climate challenges are 
then squandered.
For example, over the past decade the aforementioned Heartland Institute has 
emerged as a leading contrarian countermovement organization that questions 
both diagnoses that humans contribute to climate change, and a range of prog-
noses for mitigation policy action. As was mentioned earlier, the Heartland Insti-
tute promotes free-market policy approaches to a number of critical public issues 
such as climate change, healthcare, education, taxation, and tobacco regulation. 
In recent years, the Heartland Institute has achieved celebrity status as a “primary 
American organization pushing climate change scepticism” (Gillis, 2012).
Together, these analyses help provide more textured understandings of how 
and why outlier views in climate science and governance gratuity are provided 
media visibility. Ultimately, disproportionate coverage of CCM group claims – 
communicated through mass media – has challenged efforts that seek to expand 
rather than constrict the spectrum of possibility for varied forms of U.S. climate 
action. To more effectively inform and engage – rather than confuse and bewil-
der – the public, journalists, and editors, as well as researchers, scientists, policy 
actors, and other non-nation state actors, need to account for the nature of the 
disproportionate influence of these CCM organizations in U.S. media.
How CCM organizations and contrarian  
actors embed in U.S. society
In the case of climate change, one can consider the overwhelming convergent 
agreement within relevant expert communities in science that humans play a 
significant role in today’s changing climate (amidst an ongoing background of 
natural climate forcing). However, movements from this diagnosis to prognoses 
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for action are contentious. In other words, the path from appraising the way 
things are to the way it is thought they ought to be is fraught with discussions, 
debates, and disagreements. It is within these spaces that one finds clashes as 
well as confluences of culture, politics, economics, and society over time (Hoff-
man, 2015). In this chapter we have focused on a heterogeneous, yet loosely 
configured, set of actors dubbed climate contrarians, who at times have achieved 
outsized notoriety in contemporary discussions of climate science, politics, and 
policy in the 21st century public sphere.
In 2018, CCM organizations and associated climate courtesans have achieved 
veritable celebrity status. Beyond the quantitative evidence in this chapter that 
supports this claim, we can also consider the actions of Donald J. Trump, who 
currently occupies the Oval Office as President of the United States. Many 
climate researchers have expressed fears of McCarthyist attacks in the wake of 
the election of U.S. President Donald J. Trump. For example, Kerry Emma-
nuel from the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (MIT) has commented, 
“I think we’re in a mild state of shock after the election. Politics has [sic] been 
turned upside down and all of these dark forces have erupted” (Milman, 2017).
In 2013, Boykoff and Olson explored what they called “wise contrarians”, 
those who have gained distinction primarily by way of activities associated 
with anti-regulatory, anti-environmental, skeptical, and neoliberal environmental 
movements aligned with those on the ideological right. In addition, wrapped 
up in these stances are the dismissal, denigration, and demonization of eviden-
tiary statements that are contrary to these views. The wise here does not emanate 
from wisdom. Rather, Boykoff and Olson argue that claims, motivations, drives, 
and desires within U.S. climate contrarian movements map usefully onto the 
U.S.-based historical Wise Use movement (McCarthy, 2002).16 Wise Use pro-
ponents made use of common sense appeals to the conservative middle-class, 
speaking to the ideology of freedom and liberty, above all, which connects dually 
with the individual-centric doctrine as well as that of neoliberalism and the 
free market. Both Wise Use and CCM groups self-label ambiguously (e.g. the 
Cooler Heads Coalition) and in ways that invoke environment-economy and 
regulation-freedom dichotomies (e.g. Americans for Prosperity, the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute). The slogan of the Cooler Heads Coalition in fact is “May 
Cooler Heads Prevail”, and this rhetoric of common sense is prevalent among 
both the Wise Use and climate contrarian movements.
There are dangers that can be associated with a focus on contrarians them-
selves. Among them, analysis (and potential scrutiny of the individual) may 
come at the expense of attention paid to connections between their interven-
tions and macro-level political, economic, and societal dimensions. In other 
words, when focused on the movements of individual contrarians, such atten-
tion could displace deeper structures and architectures that give rise to the 
effectiveness of their claims in the public arena. Scholars have identified a range 
of motivations that drive CCM organizations, and many also animating Wise 
Use efforts. Jacques theorized that an “organized deflection of accountability” 
is also inspired by the drive to defend the notion of an American ideology 
(2012). Protecting corporate freedom and, thus, profits is another motivator. 
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Some – largely from within the movement itself – argue that contrarian stances 
have staked out part of a contemporary Copernican revolution in climate sci-
ence and policy, helping the general public to overcome collective delusion that 
humans play a role in modern climate change and that migration and adapta-
tion actions need to be taken to address associated challenges.
Perceived academic martyrdom, exclusion from the institution, and the 
unraveling of the scientific method are also complaints leveled against climate 
science and activism. They can also be elements that appear to generate exhila-
ration within climate contrarian communities, particularly within the celeb-
rity members themselves. Motivations are part cultural and part psychological: 
Research by Lahsen (2013) has found that many contrarian scientists who cut 
their teeth in the 1960s and 1970s have tended to view climate modeling and 
other developments in climate science that followed in the 1980s and beyond 
as inaccurate, variable, and ungrounded. Meanwhile, these articulations are part 
politics and part economics. For instance, at the time of the release of the 
United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
Fourth Assessment Report, it was revealed that the American Enterprise Insti-
tute (AEI) – a group receiving funding from ExxonMobil Corporation – was 
soliciting contrarian voices. At that time AEI was reportedly offering $10,000 
“for articles that emphasized the shortcomings of [the Fourth Assessment] 
report from the UN IPCC” (Sample, 2007, p. 1). In this way, the group was 
calling out for particular and dissenting inputs and therefore undermining 
the integrity of the scientific process. As such, it has often been the case that 
 funding-driven influences cohere with ideologically driven motivations by way 
of contrarian arguments questioning a range of relevant expert views across the 
climate science and policy spectrum (Barringer, 2012).
Amidst these highly contested, highly politicized, and high-profile cases of 
climate science and policy, answers to questions of commitments, motivations, 
and actions are complex, dynamic, and varied across claims makers and the 
claims they make. Yet, the amplification of these arguments in the public sphere 
through U.S. media accounts influences public understanding and engagement 
as these anti-regulatory, anti-environmental, and neoliberal environmental 
arguments coalesce in these CCM epistemic communities. Aforementioned 
celebrity public intellectuals such as Myron Ebell (the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute) and Tim Phillips (Americans for Prosperity) have shown themselves 
to thrive on recognition gained from these stances in the public arena.
Conclusion: the fossils among us
Moving between climate science, politics, and policy, scholars such as Schneider 
(2009) and Dunlap (2013) have pointed out differences between contrarian-
ism derived from ideology and contrarianism derived from scientific evidence. 
Over the past thirty years, anti-regulatory, anti-environmental, and neoliberal 
contrarian CCM groups have been influential in the U.S. public arena. These 
amplified views are a reflection of contemporary cultural politics, and they will 
not disappear anytime soon (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 
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2012). The influence of climate contrarianism is also a function of cultural, 
journalistic, political, and social norms.
Yet, there is the enduring notion (or hope) that events may unfold where 
these CCM groups that are seen to comprise this climate cabal will eventu-
ally be pushed to the fringes and become irrelevant along with their outlier 
views. However, ongoing research in the social sciences suggests otherwise. In 
this chapter, we have sought to further map CCM organization and contrar-
ian voices and perspectives in U.S. discourse, by way of analyses of U.S. media 
over the past thirty years. We therefore have endeavored to help unravel how 
contrarian CCM organizations in the United States demonstrate themselves to 
be (at times deliberately) detrimental to efforts seeking to enlarge rather than 
constrict the spectrum of possibility for varied forms of climate action in this 
high-stakes, high-profile, and highly charged public arena.
While some point to the climate cabal as the fossils of climate science, poli-
tics, and policy, the fossils among us are those who fail to recognize the impor-
tance of trying to understand their actions as contemporary and influential 
right-of-center social movements. Thus, the interest to better understand how 
these interventions have contributed to (mis)perceptions and (mis)understand-
ings that shape the spectrum of possibility for responses to contemporary cli-
mate challenges motivates us.
Notes
 1 The Illinois-based Heartland Institute was founded in 1984 and is motivated by free-
market policy approaches to issues including climate change.
 2 We use climate change countermovement organizations, contrarian countermovement organiza-
tions, climate change countermovement groups, contrarian countermovement groups, and think 
tanks here interchangeably.
 3 These authors discuss environmental skepticism, but the characterization holds for climate 
skepticism as well.
 4 Those attacks have given rise to the Climate Science Legal Defense Fund, set up in 2011, 
to provide legal support to counter the impacts of contrarian attacks (Schwartz, 2017).
 5 This amounted to 40,785 documents containing over thirty-nine million words.
 6 In this Farrell dataset, the organizations include a complex network of think tanks, foun-
dations, public relations firms, trade associations, and ad hoc groups.
 7 The Koch Family Foundation and its connected organizations have provided funding 
for the creation of a number of conservative organizations, including the Cato Institute 
and Americans for Prosperity. This Family Foundation has generated funds from the 
success of Koch Industries, which is the largest privately owned U.S.-based energy 
company. Koch Industries generates energy from fossil fuels and has a large stake in oil 
refining processes (Fifeld, 2009; Mayer, 2010).
 8 These have not been the only corporate and foundational actors in the climate change 
countermovement, but they have at times been the most active, based on Internal Rev-
enue Service 990 Form data.
 9 We used a Boolean string to search for the organization’s name and “climate change” 
or “global warming”. In other words, we gathered TV segments and newspaper articles 
whenever the organization was explicitly named along with a mention about global 
warming or climate change. This was irrespective of whether these articles/segments 
may have covered them in a positive, neutral, or negative manner.
 10 The years 1997–2006 saw an average of 63.1 stories or segments per year, while 2007–
2016 saw an average of 189 stories/segments per year.
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 11 The group is a registered non-profit, conservative think tank based in Washington, DC.
 12 Coverage was found here to be 32 per cent in the Washington Post, and 19 per cent was 
in the New York Times, while 14 per cent was on Fox News and less than 1 per cent 
appeared in the Wall Street Journal.
 13 Contrarian claims feed journalistic pressures to serve up attention-getting, dramatic per-
sonal conflicts, thereby drawing attention towards decontextualized individual claims-
making, and away from critical institutional and societal challenges regarding carbon 
consumption that calls collective behaviors, actions, and decisions to account.
 14 Since 2008, the Heartland Institute has organized nearly annual meetings and called 
them “International Conferences on Climate Change”.
 15 Objectivity, fairness, and accuracy are prominent here (Cunningham, 2003).
 16 The Wise Use movement arose in the American West in the late 1980s, later spreading 
across the country as a national anti-environmental effort. Wise Use fought for private 
property rights, decreased environmental regulation, and unrestricted access to public 
land for mining, logging, grazing, drilling, and motorized recreation. It was a coali-
tion of individuals, movement leaders, NGOs, and corporations that aligned behind an 
environment or economy dichotomy. The birth of Wise Use marked the rise of the mod-
ern neoliberal, anti-regulatory, anti-environmental movement prevalent today in which 
individual rights, private property, and free enterprise are prioritized over environmental 
protection. Wise Use postured as advocating for rural residents’ and resource laborers’ 
rights, conceiving of environmentalists as distant, urban elites who remained out of 
touch with the needs of those who were on the ground and engaged in the production 
of natural resources. On the other hand, Wise Use had many corporate ties and simul-
taneously served the interests of extractive corporations whose profits could be affected 
by implementation of environmental regulations. Wise Use has been understood to be 
an expansion of the earlier Sagebrush Rebellion land revolts that spanned the 1960s and 
1970s, which were a reaction to the advent of the new, vigorous environmentalism of 
the 1960s and 1970s.
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8  Think tank networks and  
the knowledge-interest nexus
The case of climate change1
Dieter Plehwe
Knowledge for particular needs and ends: the think  
tank public policy challenge
“I know that I know nothing”, a famous Greek philosopher once said, tellingly 
splitting hairs. Knowledge has long been known to be limited; to be in need of 
questioning; and to be subject to change and improvement – or displacement. 
This is true for so-called “hard scientific knowledge”; and it is certainly true for 
social science and policy-related knowledge. Existing and available knowledge, 
on the other hand, does provide us with sufficient certainty to conduct our 
personal and political affairs. Yet such established and even highly reliable (in 
scientific terms) knowledge can become subject to strong controversy for dif-
ferent reasons, including ideological or interest-based preoccupations. If much 
is at stake, public controversies erupt, whether a policy-related knowledge base 
relies on strong evidence or not. Knowledge limitations, in fact, provide ample 
opportunities for a form of public lobbying that quite simply involves raising 
doubt about some aspects of a knowledge complex (e.g. about the specifici-
ties of the health impact of smoking) in spite of sufficient general knowledge 
(e.g. about the generally detrimental health impact of smoking) (Oreskes & 
Conway, 2010). The increasing use of science in policy making has paradoxi-
cally contributed to the politicization of science (Weingart, 1982).
In recent times no subject matter has provoked stronger practical science wars 
than the question of climate change, its human causes, and its policy implica-
tions. I will address this conflict constellation, as an extreme case, to highlight 
its particular relevance to policy-related think tanks and think tank networks. 
These are the core subject of this chapter, along with the rise of transnational 
expert, consulting, and lobby/advocacy agencies that appear increasingly to rely 
on a growing number (or “a new breed”) of partisan and contract think tanks 
employed strategically to achieve political ends. Since the political character of 
knowledge has to be considered a normal rather than an extraordinary feature 
of policy-related knowledge, the expertise-interest nexus and the expertise-
lobbying feature are relevant way beyond the arguably extreme case of climate 
change. Yet think tank studies so far have not been sufficiently directed to meet 
the challenges posed by this new type of transnational political technocracy. 
Think tank network studies are introduced as a promising way to improve 
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understanding of the knowledge-interest nexus in transnational knowledge 
regimes and thus to help explain the changing “global knowledge power struc-
ture” (Strange, 1988).
Climate change knowledge – and related  
economic policy – battles
Who has got the science right on climate change? This question should have 
been easy to answer ever since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) was set up by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to assess the state 
of research on climate change and its potential impact. The work is carried out 
by thousands of scientists in classic academic fashion. Three groups are assessing 
climate science, the impact of climate change, and methods of reducing emis-
sions. Participating academic scientists are employed in universities with and 
without students. The latter organizations are also known as “academic research 
institutes” or think tanks. The 2013 report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis, had 500 authors and was based on the work of 2,000 review-
ers considering 9,200 academic publications to present the findings regarding 
ongoing global warming and its man-made causes. This publication, unfortu-
nately, confirmed previous findings with even greater certainty (95 per cent). 
Hardly any academic expert on climate change remains doubtful about the 
prospect and gravity of global warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels and 
the release of other greenhouse gases due to human activity over the last cen-
tury and a half (Cook et al., 2013; Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010).
But did the IPCC’s researchers really get the meteorological science right? 
Not so, declared a Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change 
(NIPCC), which countered the IPCC publication with its own 2013 report, 
Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science. This publication mimics the 
IPCC report. It has been written by three lead authors and twelve chap-
ter authors, who were supported by another thirty-eight chapter contributors 
and reviewers, as well as two editors at the Heartland Institute. Heartland of 
course has earned a dubious reputation as the center of corporate-backed cli-
mate change denial in the United States (Klein, 2011). Among the authors 
and other contributors of this NIPCC report are a number of scholars from a 
variety of fields including natural sciences and economics. A number of other 
contributors are listed as consultants. However, few if any of the authors have 
a track record in the academic field of meteorology or other climate related 
fields. Many of them work out of particular think tanks, like the climate change 
skeptical U.S. Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, or 
the Australian free-market Institute of Public Affairs. As well as a strong U.S. 
contingent there are a number of European authors (Heartland Institute, n.d.).
The NIPCC report claims to present scientific results that contradict much if 
not all of the findings of the IPCC. What is more, the report argues that IPCC 
research works on the wrong premise (man-made climate change), ignoring 
the alternative hypothesis of natural climate change, which is held to be much 
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more consistently backed by available data. This statement is made time and 
again, despite solid academic evidence to the contrary and despite scientific 
refutation of the arguments typically made by skeptics (e.g. suggesting solar 
activity to explain natural changes). Regardless of the evidence of human causes 
of recent climate change, the NIPCC critics argue that the IPCC is working 
on the basis of directed conclusions to back up political interventionism, rather 
than asking climate-change-related questions and trying to answer them with 
an open mind.
The NIPCC report, like the many other documents produced by climate 
change deniers, has been heavily attacked by climate change scientists and envi-
ronmental activists, some of whose arguments are, in turn, taken up and coun-
tered by NIPCC representatives (see Replies to Critics in Heartland Institute, 
n.d.). The resulting impression is one of an intense debate and a continuous 
exchange of arguments. But most academics would not hesitate to reject a 
notion of academic debate, and to point to the frequent repetition of denial 
arguments that have long been proved incorrect (see Hajer, 2013, on efforts to 
deal with this phenomenon through discursive involvement). Unsurprisingly, 
climatologists accuse climate change skeptics of working on the principle of 
directed conclusions. For more than twenty years, one of the main authors of 
the NIPCC report, Fred Singer, has consistently argued that climate change is 
natural in as far as it exists (Oreskes & Conway, 2010, p. 169f ).
How does such a knowledge and policy battle constellation square with 
conceptions of scientific research? According to standard models of knowl-
edge accumulation, paradigm competition, and turnover (Kuhn, 1962), some 
of the climate change skepticism and paradigm competition probably works 
to improve and further develop the core of climate change knowledge, unless 
it turns out that skeptical arguments have greater scientific merit and herald 
paradigm change, which is highly unlikely despite the remaining level of uncer-
tainty. An alternative perspective of competing transdisciplinary thought collec-
tives, longer range paradigms, and multiple epistemes (Fleck, 1935/1980) could 
instead be supported if at least some of the climate change skeptical forces are 
considered to produce respectable knowledge outside hierarchically relevant 
scientific communities – if for no other reasons than the fundamental limits 
of scientific knowledge in general and the acknowledged remaining margin of 
error in meteorology. But Fleck’s ideas on thought collectives are even more 
relevant with regard to competing climate-change-related economic policy 
perspectives.
Precaution versus adaptation principles
Based on insights into the human causes of climate change, many policy analysts 
propose a precautionary approach that requires a high degree of intervention-
ism and planning to promote the transformation of the fossil economy age into 
a renewable energy age (WBGU, 2011). Even within the IPCC, however, the 
group (III) that assesses methods of reducing emissions tends to place a strong 
emphasis on cost efficiency rather than on substantive policy goals, reflecting 
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a prevailing dominance of neoliberal ideas in economic science (Tanuro, 2013, 
p. 19). While IPCC group III economists are nevertheless concerned about 
the impact of global warming and the search for market-based instruments to 
reduce emissions, another group of neoliberal economists rejects as counter- 
productive not only the precautionary approach in general, but also the 
employment of market-based instruments designed to prevent climate change 
(Lal, 1997, 1998). Instead, these economists argue in favor of adaptation (Neu-
bacher, 2012). Neoliberal ideas in economics in general, and in environmental 
economics in particular, can thus be subdivided into pragmatic approaches that 
favor market-based interventionism to pursue political or social goals (while 
giving greater consideration to economic constraints than environmentalists 
would like) and approaches that reject the pursuit of political or social goals 
based on an uncompromising acceptance of the superiority of a free-market-
oriented political economy. So-called “free-market environmentalism” in fact 
here translates into a new-resource economic approach in which environmen-
tal concerns are clearly subordinated to (micro-)economic concerns (Eckersley, 
1993; Plehwe, 2012). No matter if climate change is real and caused by human 
activity, the adaptation paradigm thus objects to policies designed to prevent 
climate change. Arguments suggesting that climate change does not even exist 
or is not due to human economic activity (since industrialization) only supply 
additional support to an economic policy perspective that rejects intervention-
ism and planning on fundamental paradigmatic grounds.
Within the academic discipline of meteorology and in the wider scientific 
community, the Kuhnian model certainly prevails in the field of climate change 
research. The ongoing attempt to establish a competing paradigm of natural cli-
mate change has not been very successful, and recently has even seemed to lose 
public support. Major earlier denial stakeholders like the U.S. oil corporations 
appear to acknowledge the reality of emission damage – in terms of project-
ing carbon pricing in the United States, for example. But the Koch industry 
empire and the Koch Foundation along with other right-wing foundations 
continue to vigorously oppose climate change policies (see Brulle, 2013), and 
still have enough clout to maintain a split within the Republican Party in this 
regard (Davenport, 2013). A global report demanding constructive and consist-
ent climate-change-related public affairs activities from signatories of the global 
compact suggests that corporate lobbying still constitutes the major obstacle 
to climate change policy progress. Only about half the corporations disclose 
their contributions to civil society organizations, for example (Guide, 2013). 
A study of the funding of the climate change countermovement on the other 
hand reveals a trend towards obscuring corporate funding of skeptics. Business 
owners and managers increasingly rely on donor directed philanthropies to 
cover the tracks (Brulle, 2013). Due to the strong element of corporate lob-
bying, however, it is unlikely that the story line of natural climate change will 
gain credit within the academic community, though more-or-less respectable 
academic players will continue to deviate from the mainstream.
But the scientific analysis of climate change and its causes may in fact play 
less of a role in climate-change-related policy conflicts and debates than many 
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climate change scientists believe. Instead, the competing perspectives of eco-
nomic science may turn out to be more relevant to the climate change debate 
than climate change science. Adaptation and precaution advocates are pitted 
against each other; neoliberal market perspectives fight economic policy strate-
gies involving a certain amount of industrial planning.
The resulting alliances of climate change researchers and economists appear 
to combine a very strong academic contingent of precaution advocates in 
meteorology with a still rather weak contingent of economists available to con-
sider the stronger reliance on planning necessary to achieve precaution objec-
tives. Conversely, an academically very weak group of researchers who hold to 
a natural climate change perspective requiring adaption, if anything, is aligned 
with a group of anti-interventionist economists that appears to still be going 
surprisingly strong, despite the disrepute into which neoliberal ideas fell during 
the global financial and economic crisis.
With regard to climate change policy, time can be considered as running in 
favor of adaptation. Even if precaution sounds right to many ears, the recurring 
delays and repeated failures to meet goals previously agreed in global climate 
change policy-making work against precautionary policy coalitions. Hence 
adaptation advocates already win much by winning time. A twofold strategy 
developed to this end can be discerned: First, continue to raise doubts about the 
natural science base of climate change; second, step up efforts to raise doubts 
about the feasibility of precautionary climate change policies.
Recent advances in climate change skepticism in several countries, and the 
stagnation of global climate change negotiations, appear to be lending support 
to neoliberal perspectives. The opposition to a precautionary approach to cli-
mate change has indeed managed to fuel fears about a return to futile interven-
tionism by raising doubts both about the scientific basis of climate change and 
about the economic competence of precaution advocates (Oreskes & Conway, 
2010, pp. 169–170). The surprising advance of climate change policy contrari-
anism can arguably be much better explained by the strength of the normative 
economic and political perspectives advanced by adaptation advocates than by 
an academic constellation in the climate sciences. Paradigm competition thus 
does not really matter so much within the scientific domain of meteorology but 
can be regarded as having great importance in a battle of jurisdictions between 
the different policy-related scientific domains of meteorology and economics.
In any case, among the public at large, and certainly within the United States, 
a Fleck-inspired perspective of competing thought collectives appears to best 
capture the constellation of climate change discourse and policy coalitions, since 
the number of people believing in scientific conflict within climate science 
has increased during recent years despite the consolidation of climate-change-
related scientific knowledge. Apart from the United States, this appears to have 
happened in Australia, for example, where the trend has been explained by a 
media concentration and climate science coverage one-third of which features 
articles that raise doubts about a human contribution to climate change (Bacon, 
2013). But what are the media behind the media in Australia and other coun-
tries? What are the sources of journalists’ representation of fact and opinion?
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Transnational and trans-professional coalitions against 
climate change policy activism
It matters not that NIPCC authors can hardly claim to represent even a small 
minority within the field of climate science: The website of the NIPCC pre-
sents climate change as a discourse characterized by a battle pitching NIPCC 
research forces against IPCC science. In order to understand how climate 
change skeptics have imposed this representation, we need to look beyond the 
capacity of an individual researcher or a group of researchers in the field of 
meteorology: We need to include the academic constellation in economics; 
and we need to look beyond the academic sphere, in order to address the ques-
tion of the relevance to public policy of science, knowledge, and ideas. In order 
to do that, a sociological approach is needed that takes the social character and 
the different dimensions of knowledge production process seriously.
The present NIPCC activities grow out of a longer standing neoliberal and 
conservative strategy to fight the rise of environmental activism and climate 
justice related interventionism resulting from increasing ecological and related 
social concerns (Hadden, 2015). The Indian born economist Depaak Lal (1997) 
has termed the challenge “environmental imperialism”2 in a booklet for the Brit-
ish Institute of Economic Affairs, which is one of the key neoliberal think tanks 
in the UK (Cockett, 1995), and which can be linked to climate change skeptical 
networks. Heartland in the United States is, in fact, only the tip of an iceberg 
of global networks of normative (neoliberal) and corporate agencies that seek 
to prevent climate change policies from being designed and becoming effective.
The fundamental narrative of a need for adaptation and market-based evo-
lution may appear fatalistic to those who are concerned about climate change 
and its consequences. But for the radical opposition to planning and politically 
designed futures it is simply a superior solution based on fundamental insights 
into the character of social relations and the limits of political systems. Climate 
change policy skepticism has successfully globalized James Buchanan’s version 
of public choice theory, emphasizing government failure. A complementary 
version of explicit free-market environmentalism emerged in the 1970s led by 
John Baden and his Montana based think tank, the Property and Environment 
Research Center (PERC, founded in 1982), and the subsequently established 
Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment (FREE). Baden’s 
efforts to establish a new wing of “resource economics” date back to his work 
at the Center for Political Economy and Natural Resources at Montana State 
University in 1978. A year before (1977), he had published a volume entitled 
Managing the Commons, in collaboration with Garrett Hardin, the Malthusian 
theorist who had started the “debate on the tragedy of the commons”. This 
volume marked the transition from the early “tragedy of the commons debate”, 
which focused on the perceived need to protect the commons through public 
action, to a perspective more consistent with an anti-interventionism of both 
neoliberal and communitarian origin.
Hardin and Baden’s (1977) volume includes writers like Tullock and 
Ostrom who – for different reasons – were concerned with the limits of state 
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intervention. Tullock was mostly concerned with the problem of the social cost 
of dealing with the commons problem, which anticipated a more general neo-
liberal concern with economic calculations of policy efficiency (cost- benefit 
analysis, etc.). Ostrom was concerned with the recognition and relevance of 
community-based solutions to commons problems. While the former can be 
considered closer to climate change policy skeptics who subordinate envi-
ronmental concerns to economic considerations, Ostrom clearly was primar-
ily concerned with environmental problems and was searching for a wider 
range of solutions. Both authors share a basic rational-choice epistemology 
that clearly demonstrates the need to observe the links between epistemology, 
expertise, and other transfer and lobby/advocacy capacities, in order to assess 
the impact of knowledge in a sufficiently differentiated way (e.g. not to blame 
“neo-classical economics” or “rational choice” for all the problems in contem-
porary society).
In order to understand the impact of elements of the different scientific 
communities in turn, it is important to look at social knowledge networks 
beyond the scientific communities, which can show the ways in which aca-
demic experts are actively or passively tied into discourse coalitions (Fischer, 
1993). Think tank and think tank network studies are of enormous help here, 
because activist experts of all political colors are drawn into their orbit (in advi-
sory and supervisory boards, for example).
The many demands on think tank networks
The publicly and politically effective generation and peddling of knowledge 
relies on the ability to successfully combine expert, consulting, and lobby/
advocacy capacities. Although this does not necessarily involve skillful or stra-
tegic design, interested agencies can develop strategies to achieve such ends by 
employing appropriate organizations, such as consulting companies, founda-
tions, or think tanks. If the relevant conflict constellation is transnational or 
global, the combined agency can, and indeed must, be studied as a transnational 
expert, consulting, and lobby/advocacy network (TECLAN). Such a network 
evolves and can be strategically developed to purposefully arrange and make 
publicly relevant academic expertise and orientation to advance, modify, or 
derail public policies in one or several areas.
Such a combined knowledge-interest agency does not require an exclusive 
understanding of the functionalism or instrumentality of ideas. Corporate lob-
bies can order tailor-made expertise, of course. However, the expertise needed 
can also simply be found in the reservoirs of academic and other research 
organizations: Expertise ready to be aligned without the directing capacity of 
interest groups. Instrumentality, on the other hand, can also work the opposite 
way, with experts seeking and finding corporate (or trade union or NGO) 
allies to advance their research agendas. While the realms of academic expertise 
(sociology of science) and interest or advocacy groups (interest group studies) 
are subject to dedicated sub-disciplines, the knowledge-interest nexus and the 
specific transfer capacities situated between these realms – think tanks and think 
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tank networks – have not yet been sufficiently studied. It is only recently that 
the notion of think tanks as an “interstitial field” between the academic, corpo-
rate, media, and political fields has been developed (Medvetz, 2012).
The expertise component has traditionally been found primarily in the aca-
demic world. However, the borders are shifting, not least due to the commercial 
transformation of the universities (Mirwoski, 2011) and the advance of private 
(civil-society-based) think tanks (Gibbons et al., 1994, p. 141; Pestre, 2003). 
Private think tanks encroach upon the territory of the traditional academic 
universe. Their advance has at the same time been a driver of the ongoing 
transformation of universities and academic think tanks, which can now fre-
quently be found to share private think tank features like output tailored to 
specific audiences, a marketing orientation, and closer ties to corporate and 
other constituencies (Asher & Guilhot, 2010).
However, at the same time, think tanks are still more important in their 
own right, due to their multi-directional transfer capacity (consulting, format-
ting, and editing functions), which is needed to turn academic knowledge into 
media, policy, and other public and private formats (relevance-making). Cor-
respondingly, think tank professionals are combining and crossing various tra-
ditional professions, particularly academic research, media journalism, public 
relations, policy consulting, public affairs, and campaign management.
Lobby and advocacy groups in turn are the classic interest group variable. 
The strength of interest groups can be measured by assessing their resources 
(funding, number of people, the moral and public legitimacy of their cause, 
etc.). Depending on the strength of each component – expertise, consulting/
transfer, lobbying – on the one hand, and on the combined strength of the three 
components on the other hand, transnational expert, consulting, and lobby/
advocacy networks can be more or less effective policy agents.
Whether, and to what extent, academic think tanks involved supply  expertise 
developed primarily for academic purposes, or become instruments of corpo-
rate and other interests in more straightforward ways, is turned into an empiri-
cal question rather than assumed. Think tanks do not have to be considered 
as instruments of corporate elites or monied interests in such a framework: 
They can be drawn on for general ideological and specific agenda-setting 
purposes. While rejecting a simplistic instrumentalism for expertise and think 
tanks, a critical approach to think tank networks requires us to take different 
intellectual, professional, and material resources or power seriously, and to 
make a serious study of their relationships and directive relational capacity. 
Experts can assist in the preference formation processes of corporate leaders; 
and corporate leaders can help direct research programs; but the diverse and 
frequently multiple roles of the new class of think tank transfer professional has 
yet to be fully appreciated. Although the notion of discourse coalitions goes 
beyond the empirical dimension of such a focus on transnational expert, con-
sulting, and lobby/advocacy networks, the combined agent category can serve 
as an initial way to operationalize discourse coalition agency and improve the 
focus of discourse coalition research on rigorous actor constellation research 
(Plehwe, 2011).
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Think tanks and think tank networks are, in any case, still the most arcane 
and least understood territory in the trinity of expert, policy-related consult-
ing, and interest group studies, not least due to the rapid proliferation of think 
tanks (McGann & Weaver, 2005), the resulting transformation of the consult-
ing landscape (Falk, Römmele, Rehfeld, & Thunert, 2006), and the dynamic 
formation of think tank networks (Stone, 2013; Plehwe, 2010).
A preliminary sketch of the NIPCC coalition of expert, 
consulting, and lobby groups
The present configuration of the NIPCC versus the IPCC dates back to the 
year 2003. One of the leading U.S. climate science critics, atmospheric physicist 
Dr. S. Fred Singer, organized a meeting in Milan, Italy, as part of his Science and 
Environmental Policy Project (founded in 1990). The meeting was convened 
to evaluate the fourth IPCC report. In 2008, Singer and his think tank joined 
forces with the Heartland Institute. Together they produced an authoritative 
version of their counter argument against the IPCC: Nature, Not Human Activ-
ity Rules the Climate. In 2010, a website (www.nipccreport.org) was launched to 
document the research activities of the NIPCC. The translation of parts of the 
2009 and 2011 NIPCC reports by the “Information Center for Global Change 
Studies” of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is counted as one of the 
organization’s greatest successes. NIPCC scholars were also invited to China for 
a workshop (see About the NIPCC in Heartland, n.d.). Whatever its academic 
credentials, the NIPCC has managed to establish an alternative story line.
The capacity to create story lines that encapsulate cause and effect argu-
ments in a comprehensible form (e.g. trees dying due to acid rain) has been 
considered the key both to the formation of discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1993) 
and to think tank power (Saloma III, 1984). It is well known that many climate 
change denial efforts have been financed by ExxonMobile, due to a study of 
the Union of Concerned Scientists (2012) and subsequent tracking and trac-
ing of the flow of Exxon money to climate change denial authors and think 
tanks by Greenpeace USA (Greenpeace, n.d.). It is also known that more than 
90 per cent of the climate change skeptical or denial papers in the United States 
originate from right-wing (neoliberal, conservative) think tanks registered in 
a database of the U.S. Heritage Foundation, which was the flagship for the 
“Reagan Revolution”. Conversely, more than 90 per cent of the think tanks in 
this register have also been found to feature climate change denial perspectives 
( Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008). In addition to the immediate influence of 
fossil fuel interests like Exxon, we thus have to consider the conservative and 
neoliberal ideological wing of the U.S. political spectrum (mostly linked to the 
Republican Party) represented by the Heritage Foundation at the federal level 
and by the related State Policy Network, which ties state-level organizations in 
the United States together (Fang, 2013).
The NIPCC coalition features academic outsiders in the climate sciences, 
a wider range of university and think-tank-based experts in fields related to 
the climate change debate, including economics, and a wide range of think 
tanks that feature neoliberal and neoconservative worldviews and frequently 
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have close links to corporate lobby groups like oil, coal, and gas interests, as 
well as energy-intensive businesses. The corporate interest group basis of the 
climate change skeptical TECLANs has probably narrowed over time, because 
the majority of corporate interests joined the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development launched in 1992 by Swiss business man Stephan 
Schmidheiny. ExxonMobile, for example, has been reported to have withdrawn 
support from the Heartland Institute after strong and increasing criticism of its 
climate-change-related lobby activities (Revkin, 2009).
Due to the transparency requirements for both think tanks and corporate 
philanthropy in the United States, the composition of the U.S. elements of cli-
mate change skeptical TECLANs is fairly well known. The regulations of not-
for-profit organizations covering most think tanks (U.S. tax code 501 (c)) and 
the regulations governing philanthropic spending by U.S. corporations allow 
researchers to track the corporate spending of organizations and to observe 
the funding of think tanks in considerable detail. Data are collected and made 
available by a charity (Guidestar, n.d.), and watchdog organizations like the 
National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy subject corporate spending 
to critical scrutiny. Although various options to conceal funding continue to 
exist in the United States (e.g. donor directed philanthropies; see Brulle, 2013; 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012), investigators in other parts of the world 
have to deal with a near complete lack of comparable regulatory requirements 
and, therefore, with much less of the financial data that can inform work on the 
knowledge-interest nexus.
Unsurprisingly, it is less well known that the now defunct Stockholm Net-
work of more than 100 neoliberal think tanks and the global Atlas Foundation 
Network of neoliberal think tanks feature many think tanks that originate and 
distribute climate change skeptical pamphlets and sustain the alternative story 
line of natural causes of climate change in Europe and across the world. Among 
Stockholm Network members, the following twenty think tanks (compare 
Table 8.1) have published climate change skeptical papers of various kinds:
Close links exist between European networks and U.S. and Australian think 
tanks, for example; and in another example, the Committee for a Constructive 
Tomorrow (CFACT) was set up in the United States in 1985 and extended 
to Europe in 2004. The European section of the organization was set up by a 
German citizen, and it features strong ties to, among others, German and South 
African groups (CFACT, n.d.). Australian Joan Nenova’s climate change “skep-
tic handbook” has been translated into sixteen languages, with the German 
translation, for example, featured by the Austrian Hayek Institute ( Jonova, n.d.). 
Think tank researchers are beginning to address the communication strategies 
pursued in these circles (Miller & Dinan, 2015).
In order to establish the full range and scope of climate change skeptical 
TECLANs around the globe, a dedicated collaborative think tank network 
study is necessary to systematically establish or complement available informa-
tion,3 and to see if the various groups are operating independently of each 
other, or, alternatively, if there are close ties and coordination efforts between 
the different regional networks. Obvious candidates for the creation of such ties 
are normative groups (like the global neoliberal networks of the Mont Pèlerin 
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Society) and multinational corporations, business associations, and corporate 
foundations. Among the leading advocates of climate change policy skepticism 
are former Mont Pèlerin Society presidents like Deepak Lal and influential 
MPS members like the former Czech president Vaclav Klaus. Exxon and Koch 
money has been tracked and traced to European think tanks (CEO, 2010).
Since the leadership of individual corporations and business associations, much 
like the individual members of a normative group, can turn out to be politically 
divided over issues like climate change, it is impossible to fully equate climate 
change skepticism with, say, “oil interests” or “neoliberal worldviews”. Careful 
research into knowledge-interest relationships can yield insights with regard 
to important divisions within corporate, ideological, and political groupings 
(Fischer & Plehwe, 2013). The political dimension of the knowledge-interest 
nexus is, in any case, likely to turn out to be the critical dimension – relegating 
both science and interest categories and even general worldviews to secondary 
positions in many policy issue areas.
The battle over adequate ways to deal with ecological challenges recently led 
to a call by global environmental NGOs and think tanks on global compact sig-
natory companies to step up their climate change public affairs effort, for exam-
ple (Guide, 2013). Both climate change skeptical and promotion forces feature 
transnational expert, consulting, and lobby/advocacy networks that are pitted 
against each other in national, regional, and global policy arenas (Hadden, 2015; 
on corporate elite networks promoting climate capitalism see Sapinski, 2015).
Think tank studies: think tank network studies!
Climate change is arguably an extreme case of politicized science and lobby 
efforts. The focus on climate change, or tobacco, acid rain, or ozone hole debates, 
all involving extraordinary efforts of science lobbies or “merchants of doubt” 
Table 8.1  Stockholm Network member think tanks that have published climate change 
skeptical publications.
Hayek-Institut Austria
Institut Economique Molinari, Institut Hayek (IEM), LIBERA!, 
Ludwig von Mises Institute Europe
Belgium
Center for Economic Policy (CEP) Czech Republic
The Copenhagen Institute Denmark
Civil Society Institute (iFRAP), Institut Euro 92 France
Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT), Hayek-
Gesellschaft, Institute for Free Enterprise
Germany
Istituto Bruno Leoni, Magna Carta Foundation Italy
Instytut Globalizacji Poland
Conservative Institute of M. R. Stefanik Slovakia





Source: Think Tank Network Initiative (2012)
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(Oreskes & Conway, 2010), may create a misleading image of partly illegitimate 
post-normal science (von Storch, 2009) that is juxtaposed with the normal and 
academically focused practice of good science and expertise. Such a perspective 
ignores the fundamental political character of science and knowledge. Even the 
most perfectly controlled work of academic scientists would not suffice to cut 
the discursive links between knowledge, commitments, and interests that aca-
demic and other researchers simply cannot escape (Plehwe, 2018). As Medvetz 
(2012) has demonstrated by using the shift in U.S. welfare research funding from 
a “poverty as deprivation” paradigm to a “poverty as dependency paradigm”, 
the majority of academic and other researchers have only one choice: To con-
structively contribute to the mainstream, whether or not they are normatively 
committed to the hegemonic political orientation of science. The choice of 
remaining “clean” in terms of restricting oneself to good scientific practice or to 
engaging more actively in policy-related activities can certainly be considered 
important for the individual; but it is of minor importance with regard to the 
shifting relevance of research- and policy-related consulting as a whole.
It has been the great merit of monographs by Thomas Medvetz (2012) and 
Diane Stone (2013) that they reject the traditional typology of think tanks. “Cat-
egorizing different types of think tank . . . has become a scholarly fetish that has 
detracted attention from more sophisticated analysis of the sources of power of 
these organisations and how they garner and wield societal influence” (Stone, 
2013, p. 64). Although criticisms can be made of the definition and categoriza-
tion of think tanks in the work of McGann and Weaver (2005) and the ongo-
ing global survey activities of McGann (2017), the fact is that nobody has done 
more than James McGann to reveal the global extent and scope of the think 
tank phenomenon. In terms of analytic capacity, Medvetz (2012) has done much 
to overcome the traditional limits of think tank studies by demonstrating think 
tanks’ common reliance on resources from relevant academic, corporate, media, 
and political fields, and the multiple identities think tanks have vis-à-vis their 
audiences and constituencies. While Medvetz looks only at the United States, 
Diane Stone’s book is the first significant effort to elevate to the transnational 
level the study of think tanks and knowledge networks in relation to policy 
communities. These works are milestones with regard to the improved charting 
of unknown think tank territory. The concluding section of this chapter con-
centrates on supplementing the focus on contemporary think tanks as a peculiar 
organizational category (Medvetz) and the focus on think tank networks as an 
important element in governance regimes and a mediator of the knowledge-
power nexus (Stone) by suggesting a systematic approach to studying think tank 
network relations more explicitly, with an eye to the knowledge-interest nexus.
Instead of a conclusion: a new model to study  
think tank networks
Think tanks have for a long time been represented as clearly defined organi-
zations operating in the marketplace of ideas (Braml, 2004). Interconnections 
between organizations are consequently described as efforts to control uncer-
tainty (Lang, 2006). However, competing think tank networks and many of 
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their members seem to run against such abstract market logic, since they display 
differing normative and thematic features. In climate change policy struggles, 
think tanks are strategically employed to exploit uncertainties, for example. 
Emphasizing defined boundaries of individual organizations at the same time 
obscures the extent to which ideological and material relations, interlocks, and 
political coalitions matter in order to understand think tanks. To better explain 
individual think tanks and their (transnational) networks, theoretical approaches 
and appropriate methods are needed to understand their constituencies and the 
other major influences on their work.
Specific think tanks are best considered as research and consulting organiza-
tions that need further explanation if we are to better understand the role of 
academic and other interests at play in them, frequently involved in move-
ment and countermovement efforts (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). We sug-
gest examining think tanks according to a model adapted from Schmitter and 
Streeck (1999), which was developed in order to systematically study interest 
groups. In these academics’ account, interest groups are shown as needing to be 
explained by the bottom-up logic of membership and the top-down (or side-
ways) logic of influence, in order to account for a range of activities and formal 
structures that is frequently at odds with simple definitions. Unlike associations, 
however, think tanks rarely result from the organization of members, though 
membership can play a role.4 The adapted model proposed here combines the 
systematic study of the logic of constituencies and the logic of influence. Think tanks 
can have various constituencies, the weights of which are likely to have a strong 
impact on organizational characteristics, tasks, output, and performance.5
Consequently, the key constituencies of particular think tanks (including 
donors, and academic, corporate or normative, and political supporters) have to 
be identified as a first step, for example, by analyzing interconnectedness. The 
resulting empirical evidence of related and unrelated constituencies of think 
tank network members across countries will go a long way to making visible 
and to better explaining the overall constituencies of a network. In the case of 
climate change, think tanks involved in climate change (policy) skepticism may 
be driven by fossil fuel interest groups in one country, but find partners driven 
by more general ideological concerns in another country that may not cater 
to specific energy corporations or interest groups. While network composition 
and constituencies are likely to differ considerably between networks, institu-
tional logics are likely to be shared (for example, the increasing importance of 
supranational arenas of decision-making, the relevance of new media, interna-
tional requirements for academic research project funding, etc.).
Think tank network analysis conceived of in this way is likely not only 
to shed new light on the composition of organizational networks and their 
members (see Schlögl, 2010), but also to help identify transnational expert, 
consulting, and lobby/advocacy networks like those involved in climate change 
(policy) skepticism. Such concrete networks of organizations and individuals 
in turn can be used to better identify discourse coalition agencies relying on 
shared story lines (like natural climate change and/or futility of policy plan-
ning). Think tanks usually display ties to academic, economic, media, and other 
groups. They can therefore be considered ideally suited to the study of the 
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relationships between academic, consulting, and interest groups that appear 
to use think tank networks as a key organizational backbone. This clearly is 
the case in the climate change debate. Think tanks are thus considered to be 
an attempt to create solutions in response to knowledge, ideas, and interest 
problems: A kind of dispositif in Foucault’s sense (Bührmann & Schneider, 
2008). They consist of different elements, such as discursive and nondiscursive 
practices, actors, and objects (such as buildings and other physical resources). 
Think tank networks viewed in this way offer a wealth of empirical clues about 
individuals and social relations between individuals who are, in various ways, 
involved in knowledge and orientation struggles.
The actor-centered study of the policy power and influence of interest 
groups has been considered elusive, due to, inter alia, the complexity of interac-
tion in the policy process and the difficulties in defining and measuring influ-
ence. The knowledge effect is likewise considered hard to measure, due to the 
difficulty of attributing causal weight to specific ideas and specific knowledge 
actors. But quantitative and qualitative studies directed towards assessing the 
profile and influence of individual think tanks and networks can be accom-
plished by looking at think tank outputs as the input of, for example, elite and 
popular newspapers, radio and TV, academic journals, and policy documents. 
Policy transfer can be observed along vertical and horizontal network chan-
nels. Social network analysis can indicate the position of think-tank-related 
individuals in policy, scientific, and business communities. Historical studies can 
be used to track and trace the role of certain coalitions in driving or derailing 
policy processes (“knowledge-shaping”; see Bonds, 2011).
Even if climate skeptical think tanks cannot be blamed – either on their own 
or to a specific extent – for the lack of progress in climate change politics, they 
can certainly be used to better identify and more fully recognize the transna-
tional expert, consulting, and lobby/advocacy forces at play. Climate change 
policy skeptics have been able to delay, if not derail, a precautionary climate 
change policy regime. One thing is certain: If an international research team 
suitably qualified for the global study task is able to collaboratively establish 
the relevant information with regard to climate change policy skeptical think 
tank networks, the resulting picture of climate-change-related social agencies 
is going to be much larger and much more detailed than what can be achieved 
simply by pitching IPCC scientists against NIPCC think tank researchers.
Notes
 1 This chapter was first published in Critical Policy Studies (2014, volume 8, issue 1, pp 101–
115). The author thanks the publisher for granting permission of publication.
 2 On a more fundamental level, Depaak Lal (1998) has equated ecological thinking with 
Marxism. Both are Augustinean fallacies attempting to create heaven on Earth. Lal, much 
like Friedrich August von Hayek, re-interprets Alber O. Hirschman’s reflections on 
unintended consequences in a way that is very distant from Hirschman’s ideas. While 
Hayek and Lal suggest that planning for the future is futile and counter-productive, due to 
unintended consequences, Hirschman suggests a dynamic evolution of goals that can be 
achieved despite unintended consequences, with the latter even considered to be provid-
ing the opportunity for the pursuit of additional or new goals. Hirschman’s realism and 
optimism have thus been turned into a cynical and fatalistic perspective that is inherently 
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status quo oriented (Hirschman, 2001). I am grateful to Leonard Dobusch for pointing me 
towards this Hirschman interview.
 3 A research tool has been created ready to use for such global collaborative research 
efforts: http://thinktanknetworkresearch.net/wiki_ttni_en/index.php?title=Category: 
Think_Tank_Network.
 4 The funding of the Heritage Foundation includes the dues paid by 200,000 subscribers to 
the Heritage newsletter. The recently founded Institut für eine solidarische Moderne in 
Germany gained 1,600 members within a few weeks.
 5 Medvetz (2012) provides a good example in his study of proto think tanks, but unfortu-
nately refrains from a similar look at constituencies in his later discussion of contemporary 
think tanks. Stone (2013) includes many hints about constituencies, but refrains from a 
more thorough discussion of the knowledge-interest relationships in her case studies.
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9  The climate smokescreen
The public relations consultancies 
working to obstruct greenhouse  
gas emissions reductions in  
Europe – a critical approach1
Lucy Michaels and Katharine Ainger
Introduction
Companies and other entities use a whole host of image management and lob-
bying tactics to avoid taking action on climate change, to draw a smokescreen 
over environmentally destructive behavior, and to allow them to continue 
without legal or public sanction. Public relations messaging is employed when 
there is a gap between the image such companies wish to portray – to consum-
ers, regulators, investors, and even their own staff – and the actions they actu-
ally pursue. Lobbying takes this one step further: It is used to shape policy and 
regulations in corporations’ own interests, including to continue their environ-
mentally destructive behavior. Public relations messaging and lobbying often go 
hand in hand and are sometimes handled by the corporations in-house, but in 
many cases, they hire in independent and specialist consultancies.
Some of the worst corporate perpetrators of climate change employ a host 
of Europe-based lobby consultancies in order to influence the European public 
and European Union (EU) institutions. This chapter profiles some of these 
consultancies, exposing specific tactics used by public relations professionals and 
lobbyists to promote their clients’ version of reality and exert influence. This 
ranges from producing glossy publicity and manipulating language to arranging 
events – from cocktail parties to sponsoring major business summits – where 
corporate executives can mingle formally and informally with politicians. Other 
tactics include training corporate executives in how to engage and influence 
EU policy. It also highlights instances of what makes many of these consultan-
cies so effective: The fact that many professional lobbyists have come through 
the revolving door between public officialdom and private firms, bringing 
knowledge, contacts, and influence with them.
This chapter focuses on some of the most problematic public relations mes-
sages and lobbying around climate change conducted by public relations and 
lobbying consultancies on behalf of multinational corporations. It highlights 
four main areas where public relations has been employed: (a) Covering up 
blatant corporate deception; (b) adopting a defensive position or, alternatively, 
(c) cloaking activities in a green sheen as a company pursues business as usual 
activities in contravention of international climate legislation; and (d) blocking 
or watering down effective climate action.
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The consultancies it covers include Weber Shandwick and Fleishman-Hillard 
for branding of natural gas as necessary for the renewable energy revolution; 
Havas Paris and Gracias Press for the rebranding of palm oil as a sustainable 
commodity; four companies employed by Volkswagen (Hering Schuppener, 
Finsbury, Edelman, and Kekst) in the crisis management around its deceit over 
diesel-emissions testing; Weber Shandwick for its promotion of ineffectual car-
bon capture and storage (CCS) technologies as a viable solution to climate 
change; and GPLUS Europe, which has worked closely with Russian gas giant 
Gazprom as they pioneer risky offshore Arctic drilling and exploration to find 
new fossil fuel sources to exploit.
Public relations consultancies and lobbying  
on climate change in Europe
Public relations consultancies in the United States have played a controversial role 
in casting doubt on the science of climate change. Edelman, for example, came 
under fire and lost clients for controversial work with the climate change denier 
lobby group the American Petroleum Institute, and for working with Keystone 
XL pipeline companies (Goldenberg, 2015). In response to criticism, Edelman 
claimed in 2015 that it would no longer represent climate change deniers or 
those lobbying against climate regulation (climateinvestigations.org, 2014).
This chapter, however, focuses on public relations activities in Europe, where 
tactics are often subtler and most European businesses at least pay lip service to 
the need to address climate change. For example, German public relations firm 
Hering Schuppener is a subsidiary of massive public relations giant WPP and 
has publicly stated: “Climate change affects all of us – and we can all be part 
of the solution” (climateinvestigations.org, 2014). Similarly, Havas public rela-
tions has a specific “Climate Practice” focusing on “helping clients understand 
the media landscape of climate change that directly relates to their business or 
organization” (see Section 2) (havaspr.org, 2018). Although such statements 
appear to suggest an unequivocal commitment to addressing climate change, 
the following research illustrates that this is actually far from the truth.
Despite the powerful influence they wield, public relations and lobbying 
consultancies usually do not forefront their own involvement in particular pub-
lic relations or lobbying campaigns due to the behind the scenes nature of their 
activities. This can make it challenging to uncover the precise nature of public 
relations and lobbying activities. This research has, nevertheless, identified rel-
evant information based on publicly available sources ranging from company 
websites to press releases and even meeting minutes.
In theory, information on who is paying lobbyists to lobby whom, on what 
subjects and how much, should be recorded in the EU Transparency Register, 
a register of lobbyists operated jointly by the European Parliament and the 
Commission. Despite being vital for democratic scrutiny, this Register is both 
voluntary and not always accurate. Critics highlight that the activities of pub-
lic relations firms on behalf of clients are not always recorded and the register 
not kept up to date. The topics that lobbyists are working on are also vaguely 
defined or left out, and public relations firms often do not provide a list of EU 
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legislative dossiers that they work on for clients, despite being required to do 
so by lobby register rules.2 In some cases, it appears that the total lobby budget 
declared may be significantly underreported (Balanya & Sabido, 2017).3
In addition, legal firms conducting lobbying activities are also not included 
in the Register, citing client confidentiality. This, for example, means that the 
activities of a major global player involved in the climate lobbying field, Den-
tons law firm, is not listed at all.
There are currently moves by the three EU institutions for the lobby register 
to be revamped (Floyd, Fenn, da Costa, & Collins, 2016). Critics, however, claim 
that current proposals may cancel out some of the best elements of the current 
register, namely its broad definition of lobbying, which covers both direct and 
indirect influencing activities (Douo, 2017). In general, it seems obvious that lob-
byists should have to disclose up-to-date client and financial information, as well 
as clear information on meetings held with all EU officials, not just senior officials.
The gas lobby in Europe, Weber Shandwick,  
and Fleishman-Hillard
The European gas industry lobby is intent on keeping Europe dependent on 
natural gas, thus maintaining fossil fuel dependence well into the 21st century. 
The gas lobby uses diverse means to encourage EU institutions and the pub-
lic to buy into its narrative that gas is clean and necessary in the transition to 
renewable energy. Its tactics include hiring ex-officials who pass through the 
revolving doors from EU and national government institutions; joining expert 
groups to advise the Commission at an early stage of decision-making; and hir-
ing public relations firms (Balanya & Sabido, 2017).
According to research by Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) based on 
the EU Transparency Register, during 2016, the gas industry spent more than 
€100 million on lobbying. It paid over 1,000 lobbyists and secured 460 meet-
ings with the two Commissioners in charge of climate and energy policy (Bal-
anya & Sabido, 2017). This meant that eight out of ten of the most regular 
business visitors to these Commissioners were from the gas lobby. It is also likely 
that the gas lobby has met frequently with less senior EU bureaucrats, since this 
is where much of the knowledge is held and the work is done. This is, however, 
impossible to confirm since neither the Commission nor the gas lobby would 
reveal a complete list of meetings with all relevant staff in the Directorate Gen-
erals (DG) for Energy and for Climate (Balanya & Sabido, 2017).4
By contrast, public interest groups opposing the expansion of gas infrastruc-
ture spent barely 3 per cent of the amount of the gas lobby (€3.4 million), had 
one-tenth of the lobbyists (101), and secured only fifty-one meetings with the 
relevant Commissioners.
During 2016, Corporate Europe Observatory identified that a total of thirty-
seven consultancies together earned as much as €7.9 million from lobbying on 
behalf of sixty different gas industry players. The most popular consultancies 
include Fleishman-Hillard with ten clients, FTI Consulting Belgium, Busi-
ness Bridge Europe, Weber Shandwick, and Linklaters. The firms and indus-
try groups that spent the most on lobbying included ExxonMobil, General 
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Electric, and CEFIC (the European Chemical Industry Council, which rep-
resents many multinational chemicals companies including Dow Chemicals, 
BASF, Ineos, and Solvay).
Given this level of lobbying, it is not surprising that the EU has bought the 
industry spin that gas is a clean fuel that can help bridge the transition to renew-
able energy or as a partner to renewable energy production, providing a baseload 
of energy since renewable energy is an intermittent source, i.e. time of day or 
weather dependent.
The European Commission and national governments have now placed gas 
at the center of their energy policies and are spending billions of Euros on 
underwriting a list of often controversial new gas infrastructure projects. This 
breaks the EU’s own commitment on climate change under the Paris Agree-
ment and is locking Europe and its suppliers into forty to fifty more years of 
pipelines and other gas infrastructure.
GasNaturally and gas as a “clean”, “transition” fuel
In 2011, Weber Shandwick began painting gas as a partner fuel when it estab-
lished GasNaturally (gasnaturally.eu, 2018a). This was initially a campaign on 
behalf of a coalition of gas industry trade associations aimed at ensuring that gas 
was not dropped when the EU was planning its 2050 decarbonization strategy. 
At the launch of the scheme, François-Régis Mouton, GasNaturally president, 
said, “Gas and renewables go hand in hand to achieve secure supplies with 
lower emissions” (gasnaturally.eu, 2011). In the years since then, GasNaturally 
has evolved into a super trade association made up of six European and interna-
tional gas lobby groups with members associated with all aspects of exploration, 
research, storage, retail, and distribution of natural gas.
GasNaturally initially shared an address with public relations consultancy 
Fleishman-Hillard, and its energy practice website boasts, “GasNaturally 
enlisted Fleishman Hillard Brussels in 2013 to take its campaign to a new level 
by helping elevate awareness among EU stakeholders of the environmental and 
economic benefits of natural gas. FH Brussels helped GasNaturally successfully 
launch its marquee annual event, Gas Week, in April [2013] at the European 
Parliament” (fleishmanhillard.eu, 2013). Fleishman-Hillard’s energy team is led 
by Matt Hinde, the former head of EU strategy in the UK’s Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (linkedin.com, 2018a).
Gas Week appears to have continued until 2016 with key events from the 
2015 Gas Week including a panel debate entitled “Gas and Renewables – 
A New Reality?” with presentations from MEPs and senior bureaucrats from 
DG Energy as well as the European Wind Energy Association. It also included 
an MEP Assistants’ Cocktail Party, “a good opportunity to meet with young 
energy industry representatives and other stakeholders over a drink”.
The news articles listed on the GasNaturally website illustrate some of its 
current strategies, which include the tagline “making a clean future real” and 
key slogans such as “Natural gas is the ideal partner for renewable” and “Gas-
Naturally aims to showcase the essential role of natural gas in the forthcoming 
energy transformation” (gasnaturally.eu, 2018a).
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Although GasNaturally appears on the EU register to have only spent 
€350,000, Corporate Europe Observatory has identified that the 2016 fig-
ure for spending when combined with all its members is around ten times 
that – €3.5 million. Collectively, GasNaturally can call on twenty-nine lob-
byists (Balanya & Sabido, 2017). Its direct lobbying activities include meetings 
with high-level officials in Brussels and open letters to heads of states before 
big European Council meetings. In January 2018, GasNaturally wrote to all the 
mayors in the C40 network, which represents the mayors of major megacities 
committed to addressing climate change, to remind them of the environmental 
benefits of switching to gas for public transport (gasnaturally.eu, 2018b).
GasNaturally crafts every message to ensure that natural gas remains unques-
tioned as both a clean fuel and essential in the future world alongside renew-
able energy. Gas is not, however, a clean fuel. Although gas emits less CO
2
 on 
combustion than coal or oil, it is mainly composed of methane, which over a 
ten-year time frame is over 100 times more potent than CO
2
.
Gas also leaks during production and transportation at far higher rates than 
previously thought, and GasNaturally also speaks on behalf of companies 
engaged in fracking, which is implicated in particularly high release of methane 
and can in no way be considered a climate-friendly option. Even if society 
eliminated CO
2
 emissions tomorrow but ignored methane the planet would 
still warm to the dangerous 1.5oC to 2oC degree threshold within fifteen to 
thirty-five years (Howarth, 2016).
Gas is also not necessary as a partner for renewables as new renewable energy 
storage technologies mean that big power stations providing baseload energy 
are less necessary (Mitchell, 2016). Overall, the science is clear: 80 per cent of 
fossil fuels must remain in the ground to have a chance to prevent catastrophic 
climate change, and this includes natural gas. In addition, the extraction and 
transport of both conventional and unconventional gas have severe social and 
environmental impacts.
The drive to promote gas also makes no sense from a demand perspective: 
Renewable energy and energy efficiency policies have driven down energy 
demand – in 2016 demand in the EU was down 13 per cent compared to 2010, 
and more than 7 per cent of LNG infrastructure sits unused (Eurostat, 2017). 
The EU is also obligated to reduce gas demand by 40 per cent to meet its com-
mitments made under the 2015 Paris Agreement. Gas infrastructure will thus 
end up being a huge financial liability and stranded asset: Paid for but not usable, 
let alone profitable.
The Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC)  
and Havas Paris
From June to October 2015, massive forest fires in Indonesia destroyed some 
two million hectares of forest, and the massive haze that followed swept across 
South East Asia. More than twenty-eight million people in Indonesia were 
affected by the crisis, with 140,000 reporting respiratory illness (Al-Jezeera, 
2015). A 2016 study estimated that the haze caused 100,000 additional deaths, 
mainly in Indonesia but also the wider region (Agence France-Presse, 2016).
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Although forest fires are an annual event in Indonesia, the 2015 fires were 
the worst in years, exacerbated by an El Niño event. In what the Jakarta Globe 
described as “the environmental crime of the century” they were blamed in 
part on deliberate fires started to clear forest and peatlands for palm oil, paper, 
and pulp plantations (Topsfield, 2016).
The clearance of land not only destroys vast ecosystems, affecting many species 
on the globally endangered list, but has also destroyed globally important carbon 
sinks. The Union of Concerned Scientists has called palm oil plantations a “major 
contributor to global warming” due to industry methods that cause “the destruc-
tion of carbon rich tropical forests and peatlands” (Goodman & Mulik, 2015). 
Deforestation and land degradation are in themselves a major source of CO
2
 
emissions, responsible for around a quarter of global CO
2
 emissions (Smith & 
Bustamante, 2015). In addition, the 2015 Indonesian forest fires emitted consid-
erable levels of CO
2
 by themselves, releasing 11.3 million tonnes of carbon per 
day, which exceeded the daily rate of emissions from the whole European Union 
(Rochmyaningsih, 2016). The fires also resulted in the loss of a huge carbon sink 
of at least two million hectares of forest and peatland (Monbiot, 2015).
On the ground research conducted by Friends of the Earth Indonesia/Walhi 
in areas destroyed by the fires as well as official information from the Ministry 
of Environment and Forestry highlight who owned the concessions where 
the fires broke out (WALHI – Friends of the Earth Indonesia, 2015). They 
include among others giant palm oil conglomerates such as Cargill Indonesia, 
the Singapore-owned multinational Wilmar, and the Malaysian conglomer-
ate Sime Darby. Although industry blamed smallholders for the fires, around 
40 per cent of the palm oil brought by these large conglomerates is produced 
by these smallholders: Corporate demand is thus clearly a significant driver for 
the establishment of palm oil plantations.
Malaysia is the second largest producer of palm oil after Indonesia, and the 
commodity is vital to its economy. According to the industry, it is the fourth 
largest contributor to the Malaysian GDP and directly employs an estimated 
600,000 workers (theoilpalm.org, 2018). Malaysia is also home to the largest 
listed palm oil company globally, Sime Darby (Satish, 2013). The Malaysian Palm 
Oil Council (MPOC) states that it represents “the interests of palm oil growers 
and small farmers, in Malaysia”, noting that “40% of all Palm Oil plantations in 
Malaysia are owned or farmed by small farmers”. That said, MPOC was estab-
lished by the Malaysian government with private firms strongly represented on 
its board. Until he retired in 2017, the outspoken CEO of MPOC, Dr. Yusof 
Basiron, was also a nonexecutive director of Sime Darby (see later in the chapter).
Rebranding palm oil as a “sustainable” product
MPOC has responded relentlessly to counter growing European concern over 
the environmental costs of palm oil in food products. In the wake of the for-
est fires and in advance of the UN Climate Conference in Paris in Decem-
ber 2015, it contracted Havas Paris for a myth-busting publicity campaign, 
which it launched in Paris in September 2015 to counter the “misconceptions” 
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about palm oil (MPOC, 2015). Havas subcontracted public relations outfit Gra-
cias Press to run the Belgian campaign.
Valérie Planchez, the Vice President of Havas Paris, speaking at the campaign’s 
launch, said that “palm oil raises questions for consumers” and explained the pub-
lic relations strategy is a tool “to address fears and fight misconceptions” and deal 
with “reputation issues”. She said: “We will respond with transparency, openness, 
and education”. Havas’ campaign for MPOC has the strapline “They say every-
thing and anything at all about Malaysian palm oil”. The public relations firm 
created a quirky website to educate consumers – malaysianpalmoil.info – with 
an accompanying social media strategy, a documentary, and a print and poster 
campaign. It also included a competition in which people could win a trip to 
Malaysia by answering quiz questions about palm oil (havasparis.com, 2015).
The campaign supposedly follows three students to Malaysia to learn about 
just how sustainable palm oil is, with heavy use of images of orangutans and 
intact rainforest and expressing concern over biodiversity and human rights. 
Yet the fires of 2015 occurred in the area of forest where the largest colony of 
orangutans remain, and there is considerable concern about slavery, child labor, 
and forced labor on palm oil plantations around the world including Malaysia 
and Indonesia (Oakford, 2014).
Yusof Basiron, who launched the Havas public relations campaign for 
MPOC, has been an outspoken critic of environmental campaigning pressure 
on the palm oil industry. He is very active on Twitter rectifying supposed 
myths about palm oil and arguing vociferously that it is a sustainable product, 
despite all the evidence (Basiron, 2016a, 2016b). In his Twitter feed, Basiron 
has blamed NGOs for failing to prevent the 2015 forest fires and suggested that 
burnt areas of rainforest should now be turned into plantations (Basiron, 2015a, 
2015b). The disconnect between Havas Paris’ images of intact rainforest and 
talk of sustainability, and Basiron’s opinions for MPOC via Twitter, is startling.
MPOC’s decision to use Havas Paris to lead its public relations offensive is 
especially noteworthy given that Havas Worldwide describes itself as “at the 
heart of the debate on climate risks for over a decade” and in 2014 launched 
Havas Worldwide’s Climate Practice, to “assist companies and institutions 
towards COP21 and greater integration of climate issues into their strategies”. 
It was initially headed by Pete Boywer, a former spokesperson for UN Secre-
tary General Kofi Annan (Tilley, 2014). Havas offers strategic lobby consultancy 
on climate change issues and says: “World leaders are beginning to face up to 
the greatest global challenge of our age. But business and civil society have key 
roles to play, as well. . . . The Havas Worldwide Climate Practice will ensure 
that their voices are a critical part of that conversation, too” (Glenday, 2014).
The contradiction between Havas Paris’ climate-friendly language and its 
role in greenwashing palm oil as Indonesia’s forests burn couldn’t be starker.
The Volkswagen Group, Hering Schuppener, and others
The Volkswagen (VW) emissions scandal began in September 2015 when the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation of 
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the Clean Air Act to the German automaker Volkswagen Group. It had found 
that the company has intentionally programmed turbocharged direct injec-
tion (TDI) diesel engines to activate emissions controls only during laboratory 
emissions testing, which meant that the vehicle’s nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions 
met U.S. standards during testing. In real-world driving, however, the diesel 
vehicles emitted up to forty times more NOx (Chapell, 2015). Although the 
scandal initially focused on the true levels of NOx emitted by diesel engines, it 
grew to encompass the concealment of true CO
2
 emissions and fuel use.
Regulators in multiple countries began to investigate VW, and its stock price 
fell by a third in the days following the news. The CEO resigned, and other 
corporate leaders were suspended. It was ultimately revealed that VW deployed 
this programming software in about eleven million cars worldwide (Ewing, 
2015). The deception over vehicle emissions has life or death consequences: 
In 2016, an estimated 467,000 preventable premature deaths in the EU were 
caused by air pollution, with road transport emissions a major contributor 
(BBC News, 2016). In November 2015, VW said that up to 800,000 cars avail-
able in Europe would have incorrect CO
2
 emissions and fuel economy ratings 
(Hull, 2015). The consequences of the deception over CO
2
 are significant as 
road transport accounts for a fifth of the total CO
2
 emissions in the EU (Euro-
pean Commission, 2018).
It is no surprise that a crisis on this scale resulted in a massive loss of trust 
and credibility in VW. This continued as VW botched its initial response with 
blatant lies followed by admissions of guilt. In 2016, a Harris Poll on U.S. atti-
tudes towards the 100 most visible companies ranked VW last (Hakim, 2016).
“Crisis communication” and repairing “corporate reputation”  
for Volkswagen
VW brought in three public relations firms based in three different countries – 
Kekst in the United States, Finsbury in Britain, and Hering Schuppener in 
Germany – to join Edelman, with which VW has a long-term relationship 
(Hakim, 2016). Crisis communication was led by Germany public affairs giant 
Hering Schuppener, which has a branch in Brussels dealing with EU affairs. 
London-based Finsbury specializes in financial public relations and was pre-
sumably employed to boost investor confidence. The VW brief was led by 
Finsbury partner and Old Etonian Rollo Head (linkedin.com, 2018b). As of 
2016, Hering Schuppener and Finsbury (both part of the massive WPP public 
relations empire) formed a strategic partnership.
Hering Schuppener prides itself on leading “clients securely through chal-
lenging situations” and lists crisis and issue communication and corporate reputation 
and CEO communication among its expertise (herringschuppener.com, 2018a).
The consultancy refused to detail its work on behalf of Volkswagen, stating 
“we have never and will never comment on any client work that we might 
or might not be doing”; however, on its website, Hering Schuppener explains 
how crisis management work includes developing “bespoke crisis prevention 
and communications concepts to preserve the sovereignty of information in 
mission-critical situations and reduce the risk of stress-related communications 
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errors” (Ainger, 2015; herringschuppener.com, 2018b). This includes estab-
lishing “systematic online and offline systems for the correct response in the 
traditional media and in news and social media channels”. Its work on cor-
porate reputation includes assisting executive and senior managers to sharpen 
their personal profiles as well as training modules to help CEOs pitch their 
arguments to various target groups: “We introduce them to the rules of deal-
ing professionally with differing expectations and help them to make a self- 
confident impression in a dialogue with their target groups”.
Hering Schuppener is well connected to powerful decision-makers in busi-
ness, politics, and the media in Germany and across Europe. In 2015, its website 
stated, “we are . . . committed to fostering a better understanding between 
business and political leaders. We are convinced that our society gains from an 
intensive dialogue between the social elites” (herringschuppener.com, 2015). 
Fittingly, then, its senior team in 2015 included several ex-politicians including 
Hans Martin Bury, who brought with him a wide network of political contacts 
as former Minister of State for Europe, in the German Bundestag (Holmes, 
2008). Its staff still includes Henriette Peuker, the partner of Jorg Asmussen, 
former State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs. In 2017, the consultancy had seventeen lobbyists working within the 
EU, including Peuker (EU Transparency Register, 2018a).5
VW used to claim to be the greenest car maker in the industry, saying “sus-
tainability is a real, measurable value driver for our business” (edie.net, 2015). 
Beyond lying about its emissions, VW’s lobbying record on climate policy also 
shows a vast gulf between such claims and the reality. VW has dragged its heels 
on climate policy and CO
2
 emissions reductions, lobbying hard against Euro-
pean laws to increase vehicle efficiency and reduce dependence on oil (Influ-
enceMap, 2015). In 2017, VW spent €2,660,000 on lobbying activities (EU 
Transparency Register, 2018b). As the most powerful car company in Europe, 
it has been a major obstacle to strong climate targets.
Gazprom and GPLUS Europe
Gazprom is a giant Russian corporation and by far the world’s largest gas pro-
ducer (Rapier, 2016). It focuses on geological exploration, production, transpor-
tation, storage, processing, and sales of gas, gas condensate, and oil, and controls 
the world’s largest gas transmission system (gazprom.com, 2018). Gazprom is also 
Europe’s biggest gas supplier and in 2013 accounted for 39 per cent of natural gas 
imports to the EU. A number of EU countries are heavily reliant on Gazprom 
for supply. The company is majority owned by the Russian Government.
According to the Carbon Disclosure Project, Gazprom is responsible for 
3.9 per cent of global industrial greenhouse emissions. It is the third biggest 
institutional emitter based on cumulative historical global industrial emissions 
of C0
2
 and methane (Griffin, 2017).
Gazprom holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves (17 per cent) and 
is actively implementing large-scale gas development projects across Russia, 
including on the Arctic Shelf (gazprom.com, 2018). The entire Arctic region 
is estimated to hold 166 billion barrels of oil equivalent (Critchlow, 2014). 
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Despite significant environmental and safety concerns about oil companies 
drilling offshore in one of the world’s most pristine and fragile environments, 
the oil majors are increasingly looking towards the Arctic seas as a source of 
future supply, with Russian corporations leading the way.
Public relations firm GPLUS Europe, with offices in London, Brussels, 
Paris, and Berlin, has represented Gazprom since 2007. It also represented the 
Kremlin from 2006 (its last listing of the Russian Federation as a client is in 
November 2016). In the Transparency Register, GPLUS estimates its annual 
costs during 2017 related to activities covered by the Register for Gazprom 
Export at between €10,000 and €25,000. Although this seems a small fig-
ure, it is worth noting that another client of GPLUS is NIS, the Petro-
leum Industry of Serbia, which was worth between €50,000 and €99,999 
in 2017 – Gazprom Neft (Gazprom’s oil subsidiary) has a controlling share 
in NIS (see later in the chapter) (EU Transparency Register, 2018c; ir.nis.
eu, 2018).
In addition, in 2015, the EU Observer highlighted that although the Trans-
parency Register listed GPLUS’s Gazprom Export contract as worth between 
€300,000 and €350,000 that year, the full extent of its work was likely to have 
been worth much more, especially in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, 
which saw Russia threatening to cut off gas supplies to Europe. The Register 
noted that the Gazprom work was invoiced to a private company, DEC, which 
was also owned by the owners of GPLUS – the giant American public relations 
holding company Omnicom. British records show the value of GPLUS’s trans-
actions with DEC in 2013 was £6.6 million, indicating the Gazprom contract 
at that time was worth millions (Rettman, 2015).
Although DEC was dissolved in 2017, this kind of shady behavior is not 
completely unexpected as the New York Times describes Gazprom as riddled 
with “rampant and Kremlin-directed corruption” (Companies House, 2018; 
Dawisha, 2014). At the end of 2014, Russia and Gazprom’s relationship with 
GPLUS’s sister public relations firm in the United States, Ketchum, ended as 
conflict in the Ukraine and geopolitical tensions made conducting public rela-
tions work untenable for it (Washkuch & Nichols, 2015).
GPLUS Europe employs a large number of former EU officials and has 
been described as “virtually the exclusive employer of former spokesmen at 
the European Commission” (IntelligenceOnline, 2006). It is unclear who cur-
rently manages the Gazprom account for GPLUS; however, former advisors are 
indicative of this pattern: They include Gregor Kreuzhuber, a former European 
Commission industry spokesman, and Tim Price, who formerly worked in 
the European Commission’s Press Office in London (gpluseurope.com, 2018; 
Rettman, 2015). GPLUS Europe managing partner Thomas Barros-Tastets has 
been frequently referenced in the media as a consultant in European public 
affairs to Gazprom. He is married to Catherine Ray, the spokesperson for the 
EU’s Foreign Policy Chief (Coalson, 2014).
With friends like these, it is perhaps no surprise that Gazprom’s chief execu-
tive Alexei Miller was removed from the list of individuals targeted by EU 
sanctions over the Ukraine crisis (AFP, 2014).
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GPLUS Europe and creating a supportive environment for Arctic drilling
In 2015, NIS and Gazprom Neft supported an exhibition of photos entitled 
“Let’s Discover the Arctic” in Belgrade, which included both spectacular pic-
tures of icebergs, wildlife, and the local population as well as state-of-the art 
technologies for seabed exploration “which meets the international environ-
mental and process safety standards” (ir.nis.eu, 2018).
The melting of the Arctic has opened up new business possibilities for 
Gazprom. “The Arctic remains a strategic priority for our company”, com-
mented Alexander Dyukov, Gazprom Neft’s Chief Executive Officer: “Thus 
far, Arctic territory has remained under-researched, although we are, step by 
step, progressing further every year” (OGJ Editors, 2015). Gazprom Neft now 
has ten functioning oil wells in the Prirazlomnoye field (currently the only 
offshore oil production project in the Russian Arctic); its current plan is to drill 
a total of thirty-two wells (Gazprom Neft, 2017).
In October 2014, GPLUS’s head office in London held an Arctic event on 
“responsible economic development” of the polar region. GPLUS Account 
Manager Richard Pace described the “sturdy grounds for co-operation between 
all interested parties when it comes to the Arctic”. The event involved a round-
table discussion and networking reception, including a number of guests from 
“industry, academia and the diplomatic community”, such as members of the 
Russian embassy. The roundtable was chaired by former Finnish Prime Minister 
Paavo Lipponen. An unnamed invitee was quoted saying: “We must not allow 
current political rhetoric to undermine the great support and assistance our 
Russian colleagues have provided in developing sensible policies for safe naviga-
tion and the sustainable development of the Arctic” (gpluseurope.com, 2014).
Vladimir Putin’s views on climate change have varied over the past two 
decades from mockery to his climate-friendly platitudes to fellow world leaders 
at the 2015 UN Climate Conference in Paris (The New York Times, 2015). 
Most recently in March 2017 he has returned to the argument that climate 
change is not caused by human activities, and that has brought favorable condi-
tions for economic improvement in the Arctic with new sea routes becoming 
passable and easier access to offshore oil fields (Meredith, 2017). Beyond eco-
nomic wealth, control over huge gas reserves and the reserves beneath Russian 
Arctic waters gives Russia power. According to Vladimir Milov, former Russian 
Deputy Energy Minister, Vladimir Putin “thinks of [Gazprom] as one of the 
ultimate sources and attributes of power” (Roxbergh, 2012). Given Putin and 
Gazprom’s unambiguous commitment to continue oil exploration and drilling 
for oil and gas, there is little doubt that GPLUS is colluding in Gazprom’s crime 
against the climate.
Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Plants (ZEP)  
and Weber Shandwick
The European Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power 
Plants (ZEP) is a coalition of stakeholders united in their support for CO
2
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capture and storage (CCS) as a key technology for combating climate change. 
ZEP serves as advisor to the European Commission on the research, demon-
stration, and deployment of CCS (zeroemissionsplatform.eu, 2018).
CCS is an expensive and unproven technique that allows dirty energy power 
plants and fossil fuel infrastructure to continue to be built on a future promise 
that technology will bury their CO
2
 emissions. Not surprisingly, then, ZEP’s 
Advisory Council includes big oil and dirty energy companies such as Shell, BP, 
Statoil, Total, GE Energy, and Alstom.
CCS is so expensive that a key goal of ZEP is to attract public funds to “make 
CCS technology commercially viable by 2020 via an EU-backed demonstra-
tion programme” (zeroemissionsplatform.eu, 2018). To achieve this, ZEP needs 
powerful allies in the EU institutions, member state governments, and industry. 
However, as the Financial Times has said of CCS: “Few technologies have had so 
much money thrown at them for so many years by so many governments and 
companies, with such feeble results” (Clark, 2015).
ZEP, Weber Shandwick, and the art of political networking
ZEP contracts Weber Shandwick for lobbying and communications, a pub-
lic relations firm with one of the largest public affairs energy and environ-
ment teams in Brussels. Weber Shandwick helps coordinate high-level political 
access, media relations, core messaging, and lobbying strategy for ZEP – includ-
ing helping to access EU public financing for CCS. In 2017, Weber Shandwick 
received a revenue of between €100,000 and €199,999 from ZEP for lobbying 
work. According to the Transparency Register, Weber Shandwick also con-
ducts lobbying work on behalf of Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol, the Oil Compa-
nies International Marine Forum, and the International Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers, among others (EU Transparency Register, 2018d).
A publicly available 2014 internal meeting presentation shows how Weber 
Shandwick has been involved in crafting strategy and organizing the minutiae 
of accessing public funds for CCS. The public relations and lobbying strategy 
outlined includes identifying key political contacts in the EU institutions with 
a “contact programme to prepare the ground, gather information and establish 
or build relationships and ensure that ZEP has the full picture on the different 
funding streams”. Key stakeholders identified include officials in the European 
Commission’s Directorate Generals for Energy, Research, and Regional Devel-
opment (zeroemissionsplatform.eu, 2014a).
To engage with EU officials, cultivating personal political connections is 
crucial. During 2014, Weber Shandwick engaged in a series of lobbying activi-
ties to establish such connections for ZEP. This began straight after the 2014 
European elections, when Weber Shandwick sent a congratulations message 
and CCS information pack to each newly elected MEP and worked to “assess 
where CCS fits within the new political agenda” and to “refine strategy and 
tactics for leveraging CCS in the new environment” (zeroemissionsplatform.
eu, 2014a).
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This was followed by a July 2014 “high level engagement programme” in 
Brussels for the Chair and Vice-Chair of ZEP with an impressive range of 
high-level officials (and Weber Shandwick also attending). It focused on “the 
next steps on the 2030 framework [for climate and energy policy in the EU], 
building networks in the new European Parliament and the ongoing discus-
sions at EU level on CCS”. It included meetings with the Director General 
of DG Climate Action, Jos Delbeke, and with Marie Donnelly, Director for 
Renewables, Research and Innovation, Energy Efficiency at DG Energy as well 
as the French and Latvian energy attachés, MEP committee chairs, and others.
Weber Shandwick identified “key outcomes” from these meetings includ-
ing interest from the key member states they had approached and that “ZEP’s 
efforts to model the future energy system were warmly appreciated by Marie 
Donnelly”. Some of those approached at this time later appeared as speakers at 
ZEP events (zeroemissionsplatform.eu, 2014b).
It also highlighted the need to identify more MEPs who would work on 
the issue “on a day by day basis”. Before losing his seat in the 2014 EU elec-
tions, this work was done by British MEP Chris Davies, a CCS enthusiast 
who also sat on the European Committee (ENVI) for fifteen years drawing up 
environmental regulation. Davies now has his own lobbying consultancy, with 
Fleishman-Hillard as one of his clients (corporateeurope.org, 2018).
In September 2014, Weber Shandwick organized a series of European Par-
liament breakfast briefings on CCS. At one session on energy security, Paula 
Abreu-Marques, the Head of Unit for Renewables and CCS Policy at DG 
Energy, highlighted how CCS should be a key component in Europe’s energy 
security strategies (Bellona Europe, 2014).
At an important European Parliament hearing on CCS in November 2014, 
Weber Shandwick helped craft roundtable discussions with politicians and 
industry. It was clear that the July meetings had paid off, as EU’s Climate Action 
Director Jos Delbeke, speaking at this event, said that a “CO2 free economy 
won’t happen without CCS” (ZEP, 2014).
In December 2014, Weber Shandwick celebrated the “many results both 
quantitative and qualitative” from its lobbying activities, with “CCS being 
explicitly included in the Energy Council conclusions and the Energy Security 
paper seen as main results” (zeroemissionsplatform.eu, 2014c). Other concrete 
results that Weber Shandwick presents include: “Instead of chasing the press, 
they now increasingly start to seek for ZEP statements”, and the formation of a 
stronger coalition for CCS in the Parliament. Future plans listed were predicta-
bly a “deepening of engagement” and “increasing the funding sources for CCS”.
Weber Shandwick has played a distinct role in helping to make the case for 
public funds and political support for a technology that is risky and hugely 
expensive, and could keep those companies extracting fossil fuels and polluting 
for years to come. Given that Weber Shandwick also conducts extensive lob-
bying work for other oil and gas companies as well as oil and gas industry trade 
associations, one could also conclude that the decision to focus on CCS may 
also be self-interested.
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Conclusion: Big Energy, public relations, and lobbying 
consultancies, and the web of deception around  
what does and what doesn’t cause climate change
This chapter gives an insight into the millions of Euros that multinational fos-
sil fuel and palm oil companies have paid to public relations and lobbying 
consultancies – both declared in the European Union transparency register or 
otherwise. These consultancies have used the careful crafting of public rela-
tions messages and the direct lobbying of key officials to whitewash and excuse 
corporate deceit over polluting behavior (Hering Schuppener, Finsbury, Edel-
man, and Kekst); assert that natural gas, CCS technologies, and palm oil planta-
tion production methods are sustainable when science demonstrates that they 
are clearly not (Weber Shandwick, Fleishman-Hillard, Havas Paris, and Gracias 
Press); and assert that jobs and the economy in the Russian Arctic, a remote and 
sparsely populated area, are more important than the climate (GPLUS Europe).
In many of the aforementioned cases, this appears to be money well spent 
as it has effectively altered public understanding around the causes of and solu-
tions to climate change and has altered EU legislation and funding priorities to 
ensure these companies can continue with business as usual activities. This makes 
a mockery of international commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and prevent the destruction of carbon sinks. The public relations and lobbying 
consultancies and their well-educated, well-connected, and well-paid employ-
ees are as complicit as the companies they work for in wrecking the climate.
Public relations firms like to see themselves as lawyers do, neutrally pushing 
the side of the debate most appropriate for their clients. Some of the public 
relations firms highlighted here even have clients in the renewables sector. But 
public relations practitioners are not lawyers, but rather are directly involved in 
shaping the public debate around one of the most important crises humanity 
has faced. It may well be time for companies in the green and renewables sector 
to ask careful questions about the ethics of a public relations consultancy and 
who else they work for, before engaging them. If public relations consultancies 
and lobbyists will not avoid climate-damaging companies on ethical grounds, 
then at least it is time to perceive them as high-risk clients that will damage 
their reputation and lose them other work.
A key factor in the success of these consultancies is the Brussels revolving 
door, which has allowed Big Energy to remain close to European climate and 
energy decision-makers. In order to solve the climate crisis, those who are most 
responsible for creating it must be separated for the writing of climate policy. 
However, currently the revolving door and the fact that climate criminals and 
paid lobbyists can easily access decision-makers at UN climate conferences at 
industry-sponsored pavilions, breakaway meetings, or special jamborees mean 
this is far from the case.
It is time to consider a firewall such as Article 5.3 implemented at the 
World Health Organization for rules on global tobacco legislation. This arti-
cle ensures that, “In setting and implementing their public health policies 
with respect to tobacco control, parties shall act to protect these policies from 
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commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry” (World Health 
Organisation, 2018). In effect, this keeps big tobacco out of the room when it 
comes to policy making, applying not just at the international level but also to 
all countries that have signed the treaty. Such a firewall is needed for climate 
policy making, applying not just to the big polluters but to the lobbyists paid 
to represent them.
As the planet faces a looming catastrophic climate crisis, the need for strict 
rules and a major change of culture to tackle the hothouse of energy industry 
lobbying, privileged access for polluters, and ever-spinning revolving doors that 
are so prevalent in key EU institutions has never been greater.
Notes
 1 This chapter is an updated and adapted-to-volume version of the Corporate Europe 
Observatory publication “The Climate Smokescreen: PR companies lobbying for the big 
polluters in Europe”, October 2015.
 2 Some examples of omissions from the EU Transparency Register cited in the original 
2015 Corporate Europe Observatory report have now been rectified: Edelman is updated 
to 2018; Fleishman-Hillard now lists GasNaturally as a client; and Hering Schuppener 
now lists Volkswagen as a client.
 3 For example, Cuadrilla declared a total lobby budget of up to €25,000 in the EU’s Trans-
parency Register, but according to the accounts of FTI Consulting the British fracking 
company paid it up to €100,000.
 4 Within the European Union, a directorate-general is a branch of the administration dedi-
cated to a specific field of expertise, e.g. energy or climate change.
 5 Volkswagen was not listed as a client of Hering Schuppener in 2017.
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10  “Cowgate”
Meat eating and climate change denial
Vasile Stanescu
“Urgent action is required”
Arguably, the single most categorical and effective statement on the environ-
mental dangers of the raising of animals for human consumption was issued by 
the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In 2006, the 
FAO produced a 391-page report titled “Livestock’s Long Shadow”, conclud-
ing that animal farming presents a “major threat to the environment” with 
such “deep and wide-ranging” impacts that it should rank as a leading focus 
for environmental policy. The report concluded that “[t]he livestock sector is a 
major player [in climate change], responsible for 18 percent of greenhouse gas 
emissions measured in CO2 equivalent. This is a higher share than transport” 
(Steinfeld et al., 2006, p. xxi). Nor was the call for action at all hidden: As Hen-
ning Steinfeld, Chief of FAO’s Livestock Information and Policy Branch, put it 
(FAO, 2006): “Livestock are one of the most significant contributors to today’s 
most serious environmental problems. Urgent action is required to remedy the 
situation”.1 Furthermore, the chair of the United Nations Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, repeatedly suggested 
that people should decrease their consumption of meat in order to help offset 
climate change. As he stated (in Jowit, 2008): “In terms of immediacy of action 
and the feasibility of bringing about reductions in a short period of time, it 
clearly is the most attractive opportunity. . . . Give up meat for one day [a week] 
initially, and decrease it from there”. The evidence caused Yvo de Boer, then 
executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), to conclude “the best solution would be for us all to become 
vegetarians” (BBC, 2008).
Unfortunately, these United Nations statements on the environmental effects 
of animal agriculture and meat eating are not more well-known because of 
what I term meat-eating denial. This analogy is a reference to the concept of cli-
mate change denial, i.e. the concept that large-scale businesses with specific inter-
ests in influencing public policy internationally misrepresent scientific studies, 
via a series of rhetorical strategies, in order to influence public opinion. This is 
not to suggest that all the information provided by the denialists is false; it is to 
suggest that this information is presented to the media in an intentionally biased 
manner that produces media coverage that effectively distorts public opinion 
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on the issue. For example, according to Pew research, belief in climate change 
has been steadily eroding even as scientific support has steadily been growing. 
In April 2008, 71 per cent of U.S. citizens believed in climate change; by 2009, 
that number had fallen to only 51 per cent, of which an even smaller percent-
age, only 36 per cent, believed that climate change is caused by human activity 
(The Pew Research Center, 2009). What changed was not the scientific con-
sensus about climate change (which has only grown) nor individual reasons and 
ethics but instead the creation of an effective and systematic attempt to distort 
public information based, in part, on claims that scientific claims about climate 
change had been “debunked”. Likewise, a similarly successful pattern of sup-
posed “debunking” of scientific studies was undertaken by the meat and dairy 
industry to confuse the public about the environmental effects of eating meat. 
And it is in this broader sense that I mean the analogy between climate change 
denial and meat-eating denial.
In this chapter I focus on the research by Dr. Frank Mitloehner as a repre-
sentative example of the growing manner in which animal agribusiness has been 
able to utilize the strategies already used by climate change deniers in order 
to distort the debate on livestock production and its environmental effects. 
I focus on Mitloehner’s research, in some detail, because his supposed “debunk-
ing” of the link between animal agriculture and greenhouse gases emission has 
been the most effective and most widely reported example of meat-eating denial. 
However, to be clear, this single example is not only about Dr. Mitloehner; it is 
meant to highlight an ongoing and overarching industry-funded trend.
“Everywhere in the world”
FAO’s “Livestock’s Long Shadow” (Steinfeld et al., 2006) concluded that world-
wide meat production produced 18 per cent of all emissions relating to climate 
change, which the report went on to note was “a higher share than transport”. 
The response, particularly by livestock-based agribusiness, has been to empha-
size minor errors in the report that do not dispute the essential claim linking 
animal agriculture to greenhouse gases but that, at the same time, they suggest, 
disprove the study. For example, Frank Mitloehner, a researcher at the Univer-
sity of California at Davis, gave a presentation, entitled “Clearing the Air on 
Livestock’s Contribution to Climate Change”, before the 239th national meet-
ing of the American Chemical Society criticizing the FAO research (Mitloeh-
ner, 2011). In this presentation Mitloehner made essentially two arguments: 
The first one, which was not his main point, was that the number 18 per cent 
represents only a worldwide average and therefore does not, directly, say any-
thing about the “carbon footprint” of any one particular country (Loglisci, 
2009).2 This is true, although it does not in any way dispute the validity of the 
18 per cent itself, and the UN food and agriculture agency has been working 
on precisely this type of country-by-country break down (Abend, 2010). How-
ever, it was his second argument, which is both the main one he stressed and 
the one emphasized by all the media coverage of the presentation, that caught 
international attention. Namely, when the report claimed that agriculture 
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released more greenhouses gases than transportation this statement was incor-
rect, not because it over-reported the amount of emissions by livestock, but 
instead because it underestimated the amount produced by the transportation 
industry. Specifically, he pointed out the study had only focused on the amount 
of gases being released via transportation (i.e. direct emissions) but had not 
included the entire “life-cycle” amount of transportation, i.e. how many emis-
sions went into, say, mining the materials to build the cars. As the press release 
from the event explained:
Mitloehner says confusion over meat and milk’s role in climate change 
stems from a small section printed in the executive summary of a 2006 
United Nations report, “Livestock’s Long Shadow.” It read: “The livestock 
sector is a major player, responsible for 18 percent of greenhouse gas emis-
sions measured in CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalents). This is a higher 
share than transport.”
Mitloehner says there is no doubt that livestock are major producers 
of methane, one of the greenhouse gases. But he faults the methodology 
of “Livestock’s Long Shadow,” contending that numbers for the livestock 
sector were calculated differently from transportation. In the report, the 
livestock emissions included gases produced by growing animal feed; ani-
mals’ digestive emissions; and processing meat and milk into foods. But the 
transportation analysis factored in only emissions from fossil fuels burned 
while driving and not all other transport lifecycle related factors. “This lop-
sided analysis is a classical apples-and-oranges analogy that truly confused 
the issue,” he said.
(American Chemical Society, 2010)
Mitloehner’s point, as such, is accurate and has been conceded by the creators 
of the United Nations report. At the same time, the point is itself fairly irrel-
evant, as it has nothing to say about the actual rate of greenhouse gas emissions 
from livestock. As one of the United Nations study’s co-authors, Pierre Gerber, 
explained (in Armstrong, 2010): “[T]he comparability of the data does not 
challenge the estimate of 18 percent” since “[i]t has been endorsed by the scien-
tific community”, and even “the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change) made reference to it”. In other words, Mitloehner’s presentation had 
nothing to say about the amount of greenhouse gases livestock actually emitted, 
only a minor correction of the amount produced by transportation, which, in 
turn, had only been included for the purposes of comparison. As James McWil-
liams, a historian focused on the issue of food politics, wrote:
On the grand scale of scientific errors, though, this one was relatively 
minor. What matters most is that the 18 percent figure – and the corre-
sponding implication that reduced meat consumption would lower global 
 warming – remained essentially untouched by Mitloehner’s report. . . . 
Mitloehner’s debunking of the transportation comparison changes nothing 
about the overall impact of livestock on the environment.
(McWilliams, 2010)
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However, these fairly minor corrections, which did not, in any way, dispute 
the actual finding of the report concerning the connection of livestock and 
global warming, were picked up and reported by numerous media organiza-
tions that claimed, without context, that Mitloehner’s research “disproved” and 
“debunked” the original FAO report. This misrepresentation was clearly inten-
tional as I will highlight via examples of the media coverage of Mitloehner’s 
research: As earlier noted, the American Chemical Society released the original 
press release, inaccurately entitled “Eating Less Meat and Dairy Products Won’t 
Have Major Impact on Global Warming” (2010). The press release also included 
the quotation from Mitloehner: “We certainly can reduce our  greenhouse-gas 
production, but not by consuming less meat and milk. . . . Producing less meat 
and milk will only mean more hunger in poor countries” (American Chemical 
Society, 2010). The Cattlemen’s Association followed quickly with a press release 
to the AG (agriculture) Network entitled “Meat Avoidance Cures Flat Feet & 
Other Lies”, which claimed that Mitloehner had “disproven” the UN report 
(Cattlemen’s Association, 2010). Likewise, the Center for Consumer Freedom, 
which, despite the positive sounding name, is a lobbying group funded in part 
by the meat industry (Mayer & Joyce, 2005), also generated a series of press 
releases to the same effect. As the center’s blog explains:
We felt yesterday’s news deserved a big audience, so we circulated a state-
ment to the media. . . . Perhaps one day the anti-meat activists at PETA 
[People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals] and HSUS [The Humane 
Society of the United States] will get the memo: We should be applauding 
eco-friendly American livestock farmers, not attacking them.
(Center for Consumer Freedom, 2010)
The result was that the story was widely carried through the news media 
but only in a completely inaccurate manner. No news agency reported that 
a minor correction to an otherwise entirely accurate report had been noted. 
Instead, universally, the story was reported as though the link between animal 
agriculture and greenhouse gases emissions had been disproven.
Unfortunately, this completely inaccurate claim was carried by news media 
around the world. For example, in the United States, FOX News first seized on 
these findings with a headline “Eat Less Meat, Reduce Global Warming – or 
Not” with the introductory line “Save the planet, eat less meat . . . right? That’s 
what the UN said, anyway, but one scientist has a grade A beef with that claim” 
(FOX News, 2010). The FOX story even included a caption with the claim: 
“Reducing consumption of meat and dairy products might not have a major 
impact in combating global warming despite claims that link diets rich in ani-
mal products to production of greenhouse gases” (2010). Likewise CNN car-
ried a headline “Scientist: Don’t Blame Cows for Climate Change” (Armstrong, 
2010). Time Magazine covered it with the headline “Meat-Eating Vs. Driving: 
Another Climate Change Error?” (Abend, 2010). Both the Washington Examiner 
(Hollingsworth, 2010) and the Washington Times (Haper, 2010) ran the article 
under the headlines “Don’t Blame Climate Change on the Cows” and “Meat, 
Dairy Diet Not Tied to Global Warming” respectively. In Australia the story 
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was covered by both the Sydney Morning Herald under the headline “Eating 
Less Meat ‘Won’t Help Climate’ ” (2010) and The Australian under the head-
line “Emissions Campaign Lacks Meat” (2010). Maclean’s, published in Canada, 
ran the story under “Where’s the Beef: Scientist Takes a Second Look at UN 
Numbers That Have Led Many Environmentalists to Forego Meat”, beginning 
with the line “For those advocating for urgent action on the climate change, it’s 
been a rough few months. . . . Now the latest: the notion, trumpeted by envi-
ronmentalists and animal rights crusaders in Europe and in North America, that 
reducing our consumption of meat will help keep the planet cool [has been dis-
proven]” (Kohler, 2010). The Toronto Sun covered the story, in a column piece, 
under the title “My Beef with Meatless Monday” including the sentence “Too 
bad that like so many other environmental fads, Meatless Monday turns out to 
be mostly a waste of time and effort and could even do more harm than good” 
(Woodcock, 2010). In France the piece was carried in France 24 under the 
headline “Eating Less Meat Won’t Reduce Global Warming: Study” with the 
lead-in “Eating less meat will not reduce global warming, and claims that it will 
distract from efforts to find real solutions to climate change, a leading air qual-
ity expert said Monday” (2010). The BBC in the UK covered the story under 
the neutral headline “UN Body to Look at Meat and Climate Link” but still 
included, without comment, both Mitloehner’s claim that “Producing less meat 
and milk will only mean more hunger in poor countries” and that “Smarter 
animal farming, not less farming, will equal less heat” (Black, 2010). The Lon-
don Times carried the story under the title “Now It’s Cowgate: Expert Report 
Says Claims of Livestock Causing Global Warming Are False” (Warner, 2010). 
However, perhaps The Daily Mail in the UK had the most emphatic headline: 
“Veggies Are Wrong and Eating Less Meat Will NOT Save Planet”. It followed 
this headline with the first sentence: “Calls to save the planet by eating less meat 
are based on an exaggerated UN report linking livestock to global warming, 
according to an analysis of the study” (Derbyshire, 2010).
It is true that the UN report included an admittedly unintentional exaggera-
tion of the comparison with the transportation industry, which does count as 
an error. But what none of these stories adequately explains is that this error had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the actual point of the study, that raising ani-
mals causes significant environmental degradation, but instead involved a single 
sentence included only for the purposes of comparison. Instead, universally, the 
headlines for all of these stories suggest that Mitloehner’s evidence “disproved” 
the claim that raising farm animals helps to cause global warming as well as fre-
quently claiming that decreasing factory farming would somehow exacerbate 
world hunger, even though his study had nothing to say about world hunger.3 
However, instead of trying to correct these misunderstandings of the science 
involved, Mitloehner has, consistently, been the major force trying to distort the 
importance of his own findings.4 In fact Mitloehner cites, with approval, the 
large amount of coverage his talk has received (including several of the sources 
already cited) when addressing industry groups as a way to show his direct ben-
efit to their business (Hearden, 2010).5 As he explained in concrete terms at a 
convention of dairy farmers:
“Cowgate” 183
This is the equivalent of Newsweek in Canada, it is called Macleans. A year 
ago they said “Save the planet: Stop eating meat. The UN says so, and so 
do a growing list of school boards. Meet the new eco enemy.” The same 
journalist who wrote this article a year ago called me after my talk at the 
American Chemical Society and now says: “Where’s the beef? Scientist 
takes a second look at UN numbers that have led many environmentalists 
to forego meat.” Totally different article written by the same journalist. 
Totally, totally different. . . . These are the same journalists who say some-
thing very adverse to your industry and then turn around completely once 
they get the facts right. . . . CNN put it out and it was listened to and read 
by twenty million people, you know, CNN will really have a major impact 
if you hit that. . . . And if you think it is only a question in Europe or the 
United States it’s not. . . . Australia wrote about it, numerous articles, but 
it went much further than that. I always wanted to know how to spell my 
name in Chinese, now I know how to because it went there. It went to 
India. It went all over the world. It was Turkey and Argentina and China 
and Taiwan – everywhere in the world.
(Mitloehner, 2010a)
“Proactively” shaping the debate
It is also therefore important to note that virtually none of the newspaper 
articles included the information that Mitloehner has significant ties with the 
beef, pork, and dairy industries (Hickman, 2010).6 As Mitloehner’s own univer-
sity press release admits (although absent from the press release by the Ameri-
can Chemical Society) Mitloehner received 26,000U.S. dollars from the Beef 
Checkoff Program specifically for this research, and 5 per cent of the five mil-
lion dollars in funding he has received since 2002 has come explicitly from 
the beef industry (Wright, 2009). To be more concrete, the Beef Checkoff 
Program is administrated exclusively by the Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and 
Research Board for the sole purpose of increasing the consumption of beef 
(Cattleman’s Beef Board, n.d.; California Beef Council, n.d.). As its own web-
site explains: “The Beef Checkoff . . . program was designed to stimulate oth-
ers to sell more beef and stimulate consumers to buy more beef ” (Cattlemen’s 
Beef Board, n.d.). This is not the only funding from the livestock industry 
that Dr. Mitloehner has received, as other significant sources of funding from 
the livestock industry were simply not explicitly disclosed in the press release 
(Hickman, 2010).
Nor are these links purely monetary, as Mitloehner has previously published 
his research in multiple agriculture industry-funded publications (California 
Cattleman, 2009). Such close ties with the industry that Mitloehner is studying 
are of concern since the Cattlemen’s Association has been quite clear that its 
strategy is to “proactively” shape the debate in a manner that favors eating beef 
(Cameron, 2011). For example, in fall 2009 the beef industry created a new 
periodical, entitled Beef Issues Quarterly, funded in part by the Beef Checkoff 
program. This publication is explicitly open about its desire to “proactively” 
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shape the debate via both public relations and “issue management”. As the 
first issue explains: “This publication is designed to be a tool to support the 
industry’s identification and management of issues that can affect beef demand” 
(Advisory Panel Outlook, 2009). Mitloehner published an article, entitled 
“Livestock’s Role in Climate Change”, in the first issue of Beef Issue Quarterly 
(Mitloehner & Place, 2009).
Mitloehner also has similar ties to the dairy industry. For example, in 2011 
the dairy industry awarded him the Outstanding Dairy Industry Educator/
Research; this award was presented at the Dairy Profit Seminars and spon-
sored exclusively by the Western Dairy Business (Dairy Profit Seminars, 2011). 
As the name Dairy Profit Seminars would suggest, the stated purpose of this 
conference is to help the dairy industry to increase its profit and, like the Cat-
tlemen’s Association, to “proactively” shape the debate against both environ-
mentalists and animal rights activists (Goble, 2010). In fact, the press release 
associated with the award specifically thanks Dr. Mitloehner for making sure 
that “the dairy industry and agriculture in general are not needlessly over-
regulated” (Goble, 2010).
Mitloehner has defended himself against these accusations of bias by claim-
ing that he is only being attacked by environmentalists and animal rights activ-
ists who are simply displeased by the results that science has achieved. As he 
phrases it, “[w]hat I really regret is that these individuals do not really argue 
the science but try to discredit the scientist instead (i.e. conflict of interest 
discussion)” (Mitloehner, 2010b). At the same time, having multiple close ties 
with the industry under study does raise concerns about objectivity, particu-
larly when the organizations themselves consciously and repeatedly explain 
that their very purpose is to shape research to a predetermined conclusion that 
is favorable to their own economic self-interests: Mitloehner himself ended a 
speech to the dairy industry in 2010 with a nearly identical call of the beef and 
dairy industries’ own attempt to be “proactive” in shaping the debate (Mitloeh-
ner, 2010a).7 Hence in the same manner that we might question a climatolo-
gist who received (and accepted) an award at an Oil Profit Seminar sponsored 
exclusively by the petroleum industry, particularly if it began by praising him or 
her for debunking climate change environmentalism, so too I suggest we may 
wish to be hesitant in accepting the claims of a scientist with identical ties to 
the beef and dairy industry. Particularly when this researcher has, himself, made 
comments that both dairy farmers and researchers should be “proactive” along 
determined lines. As Gidon Eshel explained in an interview contrasting his 
own work, which is critical of animal agribusiness, to Mitloehner’s:
Mitloehner’s study also had $5 million in underwriting, five percent of 
which came from the beef industry. “Livestock’s Long Shadow” was under-
written by “nobody whatsoever,” says Eshel. “I am not beholden to any-
body, financially, morally or otherwise. . . . When you eat meat, you exert 
three times as much pressure on land demand and reactive nitrogen as you 
do with a plant-based diet”.
(Quoted in Kanner, 2010)
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“A model for the world”
Furthermore, what Mitloehner seems to fail to understand is that the critique is 
actually not about the research itself. As earlier noted, the crafters of the report 
themselves agree on the two scientific critiques. It is instead a critique of the 
way in which he has chosen to phrase the significance of his research, which is 
both biased and intentionally misleading. For example, Mitloehner in both the 
original talk and in many of the subsequent interviews on the topic claims that 
reduced meat consumption would lead to world hunger since “[p]roducing 
less meat and milk will only mean more hunger in poor countries” (American 
Chemical Society, 2010). Why people in other countries could not, say, eat 
the grains and legumes currently fed to the animals is never discussed. And, 
as earlier mentioned, his own research has nothing to do with world hunger. 
Moreover, anyone who has studied this question has come to the exact opposite 
conclusion; not only would decreasing meat consumption of animals raised in 
factory farms not cause world hunger but it would, in fact, significantly help to 
alleviate hunger (Motavalli, 2001; Fry, 2010).8 In other words, far from being 
an argument against ending factory farms, world hunger represents one of the 
strongest arguments in favor of ending them. And, as with meat eating and cli-
mate change, virtually all major works on this topic support this idea. However, 
Mitloehner simply makes the claim that decreasing factory farms would help 
to cause world hunger without any references to support it, which is then, uni-
versally, reproduced in all of the news media coverage of his talk as undisputed 
fact. As Jillian Fry wrote for the Center for a Living Future:
Professor Mitloehner . . . is quoted as saying that reduced meat produc-
tion would result in more hunger in developing countries. Hunger is not 
addressed in the “Clearing the Air” report and it is not an issue researched 
by any of the report’s three authors. In fact, research has shown the opposite 
to be true. Some experts suggest that reducing meat production and con-
sumption is one way to feed a growing human population.
(Fry, 2010)
Let me give another example of what I mean: Dr. Mitloehner has repeatedly 
claimed that the confined feeding operations (CAFOs) or “factory farms” are 
environmentally sound and should, in fact, be used as a “model” for the entire 
rest of the world (Kohler, 2010).9 As he put it in an interview: “Mitloehner 
said the big picture is that U.S. agriculture is a model for the rest of the world 
to follow because of its growing efficiency and environmental stewardship” 
(Radke, 2011). These are statements that he made even clearer in an interview 
with Feedstuffs FoodLink (an agribusiness news show):
The most important thing that the consumers need to know is that the 
way we raise livestock here is really a model of how livestock should be 
raised. Because we can produce a certain amount of animal protein with 
the smallest possible environmental impact. And that is very important. We 
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are a model for the world with respect to how we raise cattle and pigs and 
chickens and so on. So that is one of the most important messages I think 
the consumer needs to have.
(Feedstuff ’s. FoodLink, 2010)
Statements such as these read more like advertising than science. They are 
sweeping statements – not even supported by Mitloehner’s own scientific 
research. Mitloehner’s claim – that confined feeding operations or factory 
farms actually represent an environmental model that the rest of the world 
should attempt to emulate – is an extreme statement far outside of any main-
stream discussion of the environmental effects of eating meat.10 For example, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council documented that CAFOs produce 
“lagoons” of manure and urine that can run as much as forty-five million gal-
lons per “lagoon” and regularly contaminate water supply and cause a mass 
kill-off of millions of fish (Marks, 2001). Likewise, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists compiled a 68-page report entitled “CAFOs Uncovered: The Untold 
Costs of Confined Animal Feeding Operations”; the report criticizes factory 
farms and echoes all of the critiques made by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council including lengthy sections on water pollution, air pollution, human 
health, and climate change (Gurian-Sherman, 2008). Most categorically the 
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production conducted a 2.5-year 
study of American animal agriculture; the unanimous finding from all of its 
fifteen members was that factory farming was completing devastating to the 
environment within the United States (Pew Commission, 2008). Furthermore, 
the report also specifically addressed Mitloehner’s assertion that CAFOs should 
serve as an environmental “model” for the developing world. Under the title 
“The Global Impact of the U.S. Industrial Food Animal Production Model” 
the report documented that previous examples of exporting CAFOs into other 
countries had exclusively produced, in the words of the report, “disastrous con-
sequences” (Pew Commission, 2008, p. 9).
Mitloehner likes to claim, in both speeches and interviews, that he is a sci-
entist merely attempting to interject scientific rigor into debates about animal 
agriculture and the environment against unscientific animal and environmental 
activists. For example, as Mitloehner recently explained to an agribusiness sup-
ported news outlet:
Mitloehner added he has noticed that the tone of coverage has changed for 
some media organizations that previously portrayed the beef and dairy indus-
tries as destructive to the planet: “Prior to our article, everyone said if you 
cut animal protein from your diet, this is the biggest contribution you could 
make to reduce global warming,” Mitloehner said. “I think we infused some 
science into this discussion. I don’t think it was always all that scientific”.
(Hearden, 2010)
However, the reality is that it is Mitloehner’s claims – such as his comments 
about world hunger, his claim that decreasing domestic meat consumption 
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would not help the environment, and particularly the claim that factory farms 
should represent an environmental “model for the world” – are deeply and 
fundamentally at odds with virtually all mainstream science on the topic. In fact 
I cannot find a time when Mitloehner cites, or even discusses, any of the reports 
I’ve mentioned, not the Natural Resources Defense Council, not the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, not the Pew research study.
As such, it is difficult not to see Mitloehner’s research, itself supported and 
recognized by the beef and dairy industry, as intentionally biased, not in the 
sense that the particular scientific findings themselves are false – the compari-
son with the transportation industry was indeed incorrect – but in the sense 
that the conclusions he attempts to draw from these findings are sweeping, 
unsupported, and inaccurately biasing to any conversation on the topic. What 
any reasonable listener would take away from Mitloehner’s comment that the 
most important item affecting the planet is that consumers need to use factory 
farms as an environmental model for the world is not that the comparison with 
transportation is flawed, nor that a global average cannot account for regional 
variation. It is instead intended to help engender the belief that American live-
stock production, including factory farms, is not harmful to the environment 
or to human health, which are demonstratively false beliefs. Therefore, I believe 
that meat-eating denial operates in a similar method as climate change denial in 
which a single, relatively minor, error in a report is seized on as a way to “dis-
prove” and “debunk” the report as whole – as though one error, no matter how 
minor or unrelated, was significant enough to disprove an entire study. And 
likewise, research by a single scientist not even trained as a climatologist,11 with 
questionable ties to the industry under study, is held up as superior to the broad 
based consensus of numerous domestic and international researchers working 
on the same topic for many years.
Winning the argument
The reality is that the currently available scientific evidence suggests that people 
should reduce – or eliminate – their consumption of meat, eggs, and dairy. This 
evidence is reported with the same type of evidence standards that are currently 
used by those who wish to argue that climate change is happening, such as 
multiple peer-reviewed studies, United Nations reports, and even the recom-
mendation of the chair of the IPCC. It is, therefore, intellectually inconsistent 
to choose to believe in one body of evidence (climate change) and to, at the 
same time, choose to ignore a similar, albeit smaller, body of evidence (environ-
mental effects of animal agriculture). I have suggested that anyone who does so, 
in essence, engages in meat-eating denial.
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that this body of evidence on eating 
meat is not more widely known because, much as with climate change, industry 
groups, opposed to the conclusions for economic reasons, have successfully used 
public relations to distort the mainstream discourse on the topic. These indus-
tries have engaged in similar rhetorical strategies earlier deployed against cli-
mate change by lobbyists and public relations officers of the organized climate 
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change denial countermovement (Dunlap & McCright, 2015), such as seizing 
on a single error in a report, unrelated to the conclusion of the report as whole, 
as evidence that the report had been “debunked” or “disproven”, or holding 
individual scientists, not trained as climatologists and receiving funding from 
the affected industry, as equal to, and indeed superior to, entire UN govern-
mental reports. Hence, the standard set by industry for “proof” of either climate 
change or the environmental effects of eating meat is the impossible standard 
of completely flawless studies unanimously unopposed by any scientist in any 
field whatsoever. Dunlap and McCright document this use of “manufactured 
controversy” throughout the larger climate change denial countermovement:
Conservatives seized upon the strategy of “manufactured uncertainty” 
that had been effectively employed for several decades by corporations 
and entire industries, most notably the tobacco industry, in efforts to pro-
tect their products from regulations and lawsuits by questioning the ade-
quacy of evidence suggesting the products were hazardous. . . . Over time, 
manufacturing uncertainty has evolved into “manufacturing controversy.” 
To accomplish this, corporations . . . have supported a small number of 
contrarian scientists (many with no formal training in climate science) . . . 
creating the impression that there is major debate and dissent within the 
scientific community over the reality of anthropogenic climate change.
(Dunlap & McCright, 2015, pp. 306–308)
Specifically, I have shown how the industry further cloaks its influence via 
appeals to impartiality. In other words, while, in reality, Mitloehner receives 
money from the agriculture industry, is a featured speaker at its events, publishes 
in its industry-funded publications, and even accepts awards from it specifically 
for helping it to prevent regulations, he is – via public relations – still able to 
present himself as an objective researcher and spokesperson. Likewise, while 
not even trained as a climatologist, he is able to present himself as an expert in 
the news media, equal to, or even superior to, trained climatologists working 
on the same issue for many years. And finally, once these supposed creden-
tials of objectivity and expertise have been established in the media, he is able 
to forward claims – frequently reproduced word for word and without criti-
cal commentary – that are far outside the norm of current scientific research 
on animal agriculture and have nothing to do with his own research – for 
example, Mitloehner’s claim that moves to decrease factory farms will produce 
“world hunger” or that factory farms should serve as “model for the rest of 
the world”. The result, I believe, is to sow confusion when, in reality, there is 
widespread scientific agreement. This deliberate confusion is a particular prob-
lem in animal agriculture, as repeated studies have demonstrated that while 
people surveyed reported a high degree of concern for both animals and the 
environment, they also admitted a lack of knowledge and confusion about what 
is actually occurring in animal agriculture and, in specific, on “factory farms” 
(Cornish, 2016; European Commission, 2007; Faunalytics, 2012; Reese, 2017; 
Schröde & McEachern, 2004). What this research seems to demonstrate – as 
an  aggregate – is that, while the public strongly wants animals to be treated 
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well and the environment to be protected, at the same time it believes that 
current farming practices, including industrial farming, already treat animals 
well and do enough to protect the environment. In other words, it is likely to 
believe claims forwarded by Mitloehner and the animal agriculture lobby that 
the United States’ factory farms should be used as an “environmental model” 
for the rest of the world.
Allow me to end with a personal anecdote: I worked with the Stanford 
Environmental Humanities project for several years, a project that attempted to 
draw together people working on issues related to the environment from across 
all the disparate disciplines of the university. I remember one meeting where 
several of the most famous researchers on climate change came to Stanford and 
gave a completely compelling presentation on the reality of climate change 
and significant actions we had to take in order to offset the effects. However, 
they ended the presentation on a despondent note: “We have won the scien-
tific argument; what we do not know how to win is the argument against the 
industry and in the media”. That same dilemma is true for the case of animal 
agriculture and its effects on climate change. While there is still important sci-
entific disagreement on individual questions, the scientific argument about the 
environmental danger created by our current system of animal agriculture has 
been decided; however, because of industry lobbying, and the effects of public 
relations campaigns (such as those highlighted in this chapter), there has yet 
to be widespread action to combat the problem. In other words, as with the 
issue of climate change, researchers may have won the scientific debate against 
animal-based agribusiness, but they have yet to win the fight against the indus-
try and in the media. Unfortunately, if the wider debate about climate change 
is any guide, until we are able to think about animal agriculture, not only in 
terms of scientific and ethical dimensions, but also in terms of communication, 
public relations, advocacy, and industry lobbying, it is unlikely that any ethical 
or environmentally sound changes will ever occur.
Notes
 1 The UN report “Livestock’s Long Shadow” does not itself consider the option of veg-
etarianism, veganism, or active programs to decrease meat consumption as possible 
options to decrease the environmental effects of animal agriculture. It is, however, a 
logical conclusion to draw from the report as the comments by UN officials highlight. 
Moreover, Peter Gaber, one of the co-authors of the report, has later stated that decreas-
ing meat consumption – particularly in industrialized countries such as the United 
States – would represent a helpful environmental strategy (Abend, 2010).
 2 A sub point of this argument is that the EPA pegs current emission rates by the United 
States at only 3 per cent, a claim that Dr. Mitloehner routinely cites as the “correct” esti-
mate of U.S. emissions. However, the problem with this claim is that the EPA figure is 
not, itself, a full “life-cycle” estimate. Specifically it leaves out issues such as turning fuels 
to make fertilizer, tilling soil to grow feed crops, and even transportation of meat to 
market. As Ralph Loglisci, the Project Director for the Johns Hopkins Healthy Monday 
Project, explains:
A while ago I called up the EPA to find out why their numbers were so differ-
ent. One researcher told me it’s because their figures omit many of the factors that 
Livestock’s Long Shadow takes into account. If you read the executive summary of the 
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EPA’s 2009 U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory report you’ll see that, unlike Livestock’s 
Long Shadow, when EPA researchers determined U.S. agriculture’s contributions 
they were not looking at GHG emissions from fuel combustion or CO2 fluxes due 
to land use.
   (Loglisci, 2009)
   Therefore Mitloehner, himself, routinely employs exactly the same type of “apples and 
oranges” comparison (contrasting a life cycle by the UN that is a life cycle assessment 
against a report by the EPA, which is not), which he claims is inherently misleading 
and determinedly to the scientific process. This is not to mention that the attempt to 
use only percentages of emission (versus total emission themselves) is itself completely 
misleading. The EPA statement of 3 per cent of total emissions, even if the number 
is accurate, tells us little about our contribution to worldwide livestock emission and, 
instead, a lot about how polluting the United States is in other areas. As Loglisci again 
phrases it:
   Industry groups are trying to confuse the American public by focusing on percent-
ages rather than hard numbers. Even if the percentage is actually lower, that doesn’t mean 
that the total GHG emissions are any less. The fact that the U.S. spits out so much more 
GHG through its power plants, fossil fuel powered vehicles and factories than most other 
countries, it’s not surprising that the percentage number is lower. The U.S. is arguably 
the number one GHG emitter in the world. (Loglisci, 2009)
 3 As discussed earlier, the CNN article does have some discussion of this issue (Armstrong, 
2010).
 4 To be fair, since Mitloehner has fallen under criticism, he has now recently claimed that 
he has been misquoted, throughout the news and in the original press release by the 
A.C.G./American Chemical Society (Brainard, 2010).
 5 As Mitloehner again explained in an interview with Capital Press that describes itself as 
the “West Coast’s agriculture home page for news”:
Today, search for Mitloehner’s name on the Internet and the word “meat” and you’ll 
find some 11,800 entries. “Most of them just came out in the last month,” Mitloeh-
ner said. “You will see articles from all over the world – India, Finland, Chile, Brit-
ain, you name it. You’ll find that this issue of meatless Mondays has been revisited 
because of our contribution.”
(Hearden, 2010)
 6 Time Magazine briefly comments upon it as well as Maclean’s. Maclean’s’ full coverage of 
the topic reads “Mitloehner is transparent about funding he has received from organiza-
tions bankrolled by the beef industry, but downplays its importance, calling one industry 
source ‘such a small percentage that it is inconsequential’ ” (Kohler, 2010).
 7 As Mitloehner phrased it:
So I think that there are many, many different areas, of course that play into sustaina-
bility but the number one is your industry and other livestock industries have to take 
societal pressures seriously. You can’t say, in my opinion, we know how to produce 
milk, we do a good job, leave us alone. Because the public will not leave you alone. 
They are told by people on the other side that the way we produce animal protein 
is cruel, is polluting, is unsustainable, and, in my opinion, animal agriculture has to 
come out of the corner and stop being defensive. In my opinion animal agriculture 
has to be ahead of the curve. . . . We have to be more proactive. We have to be ahead 
of the curve. 
(Mitloehner, 2010a)
 8 As Jim Motavalli has written in a very clear summary of some of the work on this topic:
While it is true that many animals graze on land that would be unsuitable for cul-
tivation, the demand for meat has taken millions of productive acres away from 
farm inventories. The cost of that is incalculable. As Diet For a Small Planet author 
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Frances Moore Lappé writes, imagine sitting down to an eight-ounce steak. “Then 
imagine the room filled with 45 to 50 people with empty bowls in front of them. 
For the ‘feed cost’ of your steak, each of their bowls could be filled with a full cup of 
cooked cereal grains.” Harvard nutritionist Jean Mayer estimates that reducing meat 
production by just 10 percent in the U.S. would free enough grain to feed 60 mil-
lion people.
   (Motavalli, 2001)
 9 For example, as Mitlohern phrased it in the earlier mentioned Maclean’s interview:
Mitloehner argues the focus on reducing meat consumption is a dead end, one that 
distracts us from more significant sources of greenhouse gases (like that Hummer) 
and which may deprive hungry people in developing countries of a crucial food 
source – meat. He also believes more intensive livestock farming – more animals on 
less land – can reduce meat’s relatively small footprint even further, particularly in 
the developing world.
   (Kohler, 2010)
 10 Mitloehner primarily supports this view by citing the report “Livestock’s Long Shadow” 
itself. And it is true that the report does describe several problems with so-called “pasture 
raised” or “free-range” animal agriculture. However, these claims represent a critique of 
“free-range” meat, not an endorsement of factory farms as an environmental model nor 
a critique of decreasing meat consumption (Abend, 2010; Stanescu, 2014).
 11 Dr. Mitloehner is not a trained climatologist. His PhD is in Animal Science from Texas 
Technical University, which he received in 2000.
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11  “This nagging worry about  
the carbon dioxide issue”
Nuclear denial and the nuclear  
renaissance campaign1
Núria Almiron, Natalia Khozyainova,  
and Lluís Freixes
On December 8, 1953, the president of the United States at that time, Dwight 
Eisenhower, delivered a speech before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in New York that would become famous worldwide. “Atoms for 
Peace”, as the discourse was named, was the first step in a massive public rela-
tions effort to radically transform the world’s perception of nuclear energy in 
the context of the Cold War and the U.S.’s urgent need to clean the image of 
atomic technology – following its military use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at 
the end of the Second World War. The speech enthusiastically introduced the 
alleged benefits and possibilities of nuclear technology for civil uses. From that 
moment on, nuclear power was to be a permanently controversial reality.
Although the Soviet Union and Britain constructed electric generation 
nuclear power plants before the United States, it was the Westinghouse reac-
tors, based on the design of the first nuclear submarines, that determined the 
future of nuclear power worldwide. Interestingly, during their first decade of 
life nuclear power plants provided more than enough evidence that their costs 
did not match the promise. The results of the world’s first full-scale atomic 
electric power plant devoted exclusively to peacetime uses, the Shippingport 
plant in the United States, left no room for doubt: The electricity generated 
by the power station was ten times more expensive than that generated by 
conventional means.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) – which is ideologically 
dependent on the propagandistic aims of the civilian use of atomic energy – 
and also the reactor manufacturers, essentially Westinghouse and General Elec-
tric – which are subsidized by the government – became the main promoters 
of nuclear power energy. However, the electric companies that were supposed 
to exploit the civilian plants could not make the numbers work.
Two researchers from the University of California, Arjun Makhijani and 
Scout Saleska (1999), thoroughly reviewed government, industry, and academic 
documents from the 1940s and 1950s in an attempt to find some economic 
clue as to what the propaganda campaign was founded on. They found the 
opposite: If anything, there was a growing disappointment, verbalized even by 
some of the protagonists of the moment, such as the vice president and research 
director of General Electric, C. G. Suits, who stated that nuclear energy was 
expensive, and not cheap as the public had been led to believe.
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From the first civilian use of nuclear power energy it was therefore evident 
that generating steam by boiling water in a nuclear reactor to spin a turbine – 
which is how a nuclear power plant essentially works – was not the most effi-
cient, least expensive, and least problematic way of obtaining electricity. It is 
now clear that what impelled the civil use of nuclear energy, and the birth 
of the nuclear power industry, was not rational thinking but rather (i) public 
 relations – in particular an attempt mostly by the U.S. political sphere to redeem 
“the original nuclear sin” – and (ii) vested interests – in particular government 
and military interest in creating an excuse for ongoing military development of 
the technology (Coderch & Almiron, 2008; Verbruggen & Yurchenko, 2017). 
Since the aims were essentially propaganda and military purposes, at no time 
was attention paid to technical or economic considerations.
Unsurprisingly, construction, operation, and management problems inher-
ent to nuclear power plants proved too high as barriers, to the extent that 
after a few decades of rapid and artificial growth (Coderch & Almiron, 2008, 
pp. 70–74) investment in nuclear energy stalled in many developed countries, 
constituting a meager 5 per cent of global primary energy production in 2018 
(MIT, 2018). The nuclear industry has actually been in decline since the end 
of the 1970s, but a rhetoric depicting a nuclear renaissance gained momentum in 
the 2000s (van de Graaf, 2016). As we shall see, this endeavor represented a new 
mass public relations campaign orchestrated by an alliance of interests acting as 
a discourse coalition, as defined by Plehwe (2011): “[S]ocial forces acting jointly, 
though not necessarily in direct interaction, in pursuit of a common goal” 
(p. 130). These forces, the pronuclear movement, include the nuclear industry 
(with an unexpected group of supporters), the military, and the political sphere, 
including the state agencies and international organizations linked to it. As we 
shall see, the three are so entangled that it is difficult to address them separately.
On the other hand, the concept of nuclear renaissance has never been clearly 
defined by any of its proponents, although it can be understood as a revival 
in nuclear power justified by rising fossil fuel prices and new concerns about 
meeting greenhouse gas emission limits and energy security issues. During the 
1980s and 1990s, the main arguments spread by the industry to justify nuclear 
stagnation were nuclear accidents (Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) and the 
emergence of the environmental movement (Coderch & Almiron, 2008). In 
the 2000s, alleged improvements in nuclear technology, as publicized by the 
industry itself, and the need to reduce greenhouse emissions were used by 
the nuclear industry to request a new preponderant role for nuclear energy in 
the world (van Graaff, 2015). Despite huge consensus regarding the failure, or 
simply inexistence, of such a renaissance (van de Graaf, 2015, 2016), the industry 
has continued to capitalize on the fears raised by climate change and energy 
security even after the Fukushima disaster.
This chapter aims to provide an explanation of how the revival campaign 
in the 2000s was by no means a natural and logical consequence of either the 
environmental context or the reality of nuclear power energy. As one promi-
nent military leader of the pronuclear movement acknowledged: “[I]t did not 
just happen, it has been carefully planned” (Farsetta, 2008a). To meet our stated 
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aim, we trace the history of this public relations effort and argue that it is a mere 
continuation of the denial promoted by the nuclear industry since its incep-
tion. This denial narrative has to do with the persistent refusal by pronuclear 
advocates to acknowledge the main facts of the industry; therefore, in this chap-
ter we first review what these facts are. Then we describe the nuclear renaissance 
campaign, including its main proponents and discourse; that is, how the nuclear 
revival has been framed by the pronuclear advocates. And finally, we discuss the 
results of this campaign and conclude that is incorrect to qualify the renaissance 
attempt as a complete failure. We argue that this campaign simply continues to 
apply the same strategy of denial promoted by the pronuclear advocates since 
the beginning of nuclear energy, a successful strategy based upon public disem-
powerment and the continuation of a basic Enlightenment narrative (Kinsella, 
2005; Catellani, 2012).
Nuclear energy scrutinized
To put the nuclear denial campaign in context, we must first review the main 
issues with regard to nuclear energy. Those issues are the same today as the ones 
that caused its decline in the 1970s. More than sixty years after the industry’s 
birth, these problems remain unresolved, and their existence explains not only 
the criticisms this source of energy receives, but also why the industry has 
had to invest so heavily in public relations. As Verbruggen and Yurchenko 
(2017) illustrate, “positioning nuclear power in the decarbonization transition 
is a problematic issue and is overridden by ill-conceived axioms” (p. 1). Those 
axioms have to do with unsolved questions regarding cost, safety, waste man-
agement, and proliferation risks.2
First, nuclear power plants have never been a competitive economic option 
in a free-market environment, as evidenced by the fact that all of the power 
plants in operation have been built by state bodies, or in a regulated monopoly 
environment heavily subsidized by states, and that the risks are assumed by 
consumers (directly or through the state) and not by the operators that run 
them.3 Private investors have perceived excessive risks since the beginning, and 
these have not diminished over the years. The risks that discourage commercial 
interest in nuclear constructions have been thoroughly explained by pronu-
clear researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, 2009, 
2018) and are acknowledged by prominent pro-market think tanks like the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (Wellings, 2009). These claims include, among 
others, the high historical construction costs and lengthy construction delays, 
generally much higher and longer than expected; a very capital-intensive tech-
nology with long construction periods (usually over ten years) and amorti-
zation (between twenty-five and thirty years), which triggers financial costs; 
a very limited availability of real construction costs for recently constructed 
power plants; electricity production costs similar to those of other less risky 
alternatives that require lower investments and shorter start-up times; a means 
of operation and maintenance higher than twice that observed in comparative 
studies for other electric generation technologies; the unavoidable uncertainty 
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surrounding future construction costs, especially due to the impact of increas-
ing oil and raw material prices in all of the sectors involved in nuclear con-
struction; and the fact that investors must deal with political challenges, popular 
opposition, and regulation, which involves obtaining a license and a location 
and the costs of a potential accident.
Second, aspects related to the security of nuclear technology essentially 
include the pollution generated by normal operation of the plants, the risk of 
accidents (either produced by natural disasters or human-induced), and the risk 
of attacks. The fact that there have already been three major accidents involving 
nuclear plants (Three Mile Island in the United States in 1977, Chernobyl in 
Ukraine in 1986, and Fukushima in Japan in 2011) means that nuclear acci-
dents are the best known aspect of security issues. However, normal operation 
of the plants, including extraction of the minerals used, involves such high 
emissions of contaminating elements being discharged into the environment 
that the industry itself acknowledges it has no detailed information on either 
the total volume or the level of danger this entails (CBS, 2011). Additionally, 
although the potential catastrophe of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant 
has not yet been fully discussed by politicians and the media, it remains a dread-
ful possibility (UCS, n.a.).
Third, since its birth the nuclear energy industry has reiterated that the prob-
lem of waste would be resolved. Nowadays, proponents of nuclear energy pro-
pose some technical solutions to this (such as interim storage in dry casks and 
permanent disposal in geological repositories with excavated tunnels or deep 
boreholes for spent fuel management) but display a lack of ability to imple-
ment them. The extreme danger of radioactive waste, which extends far beyond 
human scope,4 is the main stumbling block. MIT (2018), a pronuclear institu-
tion, acknowledges that the problem – siting such facilities – remains the same 
after six decades. The historically unsuccessful struggle to build safe nuclear 
geological repositories is well summarized on Wikipedia (“Deep Geological 
Repository”, n.a.).
Finally, the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation5 is another major problem. 
Nuclear energy has never been able to disassociate itself from its military past 
and origin. Nuclear technology generates or can be used to generate fissile 
material suitable for manufacturing atomic weapons, regardless of whether this 
material has been designed for use in electric power stations or other peace-
ful applications. Accidental nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons by 
terrorists are some of the potential scenarios related to nuclear proliferation. 
Although the number of nuclear weapons in the world has radically diminished 
(from 70,000 in 1985 to 14,000 in 2018), it is still enough to end life on the 
planet, and, in fact, the use of a nuclear weapon is now more likely than any 
time since the Cold War (Borger & Sample, 2018).
To these major concerns, we must add the facts regarding the two most 
important claims embedded in the nuclear renaissance campaign: The claim that 
nuclear energy is the lowest greenhouse gas emitter of any method of electric-
ity generation, and the claim that it fixes the energy security problem (van de 
Graaff, 2015). With regard to the former, nuclear power is, according to this 
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narrative, almost carbon-free and indispensable for mitigating climate change 
as a result of anthropogenic emissions from greenhouse gases. It must be noted, 
however, that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nuclear 
industry have not published real figures on this subject. By contrast, evidence 
shows that nuclear energy is a relevant greenhouse gas emitter. As van Leeuwen 
(2017) reminds us,
a nuclear power plant is not a stand-alone system, it is just the most visible 
component of a sequence of industrial processes which are indispensable to 
keep the nuclear power plant operating and to manage the waste in a safe 
way, processes that are exclusively related to nuclear power. This sequence 
of industrial activities from cradle to grave is called the nuclear process 
chain.
(p. 5)
With the exception of the nuclear reactor, “nuclear CO
2
 emission originates 
from burning fossil fuels and chemical reactions in all processes of the nuclear 
chain” (van Leeuwen, 2017, p. 5). Van Leeuwen has actually estimated the CO
2
 
emissions from nuclear energy and, in view of its large consumption of specific 
materials, has forecasted that “it seems inconceivable” that CO
2
 emissions might 
decrease in the future and that nuclear power does not emit other greenhouse 
gases. The “absence of published data does not mean absence of emissions” 
(p. 6). As van Leeuwen highlights, the figures published by the nuclear industry 
are not scientifically comparable to those of renewable energies because the 
former are based on incomplete analyses of the nuclear process chain. “For 
instance, the emissions of construction, operation, maintenance, refurbishment 
and dismantling, jointly responsible for 70 per cent of nuclear CO
2
 emissions, 
are not taken into account” (p. 7). Van Leeuwen reminds us that we should 
also add to current emissions the energy debt (“the energy bill to keep the latent 
entropy under control from 60 years nuclear power has still to be paid”) and the 
delayed CO
2
 emission of nuclear power (“the CO
2
 emissions coupled to those 
processes in the future have to be added to the emissions generated during the 
construction and operation of the nuclear power plants”) (p. 7). In view of the 
aforementioned issues, van Leeuwen concludes that “stating that nuclear power 
is a low-carbon energy system, even lower than renewables such as wind power 
and solar photovoltaics, seems strange” (p. 7).
With respect to the second issue, since the oil crisis of the early 1970s energy 
security has been a high priority in energy policy for many countries. The 
International Energy Agency defines energy security as “the uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price”. That nuclear energy can 
increase energy security or even fix this problem is highly debatable for at 
least three major reasons. First, because a scenario of only using nuclear energy 
is not feasible, and thus there will always be uncertainty related to the other 
forms of energy needed. Second, because only a handful of countries have 
uranium mines, and therefore only they could truly be considered independ-
ent in terms of energy resources when it comes to nuclear energy. And finally, 
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because uranium is also a limited resource on the planet. However, since this 
chapter focuses on the decarbonization rhetoric of the pronuclear movement 
mainly related to greenhouse gas emissions, we are not going to deal with this 
topic.
Another fact the nuclear denial narrative persistently ignores is that it is 
technically impossible to replace all the uses of fossil fuels with nuclear energy; 
nuclear power is simply not that scalable. The pretension of a more nuclear-
ized world has elsewhere been called “the larger mirage” of the nuclear renais-
sance (Coderch & Almiron, 2008, p. 181). Considering the immense historical 
logistical and financial problems related to building nuclear plants (“plagued by 
delays, cost overruns, and design flaws” as the pronuclear think tank IEA put 
it; Wellings, 2009), the supposed aim of building the huge number of nuclear 
plants needed just to replace the electricity generated by fossil fuels today has 
been assessed as unrealistic – not to mention the fact that this would require an 
amount of cheap and available nuclear fuel (basically uranium) that simply does 
not exist (Abbot, 2011).
Finally, some of its critics even claim that nuclear power and variable renew-
able suppliers are incompatible with the future green transition for various 
reasons, including budgetary restrictions: “[T]he public budgets are limited, 
college curricula are competitive, scientists and engineers can be productively 
used for either nuclear survival or renewable technology inventions and inno-
vations, not both at the same time” (Verbruggen & Yurchenko, 2017, pp. 6–7).
Nuclear denial and the nuclear renaissance campaign
The industry’s persistence in keeping the narrative of nuclear energy discon-
nected from the facts has been accurately defined by some as a “nuclear denial” 
that “creates scientific ambiguity” and provides “cover for governmental and 
commercial interests to allow nuclear power to continue expanding worldwide” 
(Perrow, 2013, p. 57). This public relations strategy mirrors the denial campaigns 
pursued by the tobacco industry during the 20th century (Oreskes & Conway, 
2010) and the climate change denial machine in the United States at the begin-
ning of the 21st century (McCright & Dunlap, 2010).
Nuclear denial has been a communication strategy since the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on the Japanese population at the end of the Second World War. 
By nuclear denial we refer to the deliberate omission of the problems inherent in 
nuclear power at any level (Coderch & Almiron, 2008; Farsetta, 2008b; Osgood, 
2008; Perrow, 2013; Verbruggen & Yurchenko, 2017). Nuclear advocates pro-
mote the idea that nuclear risks (such as nuclear waste, radiation, or potential for 
further accidents) are vastly overestimated and full of historical preconceptions, 
and that they cannot therefore serve as valid arguments against the industry. For 
instance, in his examination of the Fukushima case, Perrow (2013) states that
the denial that Fukushima has any significant health impacts echoes the 
denials of the atomic bomb effects in 1945; the secrecy surrounding Wind-
scale and Chelyabinsk; the refusal of studies suggesting that the fallout from 
“Nagging worry about carbon dioxide issue” 201
Three Mile Island was, in fact, serious; and the multiple denials regarding 
Chernobyl (that it happened, that it was serious, and that it is still serious).
(p. 64)
Kinsella (2005) was among the first to rigorously examine the nuclear dis-
course around four “master themes” that are prominent in it. The author used 
these four themes, adapted from Kenneth Burke’s rhetoric theory, to explain 
how nuclear discourse was shaped in relation to environmental communica-
tion. These themes or tropes are still useful because they continue to pervade 
the pronuclear movement narrative. The four themes found in the nuclear 
discourse are mystery, potency, secrecy, and entelechy. Mystery refers to the fact 
that “nuclear science, technologies, and policies, products of human discourse, 
are widely portrayed as arcane, difficult, and out of the intellectual reach of 
ordinary people” (p. 53). Potency points at the fact that “human intervention 
in nuclear processes is a capstone of the subsequent modernist project and its 
conceptions of science, technology, progress, and control – a dramatic dem-
onstration of the Baconian vision of knowledge as power” (p. 57). Secrecy is “a 
fundamental principle of the nuclear discursive formation”, a most prominent 
feature of the history of nuclear development (p. 60). And finally, entelechy “is 
rooted in telos, the ultimate state toward which the system strives, but as this 
end state cannot be known with certainty, identifying it is a fundamentally 
rhetorical activity” (p. 66).
In relation to how these themes are applied in nuclear campaigns, Nisbet 
(2009) listed the different frames used by nuclear advocates to gloss over reality 
since its beginnings. He argues that during the first two decades, the technol-
ogy was framed exclusively as leading to social progress, economic competitiveness, 
and a better way of life (the “Atoms for Peace” campaign); in the mid-1970s it 
was reframed as public accountability (“arguing that the industry had become a 
‘powerful special interest’ ” (p. 16)); the Bush administration reframed it again in 
2001 as a “middle way path to energy independence” (p. 16), in reaction to ris-
ing energy costs and rolling blackouts in California; and finally it was reframed 
once more by the second Bush administration and the nuclear energy industry 
as a “middle way solution to greenhouse gas emissions” (p. 17).
However, unlike what happens in the climate debate and what happened in 
the case of tobacco, the narrative of nuclear power as a safe and green energy is 
a denial strategy supported by a large scientific community. “Nuclear ‘deniers’ 
at the academia are not a tiny minority but rather are respected members of the 
scientific community who specialize in radiation effects” (Perrow, 2013, p. 57). 
Therefore, they have enough expertise to see the objective risks and to reframe 
them in a way that seems acceptable. In particular, “most of these experts no 
longer contend that there is zero harm in low-level radiation, but rather that the 
range of uncertainty includes zero: In other words, low-level health effects may 
exist, but they are too small to measure” (Perrow, 2013, p. 57). Of course, the 
denial of the harmful radiation effects on human health is particularly problem-
atic due to the very well reported impact on human health of the Chernobyl 
accident (e.g. Alexievich, 2006).
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The nuclear deniers in the scientific community are not an isolated com-
munity, nor an independent one; their academic work, professional careers, and 
prestige are strongly dependent upon the existence and success of the civil use 
of nuclear energy, and therefore upon the success of the nuclear power industry.
The campaigners: the military, government, industry  
(and the scientific community linked to them)
If we examine which actors have been the main promoters of the association of 
nuclear energy and decarbonization we realize that the start date of the nuclear 
renaissance campaign can be situated well before the 2000s. In 1983, Alvin M. 
Weinberg, an American nuclear physicist sponsored to develop nuclear energy 
by the U.S. government,6 certified the end of the first nuclear era by pointing 
to the fact that no new reactors had been ordered in the United States after 
1978, and that the partial nuclear meltdown of Three Mile Island in 1979 had 
wounded the credibility of the nuclear industry. Throughout his career, Wein-
berg was a “tireless promoter of the expansion of nuclear energy as a means of 
averting what he called ‘Malthusian disaster’.” He recognized that “we nuclear 
people have made a Faustian bargain”, with nuclear energy placing exceptional 
demands on society, and he was an ardent proponent of action to meet those 
demands (Roberto & Nestor, 2014, p. 8). Weinberg (1983, 1986) wondered 
what it would take to jump-start a Second Nuclear Era and, long before soci-
ety was widely aware of the climate change danger, came up with the idea that 
“the ultimate reason to maintain nuclear energy is this nagging worry about 
the carbon dioxide issue” (p. 1052). In another paper, Weinberg and other 
colleagues formally announced a nuclear renaissance under the pretense of risks 
being low and in spite of public opposition (Weinberg, Spiewak, Phung, & 
Livingston, 1985).
Although the rebirth of nuclear energy did not materialize as Weinberg 
et al. had prophesized, the nuclear lobby adopted the claim about carbon diox-
ide emissions as the main pretext for keeping nuclear energy within the pack 
of viable energetic resources in the context of the climate change crisis. Since 
then, a number of energy experts, government officials, industry represent-
atives, and journalists have reproduced the narrative of the emergence of a 
global nuclear renaissance. The renaissance was supposed to take concrete form in 
the construction of new nuclear reactors and a concomitant increase in global 
nuclear capacity.7 Although nothing of this sort happened (van de Graaff, 2015), 
the discursive coalition unveiled the symbiotic relationship between the indus-
try, politics, and military interests.
The nuclear power industry comprises the companies that own nuclear 
power plants, military uses, and the manufacturers of nuclear reactors and 
plants. The world’s two foremost manufacturers of nuclear plants are state-
owned companies – the French Orano and Russian Rosaton8 – which means 
that in France and Russia the main lobbies for nuclear energy are governmen-
tal agencies, preventing any independent approach to the issue by officials, as 
nuclear energy has become one of the main state industries in those countries. 
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The third biggest manufacturer, GE/Hitachi, includes one of the world’s fifty 
largest companies, GE, the tenth conglomerate by revenue in the United States 
(according to the Fortune Global 500) and a powerful lobby – GE acknowl-
edged a U.S. Congress lobbying spending of $353.7 million for the period 
1998–2017 (according to Opensecrets.org). On the other hand, the military use 
of nuclear energy is monopolized by the American and Russian navies. The 
nuclear energy industry thus represents a major state investment (because of 
the military expenses on nuclear-propulsion and strong state subsidies to build 
civil and military nuclear plants), a relevant economic sector (because of the 
magnitudes involved in the energy business), and a powerful lobby at the same 
time (by means of the international intergovernmental organizations and the 
international lobbies representing the interests of private companies).9
Though largely kept secret, politics and military aims are even more inter-
twined. As we mentioned in the introduction, the birth of nuclear energy was 
strongly linked to the allies’ need to improve the negative image of nuclear 
power, mostly the United States, after the Second World War. However, this 
seeming redemption was not without purpose: The civil use of nuclear tech-
nology was and remains the main excuse for ongoing military development of 
the technology. The “peaceful atom” fully reveals itself as a myth at this stage. 
Although after the birth of the nuclear energy industry the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy became one of the pillars of the treaty of nuclear nonprolif-
eration and nuclear disarmament, the truth is that the civil nuclear industry is 
more often than not the source of nuclear weapons proliferation (CND, 2018).
In this context, revolving door lobbying is an everyday reality in the entan-
glement between politics and nuclear weapons, with manufacturers of the main 
pieces of the U.S. nuclear arsenal investing millions of dollars in the election 
campaigns of lawmakers that oversee related federal spending, and employing 
former members of Congress or Capitol Hill staff to lobby for government 
funding (Smith, 2012; Smith & Hubbard, 2015). The military is actually among 
the experts that some think tanks trying to influence climate change policies 
include on their advisory boards, like the U.S. Center for Climate and Security 
(https://climateandsecurity.org/), an institute that belongs to the Council on 
Strategic Risks and comprises solely security and military experts.
Finally, the grid made up of the industry, politics, and military spheres man-
aged to add an unexpected group of supporters to their public relations effort 
in the 2000s, as the pronuclear movement enlisted several environmental celeb-
rities who turned to supporting nuclear energy as a necessary component 
(often necessary evil) in the fight against climate change. The most prominent 
of all, James Lovelock, published the article “Nuclear Power Is the Only Green 
Solution” in 2004, which can be considered the point when the nuclear renais-
sance campaign took off in the media. Other environmental celebrities that 
changed their opinion about nuclear power were Tom Wigley (BAS, 2014), 
one of the world’s top climate researchers at the University of Adelaide, Aus-
tralia, and George Montbiot (McCalman & Connelly, 2015), a world-famous 
British environmental writer. While the latter two have adopted similar stances, 
supporting nuclear energy as the least worst option to avoid particular threats 
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(geo-engineering, in the case of Wigley, and economic collapse, for Mont-
biot) and omitting (or ignoring) the impracticability of a rapid upscaled nuclear 
power program to advert a global warming crisis (Abbot, 2011), Lovelock has a 
long history of ties with the nuclear industry, big business, security services, and 
the anti-green movement (Sourcewatch, n.d.).
In the United States – coinciding with the goal set by George W. Bush’s 
administration of promoting the construction of a few new reactors with 
substantial federal loan guarantees and subsidies, and the Lieberman-Warner 
Climate Change Bill supporting “zero-emissions” technologies – the Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI), the industry’s main lobby, retained several public rela-
tions firms to implement the creation of advocacy groups with green  grassroots- 
sounding names, like the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition (CASEnergy) 
(Farsetta, 2008b). At the center of these efforts were former U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) chief Christine Whitman and former Greenpeace 
member turned corporate consultant Patrick Moore, who actively advocate 
for nuclear power. CASEnergy was not the only grassroots coalition created by 
the nuclear lobby, however; other groups – like New Jersey Affordable, Clean, 
Reliable Energy Coalition or Americans for Energy Independence, the latter 
a pronuclear lobby group organized and funded by Westinghouse – appeared 
on the scene advocating for both the building of new nuclear plants and the 
extension of existing operating licenses (Farsetta, 2008b).
Interestingly, several of the new supporters of the pronuclear coalition due 
to climate change were also climate skeptics. For instance, Lovelock qualified 
his early work regarding the warming of the planet as “alarmist” (Carbonbrief, 
2012), while Moore does not believe in the anthropogenic causes of climate 
change and has participated at climate change denial conferences (Desmog, n.a.).
In the UK, after Labor prime minister Tony Blair had told a Confederation 
of British Industry audience that nuclear power was “back on the agenda with 
a vengeance” (BBC, 2006), a similar campaign was launched with the participa-
tion of high-powered media directors, political advisers, and public affairs com-
panies (Macalister, 2006; Mattinson, 2010).
Overall, the entanglement of interests between the military, the government, 
and the industrial elites, all of them promoting the growth of a pronuclear sci-
entific community, produced a coalition of interests that shared the same narra-
tive: Nuclear power as a “green” and “clean” energy.
The campaign: reframing the “Faustian bargain” as green
In this section, we review some key literature showing how the nuclear indus-
try’s denial narrative has progressively incorporated the “green” frame since 
Alvin M. Weinberg formally announced a nuclear renaissance for our “Faustian 
bargain” with nuclear energy in 1985. While a number of studies have addressed 
the media coverage of and public opinion on nuclear energy as a solution for 
climate change, research regarding how nuclear proponents (industry, govern-
ment, military, scientists) have strategically framed nuclear energy as a solution 
to climate change is still underdeveloped.
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According to Diana Farsetta, the strategic framing of nuclear power as clean, 
green, and safe started as early as 1992 in the United States, when the predeces-
sor organization of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) launched an advertis-
ing campaign making statements like “Nuclear plants don’t pollute the air”, 
“Nuclear plants produce no greenhouse gases”, and “[Nuclear energy] means 
cleaner air for the planet” (2008b, pp. 39, 41). NEI again ran advertising cam-
paigns in 1998 and 1999 in U.S. national newspapers and magazines with the 
same claim regarding the “environmentally clean” trait of nuclear energy. In 
2006, aiming to garner public support for the Yucca Mountain project, a repos-
itory for nuclear waste, NEI launched what Farsetta calls a “multi-year, mul-
timillion dollar campaign” (p. 38) under the direction of public relations firm 
Hill & Knowlton and polling and market research firm Penn, Schoen & Ber-
land Associates. The Yucca Mountain campaign again framed nuclear power as 
an environmentally friendly electricity source.10 According to Farsetta, nuclear 
companies were quick to take advantage of this by distributing materials that 
promised a green future with nuclear energy (p. 38). These advertising cam-
paigns were only the tip of the iceberg in a public relations campaign that 
included the already mentioned creation of grassroots coalitions supporting 
nuclear energy on the basis of green arguments. Farsetta states that those com-
munication efforts to rebrand nuclear as green were “only the latest in a series 
of public relations efforts to convince the U.S. public that fission is the ticket to 
a clean, efficient, and safe energy future” (2008b, p. 38).
In Europe, Karen Bickerstaff, Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, Poortinga, and Simmons 
(2008) – in their study on how UK citizens might interpret and make sense 
of a shift in political rhetoric around energy policy, which links nuclear power 
to meeting sustainability objectives – reviewed how the debate around nuclear 
power has been reframed in the United Kingdom since the end of the 20th 
century as part of the solution to the need for low-carbon energy options:
The point we make here is that expansion of the nuclear power sector is 
increasingly being constructed, by industrial actors, scientists, a range of 
senior politicians and advisors to government within a prognostic policy 
frame – in other words it is being reframed as a solution to the problem of 
climate change.
(p. 147)
According to Bickerstaff et al. (2008), the main frame that has been used by 
the industry with the goal of shifting public opinion is “risk trade-off ”, which 
means choosing the risks of nuclear power over the possible consequences 
of climate change, if not mitigated. Within this narrative, the climate change 
issue is so big that the risks of nuclear power should simply be put to one side, 
because if not the human species will be allowing the larger disaster to happen. 
These authors also discuss nuclear power being promoted as the only way for 
countries to meet their national carbon emission targets.
Banerjee and Bonnefous (2011) studied the discourse of one of the world’s 
largest nuclear power generators (not named in the research) and described 
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how the company managed the conflicting interests in what the authors call 
“the sustainability debate”. Interestingly, they concluded that “despite public 
espousals of integrating social and environmental concerns in an aim to make 
the nuclear industry more ‘sustainable’ there is no significant shift in the cor-
porate world view with a ‘business as usual’ approach that places a priority on 
economic growth” (p. 3).
Regarding politics, Bern and Winkel (2013) investigated how discourses on 
nuclear energy developed over a twenty-year period (1998–2008) in the French 
and German parliaments. While the link to climate change was made by policy 
makers in both countries, “the greenhouse effect rationale was taken up more 
proactively in the French parliamentary debates” (Bern & Winkel, 2013, p. 308). 
Thus, political proponents of nuclear energy have framed nuclear energy as an 
appropriate reaction to this environmental challenge in both countries, but 
“using the greenhouse effect argument, the French pro-nuclear discourse has a 
clear moralist dimension; the nuclear energy option is seen as right and other 
alternatives as wrong” (p. 306). Interestingly, among the frames discovered for 
both countries was the “lack of knowledge of the anti-nuclear” frame. In par-
ticular, the three frames more frequently employed in the French parliamentary 
discussions during the period were the “French exception” (nuclear energy for 
energy independence, economic growth, and the environment): “Transparency 
ensures public support” (when citizens oppose nuclear energy it is because they 
are not properly informed), and “Technological progress ensures future” (tech-
nology skepticism being identified as “heretical” by the researchers) (p. 298). 
The three frames more frequently employed in the German parliament were 
“Peaceful use of nuclear energy for modern civilization” (the belief that nuclear 
energy is needed to establish and maintain a modern economy and the social 
welfare state), “Manageable risk of technology” (risk-management calculations 
are seen as rational and objective), and “Danger of energy gap” (that the risks 
described by the anti-nuclear movement are distorted facts and unnecessary 
scare tactics) (2013, pp. 298–299).
More recently, in her research on the creation and failure of the nuclear renais-
sance, Shashi van de Graaf describes how nuclear advocates have reframed the 
merits of nuclear power by means of two key arguments:
Firstly, the growing importance of climate change as a policy problem 
meant that governments were in need of an affordable energy solution that 
could help to reduce carbon emissions. The nuclear industry capitalised 
on this by actively reframing nuclear power as a “green” energy technol-
ogy. Public information campaigns and lobbying efforts were undertaken 
to advertise nuclear power as one of the lowest greenhouse gas emitters 
of any method of electricity generation. Secondly, increasing geopolitical 
instability in Russia and the Middle East raised concerns about an over-
reliance on fossil fuel imports, prompting policymakers to seek alterna-
tive energy solutions that would improve their energy security. Nuclear 
power appeared to pose an ideal solution for countries seeking to improve 
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their energy independence. The combination of these two compelling 
arguments – environment and energy security – were meant to be “game 
changers” in the nuclear debate that would convince sceptics of the need 
for nuclear energy.
(2016, p. 1)
By way of summary, the literature review conducted in this section allows 
us to extract a list of subframes that help deconstruct how the green frame 
(nuclear energy as a solution to global warming) has been shaped by  pronuclear 
advocates. These subframes include framing nuclear energy as: Low in carbon 
emissions; the most cost effective, secure, and environmentally friendly energy 
solution; essential in any energy mix; helping to meet CO
2
 cut targets; bridg-
ing the energy gap; and with risks that are an acceptable trade-off for our 
 dependence on its products and services.
The alleged cleanness and green attributes of nuclear energy constitute the 
core frame of the nuclear renaissance campaign. However, although prominent, it 
is not the only frame. There is another, already noted by some authors previ-
ously, which it makes sense to mention because it strongly reinforces the envi-
ronmental frame. This frame refers to the aura of “trustworthiness” that is being 
created by nuclear advocates, with the aim of making the audience put nuclear 
risks to the back of their minds and simply “believe” in its benefits. One piece 
of research that yielded significant findings in this respect is that conducted by 
Hanninen and Yli-Kauhaluoma (2015) on the newsletters by the ONKALO 
repository, a deep geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel that has been under construction in Finland since 2004 (in fact, it is still 
unclear whether it will be ever in operation). As the authors acknowledge, this 
research takes part in the academic discussion on the “nuclear power industry’s 
attempts to build trust within local lay communities (Clarke, 2001; Durant & 
Johnson, 2010; MacKenzie, 1990; Sagan, 1993) and pronuclear storytelling 
(Anshelm, 2010; Catellani, 2012; Kinsella, 2005)” (2015, p. 142). The authors 
show how the industry aims to build public trust in a nuclear facility and lessen 
local resistance by socially constructing a nuclear community around the facil-
ity, an “imagery of togetherness associated with nuclear works, local culture, and 
the past” (p. 142). The study confirms that it has become increasingly important 
for the nuclear industry to persuade communities into taking a leap of faith and 
develop “a cocoon of invulnerability” (p. 134), what the authors describe as a 
“new trend in pronuclear storytelling” (p. 133) – a sort of absolute trust in the 
benefits frame. What those benefits are is not always clear. Since nuclear indus-
try communication places much emphasis on its “expertise” and “scientific 
agency”, these benefits are often communicated merely as “societal benefits”, 
“environmental benefits”, or “economic benefits” in the case of the ONKALO 
communications. This frame encourages the audience to trust nuclear experts, 
in line with the pronuclear storytelling identified by Kinsella (2005) in North 
America, a storytelling based on equating nuclear energy expertise with an 
esoteric scientific knowledge beyond the scope of ordinary citizens.
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Discussion
In 2005, with respect to nuclear communication in the United States, the 
American scholar William J. Kinsella identified a tendency towards public “dis-
empowerment” and the construction of a “modernistic” basic narrative. By 
disempowerment Kinsella was pointing to the fact that nuclear communication 
tended to present nuclear power as a subject beyond the control and inter-
vention of ordinary people, and thus excluding their participation from the 
debate, narrowing the possibilities for discussion and the contrasting of different 
opinions on nuclear energy. With regard to the “modernistic” narrative, Kin-
sella described how nuclear energy is presented as an evolution in the history 
of humankind, linked to the narrative of progress within the ideology of the 
Enlightenment (with faith in science, reason, and technology occupying the 
place of religion).
Recent research shows how Kinsella’s findings have been globalized by the 
nuclear energy lobby and adapted to a reframed version, including cleanness 
and greenness, among other traits. In 2012, Andrea Catellani published a piece 
of research with a semiotic analysis of the pronuclear rhetorical forms that 
emerged in Europe after the Fukushima accident, confirming that new forms 
of the traditional “modernist” narrative of nuclear energy had appeared, with 
the eventual presence of forms of “disempowerment” and the “meta-narrative” 
of the environment in nuclear discourses and hedonistic individualism. Regard-
ing the former, Catellani (2012)states:
The first form of adaptation is the appearance of the environment and 
of its protection. Following the postmodern theory of “grand” or “meta-
narratives” (global narrative forms of sense organization, such as religions 
or political ideologies), some scholars have proposed considering the nar-
rative based on menaces, destruction and protection of the environment 
as a new meta-narrative, which emerged after the (partial) elimination (at 
least in some parts of the world) of the traditional ones (Catellani, 2010; 
Jalenques, 2006). A meta-narrative can be seen as a supply of sense, signs 
and meaning, which can be mobilized and used by concrete social actors 
in their discourses.
(p. 301)
In view of the historical account and literature review presented in this chap-
ter, it seems obvious to us that the environmental narrative as promoted by the 
pronuclear movement over the last twenty years can be seen as a meta-narrative 
of nuclear denial, that is, a renewed attempt to provide a new source of mean-
ing to the old pronuclear narrative based on simply denying the main facts of 
nuclear energy. As Abbot states, “the fervor with which the number of nuclear 
advocates have taken up the cause of climate change appears somewhat oppor-
tunistic” (2011, p. 1616). This resonates with previous frames attempted by the 
nuclear industry since the “Atoms for Peace” campaign. Farsetta has already 
pointed out that “the most striking thing about campaigns to promote nuclear 
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energy is how little the tactics and messages have changed over the decades” 
(2008b, p. 41).
This chapter’s conclusions align with the aforementioned thesis. We can 
describe the nuclear renaissance campaign as being based on an opportunistic envi-
ronmental claim that attempts to capitalize on the concerns raised by climate 
change and energy security in recent decades. A multiplicity of interests have 
built a discourse coalition that promotes a narrative based on new forms of the 
traditional “modernistic” narrative regarding nuclear energy, and the eventual 
presence of forms of  “disempowerment”, with nuclear energy mostly framed as 
a controversy between experts (the pronuclears) and nonexperts (the ones against 
nuclear energy). What these interests all have in common is that they are elitist 
interests – fulfilling the definition of a “power elite” as stated by C. Wright Mills: 
“Composed of political, economic, and military men” (1956/2000, p. 376) – and 
they have needed regular public relations efforts to justify themselves.
Although a small number of academics, journalists, and nuclear industry rep-
resentatives continue to make the claim that a nuclear renaissance has been suc-
cessful and is taking place, authors like Shashi van de Graaff have clearly shown 
that there is a huge gap between reality and the expectation of reality created 
by the campaign. The reasons provided by authors for this public relations fail-
ure are mainly the three big nuclear accidents (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, 
and Fukushima), specific nuclear factors (related to the construction, operation, 
and management of nuclear power plants), and contextual factors (shifts in the 
perceptions, ideas, and priorities of society). While van de Graaff (2015), for 
instance, argues that the most important factors are contextual, authors like Elli-
ott (2013) remind us how the Fukushima nuclear disaster produced delays and 
full reviews of nuclear energy programs around the world. However, we argue 
that the most important factor preventing any renaissance in nuclear energy is 
actually pointed out loud and clear by pronuclear proponents, as MIT again 
stated in its 2018 report: “The fundamental problem is cost”.
We also conclude from our analysis that the nuclear renaissance public rela-
tions campaign has not been a total failure, since the idea of nuclear energy as 
a candidate for decarbonization has been successfully established, as revealed by 
its inclusion as part of the energy pack to fight against climate change in IPCC 
and government reports and the media. This success has been constructed using 
the same strategy as that of the tobacco and climate change deniers, neutraliz-
ing the reality of facts by casting doubts on them and thus generating scientific 
confusion. This confusion is then fed by the esoteric component of the denial 
narrative, which links our exploitation of resources on Earth to our beliefs in 
the superiority of human knowledge. Thus, nuclear energy continues to be 
associated with the mystery, potency, secrecy, and entelechy of the old modern-
ist tale, while ordinary citizens are requested to leave their doubts aside and just 
trust – this time in nuclear science. This can even be done with a patronizing 
attitude, as was true of the moralist dimension of the pronuclear claim identi-
fied by Bern and Winkel (2013) in the French case.
The nuclear renaissance campaign, with its environmental reframing of the 
Faustian bargain (climate change as the modern evil), clearly seems to have failed 
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from a political economy point of view, but is far from a failure at the symbolic 
level. With regard to ideas, nuclear denial has proven to be a public relations 
success tantamount to the tobacco and climate change denial campaigns.
Notes
 1 The authors would like to thank energy experts Marcel Coderch, Miguel Muñiz, and 
Ferran P. Vilar for their advice on the issues raised in this chapter.
 2 For an extended review of these problems see Smith (2006), Caldicott (2007), Coderch 
and Almiron (2008), Cooke (2009) or Storm van Leeuwen (2017). It is noticeable that 
few volumes have been published after 2010 regarding costs and risks of nuclear energy. 
After the announced nuclear renaissance some authors refreshed the criticism to nuclear 
energy only to reflect that there has been no real progress on the risks and problems of 
nuclear energy since its birth.
 3 The first nuclear reactor Westinghouse manufactured for the Shippingport plant was 
fully subsidized by the state, its operation failing to attract private investments because of 
the high costs involved. It was state subsidies and laws such as the U.S. Price-Anderson 
Act – passed in 1957 – that seduced private enterprise. This U.S. law, which was rep-
licated in the other countries with nuclear power plants, transfers any subsidiary civil 
liability in the event of a nuclear accident to the state. Thus, operators would only be 
liable for the part that insurers were willing to cover, and the state would assume the 
rest. Consequently, heavily subsidized state programs were required for the civil nuclear 
power industry to take off around the world.
 4 Plutonium-239, for instance, has a half-life of over 24,000 years, which means it will 
remain lethal for over 240,000 years. Other radio-isotopes remain radioactive for mil-
lions or even billions of years.
 5 Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and 
weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as 
“Nuclear Weapon States” by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
 6 Alvin M Weinberg’s work was always linked to U.S. national projects related to the 
development of nuclear power. In 1941, he joined the Manhattan Project’s Metallurgi-
cal Laboratory. The following year he became part of Eugene Wigner’s Theoretical 
Group, whose task was to design the nuclear reactors that would convert uranium into 
plutonium. In the 1950s he headed the ORNL, an American multiprogram science and 
technology national laboratory sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 
Much of the research performed at ORNL in the 1950s was related to nuclear reactors 
(Roberto & Nestor, 2014).
 7 According to van de Graaff (2015), a number of changes took place “which lent cre-
dence to the claim that a nuclear renaissance was about to take place across the globe, or 
was already underway”: (1) the fact that ambitious growth targets and expansion plans 
were announced by several countries with civil nuclear power programs in Asia, Europe, 
and North America; (2) countries that had planned phasing-out existing nuclear power 
plants began to reevaluate their positions; and (3) figures from the World Nuclear Asso-
ciation, the largest nuclear lobby, indicated that an important number of other countries 
that did not use nuclear energy were seriously considering using it. Van de Graaf states 
that by 2010 “social and political commentators began pronouncing the nuclear renais-
sance to have failed, or to never have existed at all”. This author provides a summary of 
the press coverage of the issue, which qualified the renaissance as a “myth”. Van de Graaf 
(2015) justifies the failure of this campaign with “nuclear specific factors” (the factors 
related to the construction, operation, and management of nuclear plants) and “contex-
tual factors” (related to change in the political and social context).
 8 In 2018, the major manufacturers of nuclear reactors were state-owned Orano (for-
mer Areva, in France), state-owned Rosatom (Russia), General Electric/Hitachi (U.S./
Japan), Kepco (South Korea), and Mitsubishi heavy industries ( Japan).
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 9 The most important intergovernmental agencies are the Atomic Energy Agency (IEAC) 
(which still retains the slogan “atoms for peace and development”), the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA), which belongs to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Eur-
atom). Besides the many national and regional trade associations working on behalf of the 
nuclear industry, the World Nuclear Association (WNA) is the main global nuclear lobby.
 10 The public relations campaign for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository was 
ineffective – “opposition to the repository actually increased” (Farsetta, 2008b, p. 41) – 
and the Obama administration terminated the project in 2011. No nuclear waste reposi-
tory had yet become operative in the United States by 2018, nor anywhere else in the 
world.
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Part IV
Advocating against  
climate change denial

12  Fighting climate change denial 
in the United States
Luis E. Hestres
Introduction
Climate change is arguably the most urgent challenge that human societies 
around the world face today. The fifth report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, issued in 2014, states that “human influence on the climate 
system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are 
the highest in history” and that “recent climate changes have had widespread 
impacts on human and natural systems” (IPCC, 2014, p. 2). In response to this 
challenge, the world has begun taking steps to curtail greenhouse gas emissions 
in order to keep global warming below 2° Celsius – the level necessary to pre-
vent catastrophic and irreversible climate impacts; for example, to date 175 of 
197 parties have ratified the Paris Agreement, which aims to keep global warm-
ing temperatures below 1.5° Celsius (United Nations, 2014).
One nation that is conspicuously absent from the list of countries that have 
ratified the agreement is the United States. Although under President Barack 
Obama the United States signed on to the agreement, Congress has not ratified 
it yet. In fact, President Donald Trump announced in 2017 his decision to pull 
the country out of the Paris Agreement altogether, painting it as a violation of 
U.S. sovereignty (Halper & Zavis, 2017). This is not unusual, however, given 
that the United States has been an outlier in climate policy for the past two 
decades (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013). Despite being the second largest emitter 
of greenhouse gases (Bradsher & Friedman, 2018), the United States has done 
little at the national level to address its share of responsibility for the worsen-
ing climate crisis. Efforts to address climate change through national legislation 
have failed repeatedly: Since 2003, when the first climate change bill was intro-
duced in the U.S. Congress, seven such bills have been introduced, but only 
one was approved by the House of Representatives, and all seven have died in 
the Senate (Layzer, 2011, pp. 368–377). The few federal efforts to fight climate 
change that were undertaken during the Obama administration are now being 
systematically reversed by President Trump. For example, in addition to pulling 
the country out of the Paris Agreement, President Trump has also announced 
his intention to undo the Clean Power Plan, President Obama’s signature policy 
for cutting carbon emissions from coal power plants and similar large sources 
in the United States (Gustin, 2017). In addition, Trump installed Scott Pruitt, 
who sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fourteen times during 
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his tenure as Oklahoma attorney general, as director of that agency (Mooney, 
Dennis, & Mufson, 2016). Between his appointments to the EPA and other 
federal offices and his executive actions, President Trump seems determined to 
reverse what little progress the United States has made at the federal level on 
fighting climate change.
The lack of progress (and recent backsliding) addressing climate change at the 
federal level has occurred despite rising levels of concern about global warm-
ing among Americans. According to the latest polling by the Yale Program 
on Climate Change Communication (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, 
Rosenthal, Cutler, & Kotcher, 2017):
More than six in ten Americans (63%) say they are at least “somewhat wor-
ried” about global warming. About one in five (22%) are “very wor-
ried” about it – the highest levels since our surveys began, and twice the 
proportion that were “very worried” in March 2015.
(emphasis in original)
Despite these growing levels of concern about climate change among Amer-
icans, there are deficiencies in the U.S. public’s beliefs about the issue that make 
it easier for opponents of climate action to advance their agenda. Although 
97 per cent of climate scientists agree that climate change is happening and is 
caused by human activities (Cook, van der Linden, Maibach, & Lewandowsky, 
2018), only 54 per cent of Americans share this belief, and a substantial minor-
ity (33 per cent) believe climate change is due to natural changes in the envi-
ronment (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, Cutler, & Kotcher, 
2017). Furthermore, only 15 per cent of Americans understand that the over-
whelming majority of climate scientists believe climate change is caused by 
human activity (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, Cutler, & 
Kotcher, 2017).
These deficiencies in the U.S. public’s understanding of climate change are 
due partly to a well-organized public communication campaign that denies the 
existence of climate change as a phenomenon, downplays its consequences for 
the United States and the world, and dismisses the ability or need for human 
beings to do anything about it. Driven by an alliance between the fossil fuel 
industry and conservative ideologues, the purpose of this campaign has been to 
sow doubt in the collective U.S. mind about the seriousness of the threat that 
climate change poses to human societies. The existence of this climate change 
denial campaign and its effects on U.S. responses to climate change have been 
well-documented by scholars (Cook et al., 2018; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Less well understood, however, are the responses 
to this denial campaign. Just as there is a well-funded and organized climate 
change denial campaign, there is a vigorous social movement in the United 
States pushing for strong national and regional responses to climate change 
(Hestres, 2015). This movement includes efforts to counteract the denial cam-
paign that is partly responsible for political paralysis the United States experi-
ences when it comes to climate change.
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The purpose of this chapter is to highlight some of the efforts that climate 
change activists are undertaking to combat the well-funded and organized cli-
mate change denial campaign described in the preceding text. After reviewing 
the literature on the denialist campaign and its effects on the U.S. public, this 
chapter will present some examples of how activists of various stripes are try-
ing to combat the influence of the denialist campaign on U.S. attitudes and 
responses to climate change. Finally, the chapter will provide some recommen-
dations as to how these anti-denialist efforts should proceed in the future.
Climate change denialism in the United States
To understand what has been called the “denial machine” of climate skepticism 
(Begley, 2007), we must first step back and look at climate change as the socio-
cultural and political challenge that it poses to the dominant paradigm of West-
ern development. Climate change has been referred to as a wicked problem so 
complex that no one solution at any one level of government or society could 
fully address it (Hulme, 2009; Lazarus, 2008). The wicked nature of climate 
change makes some form of government intervention to address its manifold 
challenges all but inevitable. This alone goes against the core tenets of modern 
U.S. conservatism, which abhors government intervention in the economy of 
almost any kind. But the challenge that climate change poses to the dominant 
paradigm of Western development goes deeper than this.
Climate change, reflexivity, and anti-reflexivity
As viewed by environmental skeptics themselves, modernity is a project built 
on the domination of nature by human beings, and it has been fantastic success 
story ( Jacques, 2006). Environmental skeptics therefore view modern environ-
mental scholarship as “leftist, antithetical to the notions of progress and econo-
mism, and determined by a manipulative environmental elite who have the ear 
of the press and popular culture” ( Jacques, 2006, p. 82). In fact, such scholar-
ship is part of a broader movement bent on tackling the world’s most pressing 
problems stemming from the unintended consequences of modernity. Some 
theorists have developed the concept of reflexive modernization, which describes 
the current era as one in which advanced nations are undergoing critical self-
reflection about the unintended consequences of material progress driven by 
modernity – including the byproducts of human activity that have led to the 
climate crisis (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994). There are two major drivers of 
this reflexive turn in modern societies: What Beck (1992) calls impact science and 
social movements.
As modern societies have become more introspective, there has been a bifur-
cation in modern science between science as part of the problem or production 
science and science as part of the solution or impact science (McCright & Dunlap, 
2010). Production science, largely comprising the physical sciences and engi-
neering, worked hand in hand with industrial capitalism to invent and inno-
vate products and technologies that created many (often unintended) chemical, 
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technological, and ecological risks for society. Impact science, mostly consisting 
of environmental science, ecology, conservation biology, and similar fields, has 
then taken on the task of identifying the risks created by production science 
and proposing ways to minimize or eliminate those risks. Social movements are 
another crucial component of reflexive modernity. Social movements, especially 
environmental movements, “help raise public consciousness of unintended and 
unanticipated effects of the industrial capitalist social order, while providing 
a vision of the social transformations needed to address them” (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2010, p. 104).
This reflexive turn in modern societies theorized by some has not gone 
unchallenged, however – especially in the United States. McCright and Dun-
lap (2010) argue that the conservative movement in this country is “a highly 
potent form of anti-reflexivity” (p. 105). Since the 1970s, the conservative 
movement, funded by wealthy conservative families, their foundations, and 
corporations, has been waging a battle for the reestablishment of the primacy 
of industrial capitalism and simple modernity and against the encroachment 
of reflexive modernity. It has done so by directly taking on progressive social 
movements and impact science while at the same time championing produc-
tion science that upholds the industrial capitalist order. This opposition to 
reflexive modernity must be seen in the context of the ascendancy of neolib-
eralism, the latest incarnation of market liberalism in the United States, during 
the 1970s and 1980s (Antonio & Brulle, 2011). Neoliberalism emerged as a 
backlash against social liberalism’s ascendancy between the 1930s and 1960s 
and its social and economic crises of the late 1960s–1970s. Conservatives in 
the 1970s reacted to the social and economic malaise prevalent at the time by 
blaming New Deal and Great Society policies, and in response they “built a 
network of think tanks that called for deregulation, privatization, welfare cuts, 
and reduced taxation to revive high corporate profits and economic growth” 
(Antonio & Brulle, 2011, p. 196). Starting with the Sagebrush Rebellion that 
originated in the western states during the 1970s and reached its apogee dur-
ing the Reagan administration, anti-environmentalism has been at the heart 
of American neoliberalism from the start (Cawley, 1993; Switzer & Vaughn, 
1997). Although a late-comer to the neoliberal assault on reflexive moder-
nity, climate change has now become the primary environmental issue against 
which conservatives rally (Antonio & Brulle, 2011). In fact, climate change 
denial has become a litmus test of conservative politics and identity, joining 
such issues as “abortion, guns, god, gays, immigration, and taxes” (Levy, 2010). 
In short, the conservative effort to sow doubt about the reality of climate 
change is a manifestation of a broader neoliberal attack on modern societies’ 
ability to reckon with the consequences of modernity through reflexivity and 
concomitant action.
Mechanisms of denial
The unifying ideological theme throughout all actors and institutions active 
in the denial machine is that there is no need for regulation of the industries 
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that are responsible for climate change (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Oreskes & 
Conway, 2011). It is this ideological unity that allows the denial machine to be 
so successful despite its multiplicity of actors and institutions and its shifting 
rationales for the lack of need for regulations. During the Reagan administra-
tion, anti-environmentalists initially tried to tear down environmental protec-
tions – and faced a public backlash for their efforts (Dunlap, 1987). Conservatives 
learned their lesson from this defeat and changed strategies accordingly. Instead 
of attacking popular environmental protections head on, conservatives began 
to question the need for environmental regulations by attacking the impact 
science that reveals the need for such regulations in the first place (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2010). This approach was eventually 
extended to climate change as the issue became more salient in the public 
agenda. In doing so, anti-environmentalists and climate change deniers bor-
rowed heavily from the tobacco industry’s playbook, which also questioned the 
science that pointed to its products as major causes of cancer and other ailments 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2011).
Pursuing their strategy of questioning the impact science that undergirds calls 
for climate action, climate change denialists have taken advantage of U.S. jour-
nalistic norms that prize balance above accuracy (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). By 
catering to the U.S. media’s desire to show two sides to every argument, regard-
less of the merits of each side, individuals with no expertise on climate science 
were allowed to present their denialist arguments side-by-side with bona fide 
climate scientists – 97 per cent of whom agree on the reality and human origins 
of climate change (Cook et al., 2018). This treatment of climate change in the 
media has led to “informationally deficient mass-media coverage” and a false 
balance between denialist/skeptical and factual perspectives on the issue in the 
United States (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007, p. 1190).
Climate change denialists have also been heavily active and successful in the 
book industry, which acts as the linchpin of an entire chain of denial. Dunlap 
and Jacques (2013) analyzed the highly symbiotic relationship between con-
servative think tanks, such as the Cato Institute, the Heartland Institute, and 
the Marshall Institute, and denialist book authors. They found that conservative 
think tank support of denialist authors has been crucial to their development 
as so-called experts on the subject of climate change. Conservative think tanks 
provide support to denialist authors, almost none of whom are climate scien-
tists, to write books that provide them with the credentials to pass as experts 
who can be called upon to provide balance in debates about climate change in 
the mainstream media. By nurturing a stable of denialist authors who pose as 
experts on climate change and propagate their views across mainstream media 
outlets, conservative think tanks act as a critical support system for the entire 
denial machine.
Whether through books, the mainstream media, conservative media out-
lets, astroturf groups – defined as groups generated by an industry to give the 
impression of grassroots support for a cause; see Beder (1998) – or front groups 
created by the fossil fuel industry (Dunlap & McCright, 2011), the overarching 
objective of the fossil fuel industry-conservative alliance is to question the basis 
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for climate action by undermining the scientific consensus around the causes 
and urgency of the crisis. The question is: What is being done to combat this 
well-funded and coordinated campaign of climate change denial?
Combating climate change denial
The role of scholars
In a sense, the literature that has been reviewed in the previous section con-
stitutes an important act of resistance against efforts to deny the reality and 
urgency of climate change. For example, scholars Riley Dunlap and Aaron 
McCright have documented and explicated several important aspects of the 
climate change denial phenomenon. These include the structure of the cli-
mate change denial machine and its components (Dunlap & McCright, 2011), 
the preeminent role of the conservative movement in the denial machine and 
its theoretical implications (McCright & Dunlap, 2010), the pervasiveness of 
climate change denial among conservative white males in the United States 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011), the importance of the book industry and con-
servative think tanks in the denial machine (Dunlap & Jacques, 2013), the role 
of conservative columnists in the denial machine (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013), 
and even examinations of the most effective counter-frames to use in the face 
of denialist frames (McCright, Charters, Dentzman, & Dietz, 2016). Likewise, 
Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway did important historical and analytical work 
in their seminal book Merchants of Doubt (2011). They traced the origins of 
the denial machine’s strategy of undermining the scientific consensus around 
climate change to earlier regulatory battles fought by other industries whose 
products were harmful to the public, such as the tobacco industry. Countless 
other scholars have laid bare various aspects of the conservative movement’s 
anti-environmentalist bent and its connection to climate change denial (Anto-
nio & Brulle, 2011; Brulle, 2014; Jacques, 2006; Switzer & Vaughn, 1997).
This work is important for various reasons. First, it contributes to a scholarly 
understanding of the climate change denial machine and its role in undermin-
ing public will to take climate action, especially in the United States. Such an 
understanding can in turn help scholars better understand the landscape of 
obstacles to climate action and devise effective social interventions. Second, and 
perhaps most importantly, this type of scholarship eventually filters its way to 
other elite communities, such as policy makers, activists, and the mainstream 
media, which can then disseminate the essence of these findings to the general 
public and raise awareness of the denial machine’s efforts to undermine public 
will to tackle the climate crisis.
Although this filtration process often happens indirectly, scholars some-
times also engage directly with these communities. For example, in 2013 
Riley Dunlap engaged in dialog with Cara Pike, the executive director of 
Climate Access, a nonprofit organization that builds political and public sup-
port for equitable climate solutions through a learning network of climate 
leaders, pilot engagement projects, and strategic services (Pike, 2013). In this 
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dialog, Dunlap and Pike discussed the denial machine’s strategy of manufac-
tured uncertainty and how to best counteract its effects. This is just one exam-
ple of how scholars can engage with activists and transform their research 
into an effective weapon against the denial machine and its pernicious effects 
on society.
The recent publication of The Consensus Handbook by John Cook et al. 
(2018) is another important contribution by scholars along this vein. This slen-
der volume summarizes the robust scientific consensus around the causes and 
immediacy of climate change, discusses the reasons why it is important to com-
municate the consensus to the public at large, rebuts arguments for not focusing 
on the consensus, and discusses the denial machine’s role in the public’s lack of 
understanding about the scientific consensus. The authors argue that focusing 
on the consensus can serve as a powerful weapon against objections to climate 
action because it serves as a “gateway belief ” for the public that can lead to 
greater support for action (Cook et al., 2018, p. 12). The Consensus Handbook 
can serve as a great resource for climate advocates looking to move public opin-
ion on the issue and serves as another example of how scholars can influence 
the public debate.
Marching for science
One of the most pernicious aspects of the climate change denial machine has 
been its efforts to smear climate scientists with accusations of conspiracies and 
manufactured controversies such as Climategate (Mann, 2013). Recently, scien-
tists have been fighting back against insinuations that they profit personally and 
handsomely from an exaggerated or even manufactured threat.
The March for Science, which took place in Washington, DC, and satellite 
locations on Earth Day, April 22, 2017, was an opportunity for scientists to do 
just that. The original idea for the march sprang from the success of the Wom-
en’s March on Washington, when a Reddit commenter, during a discussion of 
President Donald Trump’s science policies, suggested a “Scientists March on 
Washington”. Shortly thereafter, the march had a Facebook page, a Twitter 
handle, a website, two co-chairs, and a Google form through which interested 
scientists could sign up to help (Hestres & Nisbet, 2018). By the time the march 
took place, major scientific organizations such as the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, the Paleontological Society, the Genetics Soci-
ety of America, and others, as well as environmental organizations, such as the 
Nature Conservancy, NextGen Climate, Friends of the Earth, Green for All, 
and 350.org, had become partners of the march.
The 2017 March for Science spawned satellite marches around the United 
States and other countries. Approximately 40,000 people attended marches 
in both Washington, DC, and Chicago; 20,000 attended in New York City; 
and 10,000 attended marches in both Philadelphia and London (Tanos, 2017). 
Another march took place on April 14, 2018, in Washington, DC. Despite 
its relatively broad support among the scientific community, the march was 
not without detractors. For example, University of Maryland physics professor 
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Sylvester James Gates worried that “such a politically charged event might send 
a message to the public that scientists are driven by ideology more than by 
evidence” (Flam, 2017).
According to a recent survey of participants, this had been the first science-
related march for 88 per cent of participants, and the most common concerns 
they expressed were that the current Congress and the Trump administration 
would make harmful reductions in the use of scientific evidence in government 
decision-making (91 per cent); cuts in government funding for research (90 per 
cent); and reductions in access to government data for scientific research (81 per 
cent) (Myers, Kotcher, Cook, Beall, & Maibach, 2018). In addition, “nearly all 
participants said they were taking a variety of other advocacy actions to advance 
the goals that brought them to participate in the march” (Myers et al., 2018, p. 6). 
Like most protests in the contemporary United States, however, opinion about 
the March for Science was typically divided along partisan lines; most Democrats 
and younger adults are convinced that these public events will help the causes 
of scientists, while Republicans and older adults differ (Funk & Rainie, 2017). 
Despite these divisions, recent experimental evidence suggests that the credibil-
ity of scientists is not diminished by their involvement in public policy debates 
(Kotcher, Myers, Vraga, Stenhouse, & Maibach, 2017). It would seem that scien-
tists are on solid ground when advocating for the robustness of the scientific con-
sensus around climate change and the integrity of their own research. However, it 
still remains to be seen whether the March for Science and the seeming willing-
ness of scientists to become more involved in public controversies about science 
will serve to undermine the denial machine’s clout within public opinion.
The role of progressive advocates
In addition to scholars and scientists, progressive climate advocates are running 
targeted campaigns to expose the denial machine and diminish its influence in 
the public sphere. Climate Truth is one organization running such campaigns. 
The purpose of Climate Truth is to “fight the denial, distortion, and disinfor-
mation that block bold action on climate change” (climatetruth.org, 2018). The 
organization was initially launched as Forecast the Facts, a joint campaign by 
350.org, the League of Conservation Voters, and the Citizens Engagement Lab 
to pressure meteorologists across the country to report accurately on the effects 
of climate change (climaterealityproject.org, 2012).
Since evolving into Climate Truth, the organization has run a number of 
campaigns targeting some of the most influential actors in the denial machine. 
For example, Climate Truth ran a campaign that eventually led several large 
corporations, including General Motors, State Farm Insurance, Nationwide, 
USAA, Pepsi, BB&T, Verizon, GlaxoSmithKline, Farmers Insurance Group, 
and others, to drop their financial support for the Heartland Institute, one of 
the most important conservative think tanks in the denial machine (clima-
tetruth.org, 2012; for more on conservtive think tanks and the denial machine 
see Dunlap & Jacques, 2013). The organization also launched a successful cam-
paign that changed the Washington Post’s editorial stance on climate change 
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and deprived denialist columnists like Charles Krauthammer of a high-profile 
media platform (climatetruth.org, 2014b; for more about conservative column-
ists and climate change denial see Elsasser & Dunlap, 2013). Climate Truth also 
mobilized public support behind an effort to get Google, AARP, and others 
to withdraw from the American Legislative Exchange Council, a conservative 
organization that influences state legislation and denies the scientific consensus 
on climate change (climatetruth.org, 2014a).
Known for its aggressive activism, Greenpeace has used the tools of investiga-
tive journalism to expose the seedier aspects of climate change denial. In 2015, 
Greenpeace set up a sting operation to uncover some scientists’ availability 
to write reports dismissive of the scientific consensus and supportive of fos-
sil fuels for money. Posing as consultants to fossil fuel companies, Greenpeace 
staff members approached professors at leading U.S. universities to commission 
reports touting the benefits of rising carbon dioxide levels and the benefits of 
coal. They approached William Happer, the Cyrus Fogg Brackett professor of 
physics at Princeton University, to write a report touting the benefits of rising 
carbon emissions, and Frank Clemente, a retired sociologist formerly at Penn-
sylvania State University, to commission a report countering damaging studies 
on Indonesian coal deaths and promoting the benefits of coal. In both cases, the 
academics discussed potential ways to obscure the source of the funds (Gold-
enberg, 2015). The investigation climaxed in a tense on-camera confrontation 
between a Greenpeace activist and Happer just before a Senate hearing on 
climate change chaired by Senator Ted Cruz. The activist asked Happer how 
much money he had taken from the fossil fuel industry, while Happer cursed at 
the activist and claimed not to have “taken a dime” (Greenpeace, 2015).
Greenpeace USA continues to run campaigns targeting climate change 
deniers (Greenpeace, 2018). For example, its PolluterWatch project conducts 
investigations on top funders of the denial machine, such as the Koch brothers. 
In a 2011 report, Greenpeace USA alleges that Koch Industries contributed 
more than $100 million to eighty-four different climate change denying organ-
izations since 1997 (Greenpeace, 2011). The report also highlights the role of 
the donor-advised fund Donors Trust in distributing money from the Koch 
brothers and other entities to conservative think tanks and other organiza-
tions in the denial machine. According to The Guardian’s Suzanne Goldenberg, 
by 2010 Donors Trust had distributed $118 million to 102 think tanks and 
organizations, including the Heartland Institute ($13.5 million), the American 
Enterprise Institute ($17 million), and Americans for Prosperity ($11 million) 
(Goldenberg, 2013).
Other progressive organizations engaging in high-profile public communica-
tion about climate change denialism include the Center for American Progress 
and the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Center for American Progress 
has been releasing a yearly report on climate change denialism in Congress 
called the “Climate Denier Caucus”. The 2016 edition profiled 182 members 
of Congress that the Center classified as climate change deniers (Strong, 2016). 
The 2017 edition contains two fewer members but also a prominent new addi-
tion: President Donald Trump (Caiazza, 2017).
226 Luis E. Hestres
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), meanwhile, has concentrated on 
the role of fossil fuel companies in the denial machine. In 2016, UCS released 
a report detailing ExxonMobil’s ongoing involvement with climate change 
denial. Despite public statements in recent years in which the company seemed 
to accept the reality of climate change, the UCS report accuses ExxonMobil 
of continuing to deceive the public about its prior scientific knowledge of cli-
mate change and about the current level of scientific consensus, of deceiving 
its investors about the likelihood of solutions to the climate crisis materializ-
ing, and of continuing to support organizations like the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC), an organization that promotes conservative legisla-
tion at the state level and denies the existence of climate change (ucsusa.org, 
2016b). In another 2016 publication, UCS uses files garnered from bankruptcy 
proceedings of Arch Coal and Alpha Natural Resources – two major U.S. coal 
companies – to trace their involvement with the climate change denial machine 
and anticipates that similar findings will come to light from the bankruptcy 
proceedings of Peabody Energy, another major U.S. coal company (ucsusa.org, 
2016a). Among other things, the files revealed relationships between the coal 
companies and denialist think tanks like the Heartland Institute and the Com-
petitive Enterprise Institute. In 2015, UCS released a report based on internal 
fossil fuel industry memos – eighty-five memos totaling more than 330 pages – 
that proved an ongoing effort by the industry to deceive the public about the 
reality of climate change from as early as 1977 (ucsusa.org, 2015).
Addressing climate change denial on the right
Given that climate change denial has become a core tenet of modern U.S. 
conservatism, perhaps one of the most urgent challenges we face is the lack of 
prominent individuals or groups on the right willing to tackle endemic climate 
change denial within that side of the political spectrum. Some of the few such 
individuals and groups are profiled in the following text.
Katharine Hayhoe is one of the most prominent climate scientists in the 
world. She is an atmospheric scientist; a professor of political science and 
director of the Climate Science Center at Texas Tech University; the author 
of more than 125 peer-reviewed papers and many key reports, including the 
U.S. Global Change Research Program’s Second National Climate Assess-
ment, the U.S. National Academy of Science report “Climate Stabilization 
Targets: Emissions, Concentrations, and Impacts over Decades to Millennia”, 
and the 2014 Third National Climate Assessment; and an expert peer reviewer 
for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Hayhoe, 2018). She is 
also an evangelical Christian in a country where only a quarter of her co-
religionists believe that climate change is caused by human activity (Pullman 
Bailey, 2017). This paradox has placed her in the unique position of being able 
to speak to conservative Christians in a language that they might respond to 
and embrace.
In her book A Climate for Change: Global Warming Facts for Faith-Based Deci-
sions, co-authored with her husband Andrew Farley, Dr. Hayhoe acknowledges 
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all the objections that conservative Christians may have to traditional climate 
messengers (Hayhoe & Farley, 2009). “How can such activists, those whose 
voices have so often raised against us on fundamental issues like family and the 
sanctity of life – have anything worthwhile to say about the environment?” 
(p. xv). She then proceeds to reassure her fellow Christians that the issue of 
climate change really is different: “It’s not about blue politics or red politics or 
any kind of politics. It’s about thermometer readings and history. It’s about facts 
and figures. It’s about reality” (p. xv). As both a climate scientist and an evangeli-
cal Christian, Dr. Hayhoe is uniquely positioned to bridge the gap between the 
natural distrust her co-religionists have for the usual climate messengers and the 
scientific reality of climate change.
Another potential bridge between ideological conservatives and the scien-
tific reality of climate change is a relatively new organization called Republi-
cEN. Founded by former Republican South Carolina congressman Bob Inglis, 
the organization’s mission is to spur “a pivot on the right” by offering solutions 
to the climate crisis that are consonant with “bedrock principles of free enter-
prise” (republicEN.org, 2018). The theory behind this new organization is that 
conservatives have not been willing to embrace the need for action on climate 
change because the solutions that are traditionally offered by the usual climate 
messengers are anathema to conservative economic values. Change the solu-
tions, the theory goes, and conservative support for climate action will follow.
There is some support for this theory in some of the most recent public 
opinion research about climate change, which shows that majorities of Repub-
licans support policies such as funding more research into renewable energy 
sources, providing tax rebates to people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles 
or solar panels, and regulating carbon dioxide as a pollutant (Leiserowitz, Mai-
bach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, & Cutler, 2017). Large pluralities of Republi-
cans also support a revenue neutral carbon tax (which would require fossil fuel 
companies to pay a carbon tax and use the money to reduce other taxes by an 
equal amount) and setting strict carbon dioxide emission limits on existing coal-
fired power plants (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Rosenthal, & Cutler, 
2017). The creation of RepublicEN also seems to reflect the concerns of elite 
conservatives who believe environmentalists’ solutions to climate change are 
inadequate but despair at conservatives’ unwillingness to engage with the issue 
(Lane, 2014). However, given how endemic climate change denial has become 
on the conservative side of the political spectrum, the effectiveness of efforts to 
reach out to the political right remains unclear.
Conclusion
Despite the best efforts of the individuals and organizations profiled in the 
preceding text, climate change denial continues to be a formidable obstacle 
for climate action in the United States and to reflexive modernity in gen-
eral (McCright & Dunlap, 2010). Although only 10 per cent of Americans 
remain dismissive about the issue (Roser-Renouf, Maibach, Leiserowitz, & 
Rosenthal, 2016), this segment of the population is influential because of its 
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disproportionate leverage in Republican politics. Climate change denialism has 
become a litmus test that many Republican candidates must pass if they want 
to make it through primaries dominated by deeply conservative voters. Mean-
while, there is not enough issue intensity around climate change for these poli-
ticians to pay a political price during general elections among more moderate 
voters. This means that the climate change denial machine remains a potent 
force in U.S. politics.
But the latest polling on climate change may offer glimmers of hope. 
Although only one in five Americans (22 per cent) are “very worried” about 
climate change, that is the highest level since the Yale Program on Climate 
Change Communication’s surveys began, and twice the proportion that 
were “very worried” in March 2015 (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, 
Rosenthal, Cutler, & Kotcher, 2017). Rising concern about climate change 
may indicate that the influence of the denial machine is waning.
But for its influence to continue to decline, climate advocates of all stripes 
will have to continue to denounce its existence and pernicious effects on U.S. 
society. Perhaps one of the most helpful pieces of advice on this comes from 
Riley Dunlap, who advised that advocates keep “discrediting [climate change 
deniers] as outlier voices that serve to profit from attacking the science” (Pike, 
2013). The profit element involved in climate change denial, from the fossil fuel 
companies that profit from continued climate pollution to the so-called experts 
who profit from producing denialist tracts and appearing alongside bona fide 
climate experts in the mainstream media, can be a powerful messaging point 
that should be repeated whenever possible. Only the continued exposure of the 
climate change denial machine’s inner workings can reveal to the public the 
spurious nature of climate change denial.
Researchers have done important work that could do much good if practi-
tioners implement it more broadly. For example, recent research confirms that 
“what people think about expert agreement influences a range of other key 
climate attitudes, including whether global warming is real, caused by humans, 
resulting in serious impacts and importantly, whether we should act to solve 
it” (Cook et al., 2018). In other words, communicating the broad scientific 
consensus about climate change can be a powerful messaging tool for climate 
advocates. Advocates should deliver this message simply and clearly, deliver it 
often, and through messengers that the target audiences will trust.
Equally important to the task of combating climate change denial is to 
undermine it with its core audience: Conservatives. This can only be done 
by trusted messengers such as Dr. Hayhoe or Bob Inglis, who can speak about 
climate change while tapping value systems and using language that conserva-
tives trust. The average conservative will almost certainly not give Greenpeace’s 
climate messages a chance, but they might listen to an evangelical Christian 
who also happens to be a climate scientist like Dr. Hayhoe or a strong defender 
of free markets like Inglis. There is no guarantee that this approach will work 
given how deeply embedded climate change denial has become in the contem-
porary conservative identity, but given the sway that conservatives hold in the 
U.S. political system, it is worth trying.
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13  A wicked systems approach  
to climate change advocacy
Ana Fernández-Aballí
Introduction
The World Health Organization in its publication Quantitative Risk Assessment 
of the Effects of Climate Change on Selected Causes of Death, 2030s and 2050s 
establishes that the effects of climate change will directly cause approximately 
250,000 deaths per year starting from the year 2030, and this only takes into 
account human lives (Hales, Kovats, Lloyd, & Campbell-Lendrum, 2014). 
Therefore, our starting point is based on the understanding that climate change 
is a problem – a deathly one – and that in order to shed light on possible solu-
tions we must propose adequate ways in which to address it. This precisely is 
what climate change advocacy has set itself to do.
Climate change advocacy is the communication processes carried out by dif-
ferent organizations, groups, platforms, and networks at local, regional, national, 
or global scale oriented towards climate related policy and resource alloca-
tion decisions within the political, economic, social, and institutional systems 
in order to generate awareness and action to decrease the anthropogenic causes 
behind – and battle the effects of – global rising temperatures. Climate change 
advocacy has been examined and developed from multiple perspectives: Health 
(Sulda, Coveney, & Bentley, 2010; Sweet, 2011), public policy (Gronow & Ylä-
Anttila, 2016; Kukkonen, Ylä-Anttila, & Broadbent, 2017; Litfin, 2000), net-
work theory (Bomberg, 2012; Osofsky & Levit, 2008), communication (Hestres, 
2014; Levine & Kline, 2017), sociology (Nagel, Dietz, & Broadbent, 2010), and 
law ( Johnson, 2010), among other fields. Regardless of the approach, research 
highlights the limited effects of advocacy and the need for a more complex 
methodology to study and find solutions to climate change and the communi-
cative, social, and cognitive structures of human behavior causing it. To provide 
insights into this complexity, a recently emerging line of research is address-
ing climate change and its related social subsystems from an interdisciplinary, 
policy-oriented field in social complexity science known as wicked problems.
Wicked problems are unclear, interdependent, multi-causal, unstable, uncer-
tain, nonlinear, multi-centered, and dynamic problems (Conklin, 2006; Head & 
W, 2008; Salonen & Konkka, 2015; Waddock, Meszoely, Waddell, & Dentoni, 
2015), also known as social messes (Horn, 2001; Ritchey, 2013). Specifically with 
regards to climate change, it has been identified as a super-wicked problem 
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(Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012) given an additional set of difficul-
ties that enlarge the obstacles to finding effective solutions. Recent literature 
on climate change as a complex social system and as a wicked problem has 
identified the need to clarify and open a specific field of study – which has 
been coined as wicked systems – in order to address climate related phenomena, 
which are constantly escaping the possibility of being formalized and tackled 
in an effective manner.
For this reason, this chapter proposes a new theoretical approach to advocacy 
in relation to climate change that takes into account the emerging wicked sys-
tems perspective. In order to do so, we briefly examine the current literature 
on advocacy and wicked systems, as well as review the basic theoretical notions 
behind the ethics of integration to set the epistemological, ontological, and meth-
odological background necessary to situate climate change advocacy within 
wicked systems modeling.
We move on to define the elements that provide a systems-based model for 
advocacy in climate change: Eco-symbolic systems matrix. Concretely, we draw 
on the concepts of scales, rigidities, power matrices, diversities, and horizons 
based on interdisciplinary, critical, and emancipatory philosophical literature 
that explores different dimensions of this topic. Each category – scales, rigidi-
ties, power matrices, diversities, and horizons – is conceptualized according 
to variables that interrelate to create a dynamic worldview based on ethical 
premises that can be extracted from network and discourse analysis to generate 
a complex conceptual mapping of advocacy perspectives, discourse structures, 
and their underlying implications to engage in effective climate action. Finally, 
we discuss the relevance and urgency of researching about advocacy from a 
wicked systems approach.
A brief overview of climate change advocacy
Climate change advocacy can be defined as a set of strategies devised by one or 
more organized groups of people or institutions to enact change among given audi-
ences (communities, individuals, policy makers, etc.) in relation to climate change 
related topics or fields. Strategies within climate change advocacy vary across the 
literature, but policy-related actions tend to be stressed more thoroughly given 
the scale of actions required to approach climate related issues. Proposed strat-
egies include generating collaboration with policy makers, direct persuasion 
through lobbying and policy work, building support from the public and other 
influential stakeholders, coercive pressure through strikes, boycotts, and direct 
action, and litigation by suing the policy makers in court (Southern Voices 
on Climate Change, 2014). Other relevant advocacy strategies used include 
popular education projects, influencing public education curricula, awareness 
campaigns, advocacy capacity building, community organization and mobiliza-
tion, education of influencers and policy makers, policy analysis and research, 
and regulatory feedback, among others (Coffman & Beer, 2015).
Climate change advocacy groups and networks range from small-scale com-
munity grassroots organizations dedicated to local action, to international 
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NGOs such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and 350.org, among many 
others (i.e. according to the Climate Action Network web information, this 
network includes over 1,300 NGOs from over 120 countries) to large-scale 
multilateral public platforms such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change with more than 120 member countries, or the United Nations Envi-
ronment Program. In general, there are numerous groups of people, institutions, 
think tanks, and scientific communities from fields related to environmentalism, 
human and animal rights, climate related sciences, law, and environmental jus-
tice, among many others, generating climate change advocacy actions.
Despite the efforts behind climate change advocacy, Jamieson (2014) warns 
us that “the most difficult challenge in addressing climate change lurks in the 
background. . . . Climate change is the world’s largest and most complex collec-
tive action problem [and] evolution did not design us to solve or even to rec-
ognize this kind of problem. We have a strong bias toward dramatic movements 
of middle-sized objects that can be visually perceived, and climate change does 
not typically present in this way” (p. 48). Existing frameworks in climate change 
advocacy such as advocacy coalition frameworks (Gronow & Ylä-Anttila, 2016; 
Ingold, 2011; Kukkonen et al., 2017), transnational networks, and social move-
ment theories do not seem to be yielding the necessary results to address root 
causes to the rapid increases in global temperatures nor to ethical standards of 
global environmental justice (Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, & Shue, 2010), and 
climate experts are calling out for the development of advocacy approaches that 
are able to address the complexity and urgency of climate change (Bomberg, 
2012). While climate change advocacy groups, actions, and lobbies proliferate 
in the Global North with questionable results, the Environmental Justice Atlas 
is currently mapping nearly 2,500 cases of ecological conflict that are impacting 
mostly territories in the Global South:1
Across the world communities are struggling to defend their land, air, 
water, forests and their livelihoods from damaging projects and extractive 
activities with heavy environmental and social impacts: Mining, dams, tree 
plantations, fracking, gas flaring, incinerators, etc. As resources needed to 
fuel our economy move through the commodity chain from extraction, 
processing and disposal, at each stage environmental impacts are external-
ized onto the most marginalized populations. Often this all takes place far 
from the eyes of concerned citizens or consumers of the end-products.
This myopia in advocacy actions to properly address climate change recalls 
a popular joke where, during a night stroll, a man finds a drunkard clinging 
to a lamppost. The drunkard is vehemently staring at the ground, so the man 
inquires: “Sir, what are you looking for?” The drunkard replies: “I am search-
ing for my keys; I have lost them”. The man, after gazing at the ground and 
confirming that the keys are nowhere to be seen, asks: “But have you lost them 
here?” To which the drunkard replies: “No, I lost them back there, but here is 
where the light is”. This seems to be a simplified yet appropriate description of 
the current scenario in climate change advocacy. We seem to keep wanting to 
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enact change where we can see, rather than where the actual root causes are: 
Our anthropocentric behaviors, values, and beliefs.
An example of this distortion between what we know and what we do to 
address climate change can be found in the depiction of advocacy provided by 
the 350.org NGO. The 350.org website states: “It’s warming. It’s us. We’re sure. 
It’s bad. We can fix it”. With this discourse structure, it assures that climate change 
is happening at undocumented rates due to anthropogenic behaviors such as diet 
and economic and population growths that require an unsustainable burning of 
fossil fuels particularly in the Global North, and with a generalized consensus 
among the scientific community of both the causes and the devastating impact of 
global warming. However, when addressing possible actions it explains:
We know exactly what we have to do – keep fossil fuels in the ground and 
quickly transition to 100% renewable energy. Renewable energy is getting 
cheaper and more popular every day. In fact, global carbon emissions have 
already started to slow due to the rapid growth of clean energy. We’re not 
alone – the worldwide movement to stop climate change and resist the 
fossil fuel industry is growing stronger every day.
The focus of action on green technology – rather than on deeper individual 
and collective cognitive shifts in worldviews that question how we relate to 
ecological systems – seems detached from the scientific consensus of acknowl-
edged climate change causes. For Haraway:
It’s more than climate change; it’s also extraordinary burdens of toxic 
chemistry, mining, depletion of lakes and rivers under and above ground, 
ecosystem simplification, vast genocides of people and other critters, etc, 
etc, in systemically linked patterns that threaten major system collapse after 
major system collapse after major system collapse. Recursion can be a drag.
(2015, p. 159)
Climate change advocacy needs to start incorporating in its constituting ele-
ments what Zylinska (2014) called a minimal ethics for the Anthropocene, which 
engage in nonuniversal ethical standpoints, yet interlinked with scalar processes 
and effects. In order to achieve this, and in an attempt to shed light in the dark, 
post-anthropocentric, ethically integrative, and complexity-based approaches 
to advocacy are necessary. This leaves us inevitably oriented towards furthering 
our knowledge on wicked systems.
A brief overview of wicked systems
The literature situates climate change within the field of wicked problems – 
also known as social messes. Wicked problems, initially coined by Horst Rittel 
and Melvin M. Webber in the 1970s, have been defined as situations that are 
distinct from the desired outcomes of the stakeholders involved and that present 
a set of characteristics that make them difficult to solve. The characterization of 
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wicked problems as social messes (Horn, 2001; Horn & Weber, 2007; Ritchey, 
2013; Sun & Yang, 2016) indicates that:
• “[Social messes] are more than complicated and complex. They are ambig-
uous” (Horn, 2001).
• There is no unique or correct view of the problem, and the different views 
of the problem and the solutions are contradictory.
• They present ideological, economic, political, and technological constraints.
• Data and information are missing, and risks and consequences are difficult 
to calculate or imagine; they are interconnected with other (most likely 
wicked) problems, and there is a considerable amount of uncertainty.
• There are multiple intervention points, and problem solvers tend to be 
disconnected from the causes and consequences of the problem.
• They present multiple value conflicts and a great resistance to change.
Particularly in relation to climate change, Levin et al. (2012, p. 123) introduced 
four new characteristics to this list that add to the mess:
• “[T]ime is running out;
• those who cause the problem also seek to provide a solution;
• the central authority needed to address it is weak or non-existent;
• and, partly as a result, policy responses discount the future irrationally”.
Given the “now what?” challenges posed by these premises regarding prob-
lem definition, and in order to surpass the end-of-the-cliff-like sensation of try-
ing to define the problem of climate change, we decided to attempt to untangle 
the thread by looking into ethics and value scales, as these are basic drivers of 
human behavior – which, after all, is where the ultimate responsibility lies for 
both the causes of accelerating climate change and advocating to stop it.
Recent studies have started to develop a new approach to wicked problems/
social messes: the reconceptualization of certain social phenomena as wicked 
systems. This new approach opens theoretical and methodological grounds to 
understand climate change advocacy from an inclusive perspective, which goes 
beyond a single type of logic regarding the challenge and urgency of climate 
change.
Wicked systems (WS), also referred to in some literature as complex adaptive 
systems, are understood as techno-ecological-social systems composed of inter-
twined wicked problems. WS have been somewhat addressed from different 
disciplinary fields: legal studies, healthcare, information sciences, software devel-
opment, public policy, environmental sciences, engineering, and design, among 
others. WS have been defined as both complex and complicated, highly unpre-
dictable, polycentric, open, radically uncertain, and numerically large systems that 
present multi-level and multi-directional emergent causality, dynamic changes 
over time-space, and reluctance to formalization and reductionism (Andersson, 
2014; Andersson, Törnberg, & Törnberg, 2014; Chroust, 2004; Hawryszkiewycz, 
Pradhan, & Agarwal, 2015; Hawryszkiewycz, 2013; Mancini & Angrisani, 2014; 
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Manhire, 2017; A. Törnberg, 2017; P. Törnberg, 2014, 2017). Exhibiting inter-
twined and mutually reinforcing properties of complex (possibility of functional 
analysis) and complicated (possibility of structural analysis) systems (Poli, 2013), 
WS are problematic for both mathematical and behavioral modeling, and neither 
discipline has yielded theoretical or methodological tools to address WS fully 
(Manhire, 2015). Besides climate change, other examples of WS are migration, 
development investment, ICT innovation, poverty management, crime manage-
ment, genetic modification, and healthcare, among many of the most pressing, 
controversial, and persistent societal issues.
Despite the global importance of wicked systems and their impact across 
disciplines, this specific typology of systems has barely been addressed as such, 
and it is only very recently that these systems are starting to be character-
ized as a separate theoretical and methodological current, particularly in the 
social sciences (Andersson, 2014; A. Törnberg, 2017). Likewise, methodo-
logical approaches to the study of wicked systems include: Network analysis, 
social mapping, discourse analysis, decision support tools, prospective analysis, 
morphological analysis, and ethnographic research, among other social science 
methods aimed at modeling complexity in social systems. Although these tools 
have proven to be of practical use in finding solutions to sub-wicked systems, 
which are wicked systems of a more manageable scale that can be grasped by 
human cognition (P. Törnberg, 2017), other global problems such as climate 
change require epistemological, ontological, and methodological approaches 
that have yet to be explored (Andersson et al., 2014; Manhire, 2017; P. Törn-
berg, 2017). These tools, which require a more holistic, non-positivistic, trans-
disciplinary, and epistemologically complex understanding of reality, can most 
appropriately be derived from currents of philosophical and epistemological 
thought in the Global South and East, which for decades have been pushing 
for a non-Cartesian, power-situated approach to complexity and complicated-
ness, and for an urgent phenomenological understanding of how knowledge 
and methodologies are produced and applied (Fals Borda, 2014; Freire, 1970; 
Gunaratne, 2006; Torres, 1995; Tortosa, 2011). The application of Southern 
and Eastern epistemologies and methods to Northern/Western wicked sys-
tems’ approaches facilitates the creation of a concept and a characterization that 
integrates realities from different worldviews, much needed in climate change 
advocacy (Butler, 1993, 1999; Cohen-Emerique, 1999; Freire, 1970; Amy Min-
dell, 2008; Arnold Mindell, 2002; Noguera de Echeverri, 2004; Olivé et al., 
2009; Ortiz & Borjas, 2008; Villasante, 2006a).
From excision to integration in climate change advocacy
Before characterizing climate change advocacy as a wicked system, we will first 
examine the different theoretical and methodological underpinnings needed to 
focus our analysis on the relational determinants of power abuse in the interac-
tions among living and nonliving elements in a system. In order to do so, we 
need to move away from what Noguera de Echeverri (2004) identified as an 
ethics of excision, defining it as follows:
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• Ethics that exclude.
• Ethics based on hierarchy, where order is a synonym of privilege or 
domination.
• Ethics that enable inhabiting based on dominance.
• Ethics where values are based on dichotomy: good-bad, in-out, desired-
rejected, remembered-forgotten, rational-irrational, etc.
• Ethics based on thought that only legitimizes that which is rational, ana-
lytic, reductionist, and linear.
• Ethics based on assertive tendencies: expansion, competition, quantity, and 
domination.
The study of ethics from an emancipatory stance implies breaking away from one-
directional moralities and shifting the focus to non-dichotomic and non-exclusive 
interactions among groups and resources (human and nonhuman animals, the 
environment, and other resources). In this sense we approach this study from an 
epistemology and a methodology of the oppressed as detailed in Table 13.1.
An epistemology and methodology of the oppressed provide a frame for 
Noguera de Echeverri’s (2004) proposal of an ethics of integration, which is also 
argued for by authors in a diversity of fields of complexity and problem- solving 
in the social sciences (Castro-Gómez, Santiago; Grosfoguel, 2007; Cohen- 
Emerique, 1999; Gunaratne, 2008; Hooks et al., 2004; Amy Mindell, 2008; 
Siver, 2006; Villasante, 2007). An ethics of integration implies:
• Ethics that include.
• Ethics where order is based on heterarchy (un-ranked or multiple ranking 
possibilities among elements in a system).
• Ethics that enable inhabiting based on respect and acknowledgment of the 
other.
Table 13.1  Epistemological and methodological underpinnings of emancipatory ethics 
(ethics of integration).
Epistemology of the oppressed (Freire, 1970, 2002b) Methodology of the oppressed (Sandoval, 2000)
• Subject-subject dialogue (no human is a 
problem, but rather the interaction).
• OF the oppressed and not FOR the 
oppressed.
• Based on vulnerability as ontology, which 
means that it is through hope, faith, 
humility, love, trust, and indignation that the 
discovery of a shared reality reveals itself.
• Conformed by circular, dynamic, variable, 
and contextualized processes.
• Accompanied by a process of 
conscientization based on individual and 
collective awareness about power structures, 
cultural structures, and dialogic structures.
• Mirar profundo – look deep.
• Deconstruct: Defy ideological dominant 
signs.
• Meta-ideologize: Appropriate 
ideologically dominant forms and 
re-signify them.
• Democratize: Situate the previous 
steps/knowledge in a localized logic 
and oriented towards the visibility 
of power structures to ensure the 
creation/“production” of love and justice.
• Differential movement: Transition from 
one step to the other to enter a mestizo 
awareness and transcultural love.
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• Ethics where values are based on the integration of polarity, which is to 
say that a situation can be and exhibit properties of both good and bad, 
in and out, desired and rejected, remembered and forgotten, rational and 
irrational, etc.
• Ethics based on thought that is intuitive, synthetic, holistic, and nonlinear. 
In order to understand these thought processes it is useful to frame them 
in the Freirean notion of circular interaction between the naïve and the 
conscious mind (Freire, 2002a).
• Ethics based on integrative tendencies: conservation, cooperation, quality, 
and association.
The ethics and value systems of different kinds that are present in climate 
change advocacy and that mark the decision-making process and intergroup 
negotiations among agenda-setting stakeholders in the climate change arena 
are confrontational, mostly relying on Western-/Northern-based logic and 
reasoning, and deeply rooted in systemic and historical logics of dehumaniza-
tion, objectification, and exploitation of territories and of human and nonhu-
man lives (Escobar, 2005; Galceran Huguet, 2016; Tortosa, 2011; Walsh, 2008). 
Given these conditionings, and to break apart from logics of exclusion, we have 
decided to approach climate change advocacy from a Freirean (1970) epistemo-
logical perspective where:2
• Relationships between groups are understood as subject-subject interac-
tions – that is, that all agents have the ability to teach and learn, all agents 
have some kind of knowledge, all agents are subjects of the process and 
never objects of the process, all agents have an equal right to speak and to 
be heard, and all agents have the same right to propose problems, options, 
contents, and solutions.
• Awareness of the self and others is not based on our personal and histori-
cally built value scale of right and wrong, but rather on a process of consci-
entization of power and cultural and dialogic structures.
Methodological approach to climate change advocacy 
from a wicked perspective: eco-symbolic systems matrix
This chapter proposes the new concept of the eco-symbolic systems matrix 
(ESSM), which provides a theoretical framework to explore ethical positions 
in climate change advocacy, based on the emerging field of wicked systems 
modeling. ESSM can be used as a tool to define, analyze, and classify relevant 
variables within climate change advocacy systems in order to identify system 
constraints, limitations, and intergroup long- and short-term potentiality for 
conflict and consensus. Based on the literature on interdisciplinary, critical, and 
emancipatory philosophical paradigms that model and analyze complexity/
complicatedness in techno-ecological-social systems, we can define an eco-
symbolic system as a state of mind and purpose based on a cognitive matrix and 
subsequent narrative that gives a sense of being, which is shared among a large 
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group of individuals, and which is complexly intertwined with technological 
and environmental conditions. The wickedness comes into play when two or 
more polarized eco-symbolic systems become intertwined, generally in terms 
of polarity, which tends to be the case in climate change scenarios. In this case 
we can talk about wicked eco-symbolic systems.
Given an understanding of reality as a complex and complicated interlinked 
set of perceptions (Butler, 1993, 1999; Cohen-Emerique, 1999; Fals Borda, 
2014; Freire, 1970; Hooks et al., 2004; Amy Mindell, 2008; Arnold Mindell, 
2002; Noguera de Echeverri, 2004; Olivé et al., 2009; Villasante, 2006a), and in 
accordance with emancipatory theoretical premises, an eco-symbolic systems 
matrix can be used to explore simultaneously:
1 Intragroup interactions
2 Intergroup interactions among human groups
3 Intergroup interactions among human and nonhuman groups
4 Interaction among groups and natural resources
The objective of undertaking this analysis is to:
1 Pass from an ethics of excision to an ethics of integration in advocacy through a 
process of axiological translation, which is understanding the narrative of the 
eco-symbolic systems view of “the other” from a narrative that is compre-
hensible in “my” eco-symbolic systems view.
2 Analyze the role of ethics in intragroup and intergroup interactions in 
order to determine the extent to which in the name of “what is right” acts 
of dehumanization and abuse of other human and nonhuman groups are 
committed within advocacy actions and discourses.
3 Identify and foster continuous/consecutive short-term intergroup consen-
sus that can be generated through advocacy processes (hence becoming 
middle- and long-term dynamic system equilibriums) to break systemic 
abuses of human and nonhuman groups in a search for solutions to the 
threats posed by climate change.
In order to model eco-symbolic systems, we have grouped a total of twenty-
five variables in five categories: Scales, rigidities, power matrix, diversities, 
and horizons. The variables have been chosen and named following a distil-
lation of most significant factors and conditions discussed in the literature on 
social complex systems, and particularly in relation to human, nonhuman, 
and environment interactions. Each category and its corresponding variables 
interrelate with each other to create a complex and complicated worldview 
based on ethical premises, as described in Table 13.2. The last column in 
Table 13.2 indicates the main sources that have provided the basis for variable 
construction.
Based on network analysis, discourse analysis, and participatory ethnographic 
methods to identify the value(s) and range of each variable, a set of inter-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































be defined according to the following matrix for a given wicked system X 
composed of N eco-symbolic systems (ES
1





 {s(1 . . . 5); r(1 . . . 5); p(1 . . . 5); d(1 . . . 5); h(1 . . . 5)} . . . ES
n
 
{s(1 . . . 5); r(1 . . . 5); p(1 . . . 5); d(1 . . . 5); h(1 . . . 5)}
Furthermore, since each variable value is a cognitive representation of a specific 
element within the system, this belief network responds to order effects,3 so 
that the defined value of a variable depends on system disposition when meas-
ured (Alrøe & Noe, 2012; Asano, Basieva, Khrennikov, Ohya, & Tanaka, 2017; 
Asano, Khrennikov, Ohya, Tanak, & Yamato, 2015; Boyer-Kassem, Duchêne, & 
Guerci, 2016; Haven & Khrennikov, 2016; Khrennikov, 2007; Khrennikov & 
Haven, 2009; Moreira & Wichert, 2014; Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin, & Buse-
meyer, 2014). This characteristic of WS modeling implies that it is unlikely 
to be adequately represented by classical-based modeling, and further insights 
into quantum-like modeling should be taken into account in system simula-
tions. However, current tools in the analysis of WS are still restricted to either 
nonquantifiable conceptual mapping – hence large-scale simulations are not 
 possible – or classical-based systems analysis that, at most, incorporates fuzzy 
logic in computing and simulation (e.g. prospective variable and structural 
analysis software).
Notwithstanding the limitations to undertaking simulations of wicked eco-
symbolic systems, nonquantifiable conceptual mapping methods based on dis-
course and network analysis can still provide fruitful and innovative insights into 
possible short-term solutions relevant to advocacy strategies. Some examples of 
concrete contexts/currents that could be studied following this framework are 
climate change denialism in the United States, green progressive liberalism in 
Northern Europe, deep ecology in Colombia, ecofeminism in India, NGO 
versus multinational struggles in EU lobbies, local organizations versus interna-
tional NGO programs in Central America, etc. Understanding the underlying 
worldview from a complexity perspective behind the diverse stakeholders in a 
climate change advocacy process is not only relevant but necessary to address 
and transform the anthropogenic root causes behind global warming and envi-
ronmental injustice.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have provided a theoretical framework to model climate 
change advocacy, taking into account the complexity and complicatedness of 
the matter. The framework is constructed on the base of a broad interdis-
ciplinary literature review that takes into consideration authors from diverse 
epistemological backgrounds. We develop the concept of the eco-symbolic 
systems matrix as a way to model climate change advocacy within the emerg-
ing wicked systems discipline. The eco-symbolic systems matrix can be used 
as a tool to deepen our understanding of intra- and intergroup relationships of 
human groups to other nonhuman groups and the environment. This concep-
tual matrix is composed of twenty-five variables grouped in five categories that 
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have been extracted and distilled in accordance with the literature on com-
plexity in social systems, taking into account a diversity of perspectives. ESSM 
could provide deep insight into advocacy processes and strategies that respond 
to the urgency, polarization, and complexity of much needed climate collective 
action. The discourses that shape climate advocacy are mirrors of the underly-
ing structures that both explain and provide answers to the adequate paths in 
the struggle against climate change. Haraway argues:
It matters which stories tell stories, which concepts think concepts. Math-
ematically, visually, and narratively, it matters which figures figure figures, 
which systems systematize systems. All the thousand names are too big and 
too small; all the stories are too big and too small . . . we need stories (and 
theories) that are just big enough to gather up the complexities and keep 
the edges open and greedy for surprising new and old connections.
(2015, p. 160)
The proposal presented in this chapter opens a new path that is still to be 
explored and consolidated to understand underlying cognitive and social struc-
tures that can unveil how to tackle global challenges in general, and climate 
change in particular, and what advocacy groups can and should do about it. 
Although this model has the potentiality of generating innovative insights, it 
must still undergo careful exploration on its applicability to concrete case studies.
Further analysis on the defined categories – scales, rigidities, power matrices, 
diversities, and horizons – may be useful to determine the possibility of approx-
imate system optimality within the complexity of agent interaction in advocacy 
processes (human, nonhuman, and environmental). As a result, the application 
of this model should allow for the emergence of a new type or types of advo-
cacy strategies that might lead to alternative, currently hidden, and/or unlikely 
solutions that are not self-evident and push beyond our restrictive mind frames.
A particularly interesting area of study for model application is the diverse 
grassroots movements that are influencing climate-change related advocacy, and 
that could be studied using this systems approach to further explore critical and 
emancipatory courses of action. Concretely, wicked eco-symbolic systems can 
serve as a useful tool to untangle the elements of multi-agent case studies where 
a large range of interests collide and coexist within the system.
Notes
 1 Extracted from https://ejatlas.org/about on July 1, 2018.
 2 For more detail see Fernández-Aballí Altamirano (2016).
 3 “The commonly held explanation for order effects by social psychologists is the following: 
When question A is asked first, the person relies on a subset of knowledge he or she can 
retrieve from memory related to this question; but if question A is preceded by another 
question B, then the person incorporates thoughts retrieved from the previous question 
B into answering the second one about A. This intuitive explanation is NOT necessarily 
a classical reasoning explanation. In fact, it is completely consistent with a quantum judg-
ment viewpoint. Only it lacks a rigorous formulation, which is what quantum probability 
theory can provide” (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012, p. 100). Order effects are relevant to many 
fields and disciplines such as decision-making theory, cognitive modeling, sociological 
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research, and social psychology, among others, which struggle with the tools provided 
by classical probability to introduce order effect interferences in models and simulations. 
Studies in order effects are generating the evidence for a change in paradigm across social 
science fields. Wang et al. explain the significance of order effects to current cognition 
related fields as follows:
In recent years, quantum probability theory has been used to explain a range of 
seemingly irrational human decision-making behaviors. The quantum models 
generally outperform traditional models in fitting human data, but both modeling 
approaches require optimizing parameter values. However, quantum theory makes 
a universal, nonparametric prediction for differing outcomes when two successive 
questions (e.g., attitude judgments) are asked in different orders. Quite remarkably, 
this prediction was strongly upheld in 70 national surveys carried out over the last 
decade (and in two laboratory experiments) and is not one derivable by any known 
cognitive constraints. The findings lend strong support to the idea that human deci-
sion making may be based on quantum probability.
(Wang et al., 2014, p. 9431)
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